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The essays presented here, nearly all original­
ly w ritten  for this volum e by scholars from 
Latin America, N o rth  America and Europe, 
bring together m uch of the results of the rich 
research on the late colonial economies of 
both  viceroyalties during the past fifteen 
years. They allow a reevaluation of m any old 
questions und open the vista to  new ones: 
D id mining function as a lead sector? W hat 
effect did growing demand for agricultural 
comm odities have on the social distribution 
of resources and benefits in the countryside? 
D o Mexican and Peruvian processing indus­
tries have anything in com m on w ith Europe­
an proto-industrialization during the eight­
eenth century, and how  can we account for 
their relative feebleness? H ow  did merchants 
adapt to  the liberalized commercial environ­
m ent after the 1770s? W hat effect did the 
sweeping commercial and fiscal reforms of 
Spain’s Bourbon m onarchs have on particu­
lar groups of producers and consumers in the 
colonies? — W hat emerges from  this compa­
rative approach is a better understanding not 
just of conjunctural, but of structural diffe­
rences between the economies and societies 
of Mexico and Peru.
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I. IN T R O D U C T IO N
Nils Jacobsen and H an s-Jü rg en  Puhle
T his volume has its origin in a rather straightforw ard intellectual 
curiosity: Is it really true that the two core areas of S pain’s American 
em pire were economically moving in opposite directions during the last 
half -  century of the colonial regime, Mexico undergoing an unprece­
dented boom and presenting itself as a wealthy colonial society, while 
Peru at the same time was becoming empoverished through a prolonged 
crisis? This seemed the more puzzling since both viceroyalties, as 
exporters of precious metals, with a large share of Indian population, 
and evidencing a sim ilar mix of agricultural enterprises, from  tropical 
plantations to highland cereal and livestock haciendas, appeared to have 
quite similar economic structures. Indeed it becam e profitable to raise 
this question, since recent research on Peru had brought to light much 
information that contradicted the idea of a secular crisis during the late 
colonial period. At the same time the past fifteen years had seen an 
outpouring of innovative research on M exico’s economy during the 
eighteenth century, which suggested serious restraints, bottlenecks and 
even reversals to that viceroyalty’s late colonial boom.
These developments let it appear timely to bring together some of the 
scholars who have recently done research on the late colonial economies 
o f Mexico and Peru and attem pt a broad comparison between the 
structures and conjunctures of the two viceroyalties’ economies during the 
half century preceding the W ars of Independence. This is what we had 
in mind when we organized a symposium of some twenty scholars from 
Peru, the United States, C anada and various European countries held at 
the University of Bielefeld in Septem ber of 1982. T he essays published 
in this volume are, with two exceptions, revised versions of the papers 
presented at that symposium. This was the first in a series of European 
conferences dealing with research problems of Latin American economic 
history for concise periods between the late colonial era and the last few 
decades. In the meantim e a second conference, organized by R einhard 
L iehr in Berlin during Septem ber 1983, dealt with the form ation of 
Latin A m erica’s national economies and European economic interests in 
the region during the first half of the nineteenth century. Its results will
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soon be published in this series also. Two further symposia covering the 
periods 1850 to 1930 and the epoch since 1940 are in the planning stage. 
For the crucial years of the world depression there now exists the valu­
able volume edited by Rosem ary T h o rp .*
Specifically we hoped to focus the comparison between both late 
colonial economies on three broad strands of inquiry:
1. A comparison between the overall growth of the Mexican and 
Peruvian economies, 1 7 6 0 - 1810: Is it possible to arrive at indices for 
the global development of both viceroyalties, demonstrating changes in 
gross product, prices and real incomes of various social groups, and the 
value of foreign trade? W hich im pact did exogenous factors, such as the 
onset of E urope’s industrialization process, Spanish commerical policies, 
as well as international wars and disruptions of sea -  lanes have on the 
colonial economies? W hat was the relative weight of the various econo­
mic sectors within the overall structure of P eru ’s and M exico’s econo­
mies?
2. T he possibilities and limits of a supraregional economic analysis 
for each viceroyalty: in view of the marked regional discrepancies of 
economic development within each viceroyalty which have come to light 
in m any recent studies, we hoped to elicit some answers to the question 
to which degree it still makes sense at all, to speak of a global economic 
process for New Spain and Peru during the late colonial period. T he task 
here in the first place would consist in checking w hether the structures 
and conjunctures of regional economic complexes within each viceroyalty 
evinced parallel movements. To which degree did there exist an inter­
regional integration of markets for commodities, labor and capital? Was 
the era characterized by a progressive integration of markets in the 
viceroyalties? O r can we see the beginning of the trend characterizing 
much of Latin Am erica during the nineteenth century by which stronger 
direct links of regional export economies with Europe lead to the atrophy 
of broader interregional commercial circuits?
3. These problems immediately raise the question as to the mecha­
nisms by which various regional and sectoral production complexes may 
have been linked in the late colonial viceroyalties. W hat kind of multi­
plication effects were exercised not only by mining, a sector which has 
long been considered the principal motor of both viceroyalties’ econo­
mies, but also by agriculture, m anufacturing, commerce and transport? 
W hat consequences did sectoral growth produce for the social structure 
of production and markets in other sectors? Did, for example, increasing 
demand for foodstuff in m any of M exico’s booming silver mining
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districts during the eighteenth century lead to a long -  term  rise in the 
income of apreciable num bers of agricultural producers (i.e. not just a 
handful of owners of large cereal and livestock estates) and consequently 
give rise to multiplication effects for the production and trade of textiles 
and hotisehbld wares? Ö r, conversely, did the socio -  political control over 
the peasantry rem ain sufficiently strong that only a small group of 
traders and provincial officeholders -  other than a few large landholders 
-  profitted from  increasing dem and for foodstuff? In which directions 
did sectoral transfers of capital run (only from trade and m ining into 
agriculture, as suggested by David Brading)?^ W ere regional wage 
differentials large enough to produce interregional labor migrations, or, 
conversely, what im portance did forced labor recruitments still hold in 
both viceroyaltics during the final decades of the colonial period?
4. Finally we hoped to focus attention on the role of the colonial 
state and church, both regarding their influence on the economic order 
and the disposition of their income from  taxes and tithes and the various 
and sundry other revenues.
D uring and even before the symposium it becam e obvious to us that 
these ambitious goals of a global comparison between both viceregal 
economics during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were 
difficult to achieve in their totality for three principal reasons: 
1. problems inherent in comparative history; 2. the limits of our know­
ledge of both viceregal economies and the different state of the historio­
graphy on Mexico and Peru; 3. the great variety of historiographical 
approaches towards Spanish A m erica’s colonial economies, not only 
among the contributions to this volume, but in the literature at large.
C om parative studies in history, as in the other social sciences, are 
difficult but necessary. C om parison is, as Emile Durkheim  has noted, 
the only ’’indirect experim ent” in the social sciences. In order to be able 
to make -  albeit limited -  general statem ents, we have to compare. 
Com parative studies make it, more in particular, possible
-  to control, to modify or to falsify the generalizing assumptions 
and hypotheses;
-  to clarify the similarities and the differences between the pheno­
mena involved;
-  to propose and check the criteria of periodization, and to indicate 
the open questions, the direction and the adequate dimensions of 
further research. T he latter function is of special im portance in 
such cases, in which the original hypothesis has not been corro­
borated.
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Most comparisons which have been made have remained implicit 
ones. It is, however, the explicit comparison which is much more 
needed, although it tends to require a great am ount of hard work. Only 
the explicit comparison can explain its initial assumptions, its theoretical 
background (or its prejudices and biases!), and give reasons for the 
criteria for chosing the functional equivalents to be compared.
O ne problem is that there is no general rule about what is to be and 
can be compared. W hat is to be compared depends very much upon the 
questions we want to raise and the hypotheses we want to check. They 
define the elements and the scope of a comparison. T here is no general 
rule as to only comparing synchronic events. A concrete set of questions 
can, on the contrary, make diachronic comparisons necessary. N or is 
there a rule that we are only to compare phenom ena of a certain simi­
larity, as some theoreticians, like Karl M arx and M arc Bloch, have 
suggested. Even phenom ena which seem to be completely dissimilar, can 
be legitimate objects of a comparison, if our questions give reasons for 
comparing them . N or do the systems, between the elements of which we 
want to do comparisons, necessarily have to be of the same category or 
at the same level of their development.
A more fundam ental problem of comparative work consists in the 
fact that in order to be able to em bark upon a reasonable and explicit 
comparison, we need a certain theoretical framework. It is required in 
order to find the adequate hypotheses and questions to begin with. The 
problem is that in most cases the elements of this theoretical framework 
do not become completely clear before we are in the midst of our com­
parison, so that our questions might be much more general in the 
beginning than in the end of our study. For some people this has been 
reason enough not to make explicit the questions they are, in fact, 
pursuing.3
T he general problem for comparative work on Latin American 
societies consists in the fact that much of the empirical data are consi­
derably less elaborated than they are for European or North American 
history or that they are missing altogether. But this does not obviate the 
necessity of pursuing the comparative approach, because it is methodo­
logically imprescindible. T he necessary adjustm ent to these difficult 
conditions for comparative work on Latin American history would seem 
to consist in the particularly careful design of the questions to be pursued 
comparatively: T he guiding questions and the objects of the comparison 
must be chosen in such a way that the empirical data, either existing in
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the literature previously or to be elaborated in the course of the compa­
rative research, allow satisfactory findings.
T he most serious obstacle for a global comparison of both viceregal 
economies in the late colonial period lies in the limitations of our know­
ledge, in spite of the many significant studies which have recently 
appeared. For several of the key variables which would need to be con­
sidered for a comparison between the conjunctures and the structures of 
the two economies, we do not possess any data, while for other variables 
data exist only for regional case studies or for a limited num ber of 
years. T hus we practically possess no systematic information on trans­
portation and transaction costs in either viceroyalty. O ther than John  
Coatsw orth’s base line figures for the value of M exico’s sectoral products 
in 1800, we do not have any estimates for global production figures 
-  either by volume or by value -  for agriculture or for m anufacturing, 
admittedly scarce inform ation for any pre -  industrial society. As a con­
sequence, any statements about the growth of the M exican and Peruvian 
economies during the late colonial period continue to be m ere extrapo­
lations from  the data on precious metal m ining and foreign trade and 
from  qualitative indicators on the other sectors.
M any key problems have been carefully studied on the local or 
regional level in recent years. For various areas in both economies we 
now possess series on prices of agricultural, livestock and even some 
m anufactured commodities, while studies on the volume o f agricultural 
production -  based on tithe records -  or on wages are still rare. T he 
greatest advances in our understanding of the Spanish American econo­
mies during the eighteenth century, particularly concerning M exico, have 
come through the large num ber of recent studies on regional agrarian 
complexes: For quite a few areas in both viceroyalties we now have 
abundant inform ation on changing distributions of land, the development 
o f property values, rental rates, shifts in the emphasis in production, 
credit systems and labor regimes.
Yet, while all these studies greatly facilitate comparisons between the 
economic development of various regions of both economies, it is at best 
problematic to generalize from  regional data to the global development of 
P eru ’s and M exico’s late colonial economies. T he num ber of natural or 
m an -  made events and developments which could effect economic 
growth in a circumscribed region only and not in the rest o f the vast and 
geographically heterogeneous viceroyalties is large: it includes climatic 
crises, epidemics, new mining strikes and shifting commerical circuits.
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All these limitations of our knowledge are made more serious by the 
highly uneven historiography on the late colonial economies of Mexico 
and Peru: W e simply know much more on m any aspects o f the M exican 
economy than we do about corresponding Peruvian problems, a fact 
which also is evident in the contributions to this volume.
Comparisons require a clear framework of issues, variables and 
methodological approaches, all equally applied to the various subjects of 
the comparison. In contrast, historiography on the Latin American eco­
nomies has been characterized by a great diversity of issues and metho­
dological approaches. This is, of course, neither a  bad thing in itself, nor 
is it so different from  economic historiography on other continents or 
countries, although we would suggest that in the Latin American case the 
extremely weak im pact o f a historiography oriented by issues and 
methodology of professional economics makes the debate particularly 
disjointed. In any case, whatever the merits of such methodological 
diversity, it does pose serious problems for systematic comparisons, and 
this volume is not free of such problems.
Studies on the institutional framework o f trade and production have 
influenced the economic history on colonial Spanish America longer than 
the historiography on Europe and North America. Besides its obvious 
emphasis on the prescribed rather than the real structure of the colonial 
economies, this approach resulted in a strong emphasis of the Spanish 
metropolis and a neglect of autonomous economic processes in the colo­
nies. T he long survival of the periodization scheme, according to which 
in the Spanish American core areas a boom during the second half of 
the sixteenth century was followed by a secular depression between the 
1630's and the early eighteenth century which — other than in Peru — 
gave way to a renewed boom in the era o f the Bourbon reforms owes 
much to this historiographic approach. Also the insistence on the 
im portance of particular Spanish policies for the actual economic evolu­
tion of the colonies, which is shared by several contributors to this 
volume, owes much to the strong impact o f institutional studies on the 
historiography of colonial Spanish American economies. M odern policy 
studies have overcome m any of the problems of this older approach, 
especially by taking into consideration social and economic conflicts of 
interest and the evolving economic conjuncture bearing upon the deci­
sion -  making process of the Consejo  (or M inistro) de Indias, viceroys 
and lesser bureaucrats. Jacques Barbier, probably the foremost p rac ti- 
cioncr of this approach for the late colonial period, in his contribution on 
the Spanish policy concerning trade between V era C ruz and H abana
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demonstrates the rich potential of such studies.
D uring the last fifteen years or so probably the greatest num ber of 
contributions to Latin American economy history has come from eclectic 
studies which focused on both social and economic issues. Utilizing 
hitherto neglected sources, they contributed much quantitative and 
qualitative information on the economic activities and income levels of 
certain social groups, their career patterns, the structure of enterprises in 
various sectors, etc. But in a period in which economic development 
theory had become suspect, the issues which most of these studies dealt 
with stemmed rather from debates in social history than from economic 
history. T heir contributions to the economic history of the Spanish 
American colonies were incidental to their attempts to analyze societies. 
T he m ajority of the contributions to this volume follows this approach. 
M any of these studies have chosen a regional focus in order to be able to 
analyze the complex web of social and economic interrelationships 
between the various strata and sectors.
As a reaction to a  social analytical approach which tended to 
portray people as the objects of broad, anonymous historical processes, 
quite a  few historians during the last decade have opted for a vantage 
point, by which they hope to portray the subjective experience of social, 
economic and political change particularly by lower class contemporaries, 
and their struggles to improve their condition. This history ’’from  the 
bottom u p ,” in the Latin American case closely tied to ethnohistory, can 
contribute to the field of economic history an appreciation of the d iffe r­
ential effects of economic growth on various social strata. In  the present 
volume the contributions by Brooke Larson, Christine H iinefeldt and 
Albert M eyers owe much to this approach.
T he type of economic history, which builds upon the issues and
methods developped in the field of economics, has until now found few
adherents am ong students of the colonial period in Latin American
history. This poses rather serious problems for the field as it is precisely 
such an approach which could contribute much towards laying systematic 
foundations for international comparisons of economic development. In 
his paper on New Spain’s late colonial mining sector in this volume, 
John  Coatsworth skillfully demonstrates the potential of this approach.
Given the limitations of our knowledge and the great variety of 
methodological approaches characterizing Latin American economic
history in general and the contributions to this volume in particular, it 
will be easily seen how difficult it is to fulfill the exigencies of a 
systematic comparison between the late colonial economies of Mexico
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and Peru. This volume cannot claim to present a comprehensive o v e r­
view over both economies within a comparative framework. But it does 
present a substantial body of analyses on comparable sectors and 
problems in both viceregal economies, which put into relief many key 
similarities and differences between both cases. W hile achieving less than 
a comprehensive systematic comparison of both economies, the volume, 
for its very methodological diversity, also does more: Several contribu­
tions emphasize social aspects of economic change, while others carefully 
demonstrate the complex web of interests and the ideological conditions 
shaping circumscribed regional economies.
In the following pages we shall outline some of the m ajor substantive 
findings on the economies of the late colonial Mexico and Peru which 
result from the papers in this volume.
Periodization: For the case of New Spain Coatsworth and TePaske
suggest that the real value of mining output and revenue collection grew 
most rapidly during the early and middle decades of the eighteenth 
century respectively. T he years of the fam ous reform  era boom, roughly 
between the late 1770’s and m id -  1790’s, in their view saw the real 
value of mining output and revenue stagnate inspite of impressive 
nominal growth. For the period between 1795 and 1810 Coatsworth 
suggests decline.
Com parisons with the Peruvian case are difficult, since for the lack 
of lo n g - ra n g e  price series so fa r nobody has undertaken to deflate 
figures indicating the value of mining production, fiscal revenues, or any 
other indicators of economic growth. Nevertheless some broad outlines 
of periodization become discernible. Nearly nobody argues that Peru 
underwent noteworthy economic growth between the late seventeenth 
century and 1730. For the decades of the Bourbon reform  era, roughly 
from the mid -  1770’s to the early 1790’s, TePaske’s figures on revenue 
and Fisher’s data on mining output and on imports from  Spain, show 
very strong growth, comm ensurate with com parable M exican nominal 
growth rates. Flores Galindo even locates the beginning of commercial 
affluence of L im a’s merchants in the 1750’s. Ju s t as in the Mexican 
case, there is a change in P e ru ’s economic conjuncture during the 
m id -  1790’s, coinciding with Spain’s involvement in the Napoleonic 
W ars: While both Fisher and H aitin dem onstrate that sectors as mining 
and L im a -  based commerce did not enter a severe crisis before the 
outbreak of the W ars of Independence, the years between 1796 and the 
early 1810 ’s show stagnation in most available indices on P eru ’s econo­
mic growth. If T andeter’s and W achtel’s recently published price series
for Potosí during the eighteenth century are indicative of the general 
Peruvian trend, then the rapid nominal growth between the mid -  1770’s 
and early 1790’s may safely be translated into equally rapid or even 
greater real growth, since prices for both agricultural and m anufactured 
commodities were declining between 1755 and 1790.4 Since the 1790’s 
Peru, according to H aitin and Tandeter/W achtel, again joins the M exi­
can tendency towards price rises, although they appear steeper in the 
northern viceroyalty.
In the perspective of the year 1800 Peru, the erstwhile pearl of the 
Spanish Indies, had become the relatively poor cousin of wealthy New 
Spain. But it is becoming clear, that the diverging rates of economic 
growth which lead to this reversal, or at least vast differentiation, in the 
m agnitude of both economies, did not occur in the era of the Caroline 
reforms, say between the 1770’s and the early 1790’s. T he period in 
which New Spain’s economy surged ahead, while many indicators for 
Peru suggest not merely stagnation but decline, spanned the decades 
from  about 1690 to 1730.
T he middle decades of the century, from  the 1730’s to about 1770, 
render more ambivalent results in the comparison of economic perform ­
ance between the two viceroyalties: In  the M exican case Coatsworth 
posits a  slowing growth of the real value of mining output, with a long 
phase of stagnation between the late 1720’s and early 1750’s, followed 
by stop and go growth until the late 1770’s. TePaske locates the most 
rapid expansion of revenue between 1740 and 1775, while van Y oung’s 
and T hom son’s studies suggest a gradual expansion of agriculture and 
cotton textile production during this period. But there are also signs for a 
recovery of the Peruvian economy since the 1730’s, with a slow growth 
of m ining output, and, according to T andeter’s and W achtel’s figures for 
High Peru, an expansion of agriculture production.
According to this periodization scheme, then, the great divergence in 
the economic growth of both viceroyalties would have occurred early in 
the eighteenth century. W hen Peru turned around from  decline to slow 
recovery since the 1730’s, the m argin between the growth rates for both 
viceroyalties may have gradually narrowed. By the time of the Bourbon 
reforms, between the 1770’s and m id -  1790’s nominally the Peruvian 
economy seems to have grown as much as the M exican economy. 
Between 1796 and the outbreak of the W ars of Independence both eco­
nomies stagnated. T he various external and internal strains and bottle­
necks probably hit the M exican economy harder and earlier than the 
Peruvian economy, as suggested by the growing inflationary pressures
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which in New Spain began to affect purchasing power and real economic 
growth since the 1780’s.
In their commentaries on the papers of Coatsworth and TePaske, 
C arm agnani and Kossok raise im portant caveats on the methodology 
which produced the reevaluation of New Spain’s phases of economic 
growth and stagnation during the eighteenth century. In fact nobody 
draws into question the tremendous wealth which characterized the 
various entrepreneurial groups as well as the royal and church insti­
tutions in New Spain during the forty years preceding the Hidalgo 
revolt. But it would seem that since about 1780 an increasingly skewed 
distribution of income, coupled with inefficient allocation of capital and 
a mounting tax burden on most sectors other than mining and over­
seas commerce acted as a ceiling on New Spain’s economic growth.
Population: T he periodization scheme just outlined suggests the
significance of demography for economic growth in late colonial Mexico 
and Peru: T he Andean viceroyalty’s lag in the commencement of popu­
lation recovery -  it only set in around 1730, some eighty to hundred 
years later than in New Spain -  is m irrored in a lag o f at least forty 
years in the onset of economic growth. For agriculture population growth 
provided both an increased supply of the labor force and growing 
demand for foodstuff, as Eric van Young has shown. T he renewed 
expansion of silver mining in Mexico and Peru during the eighteenth 
century was unthinkable without the onset of recovery from the extre­
mely low demographic nadirs. E ither the necessary labor for new mining 
operations would not have been available or high wage levels would 
have made m any enterprises unprofitable.
Production technologies, productivity: T he general stability of the 
price of labor throughout the eighteenth century, a consequence of 
demographic expansion, royal policies and increasingly unequal distri­
bution of productive property and income, apparently operated as a 
disincentive for the employment of labor saving devices in most sectors 
of both viceroyal economies. Increasing availability of capital usually lead 
to the expansion of production in periods of high profit m argins by 
putting increments of the factors of production into operation — be they 
land, labor, looms or mining shafts. Usually these processes of expansion 
neither lead to a shift in the ratio of factor inputs, nor to the employ­
ment of more efficient productive technology. In  the face of growing 
competition, the textile industries in both viceroyalties attempted to turn 
to the production of better quality, higher priced products, rather than 
pursue a reduction of costs of production.
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T here did occur technological changes in Mexican mining, such as 
the application of gunpowder to obtain the ore and to construct drainage 
tunnels, the installations of whims for hauling ore and w ater out of the 
mining shaft, and the increased use of mule -  drawn mills to crush the 
ore. But according to John  Coatsworth such changes did not lead to 
productivity increases. These changes undertaken simultaneously with 
rising costs of production due to increasing input prices as well as deeper 
shafts and w ater problems, could not have kept the operation of many 
mines from becoming uneconomical, had it not been for the substantial 
government help for the industry. Nevertheless, the productivity of the 
Mexican mining industry during the late colonial period now appears as 
a key problem for future research. O n the other hand, the backwardness 
and low productivity of P eru’s mining industry seems beyond doubt, as 
becomes evident from  John  Fisher’s research.
W hile most authors see little technological advances in the growing 
economies of late colonial Mexico and Peru, several contributions stress 
changes in the industrial organization of enterprises, at least for the case 
of New Spain. In various sectors their average size grew significantly 
during the eighteenth century and there was a tendency to integrate all 
phases of production within one enterprise. Such changes could come 
about as a consequence of market forces and the unequal distribution of 
capital and credit, as in the case of New Spain’s cotton and wool indus­
tries or in the mining sector. It could also be the result of government 
intervention, as in the case of M exico’s and L im a’s tobacco factories, 
described by Susan Deans -  Smith and Christine H ünefeldt. T here is 
much less evidence for such changes occurring in Peru than for New 
Spain.
In his comments on the contributions dealing with the textile indus­
try, John  Coatsworth ventures the hypothesis (and it can be no more 
than that at the present state of our knowledge), that productivity was 
’’substantially lower” in Peru than in Mexico in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Given the quite similar level of technology in both 
viceroyalties (with the possible exception of the mining sector), however, 
’’physical productivity” (i.e. physical output per unit of input) could 
hardly have been much higher in Mexico than in Peru. Indeed, Coats­
worth would not deny this, but suggests that still Peruvian productivity in 
m arket terms was much lower, since its economy probably faced ’’higher 
transport costs, limited effective demand, high information and trans­
action costs, fewer opportunities for regional specialization, minimal 
access to credit, and inelastic supplies of labor.” A key difference
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between both economies would thus have its origins in the distinct eco­
logies, socioethnic structures and settlement patterns of both viceroyalties. 
Jacobsen sees these same factors as differentiating both colonies’ live­
stock economies.
The impact o f  the colonial state on the economy: T he debate about 
the significance of the ’’Bourbon reform s”, that catch -  all phrase cover­
ing all the decrees, reorganization schemes and fiscal measures churned 
out by the Spanish Crown and its new corps of bureaucrats between the 
1760’s and 1790’s, continues vigorously and is in evidence among the 
contributions of this volume. Any discussion of the impact of the various 
reformist crown policies on the American colonial economies must keep 
in mind that they were far from homogeneous. As H orst Pietschmann 
suggests, it is possible to discern both a mercantilist and a proto -  liberal 
strand of po licy -m ak ing  during the reign of Charles III.
John  TePaske demonstrates that between the 1740’s and early 1790’s 
tax revenues in New Spain grew considerably faster than population. 
Even if we account for economic growth, and the loans raised by the 
treasury from civil and ecclesiastical corporations, there can be little 
doubt that for numerous social groups in both New Spain and Peru the 
burden of taxation was increasing particularly during the 1770’s and 
1780’s. Scarlett O ’Phelan shows how the new fiscal policies affected 
Indian peasants, mestizo muleteers and creole landholders and merchants 
alike by raising the rate of old taxes, decreeing their extension to cover 
previously exempted segments of the population, and establishing new 
levies. In O ’Phelan’s view this new taxation program  overestimated the 
strength of U pper and Lower P eru ’s monetary economy and thus lead to 
the crisis of the colonial society which erupted into the cycle of rebel­
lions in the early 1780’s. -  Yet the viceroyalty of New Spain was not 
shaken by similar rebellions at that time, although, as John  TePaske tells 
us, the levying of new taxes was much more marked there than it was 
in Peru. This discrepancy in the correlation between rising level of 
taxation and rebellion either might point to a higher degree of moneta— 
rization and, possibly, a higher income level for large segments of 
M exico’s population -  making it easier to absorb increasing taxes 
without serious disruptions of the economy -  , or alternatively might 
suggest a greater degree of acceptance and legitimacy of the Crown and 
its viceregal bureaucracy.
Parallel to other regimes of enlightened despotism in Europe, the 
Spanish Bourbons attempted to strengthen the influence of the state on 
the economy, also in its American colonies. This goal was not pursued
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only through the intensification of the fiscal and administrative infra­
structure but also through a greater direct involvement in the economy. 
T he papers by Deans -  Smith and Hiinefeldt demonstrate that the 
tobacco monopolies, while successful fiscally, contributed rather little to 
the economic development of the two viceroyalties. T he concentration 
and supervision of production and processing of the tobacco did not lead 
to changes of technology and productivity increases. T he real income of 
most growers and of the workers in the factories declined under the 
monopoly. The only beneficiaries were a handful of large growers, the 
bureaucratic administrators, and a few muleteers and traders, most of 
whom improved their income through some form  of trickery, graft or 
contraband.
Also in this case one can observe that the Peruvian viceregal 
bureaucracy had much greater difficulties to impose an effective control 
over the industry than its Mexican counterpart. Given the haphazard 
operation of the Peruvian monopoly, shot through with generous 
loopholes for contraband trade in the interior of the viceroyalty, it is 
difficult to understand that nevertheless it was able to create the kind of 
artificially shielded market conditions under which Peruvian tobacco 
could withstand foreign competition. Since the early 1820’s, with the 
monopoly’s gradual demise, Peru was rapidly swamped by tobacco 
imports from  Virginia and C uba.
T he direct impact of the new Bourbon policies varied from  sector to 
sector. V an Young speaks of the almost total neglect of agriculture by 
the Bourbon reformers. In his view, whatever changes occurred in the 
agrarian economy of New Spain during the late colonial period, these 
were consequences of exogenous factors, prim arily the rise of population 
and the large upswing in transatlantic trade. Salas and Larson do not 
note any significant royal policies directed towards the development of 
textile production in Lower and U pper Peru. Thom son sees Puebla’s 
cotton industry indirectly benefitting from policies designed to promote 
the C atalan textile producers, and particularly from  Spain’s frequent 
wars, blocking transatlantic trade. T he wars, to be sure, were a boon for 
industries everywhere in Spanish America, and lead to many short­
lived cycles of rapid industrial expansion, as in the case of Cocha­
b am ba’s cotton trades between 1796 and 1802. But they can hardly be 
considered as asset of the C row n’s economic policies towards the colo­
nies. At the same time, these three studies present little evidence for the 
often repeated hypotheses that Spain’s policy explicitly aimed at dis­
rupting the American colonial textile industries during the late eighteenth
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century. O n balance Spain’s explicit policies towards this sector in 
Mexico and Peru might best be described as one of neglect.
It is in trade and in mining where the direct impact of the Bourbon 
reform  policies is usually considered to be most evident. Indeed at face 
value it appears obvious that both Peru and Mexico saw their trade with 
Europe expand tremendously as a consequence of C harles’s III free 
trade ordinance of 1778 (1789 for New Spain). But while the precise 
timing of this quantum  leap owed much to Crown policy, its underlying 
causes lie in the upswing of Europe’s industrial and proto -  industrial 
production, improved ship technology, and growing amounts of species in 
the colonies with which to purchase European goods. T here is much 
cause to agree with Lockhart’s and Schwartz’s recent assessment that the 
Caroline trade reforms reacted to secular changes rather than having 
created them .5 As Jacobsen notes in his comm entary on Jacques B ar- 
b ier’s paper, this type of reactive trade liberalization in the face of the 
inevitable also characterized M adrid’s decision in 1807 to allow the 
reexport of European goods from La H abana to V era Cruz.
T he case of silver mining was different. In both Peru and Mexico 
during the late eighteenth century the industry reached what C arm agnani 
calls ’’the m aximum of its possibilities given its technology of extraction 
and refining” due to government subsidies such as lowered mercury and 
gunpowder prices and tax reductions. Coatsworth thinks that in New 
Spain these subsidies lead to an expansion of output at ever lower or 
even negative marginal productivity. For fiscal reasons the crown in this 
view would have propped up a mining industry, which without this aid 
inevitably needed to shrink drastically. In John  F isher’s view, however, it 
was the disruptions brought about by the W ars of Independence, and 
not intrinsic problems of the industry, which brought the decline of 
Lower P eru’s silver output during the second decade of the nineteenth 
century. Put differently, the vast expansion of output between the 1770’s 
and 1790’s, which owed much to Crown policy, according to Fisher did 
not create an oversized industry characterized by rapidly declining mar­
ginal productivity. For U pper P eru’s modest mining recovery during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, F isher’s 
assessment is more compatible with Coatsw orth’s evaluation of the case 
of New Spain between the 1780’s and 1810, when he notes that "the 
industry in Potosí remained dangerously dependent upon the state for the 
provision of labour, mercury and financial subsidies.” It is perhaps 
germ ane as further evidence for the difference between M exico’s and 
U pper P eru’s silver industries on the one hand and that of Lower Peru
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on the other, that only Lower P eru’s industry seems to have recovered 
the high level o f its late colonial output within fifteen to twenty years 
after the W ars of Independence.
But what about indirect, not explicitly aimed at, effects of the Bour­
bon policies on the two viceregal economies? John  Coatsworth succinctly 
outlines one m ajor position on this question: T he Bourbon’s singleminded 
pursuit of revenue maximization lead them to favor the increasingly 
inefficient mining sector to the detrim ent of the rest of the economy. 
T he transferral of capital (through subsidies and credits) and other 
factors of production (especially labor) to the mining sector represented a 
misallocation of resources. T he withdrawal of these resources from 
sectors like agriculture and m anufacturing throttled their growth prem a­
turely and contributed greatly to bottlenecks and inflationary pressures, 
which characterized New Spain’s economy at least since the 1790’s.
T he opposite view is taken by G uy Thomson. Referring specifically 
to New Spain’s industries, he rules out that a putative ’’Leviathan -  like 
colonial state or tyrannous and interventionalist petty officials” were 
am ong ’’the prim ary obstacles to the further grow th.” It should be noted 
that this view does not imply a strongly favorable impact of the Bourbon 
policies on the economies of Mexico and Peru, a position which does 
not find any convinced adherents in this volume. R ather it turns the 
prim ary focus in accounting for the stagnation of both economies at least 
since the 1790’s to key structural, not policy -  related elements in the 
two colonies’ ecology, economy and society.
It is not possible to come down on either side of this debate conclu­
sively. W e would need to m easure to which degree increasing subsidies to 
the mining sector and rising revenue collections made capital for other 
sectors of the economy scarcer and more expensive. It does seem clear, 
however, that in specific instances the Bourbon policies, affected the 
social and geographic distribution of production and income. Comercio 
libre may have hurt the established monopoly merchants, as Alberto 
Flores Galindo contends, while at the same time it created new oppor­
tunities for numerous new traders, often with ’’lesser m eans.” The 
tobacco monopoly brought decreasing incomes to the majority of the 
producers and workers, while it was a boon for a few large privileged 
growers. At the same time the monopoly in New Spain favored a 
handful of cities, notably Mexico, as locations of tobacco factories, while 
withdrawing income earning possibilities in this industry from other 
towns.
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Overall one arrives at a  rather motley picture of the Bourbon refor­
m ers’ impact on the colonial economies of Mexico and Peru. It would 
appear, as if the policies may have affected the timing and rate of eco­
nomic changes, but not the secular trends. Economic growth depended 
primarily on the structure of production and markets, factor costs and 
productivity. These may have been influenced to a degree by higher 
taxation, subsidies for mining inputs and liberalization of trade flows. 
But the prim ary variables having a bearing on these factors were the 
demographic development, the natural environment, technology and the 
social distribution of the means of production.
M ore significant than the Bourbon policies’ immediate impact on 
economic growth in Mexico and Peru was the fact that the reforms 
initiated by Charles III and his ministers and bureaucrats began a 
long -  term trend towards rearranging the relation between the state and 
the economy. T he expansion and the intensification of the fiscal infra­
structure in the viceroyalties, coupled with a more activist economic 
policy, heightened the stakes involved in Crown economic and fiscal 
decision -  making for the colonies’ intereses creados. This increased the 
potential for conflicts between various social groups and the viceregal 
administrations. T he outcome of such conflicts did not inevitably have to 
lead to a perm anent alienation of the wealthy creole social strata in 
America from the Spanish metropolis, as M anfred Kossok assumes. The 
weakness of the Spanish state -  and hence its narrow limits of 
autonomy -  became fully apparent with the mounting fiscal crisis since 
the m id -  1790’s. In Mexico and Peru the C row n’s dependence on 
donations and loans, forced or otherwise, from the Consulados and other 
civil and ecclesiastical corporations grew considerably during the 
rem aining twenty -  five years of the colonial regime. T his opened the 
door to renewed accomodations with the intereses creados, albeit in a 
new political and economic environment. T he legacy of the late colonial 
regime in Mexico and Peru would seem to consist in a weak state, which 
nevertheless pursued an activist economic project containing both 
neo -  mercantilist and proto -  liberal facets, and thus laid itself open to 
dependence on powerful economic pressure groups.
Regional economic development within the viceroyalties: Both in 
Mexico and in Peru there were significant shifts in the economic center 
of gravity during the late colonial period, or, put differently, some 
regions experienced a notably higher rate of growth than others. In both 
cases the direction of the shift was northwestwards and was accompanied 
or caused by shifts in the distribution of population. But while in
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Mexico it was a gradual process, gaining steam over most of the eight­
eenth century, in Peru the shift may have been more dram atic, becom­
ing evident to contemporaries within a short time span.
In New Spain it was primarily the regions lying on, or slightly north 
of a belt stretching from  V era C ruz over Mexico City, Q uerétaro , León, 
G uanajuato, Celaya to G uadalajara, which experienced strong growth 
during the eighteenth century. Responding to rapid demographic increase 
-  particularly in the burgeoning cities -  and the upswing of the silver 
output in nearby mining districts, agricultural production, both of cereal 
and industrial crops, some branches of m anufacturing, and trade in both 
European and domestic goods underwent a sustained growth during 
most of the eighteenth century.
In contrast the economies in the Intendancies o f Puebla and O axaca 
developed much more haltingly and in some aspects experienced serious 
reversals. T he middle decades of the century saw an agricutural crisis in 
both Intendancies -  accompanied in Puebla by a great loss of popula­
tion through epidemics and emigration. W hile cereal production seems to 
have increased again during the last three decades of the century, and 
in Puebla cotton m anufacturing underwent its erratic growth process, 
other trades in that old industrial center decayed, and O axaca saw its 
im portant cochineal production decline since 1780. A part from deleterious 
government policies (affecting the cochineal trade), m ajor causes for the 
southeastern regions’ more sluggish economic development may have 
consisted in the difficulties to compete with the central and western 
regions in supplying the largest urban centers and mining districts with 
agricultural and m anufactured goods and the greater share of Indian 
population which brought with it slower population growth (especially in 
cities), a lower degree of monetarization, and narrow limits for 
commercial agriculture.
In  Peru the regional economic differentiation was more dram atic and 
of greater consequence than in New Spain. T he decline of the Lim a -  
Potosí circuit, although a long -  term process, reached a critical phase 
during the late 1770’s and early 1780’s. T he integration of the Audiencia 
of C harcas (High Peru) into the newly formed viceroyalty of Buenos 
Aires in 1776 seriously affected the trade from  Lower P eru ’s southern 
highlands (the regions of Cuzco, parts of Arequipa, and Puno -  even 
though this intendancy belonged to the new viceroyalty until 1796) to 
U pper Peru, as Scarlett O ’Phelan affirm s. Inspite of John  F isher’s 
suggestion that southern P eru ’s late colonial regionalism had more 
cultural than economic causes, the evidence for deep economic problems
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is mounting. M iriam  Salas shows, how by the 1780’s woolen textile 
production in V ilcashuaman was declining and the obrajeros were 
attempting to redirect their trade from U pper Peru to Lim a. Recent 
studies have also suggested the stagnation or decline of agriculture and 
livestock herding in Cuzco and Puno since the 1770’s.® Since that 
decade, U pper P eru ’s modest mining recovery apparently benefitted 
mostly the economies of that region itself and certain parts of the La 
Plata basin.
W ith this multifaceted crisis of trade and production in much of 
southern Peru, the center of gravity of the viceroyalty shifted northward. 
For the period between the 1780’s and 1810 most indications for 
economic growth concern the central and northern Sierra and the central 
coast. These regions benefitted from expanding silver mining output, 
more rapid population growth than in the south, and L im a’s growing 
urban dem and, all of which seemed to have spurred agricultural pro­
duction on the central cost and in at least some of the serrano provinces 
in the Intendancies of T arm a and Trujillo. T he increasing imports of 
European commodities, channelled by L im a’s merchants into the new 
mining regions and made possible by the growing output of silver, 
apparently affected the textile manufactories in the central and northern 
Sierra as adversely as in the south.
Did the integration of commodity, capital and labor markets above 
the regional level increase in late colonial New Spain and Peru? Alberto 
Flores G alindo’s contribution outlines for the Peruvian case, as John  
K icza’s recent monograph does for Mexico, how the wholesale merchants 
of the capital constructed a web of itinerant traders, stores and agents 
throughout the viceroyalty.7 Through this web flowed European 
products and a few imports from other colonies, such as cocoa, down­
ward, and high value colonial products such as sugar, cochineal, livestock 
products and chinchona bark upw ard. As the spatially distant and 
socially low echelons of the trade hierarchy were characterized by a 
severe chronic shortage of specie, these interregional commercial webs 
were articulated through credit. T he growing output of silver permitted 
the commodity and credit flows through these interregional commercial 
webs to increase considerably during the last third of the eighteenth 
century. In New Spain the credit system appears to have become more 
agile also during this period, as bills of exchange became a common 
instrum ent for domestic transactions.
Nevertheless the greater part of the credit transactions and certainly 
the bulk of commodity flows never went beyond the realm of a region
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articulated by a provincial urban center. W hile credit for mining more 
often than not was handled by the importers and wholesalers in the 
viceregal capitals, the credit for m anufacturing and particularly for 
agriculture, for which provincial ecclesiastical lending institutions played 
such a prom inent role, was raised overwhelmingly within the region. 
Most agricultural products, building materials and even the cheaper types 
of domestic manufactures had a too low unit value to stand the extra­
ordinary costs of interregional transport. Most importantly, as Flores 
Galindo underlines, the expansion of an integrated viceregal market 
encountered a barrier in the continued vitality of a subsistence economy, 
in which the m ajority of the rural population kept monetary exchanges to 
the m inim um  required by state, church and private surplus extraction. 
-  John  Coatsworth suggests, that both the degree of monetarization and 
per capita incomes were higher in Mexico than in Peru. But much of 
this higher m argin of per capita commercial transactions in New Spain 
might have resulted in the intensification of infra -  regional commerce, 
the exchange between a provincial urban center and its hinterland, the 
importance of which is underscored by V an Young.
O ne key variable determining the rate of integration of interregional 
markets is the degree of specialization of the regional economies and 
hence their complementarity. T he contributors disagree on this issue: 
Thom son and V an Young assume that the specialization of regional 
economies in New Spain did not advance enough during the late colonial 
period to broaden the interregional market through significant volumes 
of complementary exchanges. Coatsworth, on the other hand, does see a 
movement in this direction. T he relocation and concentration of some 
previously dispersed economic activities during the late colonial period, 
such as wheat growing, livestock raising, cotton and wool m anufacturing, 
would seem to present evidence in this direction. Except for shifts in the 
production of sugar from the north to the central coast, there are no 
signs of growing specialization in regional economies in Peru during the 
eighteenth century.
In sum , the limited information which we have so far on the question 
of interregional market integration, renders a contradictory picture: In 
both viceroyalties the volume of trade with European commodities 
increased particularly since the 1780’s. But in New Spain the bottleneck 
which constrained the growth of commercial circuits was woven into the 
very model of eighteenth century expansion: T he falling real income of 
labor in the countryside and in the city, without which neither silver 
mining nor, as a consequence, overseas trade could have grown so much,
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limited the expansion of the interregional market. Again it would seem 
that the model of economic growth followed in New Spain during the 
eighteenth century contained its own barrier through the increasingly 
unequal distribution of income and factors of production.
M ining as a lead sector for the late colonial economies? M uch recent 
literature has suggested that economic fluctuations in the core areas of 
colonial Spanish America had their origin in the ups and downs of 
precious metal mining. John  Fisher cautiously takes this position for late 
colonial Peru, and is seconded for the M exican case by Marcello 
Carm agnani. Systematic research testing the correlations between output, 
productivity and wage levels in the mining sector with the corresponding 
values for other sectors and tracing the effects of increments of silver 
output in the economy at large have not been undertaken so far. But 
some bits and pieces of evidence, also contained in this volume, make it 
necessary to attach a more limited, but also more complex role to the 
mining sector.
Silver mining could affect the economy prim arily through its demand 
for inputs and its supply of circulating medium, silver coin. Even if the 
volume of inputs demanded by the industry, and silver output entering 
the Mexican and Peruvian economies had fluctuated parallelly -  which 
they did not, due to changes in productivity and the share of silver 
immediately withdrawn from  the domestic circuit as Crown revenue — , 
the impact of these two aspects of mining on the general economy at any 
given time could be rather different.
T he silver output was primarily diffused through the whole m one- 
tarized viceregal economy by way of the commercial webs controlled by 
the large wholesale m erchants in the capitals (and the one or other large 
provincial city in New Spain). As we have seen, these merchants 
channelled their money prim arily into the import of European goods and 
secondarily into the purchase of high value colonial goods. T hus any 
increment in the m ines’ output of silver only lead to a much smaller 
increment in the demand for goods produced in the colony itself, and 
was smallest for the great mass of low value goods, such as food crops, 
building materials and low grade textiles. Conversely, any decrease in the 
output of silver would have created a proportionally much smaller 
decrease of demand for these low value colonial goods. T o the degree 
European imports competed with commodities produced in the vice­
royalty, any increase of silver output threatened the domestic commodi­
ties’ market position through expanding European imports. T here can be 
little doubt that much of the textile industry in both Mexico and Peru
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suffered from this consequence of growing silver production during the 
last third of the eighteenth century.
T he mining sector’s demand for domestically produced inputs affec­
ted primarily the local and regional economies in which the mining 
districts were situated. Only for those higher value domestic products 
which were not replaced by European imports -  especially transport and 
draft animals and livestock products -  , the demand from  the mining 
districts affected interregional markets. Some regional markets in New 
Spain, such as those of Zacatecas, G uanajuato and San Luis Potosí, 
benefitted comparatively more from the silver m ines’ demand for inputs 
than any Peruvian region, since the size of the operations was much 
larger in the im portant Mexican districts. While the share of the total 
population perm anently employed in mining was at least as high in Peru 
as in Mexico towards the end of the eighteenth century (0.8 and 0.5 
percent respectively according to Fisher), the size of the operations in 
Lower Peru, in terms of their labor force, was quite small -  only one 
district had a perm anent work force of 2,500 laborers, and three more 
between 500 and 1,000 - ,  so that demand for domestically produced 
inputs could largely be met by narrowly circumscribed regional econo­
mies. T he rapidly expanding silver mines of Hualgayoc, for example, 
did not even constitute a sufficiently large market to pull the nearby 
coastal province of T rujillo out of its late colonial doldrums. In  both 
viceroyalties the cities constituted a larger market for agricultural pro­
ducts than the mining camps and, at least in Mexico, urban demand 
would seem to have grown faster than that of the mining sector during 
the half century before the W ars of Independence.
In sum , silver mining affected the various regions and sectors of the
two viceroyalties’ late colonial economies in rather different ways. Its
impact on demand for low value colonial products was rather limited, 
although it may have accentuated the short -  term  price cycles for
cereals. O n the other hand, the growth of silver output played a key role
for the vast increase of European imports into the colonies. Through 
this crucial link to transatlantic and interregional trade, silver mining 
exerted a strong influence on the structural changes experienced by the 
viceregal economies, particularly regarding the articulation with the ubi­




Parallel and Divergent Trends in the Economies o f  Late Colonial M exico  
and Peru:
Looking at available indices of aggregate economic growth, both 
viceroyalties seem to have undergone remarkably similar processes during 
the last half century of unchallenged colonial rule: M ining output,
overseas (and probably domestic) commerce, agricultural production and 
government revenue all grew, at least nominally, from the early 1770’s 
until some time during the 1790’s. Most sectors of both economies then 
entered a phase of stagnation or modest decline lasting until the outbreak 
of the W ars of Independence. Only the textile m anufacturing sector in 
both viceroyalties hit hard times no later than the 1780’s. It experienced 
short -  term  cycles of growth in times of international war, which were 
difficult for other sectors of the economy.
T he strong correlation between both viceroyalties’ rhythm of expan­
sion and that of the international economy underlines the significance of 
exogenous influences on the colonies’ economy. In the long -  term pro­
cess of increasing flows of commodities, capital and labor between the 
European metropolis and Spanish America, which has continued, with 
spurts and pauses, from the sixteenth to the twentieth century, the 
rhythm  of economies as those of Mexico and Peru has become ever 
more tied to that of the European and later North -  American econo­
mies. T he years between the mid -  1760’s and early 1790’s constituted a 
period of intensification of these links, as European merchants placed a 
growing share of some key industrial and proto -  industrial commodities 
(the French ”bretafias,” Silesian linens and English wool and cotton 
cloth) in the S o u th -  and, especially, North -  American markets. 
Obviously the fairly uniform application of the Bourbon fiscal and 
economic policies in New Spain and Peru also fostered parallel develop­
ments in both viceroyalties, what with the growing taxation of domestic 
trade and Indian tributaries, the establishment of new Crown monopo­
lies, subsidies for mining, and the liberalization of overseas trade which 
lead to changes in the composition of m erchant communities.
But these homogenizing exogenous factors worked upon two colonial 
economies which, inspite of their common hispanic institutional, social 
and political heritage, differed from each other concerning some struc­
tures of long duration. Perhaps most importantly, the demographic 
recovery had advanced further in Mexico than in Peru. By the late 
colonial period in New Spain this lead to rising values of rural property, 
and increasingly unequal distribution of land and income, and a growing
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supply of labor. Although the population also increased in late colonial 
Peru, its absolute size and its density were still too low in most parts of 
the viceroyalty to lead to similar processes as in New Spain. Inflationary 
pressures, due to faster growth of population than of agricultural 
production, became a problem earlier and more intensely in Mexico than 
in Peru. Labor mobility was probably also higher in the northern 
viceroyalty. All of these factors owed much to the stronger entrenchment 
of the Indian peasant communities in large parts of central and southern 
Peru, compared with most of Mexico, something underlined by Friedrich 
Katz.
Mexican late colonial markets were larger than those of Peru, not 
only because of the different demographic situation (especially regarding 
the large cities) and the higher degree of monetarization, but apparently 
also as a consequence of lower transportation costs, which tended to 
extend the radius in which goods could be profitably sold. T he rapid 
growth of markets in Mexico during the eighteenth century constituted a 
stimulus for internal colonization, changing crop patterns, and probably 
even some more regional economic specialization, developments which 
were scarce in Peru during the period.
The comparison between the experience of the tobacco monopolies 
has lead us to suggest that in Peru the colonial state may have been 
weaker than in New Spain. T he effectiveness of its measures out in the 
provinces was very low indeed. This is in a sense paradoxical, because, 
more than in Mexico, the archaic nature of the viceroyalty’s economy, 
characterized by a low elasticity of labor supply and a low degree of 
monetarization, required the coercive power of the ’’state” to articulate 
the still weak commercial sphere with the vast subsistence sector. But 
although forced commodity sales and corvee labor drafts ultimately were 
based on Crown sanction, they only became effective through the consent 
and involvement of local and provincial authorities and notables. 
W ithout their cooperation the state rem ained weak in Peru, and if the 
interests of the central Crown bureaucracy and provincial authorities and 
notables were opposed, this might result in widespread contraband or 
rebellion.
In all, one is left with the impression that economic growth in late 
colonial Peru only spread a thin and fragile veneer of progress over parts 
of the viceroyalty. This type of growth relied on the articulation of a 
rather archaic socio -  economic substrate, characterized by widespread 
subsistence production, a low degree of monetarization, scarce and 
inelastic labor supplies, extremely high transaction and transportation
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costs, weak integration of local and regional markets and the continued 
importance of coercive practices.
W hile such elements were of course not absent in Mexico, it never­
theless appears that the northern viceroyalty experienced more profound 
transform ations in the course of the eighteenth century. H ere economic 
growth was coupled with changes in the land tenure pattern and the 
spatial distribution of agricultural production, growing importance of 
wage labor, increasing inequalities in the distribution of income, expan­
sion of markets, reorganization of the surviving textile industry towards 
more complex arrangem ents reminiscent of proto -  industrial complexes 
in Europe and, possibly, an increase of productivity in market terms.
By 1800 both the Peruvian and Mexican economies had entered a 
phase of stagnation. While the Napoleonic wars certainly played a role in 
this, there were im portant domestic structural causes as well. In Mexico 
they had to do with the inflationary pressures brought about by the very 
model of economic growth: M arkets having grown faster than agricul­
tural production and population; growing costs of industrial inputs, 
declining real wages. In Peru the problems may have consisted in the 
very limited market sphere, coupled with a crisis of commercial agricul­
ture for export.
In this introduction we have only touched upon some of the issues 
involved in a comparison of the late colonial economies of Mexico and 
Peru. M any more problems are raised by the contributions themselves. 
Q uite  a few questions rem ain unresolved and will require further 
research. But we hope that this volume will demonstrate that the differ­
ence between the late colonial economies of Mexico and Peru has little to 
do with varying o r even opposite conjunctures. R ather it is in some 
im portant structural elements of both economies and societies, where we 
should hope to find the roots of their distinctiveness.
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II. T H E  M IN IN G  SE C T O R
1. T H E  M E X IC A N  M IN IN G  IN D U ST R Y  IN  T H E  E IG H T E E N T H  
C E N T U R Y
John  H . Coatsworth
This paper describes trends in the growth of precious metals produc­
tion in eighteenth century New Spain, assesses the relations between 
government and industry in the Bourbon era, analyzes the role of the 
mining sector in the colonial economy, and sketches the causes of the 
collapse of the mining industry after 1810. T he principal focus of the 
paper is economic, rather than institutional. T he approach is general, 
rather than detailed. T he purpose is to present a somewhat different 
view of the Mexican mining industry in this period than that found in 
the historiography, and to indicate the research tasks that promise the 
most significant results in the future. A more general objective of the 
paper is to contribute to new currents of work on the late colonial eco­
nomy at a moment when -  as this timely volume demonstrates -  
research in this area is already transform ing the field. It will become 
clear in the course of this paper, however, that the author owes a large 
debt to scholars who have published an indispensible series of monogra­
phic studies on the colonial mining industry over the course of the past 
decade, and especially to David Brading, whose work on M iners and 
Merchants in Bourbon M exico  set a standard for the field .' T he story of 
the eighteenth -  century mining industry that emerged from  the new 
work of the past ten years did not always fundam entally alter received 
wisdom about the industry. Late colonial Mexico experienced an unpre­
cedented mining "boom”; the task was to explain how this boom was 
achieved. Government promotion played an im portant role in the boom; 
the problem was to explain the origins of official activism and to distin­
guish its effects. T he industry collapsed when the 1810 insurgents, in 
their zeal to destroy all things Spanish, laid waste to mine works and 
refineries; little research was required to document this conclusion.
For the most part, this story is false. Mexico did not experience an 
unprecedented mining boom at the end of the century, but at the 
beginning, as G arner has already shown.^ In fact, the late colonial
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mining industry was in such deep trouble that it survived by draining the 
public treasury and diverting resources from  other sectors. Government 
promotion cannot explain a boom that did not occur; it can only explain 
an increase in physical output based on propping up marginal operations 
(some quite large). The insurgents did not cause the collapse through 
destruction of plant and equipm ent (which could have been repaired). 
They merely accelerated the fiscal crisis that would have ended public 
subsidies and produced the collapse of industry in a short time anyway. 
T he mining industry was so sick by 1810 that it can be doubted whether 
the industry’s decline had anything to do with the insurgency at all.
This rather different story emerges from a study of published data, 
rather than new research. It is thus based on the work of other scholars 
whose studies departed from a much different set of assumptions and 
embodied different research strategies. T he data they report are therefore 
imperfect for testing the hypotheses sketched here. Nonetheless, they are 
sufficient to demonstrate the significance that new prim ary research in 
this area could have for understanding economic trends in the late 
colonial era. T he first section below reviews descriptive accounts of 
trends in physical output, the second questions the significance of this 
raw data for analyzing the health of the industry and recomputes output 
to reflect the purchasing power of the gold and silver produced in market 
terms, the third addresses the related questions of industry productivity 
and profit trends, the fourth reviews government efforts to prop up the 
industry, the fifth discusses the role of the mining industry in the 
economy as a whole, the sixth takes a new look at the industry’s decline 
after 1810, and the final section comments on the future of research in 
this area.
/.
Descriptive accounts of the growth of precious metals production in 
eighteenth -  century New Spain can rely on reasonably accurate da ta .3 
T able I reproduces the well -  known statistics, with the data grouped into 
five year periods. Table II presents the same data in index form, 
showing the output of each period as a percentage of the output of the 
period 1755 -  59. M easured from  the endpoints of each quinquennium , 
output increased at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent from  1695/99 
to 1805/09. This growth represents an impressive achievement, the more 
so when it is recalled that population grew in this period at only about 
0.5 percent.*
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TABLE I: Production o f  Precious Metals, 1 6 9 5 - 1814 
(Millions o f  pesos, by quinquennia)
1695/99 19.6 1755/59 65.7
1700/04 25.3 1760/64 58.5
1705/09 28.5 1765/69 60.9
1710/14 32.8 1770/74 80.8
1715/19 35.0 1775/79 91.0
1720/04 50.3 1780/84 100.3
1725/09 52.0 1785/89 93.2
1730/04 52.5 1790/94 109.7
1735/09 47.7 1795/99 121.2
1740/04 48.6 1800/04 104.6
1745/09 59.6 1805/09 122.0
1750/04 64.6 1810/14 47.1
Source: M anuel Orozco y Berra, "Inform e sobre la acuñación en las Casas de 
M oneda de la República,” Anexo to the Memoria of the Secretaría de 
Fomento (Mexico, 1857).
TABLE II: Index o f  Physical O utput, M exican M ining, 1 6 9 5 - 1814 
(1 7 5 5 -5 9  -  100)
1695/99 29 1755/59 100
1700/04 39 1760/64 89
1705/09 43 1765/69 93
1710/14 50 1770/74 123
1715/19 53 1775/79 139
1720/24 77 1780/84 153
1725/29 79 1785/89 142
1730/34 80 1790/94 167
1735/39 73 1795/99 185
1740/44 74 1800/04 159
1745/49 91 1805/09 186
1750/54 98 1810/14 72
Source: See Table I.
R ather than steady increases, decade by decade, New Spain’s mining 
industry appears to have grown in sharp spurts, followed by prolonged 
periods of stagnation. In the first half of the 1720’s, output reached an 
annual average of more than ten million pesos. T hen, for the next two 
decades it stuck there. In  the late 1740’s, production leaped to twelve 
million a year and stuck again at the new level, this time for a quarter 
century, until a new spurt in the 1770’s. In the 70’s and 80’s, output 
stuck again between sixteen and twenty million pesos per year. In the
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final two decades of the period, annual production averaged between 
twenty -  one and twenty -  four million pesos per year. H istorians of the 
eighteenth century mining industry have thus correctly searched for dis­
crete events, local bonanzas, and policy initiatives to explain the 
achievement of each new plateau.
This pattern is also revealed in the data displayed in Table III. H ere, 
the data have been grouped into irregular periods suggested by the 
plateau pattern. T he growth rates displayed in the table represent the 
compound annual rate of increase (or decrease) for the five year average 
measured from the last year of one quinquennium  to the last year of a 
subsequent quinquennium . T he table shows that the most prolonged 
period of rapid growth in the entire century occurred in the first quarter 
when the output of precious metals advanced at an annual average rate 
of 3.2 percent. This is the only period which does not display the plateau 
pattern, although growth did slow somewhat in the late 1710’s. From 
the 1720’s to the 1740’s, production declined at just under 0.1 percent 
per year. T he spurt in the late 174-O’s reached a rate of 4.1 percent per 
year. From the 1740’s to the 1760’s growth declined to a mere 0.1 
percent per annum . T he spurt in the 1770’s lasted most of the decade; 
annual growth averaged 2.7 percent. From the late 1770’s to the late 
1780’s, growth fell to 0.2 percent per year. T he spurt in the late 1780’s
TABLE III: Growth o f  M ining Output, 1 6 9 5 -1 8 0 9  
(Average A nnual Increase in Percent)
1695/99 - 1720/24 + 3.2
1720/24 - 1740/44 0.1
1740/44 - 1745/49 ■ 4.1
1745/49 - 1765/69 + 0.1
1765/69 - 1775/79 + 2.7
1775/79 - 1785/89 + 0.2
1785/89 - 1790/94 + 3.3
1790/94 - 1805/09 + 0.1
1765/69 - 1805/09 + 1.7
1775/09 - 1805/09 + 0.7
Source: See Table I.
to early 1790’s reached a rate of 3.3 percent, while the succeeding period 
saw stagnation at 0.1 percent per year. M easured without the brief 
spurt in the 1790’s, the annual average rate of increase from  the late 
1770’s to 1805/09 was 0.7 percent. This exercise suggests that historians 
of growth should focus on the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the
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early 1740’s, and the decades of the 1770’s and the 1790’s in looking 
for the causes of New Spain’s mining ’’boom”. Most of the growth in 
physical output of precious metals occurred in these brief periods."’
Although two decades of significant growth occurred during the 
Bourbon period, it is not clear from the data w hether the historians are 
justified in referring to the period as a ’’boom”. M easured from  the 
beginning of the era in the late 1760’s to its end in the quinquennium 
1805/09, output grew at an annual average rate of 1.7 percent. This is 
certainly a respectable rate of growth, even if it was largely confined to 
two of the four decades in the period. It is more than twice the rate of 
population increase, and rapid even by the later standards of the 
industrial revolution. This conclusion stands, even if the data are ad­
justed to take into account the debasem ent of the coinage that occurred 
in small doses in 1732, 1772 and 1776.6 By the latter date, the silver 
content of the coins minted in Mexico had fallen to just over 93 percent 
of the silver content of the pre -  1732 period. Adjusted for this debase­
ment, the growth rate over the whole Bourbon period drops only slightly, 
to 1.4 percent per annum . Nonetheless, the growth of output at the 
beginning of the century over a period of equal length averaged 3.2 
percent per year, a much more impressive achievement.
II.
M easuring the growth o f the mining industry in terms of physical 
output gives only a partial and not altogether accurate picture of trends 
in the industry. M ining produced money. T he law required that all 
metals produced be dispatched to the mint to be converted into bars of 
coin. T he prices of the goods and services for which gold and silver were 
exchanged fluctuated constantly. T o assess the productivity of the 
mining industry, it is necessary to take into account these fluctuations in 
the purchasing power of the industry’s output.
To measure productivity, physical output is not always the appro­
priate measure, since it does not m easure output growth in market terms. 
Economists define productivity as the return to scarce factors of pro­
duction. W hen the commodity produced is money itself, its value must 
be expressed in terms of its capacity to comm and other resources. Only 
then can costs incurred in the marketplace to produce the output be 
measured against the market value of the product.
Unfortunately, no adequate measure o f the purchasing power of gold 
and silver coins yet exists for eighteenth -  century Mexico. T o  analyze
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the health of the industry, metals production should be deflated by an 
index of the prices of the commodities purchased by metals producers. 
Although the history of prices is still in its infancy, two long price series 
do exist that provide a crude measure of the purchasing power of the 
peso. O ne is the study by Enrique Florescano of the price of maize in 
eighteenth -  century Mexico City; the other is an index of the prices of 
seven agricultural and livestock commodities produced by Cecilia Rabell 
in her study of San Luis de la Paz, a small farm ing community near 
G uanajuato .7
TABLE IV: M arket Value o f  Precious M etals Production in M exico, 
1 6 9 5 - 1814 (M illions o f  pesos o f  1775/79)


























Table IV  reestimates mining output by deflating data on physical 
output using the Florescano and Rabell price indices. T he results of this 
exercise are striking. T he three decades at the beginning of the eight­
eenth century stand out even more than before for sustained and rapid 
growth, reaching an average of 6.1 percent per year when deflated by
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the Rabell index. At the same time, the Bourbon period looks much 
more anemic than before. Deflated by either index, the series reaches a 
peak in the five year period 1775/79. M easured from that point to any 
later point, the growth rate is negative. T he market value of the precious 
metals produced between 1775/9 and 1805/9 declined at an annual 
average rate of 1.0 percent.
TABLE V: Index o f  M arket Value o f  Precious M etals Production in 
M exico, 1 6 9 5 - 1814 (1755 -  59 -  100)
Florescano Rabell (Physical Output)
1695/99 . 20.0 (29)
1700/04 - 28.3 (39)
1705/09 - 33.5 (43)
1710/14 - 48.9 (50)
1715/19 - 60.6 (53)
1720/24 79.5 88.4 (77)
1725/29 82.3 65.8 (79)
1730/34 79.4 64.1 (80)
1735/39 69.4 72.6 (73)
1740/44 62.1 65.5 (74)
1745/49 75.3 62.7 (91)
1750/54 76.3 98.8 (98)
1755/59 100.0 100.0 (100)
1760/64 87.1 106.5 (89)
1765/69 114.5 _ (93)
1770/74 95.1 168.5 (123)
1775/79 150.8 202.9 (139)
1780/84 119.2 - (153)
1785/89 64.8 - (142)
1790/94 142.5 - (167)
1795/99 123.7 109.0 (185)
1800/04 102.7 78.7 (159)
1805/09 105.5 - (186)
1810/14 27.5 - (72)
Source: See Tables II and IV.
T he plateau pattern observed in the physical output data can also be 
observed in the purchasing power of value series, and the timing is 
roughly the same. T he value series reaches its first plateau in the first 
half of the 1720’s, spurts again in the early 1750’s (later than physical 
output), and reaches a new plateau in the 1770’s. Only the low level of 
prices at the beginning of the century and the marked inflation at the 
end of the period produce noteworthy alternations in the trends, sharp­
ening the expansion at the beginning and converting modest growth into 
depression at the end of the century. T able V  displays the data in index
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form , while Table V I recomputes industry growth rates.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the market value series. 
T he new figures represent the total value of mining production solely in 
terms of domestically produced agricultural commodities. In the absence 
of other price indices for eighteenth -  century Mexico, however, the 
series can help to correct impressionistic accounts that have relied on 
measures of physical output alone. M oreover, the significance of agri­
cultural prices for mining operations have never been doubted. As 
Brading observed, ’’any increase in the price of maize and hay could 
easily drive a m iner close to bankruptcy.”® For more precise analytical 
uses, however, the data are still far from satisfactory.
TABLE V I: Growth R ate o f  M arket Value, Precious Metals, 
1695 -  1809 (Annual Average Percentage Change)
Florescano index Rabell index
1695/99 - 1720/24 + 6.1
1720/24 - 1740/44 -  0.1 -  1.1
1740/44 - 1765/69 + 2.1 -
1765/69 - 1775/79 + 2.8 _
1775/79 - 1785/89 -  8.8 -
1785/89 - 1 790/94 + 8.2 _
1790/94 - 1805/09 -  1.5 -
1775/79 - 1805/09 -  0.1 -
1765/69 - 1805/09 + 0.2 -
Source: See text.
III.
Systematic data on factor and input costs facing the eighteenth- 
century mining industry have yet to be collected. It is therefore impos­
sible to make precise estimates of trends in productivity. T here are no 
reliable data with which to compare the market value series. An indirect 
and partial m easure may be suggestive, nonetheless. If costs rose in 
proportion to the level of prices, then the ratio of market value to phys­
ical output can serve as an indicator of the productivity of the industry. 
(In this case, the ratio of market value to physical output would equal 
the ratio of total costs to physical output.) Alternatively, this ratio can be 
used as a rough index of changing profit levels. (In this case, profits 
would be assumed to depend on the ’’basket” o f commodities that a given
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level of output could command in the m arket.) Com bining the two 
interpretations would make the series into a rough measure of the health 
of the industry. T he data are presented in T able V II. T he table shows 
the num ber of pesos of constant purchasing power of 1755/59 that mine 
owners earned for each 100 pesos of coin produced.
TABLE V II: Ratio o f  M arket Value to Physical O utput, Precious 
Metals, 169 5 -1 8 1 4


























T he ratio series correlates roughly with the output and value series. 
T he ratio increases by nearly 50 percent between 1695/99 and 1720/4, as 
the industry boomed. T he period of highest index values occurs in the 
third quarter of the century, between 1750/4 and 1775/9. T he decline 
after this point to the end of the century is quite marked.
O f course, this index measures productivity only if the unit cost of 
producing a mark of silver moved in concert with the price indices 
employed to construct it. If  unit costs were rising more rapidly than 
prices, the ratio will overestimate productivity. If unit costs rose more
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slowly, productivity will be underestimated by ratio. T he question yet to 
be answered is whether the real cost of producing a unit of constant 
market value was rising or falling.
The evidence is mixed on this point, but it appears easier to interpret 
toward the end of the eighteenth century than at any point earlier. The 
hypothesis that best explains the evidence is that the industry faced rising 
marginal costs for at least the period 1780 to 1810. T hat is, the cost of 
producing a fixed quantity of metallic purchasing power was rising. The 
industry was in trouble.
T he evidence on this point can be summarized briefly under three 
headings. First, there is abundant evidence that quality of the ores mined 
was declining. An increasing proportion of the output of M exico’s mines 
consisted of low grade ore for which the patio  or am algam ation process 
(as opposed to cheaper and faster smelting) had to be employed to 
extract the metal. Brading presents very clear evidence of this. In  Zaca­
tecas, the proportion of low grade ore processed by am algam ation 
increased from  66 to 85 percent between 1763 and 1806. In G uanajuato, 
the entire increase in production between the 1760’s and 1804 was due 
to am algamation. T he output of smelted ore actually decreased in this 
period.9
Second, the size and depth of mine shafts and their attendant 
drainage works was increasing. As shafts were driven deeper, drainage 
problems increased. T he revival of Zacatecas (and its later decline), as 
well as the fortunes of all the other m ajor mining centers, came to 
depend critically on reaching ever lower depths. Such excavations and 
drainage operations made it more costly both to reach the ore and to 
extract i t .10
T hird , labor costs appear to have been rising along with the cost of 
other inputs miners had to acquire in the market, mules, tim ber, tools, 
and the like. T he evidence on labor costs is mixed, since efforts were 
made, quite logically, to reduce costs either by forcing down wages, 
eliminating or reducing the partido  or resorting to government aid 
(exemption of the labor force from  the tribute, forced labor drafts, and 
the like).11
The evidence on industry profits has not been systematically collected 
and analyzed. Two main sources of profit support have been identified 
in the literature. T he first consisted of organizational and, though less 
likely, technological changes that could have offset rising factor and 
output costs. T he second, discussed below, was government support for 
the industry.
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O ne way to approach the issue of profit is to revise the market value 
series to reflect more closely the ’’basket” of commodities on which profit 
earners may have been spending their gains. T he series in T able IV 
above provides a m easure of the purchasing power of mining output in 
the market for maize (Florescano) or maize plus six other products 
(Rabell). T he owners of New Spain’s principal mines, however, built 
their reputations for opulence in conspicuous consumpton and for 
marshalling investment capital through their command over a fa r  wider 
variety of products and services.
For both consumption and investment, it is safe enough to assume 
that these were highly labor intensive. T hus, actual profit depended on 
labor market conditions and social organization (in which conditions 
appear to have favored employers, at least from  the 1750’s to the 
1810’s).1  ^ Q ualitative evidence also suggests that consumption, and 
possibly some investment activity, depended to an unm easured degree on 
imports from abroad .15 While there are no measures of elite propensi­
ties to consume imports, descriptive accounts suggest that they were high, 
especially in clothing, wine, consumer durables like pianos and furni­
ture, and (possibly for investment) iron and steel products.
Price trends for commodities imported to New Spain have not yet 
been studied systematically. T he data rem ain scattered through an 
immense ramo of the Archivo General de la Nación. Nonetheless, two 
observations can be made from the quantitative evidence available at 
present. First, as Brading has observed, the Bourbon liberalization of 
intra -  imperial trade appears to have reduced the prices of imported 
products to consumers in the colony, in part through reducing the 
inconvenience and cost of shipping between New Spain and the rest of 
the empire and in part through abolishing (in 1778) the monopoly on 
foreign trading once held tightly by the Consulado de M éxico.1“1 
Secondly, however, international trade prices in the late eighteenth 
century are known to have been rising, especially in periods of war
(1 7 5 6 -6 3 ; 1 7 7 8 -8 3 ; 17 9 6 - 1802; 18 0 3 - 1812). For New Spain, the 
positive effects of liberalization were probably felt most strongly in the 
1770’s and 1780’s (but offset in the 80’s by the great fam ine of 
1 7 8 4 -8 5 ) , while the negative impact of international w arfare was 
strongest later in the period. T he Bourbon reforms may have produced a 
series of once -  and -  for -  all decreases in the level of prices consumers 
would otherwise have paid for imports, while the sharply rising trend in 
international prices after 1796 clearly offset these earlier gains by the 
turn of the century.15
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T hus, for mine owners and other consumers (and investors) of 
imported products the qualitative literature indicates that long -  run 
international price trends were consistent whith those observed for 
domestic prices. In both cases, any gains made earlier in the century had 
disappeared by the w ar years that preceded the Hidalgo revolt. In terms 
of its purchasing power, the international market value of M exico’s 
silver output was probably declining at least as rapidly as it was on 
domestic markets.
However it is measured, the mining industry of New Spain entered 
into a crisis during the era of the Bourbon reforms, an economic crisis in 
which the declining market value of precious metals combined with 
rising costs of production. Each mark of silver produced bought less and 
cost more to produce.
IV .
G overnment policy towards the mining industry not only recognized 
this crisis, but in part created it. As Brading has clearly shown, govern­
ment policy was directed towards maximizing output on the assumption 
that the output of the mining industry determined the level at which the 
colony could be taxed .16 This assumption was based on experience. 
T here was a close correlation in the eighteenth century between govern­
ment revenue and mining output. This relationship is shown in Table 
V III, where the production of precious metals is expressed as a per­
centage of government revenues. As the table indicates, this ratio was 
fairly stable throughout the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, 
varying around a mean of 225. T he only exceptional period was the 
decade of the 1720’s when mining output reached very high levels and 
the ratio leaped to more than 300. In the 1780’s, the ratio declined to its 
lowest level in the century and dropped steadily thereafter. By 1805/09, 
the ratio reached 42, that is, m ining output accounted for less than half 
of government revenue. T he Bourbon reform s culminated in w hat even 
the Spanish rulers themselves must have recognized as a drastic decapi­
talization, or at least demonetization of the colony.
In any case, until this final period of desperate expediencies, the 
Crown found that the am ount of gold and silver it could extract from  the 
colony depended on the level of production of the two metals. W hen the 
Seven Years W ar pushed the Crown to ’’reform s” that could increase 
colonial revenues, it mixed new exactions and more effective adminis­
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tration with measures to promote mining production. These measures 
included a series of steps to stimulate the revival and rehabilitation of 
marginal producers in the industry. W ith tax breaks, government aid in 
recruiting labor and generous credit to undertake the necessary excava­
tion and construction, entrepreneurs found they could make a profit of 
mines long abandoned. For the existing mines, the government was 
somewhat less generous but equally concerned. T he entire industry 
benefitted when the prices of estanco mercury and blasting powder were
TABLE V III: Precious M etals Production as a Percentage o f  
G overnm ent Revenue in M exico, 1695 -  1809
1695/99 169 1755/59 211
1700/04 184 1760/64 259
1705/09 204 1765/69 173
1710/14 186 1770/74 199
1715/19 185 1775/79 203
1720/24 380 1780/84 153
1725/29 333 1785/89 129
1730/34 226 1790/94 135
1735/39 251 1795/99 70
1740/44 192 1800/04 44
1745/49 246 1805/09 42
1750/54 229
Source: See Table I and John  TePaske, La Real Hacienda de Nueva Espãna:
La Real Caja de M éxico (1 5 76-1816)  (Mexico: IN A H , Colección 
Científica N o.41, 1976).
reduced, when the crown created the Real T ribunal de M inería to 
service the industry, and when a range of services and protections 
(including special mining courts, a new mining code and technical 
assistance missions) were provided.1  ^ T he result of these measures was 
to make production profitable despite higher costs. Physical output 
reached very high levels.
It is also possible that government aid to the industry made possible 
technological advances that would otherwise have been impossible to 
achieve. T he extent and effect of technological advance has never been 
measured, however, and Brading was probably right in according it no 
more than a minor role, certainly too small to have arrested the rise in 
marginal costs.1®
In short, the mining industry was already in decline by the time the 
independence movement erupted in 1810. T hat it did not collapse earlier
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was due in large part to direct and indirect subsidies from government. 
T he government taxed to stimulate more mining production to tax still 
more. W hen the combined forces of Napoleon Bonaparte and Padre 
Hidalgo destabilized the state, they doomed the mining industry at the 
same time.
V.
T he role of the mining industry in the economy of New Spain has 
often inspired discussion. Two broad and somewhat contradictory notions 
may be found in the literature. O ne of these holds that the mining 
industry was overdeveloped to serve the interests of the M other Country. 
Overdevelopment of mining distorted the colonial economy in both 
traditional and dependency school analysis.19 T he second broad in ter­
pretation suggests that the mining industry acted as a kind of ’’leading 
sector”, prom oting the growth of agriculture, commerce, and industry 
through backward linkages, dynamizing the economy of New Spain much 
in the m anner of a modern export s ta p le ."  It may be noted in passing 
that these two views are not necessarily opposed to each other. They may 
be reconciled in various ways. For example, more sophisticated versions 
of the dependency argum ent no longer challenge the dynamic linkages 
created by export booms. T he argum ent now turns on the long term  as 
opposed to s h o r t- te rm  benefits of such episodes.“11 Alternatively, it has 
been suggested that social, cultural or institutional constraints may 
dam pen or thw art altogether the dynamism of the export sector.11 
Distortion occurs in this model as mining profits "sink” into a backward 
agricultural sector or are dissipated in conspicuous consumption.
T he present state of research does not make it possible to reach firm 
conclusions, but the data do suggest a somewhat more complex picture 
than is usually drawn. T he relations between agriculture and m ining can 
serve to illustrate this point. Regional accounts of agricultural develop­
ment in the first quarter of the eighteenth century provide evidence of 
trends in agricultural development that appear to have coincided roughly 
with the growth of mining. Areas close to mining centers, like the Bajío 
and portions of M ichoacán and Jalisco, benefitted from  the rapid 
increase in mining production in this period.'13 It is precisely in the 
1700’s to 1720’s that many abandoned or rundown estates were 
purchased by new owners and refurbished. This trend appears to have 
continued during the 1730’s and 1740’s, but there is some evidence that 
agricultural investments were less successful in this period.1,1 After
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mid -  century, a second trend emerged, that is, the movement of the 
livestock frontier towards the far north and the conversion of cattle and 
sheep haciendas in the central regions to the production of grain and 
pulque. The timing of this shift varied, but appears to have taken hold 
in the Bajío by the 1760’s and in the G uadalajara region by the 
1770’s .25 Population growth played a role in this shift. In part, however, 
it may be attributed to the growth of the mining industry, but the data 
are too fragm entary to perm it a conclusive test.
O ne clue to the relationship between mining and agriculture may be 
found in the market value data in T able V I. This series may also be 
read as a rough index of the commodity terms of trade between mining 
and agriculture. For most of the century, terms of trade moved in favor 
of mining and against agriculture. T he high point was reached in the 
1770’s. While mining growth may have stimulated production, this 
linkage cannot explain the downward trend in the terms of trade. The 
falling relative prices for agricultural commodities could be explained by 
increasing productivity. W hile conclusions must necessarily be tentative, 
it appears that the stimulus to increased agricultural output, particularly 
to the production of food and beverage crops, promoted increased 
productivity through greater regional specialization in production, at least 
through the 1770’s.
It is possible that the growth of mining production inspired produc­
tivity gains in other sectors as well. Scattered evidence suggests that 
commerce, or the transactions sector as economists call it, becam e more 
efficient in part because markets expanded. C apital markets certainly 
became more fluid and better organized. T he development of the mining 
regions attracted labor, especially to the Bajío, so the economy gained 
from the greater mobility of labor. Productivity gains in industrial acti­
vity -  textiles, tanning and leather goods, soap and other ’’chemicals” -  
appear less likely, although processing industries like milling and sugar 
refining may be exceptions. In any case, the causes and the timing of 
these gains have yet to be investigated.26 It is noteworthy that not a 
single study has yet been completed that addresses the question of 
productivity in this period. The single exception rem ains the necessarily 
partial analysis by W ard Barret in his monograph on the sugar haciendas 
of the Cortes fam ily.27 No one has challenged his conclusion that output 
per unit of labor on these sugar estates tripled between the late sixteenth 
and the mid -  eighteenth centuries.
T he data do make clear that the role of the mining industry had 
changed significantly by the 1780’s. By this time, the dynamism of the
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industry had disappeared. By the end of the eighteenth century, the 
mining sector had become a drag on the economy. It is an open question 
w hether marginal product was declining faster in agriculture than in 
mining, but the shift of the terms of trade toward agriculture is sugges­
tive. In Mexico, as in the rest of the world, precious metals were 
becoming less scarce and agricultural products more scarce in relation to 
demand. Resources that would otherwise have shifted from m ining to 
agriculture responded to public policies designed to m aintain the attrac­
tiveness of mining for investors. Wages in both sectors failed to keep up 
with inflation, not only because unemployment was higher as a result of 
the misallocation of capital to mining and away from agriculture.
While precious metals poured from the world’s mines in immense 
quantities by the end of the eighteenth century, this commodity was 
always scarce from the point of view of the Spanish treasury. H ence the 
obsession with policies that could not have been better designed to 
weaken the Mexican economy, increase the world supply of silver, and 
thus increase still more the treasury’s appetite for this effectively 
devalued commodity. M ore measures to stimulate mining production and 
tax revenues followed, with still greater distorting effects of the alloca­
tion of capital and labor in the Mexican economy.
It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate the significance of this 
vicious circle for New Spain’s economy as a whole. At the end of the 
eighteenth century, the m ining industry accounted for no more than 
about 8 percent of the colony’s gross domestic product of some 240 
million p e s o s . E v e n  if the entire increase in mining output after the 
1760’s could be attributed to the distortion of investment induced by 
government subsidies, it is not clear that the capital involved, even if it 
equalled as much as an entire year’s output of some 20 million pesos, 
could have reversed the decline in agricultural productivity or much 
improved the perform ance of other sectors of the economy. In any case, 
the data do not yet exist to make feasible a test of this counterfactual 
proposition. It is possible only to conclude that the mining industry con­
tributed to the general economic crisis that occurred at the end of the 
colonial period, and that this contribution was actively promoted by 
government policy.
VI.
T he collapse of the mining industry after 1810 occurred not because 
of the violence and predations of the independence movement, but
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because the government, already under seige after Napoleon’s invasion 
of the peninsula in 1808, was unable to continue supporting the industry. 
Between 1800 and 1809, M exico’s mines produced an annual average of 
22.2 million pesos. Between 1810 and 1819, output dropped to an 
annual average of only 11.3 million, a decline of nearly 50 percent. A 
portion of this decline was due to the violence and destruction wrought 
by the Hidalgo movement and by the effort to suppress it, but only part. 
T he records of the T ribunal de M inería are full of accounts by mine 
owners of the conflict and its effect on output. M any petitioned to be 
exempted from the provisions of the mining code that specified revoca­
tion of the mine ow ner’s right to exploit a mineral deposit after four
90months without working it. Most of the petitions were granted. By 
1812, however, the mine ow ner’s complaints had changed. From  this 
point until Iturbide’s coup, their letters and petitions, and the meetings 
of the mining deputies, are filled with other problems. H igh on the list 
of problems was the scarcity of mercury. In 1811, the Cortes had 
decreed an end to the estanco and declared mercury open for comercio 
libre. T he  mineowners were appalled. Private suppliers ran the price up 
from the monopoly’s subsidized price of 41 pesos to as high as 200. 
Even then, supplies were often impossible to obtain.30 In 1812, the 
Tribunal proposed to raise the funds necessary to outfit a naval expedi­
tion whose sole object would be to seize the mercury stored at Seville 
and Almadén in occupied Spain.3  ^ T he project was set aside when 
Ferdinand recovered the throne, but mercury remained scarce and the 
price high even after restoration of the monopoly.
Most of the tax exemptions, official credit, and other privileges of 
the mining industry also came to end after 1810. M iners complained 
repeatedly about the tax surcharges imposed by royalist commanders 
throughout the decade.3  ^ The T ribunal defaulted on its loans after 
making extraordinary contributions to the war effort. Official credit to 
miners for the purchase of mercury ended. Private capital dried up. 
T o make matters worse, transport charges rose precipitously with 
brigandage and labor became scarce.3^ In short, Hidalgo and Napoleon, 
even though defeated militarily, made it impossible for the government 
to provide either the subsidies or the security the industry needed to 




M uch more research on the mining industry in pre -  modern Mexico 
will be needed before the revisionist account presented here can be 
accepted, modified or cast aside. M y purpose has been to show that the 
literary and quantitative data now available provide little support for the 
traditional view of boom and prosperity, benign government, and 
collapse by destruction. Instead, the evidence points to a sick industry, 
propped up by distorted public incentives, that collapsed of its own 
weight when the colonial government could no longer intervene to 
prevent it. Testing these opposing images systematically will no doubt 
help to produce a picture with more subtle shadings, but this is scarcely 
the point. Future research can now rely on a large num ber of recent 
monographs that have effectively illuminated the institutional history of 
the mining industry. Because of this, scholars are now in a better posi­
tion to analyze the economic aspects of the silver legend directly.
Such an effort will require far more attention to the systematic col­
lection of quantitative data that bear directly on the economic issues. The 
history of prices is crucial, as are more microeconomic (firm  — level) 
data that can be manipulated to estimate the critical indicators of indus­
trial health -  costs, productivity, profit rates, the impact of subsidies -  
over time. T he data do not have to be exhaustive, merely useful for 
analytical purposes.
At the aggregate level, progress in interpreting the articulation of the 
mining industry with the rest of the economy will remain dependent, to 
an extent, on the development of economic historical work on other 
sectors of New Spain’s economy and on the international economy in the 
eighteenth century. Price history will be critical here, too, as will studies 
that address sectoral (or even micro -  level) rates of output and 
productivity change, returns to capital and land, and the like. Much 
more is known already, however, than historians have put to use for 
analytical purposes. Long run price trends for agricultural commodities 
in diverse regions of Mexico have proved to be highly correlated with 
each other, and with international price movements, for example. 
Regional studies of agricultural development, though often lacking in 
economic analysis, have produced im portant and convergent findings on 
crop mix changes and investment patterns across wide areas of the 
colony. New studies of trade and public finance have added immense 
stores of data to be assimilated.35
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In short, the economic history of the colonial mining industry in the 
eighteenth century can now be approached from a fresh perspective and 
with the support of a monographic literature that already provides the 
foundation for new discoveries. Some of them will be bonanzas.
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2. M IN IN G  A ND  T H E  PE R U V IA N  E C O N O M Y  IN T H E  LATE 
C O L O N IA L  PE R IO D
John  Fisher
It has tended hitherto to be necessary, when one has written papers 
on the welfare of either the overall Peruvian economy or, more specifi­
cally, the mining industry in the late colonial period, to outline and then 
challenge the deep -  rooted historiographical tradition which identified the 
last fifty years or so of the colonial period as an era of economic decline 
for the viceroyalty of P e ru .1 O n this occasion, thankfully, such an 
introduction would be superfluous, for, it is now generally accepted, at 
least by specialist researchers, that it is invalid to identify the period 
between 1760 and 1810 as one of global crisis for the Peruvian economy. 
Some recent comm entators, it is true, have accommodated this revised 
interpretation grudgingly, and continue to argue, for example, that, even 
if it can be demonstrated that the mining industry increased its 
production, ’’the colony’s other economic sectors -  m anufacturing, 
agriculture, and commerce -  presented a picture of gradual decline 
throughout the eighteenth century.”  ^ According to this interpretation ’’the 
most disastrous blow” was the loss of U pper Peru to the new Viceroyalty 
of the Rio de la Plata in 1776, a step which, together with the revoca­
tion of L im a’s formal monopoly of Spanish South A m erica’s overseas 
trade in 1778, led to Buenos Aires supplanting Lim a as the im porter of 
European goods and the exporter of bullion. An alternative view, and 
one which is both more persuasive, and, as we shall see, supported by 
the fragm entary evidence available on internal and external commerce, is 
that most recently restated by Assadourian and others in their outline of 
a research project on Andean mining from  the sixteenth to the twentieth 
century.^ T heir essential hypothesis is that the mining industry in colo­
nial Peru and U pper Peru was of such dynamic importance to the rest of 
the economy that the significant increase in silver production which 
characterized the period after 1750 necessarily both reflected and acted as 
a stimulus to the general expansion of the late colonial economy.
It remains true, of course, that our understanding of the social and 
economic structures of late colonial Peru is generalized and superficial.^ 
Significant progress is being made, however, as the contributions to this 
volume indicate and it has been reassuring to discover during recent
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visits to Peru both that welcome advances are finally being made in the 
organization of regional archives, and that a new generation of domestic 
scholars is demonstrating an increased willingness to undertake detailed 
research in them .5 M y own contribution to the debate has been to 
provide not a definitve, detailed statement of the state of the late colonial 
economy as a whole -  it will be many years, surely, before any scholar 
will be capable of offering this -  but a general survey of the state of 
the mining industry in the half century between the separation of U pper 
Peru and the obtaining of independence in 1824. T his monograph, 
published in 1977 in both English and Spanish, was based essentially 
upon general documentation in Spanish archives concerning crown policy 
towards the mining industry in the reigns of Charles III and Charles 
IV , and upon the rich but somewhat introspective archive in Lim a of the 
M ining T ribunal, the body founded in 1787 to regulate and promote 
silver mining in the viceroyalty.® O ne is conscious that the study was 
limited chronologically -  it deliberately ignored the p r e -  1776 period 
prim arily because of the immense difficulty of locating detailed data 
about production for the years prior to the inauguration of the visita 
general of José Antonio de Areche and Jorge de Escobedo -  , geo­
graphically -  little attempt was made to examine the continuing links 
between Lim a and U pper Peru -  , and thematically, in that the rela­
tionship between m erchants and miners was hinted at rather than 
analysed in detail. But it was considered appropriate to present the fruits, 
im m ature though they were, of my investigations to fellow researchers, 
partly because they provided a reasonably full account of crown policy 
towards the reorganization and modernization of the mining industry, 
and, thus, could make a useful contribution to the overall appreciation of 
the efficacy of the Bourbon reforms -  and also because of the hope 
that the data therein on silver production, mercury supply, and labour 
would provide a useful framework within which others might pursue 
more systematic research at a  local level.
Before going on to discuss recent historiographical advances, it is 
perhaps appropriate to restate the principal conclusions of my 1977 
research, which was supplemented by two articles: the first, published in 
1976, although written while the monograph was in the press, demon­
strated on the basis of alcabala accounts kept in the Archivo General de 
la Nación, a clear dynamic relationship between the rapid increase in 
silver production at C erro de Pasco, P eru ’s leading mining centre in the 
late colonial period, and the transmission there from the viceregal capital 
of imported European m anufactures.7 It thereby supported the thesis
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that the mercantile community of Lim a benefitted from the expansion of 
mining through its links with the aviadores which enabled it to supply 
both credit and merchandise to the mining centres, whilst holding back 
from the lo n g e r- te rm  investment which characterized the Mexican 
industry in the same period. T he second article, published in 1978, 
adopted a somewhat different approach to the same basic problem of the 
links between miners and merchants, by sampling notarial records in the 
Archivo Histórico D epartam ental of Arequipa to trace ties between 
registered miners and merchants in H uantajaya, the most southerly of 
Peru’s mining centres. It revealed not only links but also a confusion of 
identities, in that the principal mine owners of T arapacá were identified 
as leading residents of P eru’s second city, prom inent as merchants, 
landowners, and magistrates.®
T he first, and most im portant, conclusion which can be drawn from 
my research is that the attempts of the Spanish crown to stimulate the 
mining industry in Lower Peru after 1776 inaugurated a period of 
impressive growth in the industry. The Spanish Crown, recognizing the 
vital importance of silver mining to both the Peruvian and the general 
imperial economics, despite a growing emphasis upon the need for the 
development of agricultural resources, made a determined effort in this 
period, as part of an overall strategy of imperial reform , to modernize 
and revitalize the inefficient mining industry which had been allowed to 
develop haphazardly during the previous two centuries. It did so against 
a background of deep pessimism in Peru about the viceroyalty’s 
economic future following the loss of the mines of U pper Peru to the 
new viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata in 1776.
T he decade after 1776 was devoted principally to an investigation of 
the state of the mining industry in Peru and the formulation of plans to 
reinvigorate it. Areche concentrated upon attempts to improve the supply 
of mercury from Huancavelica, while Escobedo, his more able successor 
as visitador general, paid more attention to the need for basic structural 
reform , which he considered an essential prelim inary to technical 
improvement. T he fundam ental features of his policy were the adapta­
tion of the Mexican mining ordinances of 1783 for use in Peru, and, 
arising out of this, the organization of the viceroyalty’s miners into a 
guild, headed by a mining tribunal, which, from the beginning of 1787, 
was endowed with the basic responsibility for the future welfare of the 
industry. T he mining tribunal operated reasonably successfully in certain 
spheres, such as that of judicial administration, but it failed to improve 
the social standing of the majority of miners, who were generally
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regarded as the inferiors of m erchants and bureaucrats, and it also did 
little to weld them into an effective pressure group. Elections in the local 
deputations and to the tribunal itself were characterized by confusion, 
intrigue and manipulation. Successive viceroys met little resistance as 
they interfered with elections to the tribunal, and, more seriously, as they 
cynically restricted its attempts to use its revenue for the welfare of 
miners as a whole. T he most serious intervention in the tribunal’s affairs 
was that of Viceroy Francisco Gil, who in 1794 closed the exchange 
banks established at the beginning of the decade, apparently so as to 
prevent miners using them  in preference to local silver merchants.
In the sphere of mining education there was no progress. Escobedo 
looked forward in the 1780’s to the establishment of a mining college, as 
suggested in the new mining code, but a combination of offical disin­
terest in M adrid and the stubborn reluctance of miners to consider 
abandoning time -  honoured techniques prevented the opening of such an 
institution. An alternative means of improving the industry’s technology 
was theoretically provided by the Nordenflicht mining mission. T his, too, 
however, was a disastrous failure. Its basic difficulty was that the new 
am algam ation which the Swede, Thaddeus von Nordenflicht, and his 
team  of G erm an specialists were supposed to disseminate in Peru, 
proved, in practice, to be unsuitable for the dispersed type of industry
that had developed there. W ith greater cooperation from the M ining
T ribunal and more imaginative deployment of his G erm an colleagues by 
successive viceroys, Nordenflicht might still have contributed to the
improvement of mining technology in Peru, but the antipathy between 
him and the industry’s representatives intensified the longer he remained 
in the viceroyalty. H is mission continued officially for over twenty years, 
but only because successive ministers in M adrid literally forgot about it 
as the program m e of imperial reform as a whole lost its impetus in the 
reign of Charles IV.
Despite N ordenflicht’s failure to introduce modern European
technology to the mining and refining of Peruvian silver ores, and the 
inability of the M ining T ribunal to promote mining education, the 
industry experienced a prolonged period of expansion in the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century. As Figure I indicates, silver production more 
than doubled in the fifteen years after 1776, and by 1792 it had passed 
the 500,000 marks level. It reached a peak of 637,000 marks in 1799, 
and, although somewhat less buoyant in the first decade of the nine­
teenth century, remained high until 1812. This impressive growth was 
made possible to a certain extent by an improved supply of mercury,
49
particulary in the period after 1784. T he increased demand for the 
commodity was met not from Huancavelica, which, after being tempo­
rarily stimulated by the closure of the old royal mine and the granting of 
permission for the working of other deposits around the town, gradually 
became increasingly unable to provide all the mercury required in Peru, 
but by heavy shipments o f  Spanish a n d  Id r ia n  mercury from C á d iz .
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Reserves were never large enough to satisfy silver miners, but, in prac— 
tice, there was sufficient mercury stockpiled in Peru to prevent m ajor 
crisis for them during the three periods when w arfare between Spain and 
G reat Britain cut off supplies from the peninsula. (See Figure II and 
T able I)? H ad reserves been greater, or Huancavelica more produc­
tive, silver production, would probably have been even higher, and it 
undoubtedly 'would have been so had the Crown acted before 1809 to 
bring the price charged for the am algam ating agent closer to that 
charged in New Spain.
TABLE I: Peruvian M ercury Im ports 1776 -  1816
YEAR A M O U N T YEAR A M O U N T
1776 4,000.50 1796 1,000
1777 3,968 1797 2,996
1778 5,966.06 1798 -
1779 1,997.86 1799 -
1780 - 1800 -
1781 - 1801 -
1782 - 1802/03 9,930
1783 - 1804/05 7,501
1784 1,998.17 1806 -
1785 - 1807 -
1786 4,002 1808 -
1787 - 1809 5,032
1788 1,500 1810 4,919
1789 8,004 1811 -
1790 4,511 1812 -
1791 3,501 1813 -
1792 2,500 1814 5,044
1793 2,500 1815 -
1794 3,000 1816 2,048 (?)
1795 2,498
T h e  o th e r g e n e ra l fa c to rs g o v e rn in g th e  level o f  s ilv er p ro d u c tio n
were the availability of labour and capital, although the form er was 
perhaps less crucial than many miners believed. They frequently pro­
tested about the difficulty of persuading Indians to agree voluntarily to 
work in the mines, but, in fact, it is clear that the viceroyalty’s 
perm anent force of mineworkers was large in relation to its total popu­
lation. Indian communities in some areas still provided men to perform 
mita service at Potosí and Huancavelica, o r cash compensation to miners 
there instead. But silver mining in Lower Peru was basically dependent
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upon voluntary workers. This did not prevent miners from frequently 
demanding the extension of the mita system to provide them with an 
improved supply of labour, or viceroys and other administrators from 
agreeing to the conscription of Indians for certain projects. T he diffi­
culties in overcoming steadfast Indian resistance to forced work in the 
mines, however, outweighed the advantages to be derived from the 
payment of artifically low wages, and most miners found it easier to 
recruit men on a voluntary basis. Local labour shortages in times of high 
silver production occasionally enabled workers to exploit competition for 
their services, but they usually worked long hours in harsh conditions for 
very small wages.
W ith a few im portant exceptions, the average Peruvian silver miner 
employed about a dozen men and worked a single pit, producing just 
enough silver to cover his costs. The mining tribunal frequently drew 
attention to the fact that in many areas the industry operated almost at a 
subsistence level, and protested that the main reason for its backward­
ness was the fact that m erchants in Peru, unlike in New Spain, were 
simply not prepared to invest capital in basic improvements. T heir 
reluctance to provide long — term investment capital was partly a result of 
the fact that miners were notoriously unreliable at repaying loans, as the 
tribunal itself discovered when it advanced capital to a num ber of indi­
viduals. A more positive reason, however, for mercantile unwillingness to 
invest directly in the industry was that there were larger, quicker profits 
to be made from the investment of capital in the supply of m anufac­
tures to miners. As silver mining expanded, in fact, it provided a 
growing market for imported manufactures, and offered merchants some 
compensation for the loss of their form er lucrative trade with the 
corregidores, following the introduction of the intendant system in 1784. 
As mercantile confidence revived with the expansion of overseas trade, 
particularly in the decade before 1796, capital was also channelled to 
miners through aviadores, although generally on a short -  term  basis and 
at high rates of interest.
T he reliance of the aviadores upon capitalists in Lim a for both credit 
and supplies m eant that the welfare of the mining industry was closely 
related to that of trade. T he general fall in silver production throughout 
Peru after 1812 was partly a product of the economic disruption caused 
by continuing w arfare in Europe and revolutionary activity in South 
America. The most im portant single cause, however, was a sudden 
collapse of the industry at C erro de Pasco, which had emerged in the 
previous twenty years as the leading mining centre in the viceroyalty.
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Cerro de Pasco’s expansion had been made possible by the cutting of
drainage tunnels, which, although relatively near the surface, had
enabled miners there to bring vast quantities of ores to the surface for 
refining. By 1812, however, most of the pits had reached the maximum
depth at which they could be effectively drained by these traditional
socavones, and the result was an immediate fall in production. T he years 
after 1812 saw a continuing decline at C erro de Pasco, and also in most 
other Peruvian mining centres. T he situation deteriorated as mercury 
became increasingly scarce, and, more seriously, as Spanish merchants 
began to ship their capital back to Europe. But, against the general 
trend, one small group of capitalists in Lim a attempted to solve C erro de 
Pasco s drainage problems by importing English pum ping engines for 
use there. W ith the full support of the viceregal authorities, who were as 
aware as the promotors of the company of the advantages to be derived 
from  English technology, steam engines were installed and in action by 
1820. They made an immediate, dram atic impact upon the level of silver 
production by enabling miners at C erro de Pasco to exploit rich ores 
lying beneath the w ater level for the first time, and silver registration at 
Pasco soared to over 300,000 marks in 1820 as a result.
The W ars of Independence destroyed both the steam engines and the 
prospects of renewed expansion for the silver mining industry in Peru. 
It is abundantly clear, however, that, contrary to what many historians 
have asserted, the late eighteenth century, at least, was not a period of 
decline. T he growth of the industry in the late colonial period was 
relatively limited, it is true, in comparison with what occurred in New 
Spain, and its backwardness was still sufficiently evident in 1800 to dis­
courage dream s of economic revolution such as were being entertained 
by the inhabitants of rapidly expanding areas like the Rio de la Plata. 
Nevertheless, it was surely sufficiently impressive to convince Peruvians 
that, despite what many of them  had believed immediately after 1776, 
the viceroyalty had not been condemned to perm anent economic decline 
by the loss of U pper Peru.
Little of importance has been published in the last few years speci­
fically on the mining industry of eighteenth century Lower Peru. There 
have appeared, however, several significant contributions on other 
aspects o f economic activity, and one of their effects has been to further 
erode the interpretation of the period as one of sustained decline. 
Nicholas C ushner’s incisive 1980 monograph on the Jesuit estates of 
colonial Peru, for example, depicts the period after 1700 as one of 
radical im provem ent in the financial position of the Society of Jesus,
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suggesting that this development may be regarded as an indicator of a 
general expansion of the viceregal economy in the first half of the 
eighteenth century.*® H is work also provides a fascinating picture of the 
Jesuit marketing and distribution network for sugar and wine, which 
radiated from Peru to Q uito , the Rio de la Plata, and Paraguay, thus 
rem inding researchers of the existence of a series of overlapping and 
complex economic infrastructures which often rem ain invisible to those 
preoccupied with external trade between Peru and markets further afield. 
A similar function is fulfilled, albeit on a much more limited scale, for 
the p o s t-  1767 period by Jorge Polo’s valuable 1976 study of the 
fortunes of the form er Jesuit hacienda of Pachachaca.** This work, too, 
provides a glimpse of a flourishing agricultural economy, and substan­
tiates the now generally accepted assumption that the separation of 
U pper Peru from  the old viceroyalty did little to damage the importance 
of the Potosí market for the sugar producers of the Cuzco region. 
M agnus M örner’s 1978 study of rural society in the province of Cuzco 
at the end of the colonial period -  an appetizer for his eagerly awaited 
analysis of the historical dimensions of the social structure of southern 
Peru in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries -  is also worthy of 
mention in this context.*'* It, too, provides evidence of the continuing 
and extreme importance of the U pper Peruvian market for the sugar, 
coca, and cloth of Cuzco, as well as confirmation of a clear population 
increase between the late seventeenth century and the late eighteenth 
century. It is interesting to note, however, that the latter process was not 
uniform , and that one of the suggested reasons for the continuing 
migration of indigenous males from certain zones, a process which 
inevitably caused an imbalance of the sexes, was ’’the destructive impact 
of the mining m ita.”*** M ore recently still the pioneering study of Olinda 
Celestino and Albert M eyers on cofradías in central Peru has attributed 
the incessant and increasing judicial conflicts over land titles in the 
eighteenth century in part to ’’the growing pressure of men on the land 
and the demographic recovery which occurred in almost all the 
regions .
Further evidence of the continuing and, indeed, growing vitality of 
the Peruvian economy in the final decades of the eighteenth century is 
provided by recent research into the effects of comercio libre upon 
exports from Spain to America between 1778 and 1796.*"* Throughout 
this period exports through Cádiz were worth on average 76 percent of 
total exports from Spain to the empire, and an analysis of their stated 
destinations provides an interesting measure of the relative economic
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importance of different regions. Predictably, New Spain was the most 
im portant market, absorbing over 40 percent of the goods exported 
through Cádiz in 17 8 5 - 1796; Venezuelan ports took 10 percent, and 
C artagena, the Caribbean port of the viceroyalty of New G ranada, 8 
percent. The Rio de la Plata, served through Montevideo and Buenos 
Aires, emerged as an im portant market for the Cádiz m erchants, its 
share of 11 'percent of their exports being slightly larger than that of 
Venezuela. But the Pacific market, within which silver -  rich Peru was 
by far the most im portant single region, was more im portant in this 
period than Venezuela and the Rio de la Plata put together. It absorbed 
from  Cádiz alone goods with an average annual value of 52 million 
reales (2.6 million pesos) at 1778 value, compared with 26 million reales 
(1.3 million pesos) for the Rio de la Plata, and 24 million reales for 
Venezuela. It is not possible, unfortunately, to calculate the precise 
distribution of merchandise between Valparaíso, Arica, Callao, and 
Guayaquil, for, although virtually all the shipping registers name Callao 
as the single port of destination, a few link it with other Pacific ports 
without providing details of the proportions of cargoes intended for each. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Peru absorbed the bulk of this 
merchandise, paying for it with the increasing output of its silver mines: 
bullion accounted for 88 percent of its exports to Spain in 1 7 8 5 -8 9  and 
85 percent in 1790 — 94.^® Although substantially more ships went from 
Cádiz to the Rio de la P lata than to Peru, they tended to be small 
vessels, carrying relatively unim portant cargoes, whereas individual 
vessels supplying the more discerning and richer Peruvian market each 
carried goods worth up to almost a million pesos at wholesale values in 
Cádiz. ^  It is clear that Buenos Aires drew some trade away from Lima 
after 1778, but the idea that it supplanted it is a myth, albeit one created 
by the Consulado of Lim a in its vehement protests against free trade. 
In the mid — 1780’s, when the Spanish American market as a whole was 
being flooded with unsaleable goods, its fears were not entirely ground­
less, but the pattern of trade quickly stabilized, and during the decade 
1787 -  1796 exports from Cádiz to Callao were substantially larger than 
those to the Rio de la Plata in every year except 1790. Continuing 
research on the reverse trade, between America and Spain, in the same 
period, is planned, and should add substantially to our understanding of 
the economic effects of the Bourbon commercial reforms in Spanish 
America.
In view of the fundam ental importance of the mining industry to the 
whole economy of late colonial Peru, continuing research into trade and
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agriculture will inevitably throw light upon mining, and vice versa. It is 
also the case that any serious attempt to comprehend the totality of the 
Peruvian economy in this period must take account of the continuing 
close commercial links between the truncated viceroyalty and its further 
dependencies, notably U pper Peru.
T he historiographic picture with regard to economic life in U pper 
Peru has improved considerably. Peter Bakewell’s researches into the 
early history of Potosí have extended, insofar as silver production is 
concerned, as far as 1735.19 O n the late colonial period proper the out­
standing developments have been the appearance of Enrique T andeter’s 
1980 doctoral dissertation on the Potosí mining industry, 1 7 5 0 - 1826, 
and the publication of Rose M arie Buechler’s monograph on the mining 
society of Potosí, 17 7 6 - 1810.20 T andeter’s dissertation ranges widely 
across labour supply, investment and profit, and royal policy. It is 
appropriate to point out that he confirms the assumption that silver 
production continued after 1750 to recover from  its early eighteenth 
century trough, although the industry in Potosí remained dangerously 
dependent upon the state for the provision of labour, mercury, and 
financial subsidies. W hen these props were necessarily w ithdrawn, as a 
consequence of the destruction of the colonial state during the W ars of 
Independence, U pper Peruvian silver mining was left even more exposed 
to the harsh winds of change than the industry in other Spanish 
American countries. T he contraction of U pper Peruvian mining had 
already begun about 1800, it is argued, the decline was accentuated from 
1810, and continued until the 1870’s, despite the somewhat feeble 
attempts of English investors to pick up the pieces in the 1820’s.21
Like Tandeter, Buechler does not attem pt a definitive statem ent of 
the level of silver production in U pper Peru throughout the period under 
consideration. But her figures of purchases made by the Real Banco de 
San Carlos between 1779 and 1820, which must approximate closely to 
total registered production, confirm his suggestion of stable production in 
the 1780’s and 90’s, followed by decline after the turn of the century, 
slow at first and accelerated in the second decade of the nineteenth 
century. Between 1779 and 1788, the San Carlos purchases exceeded the 
registration of silver throughout Lower Peru. T hereafter, as Figure I 
indicates, the output of the Lower Peruvian mines surged ahead, while 
that o f Potosí stagnated and then declined.22 In 1802 purchases at Potosí 
-  205,000 marks -  were only 40 percent of registered Peruvian
production -  505,000 marks -  of which the single centre of C erro de 
Pasco accounted for 283,000. T hereafter, Peruvian output remained
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substantially higher than that of U pper Peru for the rem ainder of the 
colonial period. Both entered upon a period of decline after 1812, partly 
as a consequence of economic dislocation caused by continuing hostilities 
in Europe, partly because of internal revolutionary activity. But whereas 
Potosfs decline continued inexorably, that of Lower Peru was abruptly 
arrested in 1820, as we have noted, as the consequence of the installation 
of the English pum ping engines at C erro de Pasco.
Despite the fact that it contains valuable information on silver 
production at Potosí, Buechler’s meticulous monograph is concerned 
primarily with social history and the general impact of the Bourbon 
reforms in Potosí rather than with economic life as such. A thorough 
analysis is provided of the social composition of the mining guild. It 
demonstrates the complex links between im m igrant silver producers and 
the creole owners of refining plants, who tended to rent their facilities to 
the new arrivals rather than engage directly in large -  scale production. 
T he internal affairs of the guild, it is shown, were characterized on the 
one hand by the factious squabbles for which miners throughout the 
em pire were notorious and, on the other, a  readiness for all m em bers to 
combine with local administrators against interference from both Buenos 
Aires and M adrid.
It seems legitimate to suggest that as a result of this recent work on 
U pper Peru, coupled with one’s earlier researches on Lower Peru, the 
overall level of silver production in both areas has been established with 
reasonable accuracy for the late colonial period. It rem ains true, of 
course, that a considerable proportion of silver actually produced 
undoubtedly escaped registration to enter the channels of contraband 
trade, but it is difficult to find a way of m easuring this phenomenon 
with precision: most commentators reproduce H um boldt’s estimate that a 
quarter of total production was syphoned off.^3
Figures of silver registration, like the even more general data on 
treasury receipts, can offer at best only a  guide to the perform ance of 
the mining industry, and, indeed, can sometimes be misleading. For 
example, the figures presented in John  J .  T ePaske’s fascinating paper in 
this volume on the income of the Lim a treasury seem, at first sight, to 
suggest that the mining industry was more heavily taxed in the 1770’s 
than in the boom period of the 1790’s. But reference to his m ajor 
compilation of treasury accounts for Peru indicates that the yield of taxes 
on mining in other treasuries, notably Pasco, expanded significantly in 
the last decades of the eighteenth century.^4 T he Lim a figures, there­
fore, might be taken as reflecting a relative decline of the mining indu-
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stry in the areas adjacent to the capital, coupled with a greater readiness 
of miners and merchants to do their business with local treasuries.
A nother very suggestive contribution to this volume is that of John  
Coatsworth. O n e’s immediate reaction to this is that, whilst the approach 
is fascinating, it depends upon the reliability and appropriateness of the 
indices used to measure the purchasing power of silver. As fa r as Peru is 
concerned, the principal commodities which miners needed for their 
operations were mercury and labour and their other m ajor areas of 
consumption were in the purchase of imported manufactures, followed 
by local agricultural and viticultural products. T he price for mercury was 
fixed, that of labour fluctuated from region to region and week to week, 
although on the whole there was not a ’’labour shortage.” T he price of 
imported goods probably fell in the 1780’s and early 90’s, while little is 
known of agricultural prices. O ne point to bear in mind here, is that 
many miners were also m erchants and/or agricultural producers, large 
and small. M ining, in other words, can be isolated from the rest of the 
economy, and miners (who ranged from entrepreneurs to subsistence 
producers) from the rest of society, but the processes tend to be arti­
ficial. W hat is clear is that at the moment we simply do not possess the 
detailed data required to establish whether in Peru, for example, the real 
purchasing power of silver or the costs of labour, altered substantially in 
the eighteenth century.
One unanswerable question which is touched upon in the introduction 
to this volume is the extent to which the overall economic structure of 
Peru in the late colonial period reflected and/or provoked regional d iffe- 
rentation. A comment upon rather than a definitive answer to this 
question is that regionalism is certainly one of the crucial features of the 
late colonial political and social structures of Peru, with close identifica­
tion between racial conflict, insurgency, and the general hostility of the 
southern interior, represented by Cuzco, towards the viceregal c ap ita l.^  
T here are some indications that this hostility had in part an economic 
basis, and in this context it is possible, for example, to cite protests from 
mining deputations in Puno and H uam anga against the extravagance 
and inutility of the M ining T ribunal in distant Lim a, and its neglect of 
their local interests.^6 However, mining was relatively unim portant in the 
province of Cuzco, which acted as the focus for this regional discontent, 
particularly after 1810, and one’s general view at this stage is that 
tradition, coupled with racial and social considerations was probably a 
more im portant cause of antimetropolitan sentiment than anything 
specifically economic. It is also feasible that the relative prosperity of the
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late colonial period, a prosperity based prim arily upon the growth of the 
m ining industry, predisposed and enabled the elite in the viceregal 
capital to prefer continuing dependence upon Spain to the uncertain 
future offered by the tentative movements for independence which 
surfaced between 1810 and 1815 and which were characterized, espe­
cially in 1814, by a strong anti -  Lim a bias.
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C O M E N T A R IO
M arcello C arm agnani
Es tarea difícil com parar, a partir de los estudios de Coatsworth y de 
Fisher, la evolución del sector minero en el área de la Nueva España y 
en el área peruano en el último medio siglo de dominación colonial. La 
dificultad emerge del hecho que mientras Coatsworth trata de m ostrar la 
inexistencia de un crecimiento productivo, Fisher insiste en su existencia.
Recogiendo acríticamente los resultados de Coatsworth y Fisher, se 
debería pensar que los dos áreas conocen una evolución divergente. Pero 
hay en verdad una tal divergencia? Si observamos la evidencia que nos 
ofrecen, vemos que Fisher fundam enta su análisis en la serie del volu­
men físico de la producción mientras que Coatsworth lo fundam enta en 
la serie del valor de la misma. Sin em bargo, por el hecho que el valor 
de la plata no sufre alteración hasta muy entrado el siglo X IX , ambas 
series son susceptibles de comparación. Si observamos la Tabla I de 
Coatsworth y la Figura I de Fisher se tiene la impresión que, todo 
sumado, tanto en la Nueva España como en el Perú, la producción 
m inera presenta tendencias similares: crecimiento entre 1770 y 1795, 
estancamiento entre 1795 y 1810, y, decrecimiento, a partir de 
1 8 1 0 - 1820.
La diferencia entre los dos análisis radica en el hecho que Coats­
worth, a diferencia de Fisher, tra ta  de verificar si la expansión de la 
producción se traduce en un verdadero crecimiento de la misma, enten­
diendo por crecimiento la expansión del valor real, medida en términos 
de poder de adquisición, de productividad y de rentabilidad. Procediendo 
en esta form a Coatsworth construye, en form a más rigurosa que Fisher, 
un análisis sobre el nexo existente entre producción minera y economía 
global y acepta de correr los riesgos inherentes a toda em presa intelectual 
nueva.
Coatsworth construye su serie del valor real de la producción minera 
deflacionando el valor nominal de la mism a por los precios agrícolas. 
Este modo de proceder, convincente como técnica, es poco convincente 
como resultado, pues -  como puede verse comparando su T abla  I con 
su T abla IV  -  se traducen en una progresiva divergencia entre valor 
nominal y valor real de la producción, a partir de 1 7 6 0 -6 4 . Esta 
divergencia, insuficientemente explicada en su análisis, es de gran
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im portancia porque es a partir de ella que Coatsworth fundam enta su 
tesis de la inexistencia de un real crecimiento del sector minero en la 
Nueva España en el último tercio del siglo X V III.
A mi parecer la falta está en el tipo de deflactor utilizado para 
construir su serie del valor real. En efecto, es bien conocido que en el 
último tercio del siglo X V III y en el prim er decenio del siglo X IX  se 
asiste a una aceleración de los precios agrícolas. Pero hasta qué punto 
esta aceleración se traduce verdaderam ente en una progresiva disminu­
ción del valor real de la producción minera? Siguiendo las informaciones 
de H um boldt y Brading, el valor de los insumos para el sector minero 
puede así desagregarse: 18 por ciento en mercaderías importadas (fierro 
y mercurio), 36.8 por ciento en mercaderías nacionales (pólvora, cal, sal, 
m adera y muías) y 44.3 por ciento en salarios. Ahora bien, dado que el 
crecimiento de los precios agrícolas incide esencialmente en los salarios y 
por el hecho que ellos representan menos de la mitad del valor de los 
insumos, se puede pensar que el deflactor que Coatsworth debería haber 
utilizado debería haber sido un deflactor ponderado o, en su defecto, un 
deflactor de precios agrícolas construido usando los precios mínimos y no 
los medios. Con un nuevo deflactor, posiblemente el valor real de la 
producción minera se acercaría, como sucede hasta 1 7 6 0 -6 4 , más a su 
valor nominal, confirmando por lo tanto la validez de la tesis tradicional 
de existencia de un crecimiento en el último tercio del siglo X V III.
Interesante, aunque difícilmente aceptable, es su serie valor de 
mercado -  producción física a partir de la cual construye Coatsworth sus 
hipótesis de disminución de productividad y de beneficios mineros en el 
último tercio del siglo X V III. En efecto, siempre utilizando las infor­
maciones de Hum boldt y de Brading, se puede ver que, por efecto de 
escasa monetarización de los salarios, el costo de producción de la plata 
es inferior de un 25 por ciento a su costo de producción nominal (36 
reales por marco) en los años de 1790.
Coatsworth y Fisher parecen por lo menos concordar en un hecho: el 
sector minero en la Nueva España y en el Perú ha alcanzado a fines de 
la época colonial el máximo de sus posibilidades dada la tecnología 
extractiva y de refinación utilizada, esencialmente labor -  intensive. De 
allí entonces que el boom  se pueda explicar más por las condiciones 
favorables del contexto comercial internacional y por la política de 
subvenciones seguida por la corona en el aprovisionamiento del azogue y, 
yo agregaría, el precio político de la pólvora. Sin embargo, en este 
contexto sin la estructura mercantil del avío o habilitación, como emerge 
muy bien del análisis de Fisher, la producción m inera no habría podido
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alcanzar su máximo de expansión a nivel de circulación. Es además esta 
estructura mercantil, basada en la anticipación de bienes a cambio de 
metales preciosos que continuó funcionando hasta casi mediados del siglo 
X IX , que nos perm itiría comprender, si dispusiéramos de más estudios, 
el verdadero significado del sector minero en la economía mexicana y 
peruana.
Decir, como hace Coatsworth, que la minería representa apenas un 
ocho por ciento del producto territorial bruto mexicano, dice poco sobre 
su rol de generador de recursos monetarios en economías que, todo 
sumado, poseen todavía amplios sectores no monetarizados o escasamente 
monetarizados. Las observaciones de Fisher sobre el significado de la 
m inería en la economía peruana pueden entonces ser comparables a la 
que tuvo en la economía mexicana. La sugestiva hipótesis de Coatsworth 
relativa la progresiva mayor im portancia del sector agrícola en la eco­
nomía global merecería pero ser recogida y verificada en los dos con­
textos productivos, pues, tengo la impresión que ella contenga una buena 
dosis de verdad aunque tal vez tenga poco que ver con la productividad 
y la rentabilidad de la producción m inera y esté posiblemente asociado a 
la imposibilidad de una transformación estructural del sector.
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III. A G R IC U L T U R E  A ND  L IV E ST O C K  R A ISIN G
3. T H E  AGE O F PA RA D O X : M E X IC A N  A G R IC U L T U R E  A T  
T H E  END O F  T H E  C O L O N IA L  P E R IO D , 1 7 5 0 - 1810
Eric V an Young
The eighteenth century was, for Mexico, an age of paradox. In a 
period of Baroque splendor -  witness those sumptuous monum ents to 
the C hurrigueresque style: Santa Prisca, Tepotzotlán, La V alenciana -  
the lépero became a fam iliar figuic on the streets of the viceregal 
capital. As the sphincters of imperial trade policy loosened and 
commercial prosperity increased, the fiscal machinery was cranked up to 
extract ever larger surpluses from New Spain, and political controls were 
tightened on the colony, producing a real sense of disfranchisement 
within a large segment of the colonial elite. While educated, white, and 
wealthy urban dwellers sought increasingly to be a part o f a wider 
western culture, large groups of the uneducated, brown, and poor rural 
masses fought tenaciously to preserve a traditional way of live slipping 
from their grasp. These contradictions and many others were not of 
course children of the Bourbon century exclusively. Every age has its 
paradoxes, and the seeds of these had been planted long before. But the 
eighteenth century -  and especially its latter half -  seems to have been 
a period of particularly sharp contradictions and of accelerating change.
In no aspect of M exican life of the period was this characteristic 
more marked than in rural economic structure. T hus, for example, while 
absolute levels of agricultural and livestock production seem to have 
risen considerably, productivity -  that is, the relative capacity to 
produce of a given unit of capital, land, or labor -  seems to have 
stagnated or grown little. Rising prices for agricultural and livestock 
products made la rg e -sc a le  agriculture more profitable, while declining 
real wages for farm  labor helped produce a general scenario of rural 
impoverishment and proletarianization. Large landholdings seem to have 
grown more valuable and effectively larger, and small ones smaller. 
While agricultural surpluses grew and commercialization spread through 
the countryside, crises of death and fam ine seemed to come more 
frequently and to be of greater magnitude. R ural population grew
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precipitously, but poverty was ever more widespread. In terms of the 
overall social distribution of wealth, then, the eighteenth was a century in 
chiaroscuro -  a  pattern of light and dark, of vivid contrast and 
contradiction.
Most modern historiography on late colonial Mexico has tended to 
emphasize the boom aspects of the period after 1750, the age of the 
’’new prosperity” as Leslie B. Simpson called it .1 It has been assumed 
that the agricultural economy, ipso facto , must have shared in the 
prosperity and growth, following the more dynamic commercial and
O
mining sectors. Yet there are im portant reasons to doubt the accuracy 
of this knee -  jerk model of agricultural development. In the first place, 
as mentioned above, the putatively bright picture of the late colonial 
rural economy offers darker shadings as well. Secondly, evidence is 
beginning to accumulate that even in the leading sectors of the Mexican 
economy, notably mining, the vaunted late colonial boom was not as 
strong as investigators have always thought, and may even have repre­
sented a decline relative to earlier cycles of prosperity.3 If the condition 
of commercial agriculture, in particular, is seen to be linked to that of 
other economic activities, and if those activities did not undergo the kind 
of degree of development we have thought previously, then some doubt 
must be cast on the optimistic view of rural economic development as 
well. Thirdly, it is becoming fairly clear that even in some areas where 
the prosperity of agriculture was very marked -  in the G uadalajara 
region and in the Bajío, for example -  the changes evident in the late 
eighteenth century were ones of degree, and not of kind. T hat is to say, 
we are looking at situations in which growth is present, but development 
may not be present, or may be significantly distorted.4 These reserva­
tions notwithstanding, the evidence of considerable agricultural prosperity 
in late colonial Mexico is substantial. How, then, can views of boom 
and poverty or stagnation be reconciled?
This apparent contradiction can, in fact, be explained by the consi­
deration of a somewhat more complex model of agrarian change -  a 
model that goes beyond the compilation of aggregate figures or general 
descriptive statements. Such a model would need to take into account 
distributional factors, both horizontal and vertical, as well as overall 
quantitative ones — that is, the distribution of agricultural property and 
product am ong identifiable regions within New Spain (horizontal), and 
among class and ethnic groups (vertical). If  these c ro ss-cu ttin g  variables 
are ignored, then the averaging tendency of general statem ents, both 
descriptive and statistical, will obscure not only spatial and social parti­
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cularities which are interesting in themselves, but also the internal 
dynamism of the rural economy considered as a system. Seen from  this 
perspective, the apparent contradictions of late colonial agrarian structure 
can be treated as a series of interlocking, symbiotic sub -  systems rather 
than as sets of irreconcilable inconsistencies. T o cite but one example, 
the relative growth and florescence of some Mexican cities can be asso­
ciated with a dual process involving both spatial and social shifts in 
economic resources. O n the other hand, resources were in a sense 
transferred from hinterlands to urban areas in the form of declining 
rural wages and only moderately rising food prices for urban -  dwellers.'’ 
O n the other hand, the process of agricultural commercialization 
spurred by expanding urban demand implied a greater social concentra­
tion of wealth in the non -  subsistence sector of the farm ing and stock- 
raising economy -  thus the horizontal and vertical shifts, respectively. 
We shall have occasion to cite other examples of seeming paradox within 
Mexican agrarian structure, aspects of late colonial developments which 
are really more dialectical than inconsistent with each other.
T he present essay is an effort to define some of the characteristics of 
late colonial agrarian structure in New Spain with reference to the 
apparent contradictions of the age -  factors which upon closer inspec­
tion turn  out to be the obverse and reverse sides of the same coin. 
R ather than aim at presenting a unified, coherent vision of M exican 
rural economy from 1750 to 1819 -  impossible in any case one would 
think, in an essay of this length -  I have opted to focus on sets of 
problems and of processes. T he approach is therefore necessarily allu­
sive, cleaving closely to the limitations of the secondary literature which 
it synthesizes incompletely. T he central method is to fit the characteristics 
discussed into the matrix formed by the cross -  cutting variables of 
horizontal and vertical resource distribution mentioned above.
I. Agriculture and the Bourbon Policies: Step—child in an A ge o f 
R eform
Perhaps the most dram atic and noisiest development of the late 
colonial period, at least as portrayed by modern investigators, was the 
advent of the Bourbon reform s -  what one scholar has dubbed a 
’’revolution in governm ent.”^ W hether these reforms -  a largely incoher­
ent mass of imperial legislation created in the name of military pre­
paredness, fiscal efficiency, and economic revitalization -  revolutionized 
anything more than the structure of the colonial bureaucracy is open to
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serious question. Nonetheless, the reforms and the general atm osphere of 
’’enlightened despotism” which prevailed at the end of the colonial period 
did bring about certain changes in the M exican economy, particularly in 
the area of taxation, but also notably in commerce, and to a lesser 
degree in mining and m anufacturing.7
Agriculture was the step -  child in the age of enlightened despotism 
-  it was almost totally neglected by the Bourbon reformers, both in a 
philosophical and a practical way. C om pared with the perceptible 
restructuring of activity that occurred under the impact of the Bourbon 
reforms in bureaucratic organization, fiscal policy, international and 
domestic commerce, and to some degree in the mining sector, state -  
induced change in agriculture was minimal. T he agricultural economy 
was thus the passive recipient of effects produced in other sectors of the 
colonial economy which were directly affected. David Brading has 
suggested, for example, that one result of reduced trade restrictions 
within the Em pire beginning in the 1770’s was to drive mercantile capital 
out of international commerce, where it had enjoyed strongly monopol­
istic advantages and concomitantly high profits, and into large -  scale 
landownership. O ther investigators, on the other hand, have pointed to 
the continuing functional links between large -  scale commerce and 
landownership to the very end of the colonial period, since the business 
of agriculture often required a constant injection of capital to yield its 
unspectacular but steady profits.9 T he relationship suggested by the latter 
situation, then, would be one not so much of capital flight or se lf -  
liquidation as of constant symbiosis. W hatever interpretation one elects, 
it seems clear that the late colonial commercial boom was stimulated by 
population growth and imperial trade reform , and that commercial 
capital in turn was made available to finance agriculture. T he change 
itself was exogenous to the agricultural economy to a large extent, 
however. 19
Attempts to change Mexican agriculture substantially by royal fiat, or 
at least to regulate it, were made, but in the first case demonstrated 
little success, and in the second were inplemented with quite different 
ends in mind. Crown efforts to encourage the planting of new crops, 
such as flax, by Indian peasants and other farm ers met with indifferent 
results.11 T he creation during the latter part of the century of royal 
monopolies, or increases in fiscal exactions on semi -  processed agricul­
tural products of wide popular consumption such as tobacco and the 
ubiquitous pulque  certainly rendered profits to the crown by concentrat­
ing production and keeping prices high, but they also limited the d iffu -
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sion of incomes from such activities, stimulated contraband, and may 
ultimately have damaged the industries.1^  Agricultural colonization in the 
far north of New Spain, despite its long -  term significance, did little to 
relieve population pressures in the central part of the country, and 
indeed, if it had, would probably have driven up rural wages and 
inhibited the commercialization of la rg e -sc a le  farm ing .1'1 At the end of 
the period the infamous Consolidación de Vales Reales of 1804 - 1809
succeeded in wringing several million pesos of borrowed ecclesiastical
capital from the agricultural economy, but this was an ad hoc policy 
initiated without regard for that economy per se, and its actual effects on 
the rural economy of New Spain are still not clear.14
W hy should the reformist Bourbon monarchy have, at best, taken a 
few half measures towards stimulating the Mexican agricultural economy 
and, at worst, have preyed upon it as a source of revenue without 
thought as to the effects of fiscal exactions? Two interrelated reasons 
suggest themselves. In the first place, despite the awareness of con­
tem poraries (Alexander von Hum boldt and José M aría Q ueiros, for 
example) that agricultural production in New Spain had a greater
aggregate yearly value than any other sector of the economy, the 
Spanish crown simply was interested in other things as targets for
reform, activities which the Bourbon ministers and proyectistas felt 
offered greater fiscal benefits in the short -  run and which were more in 
keeping with current European notions of political econom y.1'’ Thus, 
despite the beginnings of a mild, Physiocratic -  like critique of la tifun - 
dism in the colony, taken up even by such illustrious members of the 
colonial establishment as Bishop Abad y Q ueipo of Michoacán, a 
fundam ental attem pt to restructure M exican agriculture in general and 
the landholding system in particular was not forthcoming, let alone any 
widespread public debate on the issue.1® In the second place, the agri­
cultural economy, even had reformers wanted to change it significantly, 
was much harder to get at than commerce or the fiscal structure. As an 
economic activity it was ubiquitous, less concentrated, and more hetero­
geneous than other sectors: its ills were harder to analyze and its pro­
cesses harder to control. Therefore, to the degree that the Bourbon 
reforms, although they took place over several decades, were a ’’quick 
fix” for imperial ills, they quite naturally ignored the ponderous and 
glacier -  like socio -  economic structures represented by the rural 
economy.
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Capital and Technology: Growth without D evelopm ent
Although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to construct figures 
regarding productivity in agriculture for the last half -  century of the 
colonial era, it seems reasonable to say that overall increases in produc­
tion can be ascribed to higher levels of capital investment and labor 
inputs, rather than technological improvements or new production 
arrangem ents.In  terms of the distributional variables discussed above, 
capital investment in market -  oriented agriculture, especially among 
large and middling haciendas, seems to have moved up and in; that is to 
say, from  the mass of the rural population towards large landowners, 
and from  the countryside to the city. Low rural wages (on which more 
below) partially underwrote the profitability of investment in large -  scale 
agriculture, and in turn fed the burgeoning cities of the realm. U nder 
such circumstances, the landholding elite, new and old, exacted a kind of 
brokerage fee in the transfer of resources from  country to city in the 
form  of profits on agricultural investment. W ages lagged behind prices 
for agricultural commodities and m anufactured goods, creating an 
available surplus for a form  of primitive accumulation which fueled some 
forms of economic development, albeit in a truncated way.
Capital investment in commercial agriculture apparently tended to 
assume the form of land acquisition, where possible; or of m ise -  
en -  valeur of land previously underutilized; or of the expansion of a 
technology already basically in place. O ne common form of the latter 
process was the pattern of crop successions and displacements typical of 
areas of commercial agriculture. In the valley of Mexico, for example, 
T utino has noted the northward displacement of stock raising in the late 
eighteenth century in favor of pulque  production and other more inten­
sive activities which grew up in response to the expanding market of 
Mexico City. Similarly, in the G uadalajara region and Bajío tillage 
expanded at the expense of livestock raising, and wheat cultivation at the 
expense of maize, while in large parts of M ichoacán, considerable 
capital was invested in irrigation w orks.17 Land values rose, particularly 
in the commercial agricultural sector, not just owing to the passive pro­
cesses of population growth and the limitation of resources, but also due 
to active capital investment, much of it supported by landowner bor­
rowing from  the church. In the case of the G uadalajara region, which I 
have, studied, increases of several hundred percent in the value of m ajor 
grain -  producing haciendas were not uncomm on. For example, the 
im portant H acienda de Atequiza, near Lake C hapala, grew 800 percent
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in value between 1725 and 1821, and the great H acienda del Cabezón, 
further to the west, increased in value by 300 percent in the thirty years 
between 1763 and 1793. By way of contrast, rural wages remained 
virtually stable during the eighteenth century, while maize prices barely 
doubled between 1700 and 1810.^  Capital continued to flow into 
large -  scale agriculture, as we have noted above, from  the mining and 
commercial sectors of the colonial economy, supporting traditional elite 
status aspirations and the optimizing strategy of economic diversification 
so characteristic of late colonial family enterprises.*®
T he late colonial rise in production levels was created principally by 
capital investment in dam s, irrigation works, storage facilities, etc.; by 
the intensification of existing technologies; and by increased labor inputs. 
Productivity increases ascribable to the natural fertility of previously 
unworked lands being brought into production were probably offset by 
the fact that most prime arable land in the more heavily populated parts 
of Mexico had already long since been occupied.'*® T he development or 
application of new technologies -  of new multipliers of hum an effort -  
in late colonial agriculture, such as the fallowing practices, fertilizers, or 
crop rotations which characterized the ’’new husbandry” in northern 
Europe, were scarcely to be found in New Spain or elsewhere in Latin 
America. At the very end of the colonial period contemporary observers, 
such as Baron von Hum boldt, noted the relative backwardness of M exi­
can agricultural technology even within the commercial sector. Attempts 
at state -  directed innovation in agriculture were not particularly suc­
cessful, as noted above. Even capital -  intensive, specialized agricultural 
industries, such as sugar production, tended to experience improvement 
in very small increments, if at all. In the specific case of sugar there 
were technological innovations, especially in the milling process, but these 
seem to have been zealously guarded and remained of local impact 
only.“*1
As other societies have found before us, and as we are finding today, 
there are definite limits to the am ount of technological innovation 
applicable under given environmental, economic, and social conditions.
nn
Some of these limits are natural and some m a n -m a d e . U nder the 
prevailing conditions of late colonial Mexico, three factors operated to 
keep technological innovation in agriculture to a m inim um . First, and 
most intractable, was the scarcity of arable land (it has been estimated 
that only about 10 or 12 percent of the total land area of the country is
no
capable of sustaining agriculture under optimal conditions) and w a te r /0 
Second, population densities in the colony had apparently not reached
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sufficiently high levels to w arrant intensifications of a technological 
nature such as were occurring in parts of Europe during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. France, for example, which hardly led the way 
in technological innovation in agriculture in this period, had an overall 
population density of approximately 127 people per square mile in about 
1800, as compared to M exico’s seven per square mile.^4 U nder such 
circumstances technological intensifications simply would not have been 
cost -  effective in New Spain, even given the generally low prevailing 
wages in agriculture. Finally, the low degree of economic specialization 
in agriculture, represented by the continued importance and resilience of 
the peasant subsistence sector, acted as a drag on technological innova­
tion in agriculture as a whole. Demographic growth in the peasant sector 
on a more or less fixed land base tended to force wages downward, thus 
shifting the production costs in the direction of labor and largely elimi­
nating the need for technological improvement. W ithin the peasant sector 
itself an already highly adapted technology, that of maize agriculture, 
formed the material base of production. Given enough land for the 
expansion of peasant agriculture, the technology would simply have been 
extended in an additive m anner. Since this was not the case in the 
peasant sector, the tendency was for Indian and other subsistence pro­
ducers to invest more labor rather than more capital or technology, along 
the lines of the model suggested by A .V . Chayanov. Surplus manpower 
was put to work in what I have elsewhere referred to as ’’interstitial”
economic operations, such as labor -  intensive artisanal and collecting
. . .  «  activities.
III. Population M ovem ent and Subsistence Crisis: A  M althusian  
Scissors?
T he growth of population in eighteenth century New Spain seems to 
have fueled a certain am ount of economic expansion while at the same 
time imposing limits on that very expansion. T he increase of rural 
population in particular, through the process of migration, contributed to 
the growth of M exican cities at rates considerably in excess of the 
natural, thus stimulating the economic division of labor within the 
country while providing larger markets of agricultural products. This was 
notably the case with the viceregal capital, which grew from a popula­
tion of about 100,000 in around 1742, to nearly double that num ber in 
1810, but it also occurred in other regional capitals. For example, 
G uadalajara, which had a population of about 5,000 in 1700, had
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increased to some 35 -  40,000 by 1800, or roughly double the size one 
would expect to see assuming a natural rate of increase in the 1700 
population of even 4 percent annually. M oreover, the growth of this 
provincial capital was concentrated most strongly in the period after 
1750, during which the city nearly quadrupled in size. M uch of this 
growth was the result of migration from the countryside around the city. 
O ther provincial cities, if they experienced less dram atic rates of growth 
during the later eighteenth century, nonetheless increased in size sub­
stantially, such as G uanajuato, which tripled in size to reach some 
90,000 between 1742 and 1809, and Q uerétaro , which doubled its 
population (from about 25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants) between 1750 and 
1800 .^  Intra -  regional migration, then, played an im portant part in the 
creation of market opportunities -  even though the market thus created 
may have possessed a relatively low consuming power -  by achieving a 
partial horizontal shift in population.
T here is evidence, however, that the same demographic expansion 
which helped to stimulate the colonial economy by depressing wage levels 
and contributing to urban growth was flagging by the end of the colo­
nial period as a result of M althusian pressures. T o cite the case of the 
G uadalajara region once again, the rate of aggregate population growth, 
combining a recovery in the Indian population (after its nadir in the 
seventeenth century) with increase of non -  Indian groups, hit well over 2 
percent by the early eighteenth century, but lost its mom entum by the 
close of the colonial period, dropping to 0.7 percent in the decade 
18 0 0 - 1810, and recovering only slightly in the following decade. O ther 
areas in New Spain showed the same general upsurge during the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries, and the same tendency to reduce their 
rates of growth in the last decades of the colonial era. Demographic 
analyses for San Luis de la Paz and León, both in the Bajío, corroborate 
this overall trend in population movement, as do those for parts of 
O axaca.^7 W ithin the overall trend of increasing population, but with a 
decline in the rate of increase setting in at the end of the colonial era, 
shifts also occurred in the ethnic composition of the Mexican population, 
though with strong regional variations. T he valley of O axaca, for 
example, remained heavily Indian to the end of the period despite m ajor 
demographic strides by non -  Indian groups in the population. In the 
middling case, the population of the G uadalajara region was divided 
almost equally between Indians and white and mixed -  blood groups by 
the close of the period, while that of large parts of the Bajío was 
becoming predominantly mestizo. This would have im portant implica—
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tions for regional agrarian structures, particularly for the resilience of 
Indian landholding communities, the degree of commercialization in 
agriculture, and the extent of rural proletarianization and proto -
industrialization.28
The reasons for the slackening in Mexican population growth toward 
the end of the colonial period are not altogether clear as yet. David 
Brading and Elsa Malvido, am ong others, have suggested that variations 
in the death rate, especially in the Indian segment of the population, 
rather than changes in fertility or other factors account for the charac­
teristic ’’old regime” demographic movements one sees during the last
century of colonial ru le.2® These patterns include periodically sharp 
increases in mortality -  e .g ., 1690’s, 1730’s, 1760’s, 1780’s (though
unevenly distributed among the m ajor ethnic components of the general 
population) -  linked to epidemic disease and subsistence crises, and an 
equally marked tendency for high birth rates and the ability for the 
population to reestablish relatively rapid rates of growth after each crisis. 
Although changes in mortality do account convincingly for general 
population movements during the period, it is impossible to explain the 
demographic retrogression of the late eighteenth century by reference to 
the inherent severity of disease and fam ine alone. Indeed, it is difficult 
to see that the incidence of disease and fam ine increased significantly 
during the late eighteenth century over the early part of the century, or 
even over the seventeenth.30 W hat did  change during the period, 
however, were the relative relationships of different sectors of the 
population to the means of production, and the relationship of the 
Mexican population as a whole to environmental resources. Contem po­
raries certainly noted the demographic effects of recurrent disease and 
fam ine. N avarro y Noriega wrote in 1820, for example, that:
U no no encuentra que este reino (de Nueva España) esté tan poblado como 
debería estarlo, excepto en una o dos provincias, porque la miseria en la que 
el pueblo bajo vive, los desafortunados defectos de su educación y las hambres 
y las epidemias, han causado la desaparición de un gran núm ero de per­
sonas. 31
Alexander von Hum boldt, on his part, ascribed much of the social 
malaise of New Spain, despite the country’s abundant resources, to the 
highly skewed distribution of w ealth.32
It is with reference to distributional factors, then, that one must seek 
to explain the severe effects of late colonial subsistence crises and 
epidemic disease on the M exican population. Enrique Florescano has
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mapped and traced these episodes for the eighteenth century. In addition 
to describing the dislocative effects of recurrent subsistence crises linked 
to occurrences of epidemic disease -  rising incidence of vagabondage 
and crime, labor problems, disruptions in mining, manufacturing, and 
agricultural activities -  he emphasizes the periodicity of such crises, the 
increasingly wild fluctuations in maize production and prices which 
characterized them , and the secular trend of rising maize prices which 
set in after 1790 or so. T he most serious and so fa r the best studied of 
these late colonial breakdowns was that of the fam ous año de ham bre  of 
1785 - 1786, in which agricultural dearth combined with epidemic disease 
produced truly lethal effects over much of New Spain.33 It is true that 
such cycles in New Spain tended during the late colonial period to 
correspond with those in Europe, lending some weight to the argum ent 
that meteorological and other factors extrinsic to the Mexican economy 
were in part responsible for the demographic s low -dow n  visible after 
1760 or so.3* Nonetheless, it is im portant to note that such mortal 
episodes were frequent in the era before the population b reak -d o w n , 
that they demonstrated a relative intensity on occasion equal to or greater 
than those of the later period, and that after them  population still 
continued its rapid upward clim b.35 W hat had changed by the late 
eighteenth century, and what aggravated the effects of dearth and 
disease, was the economic situation of the mass of the Mexican popula­
tion, especially in rural areas. Increasing rural proletarianization, 
declining real wages, growing concentration of property in land, and a 
num ber of related socio-econom ic factors combined to make the popular 
classes even more vulnerable to the effects of epidemic and subsistence 
crises. If  one cannot speak, precisely, of a terminal M althusian crises or 
of a ’’M althusian scissors effect,” it is nonetheless clear that in large parts 
of the country the population had begun to press closely upon the 
available agricultural resources, making the periodic subsistence episodes 
of the era more formidable than they might otherwise have been, and 
slowing the mom entum of demographic growth.
IV . The Land Question: "Nothing is S u rer ...”
The most im portant key to the late colonial situation seems to have 
been the growth of population in many regions of New Spain relative to 
available land resources -  that is, an increasing concentration in 
landownership. T he indications are, however, that the m ajor impulse for 
this concentration came from  below -  from the population end, rather
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than from above -  from the landowning end. This is not to say that 
land itself did not change from  the Indian/peasant sector in the direction 
of the large, non -  Indian property owners, but simply that m ajor 
changes in the legal ownership of land were a product of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and not of the eigthteenth.
Throughout much of central Mexico -  the area between the 
Chichimec frontier and the isthmus of Tehuantepec -  the Indian 
demographic collapse which took place in the century and a quarter 
following the Spanish conquest left large stretches of the countryside 
empty or significantly depopulated. Combined with the general availa­
bility of land, the period saw the generation of im portant market 
opportunities with the growth of cities and towns and the non -  Indian 
population generally. This conjunction of circumstances gave rise to the 
classical Mexican great rural estate, the hacienda.'*7 In general terms, 
the period which saw the indigenous population reach its low point 
-  the mid -  seventeenth century -  also saw the hacienda occupy the 
vacuum in the countryside with a more or less extensive form of 
exploitation, depending heavily on indebted labor and emphasizing 
livestock raising. T here were, of course, some notable exceptions to this 
general scenario, in areas which remained relatively heavily populated or 
outside the orbit of Spanish economic interest. In the valley of O axaca, 
for example, as William Taylor has shown, Indian landholding remained 
dominant throughout the colonial period.38
By the time the population recovery of the period 16 5 0 - 1750 began 
to put significant pressure on agricultural resources, most readily culti­
vable land had been pre -  empted by Indian communities themselves and 
by non -  Indian estates. As the eighteenth century progressed, and with 
it an increasing development of large -  scale capitalist agriculture, the 
chafing between growing num bers of peasant villagers and estate -  
owners became even more notable. Litigation, violence, land invasions, 
and enclosure seem to have increased in frequency in a num ber of m ajor 
agricultural regions of New' Spain. M inor adjustm ents were made in the 
boundaries of already -  existing haciendas in many areas of the country, 
but remarkably few new properties were created by agglomeration of 
smaller parcels or by large scale expropriation of Indian lands, as studies 
of the valley of Mexico, the Puebla -  T laxcala area, the Bajío, and the 
G uadalajara region have all shown.3® M ore specifically, the ownership 
histories of individual rural estates indicate that m ajor land acquisitions 
for the most part preceded 1750, or even 1700. For example, H erm an 
K onrad’s detailed study of the land titles of the great Jesuit hacienda of
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Santa Lucía and its annexed properties, directly to the north of Mexico 
City, shows that most land transactions instrum ental in building the 
hacienda occurred previous to 1700, and that there were no further 
acquisition at all after 1737. O n the other hand, of the eighty -  five 
conflicts and disputes involving the hacienda in the two centuries between 
1576 and 1767, about two -  thirds occurred after 1700. Much the same 
story can be told for the m ajor haciendas of the G uadalajara region, 
nearly all of which measured the same size in 1800 as they had in 
1700.110 As I have pointed out above, what occurred during the growth 
phase of large -  scale Mexican agriculture in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century was a process of internal colonization of estates 
already established during the preceding centuries, and not the creation 
of a land -  hungry, aggressive commercial agriculture out of whole 
cloth.
Rural agrarian structure, at the end of the colonial period, demon­
strated a more complex distribution of types of production units than just 
large haciendas and Indian villages. Particularly in the north -  central 
and western -  central parts of New Spain -  in the Bajío, in Michoacán, 
and in New Galicia -  smallholdings survived in considerable numbers 
in the countryside on the margins of the large hacienda, often enjoying 
independent juridical status as individually owned ranchos. But also in 
the valley of O axaca, where Indian landholding remained relatively more 
im portant in the total land tenure picture than elsewhere, small non -  
Indian owned properties were numerous, and may even have increased 
in num ber, if not in aggregate size, during the eighteenth century.^* 
Indeed, such small properties, sandwiched in socio -  economically along 
with small provincial m erchants and other rural middlemen between 
landholding Indian communities and large, commercially oriented estates, 
served to articulate peasant and capitalist modes of production in 
im portant ways.4  ^ In some areas renting and sharecropping arrange­
ments abounded, so that even where legal title to agricultural lands had 
already been preempted by the owners of large estates, effective units of 
production were more numerous than might be expected. In fact, as has 
been demonstrated for parts of the Bajío and Michoacán, while hacen­
dados often worked their demesne farm s, income from rentals and 
sharecropping formed im portant parts of overall hacienda revenues, with 
the terms of such arrangem ents generally shifting in favor of large 
landowners towards the close of the colonial period.
Heterogeneity and internal differentiation also characterized economic 
life within the peasant sector, particularly in landholding Indian villages.
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T he growing market opportunities and monetarization of the rural 
economy during the eighteenth century, and especially during its latter 
half, may have increased wealth differences within indigenous commu­
nities, producing strains which ill accorded with the cosmological 
assumptions upon which communal solidarity was based. Gibson, in his 
study of the Indians of the valley of Mexico, found wealth accumulation, 
pretension to noble status, and social -  climbing present in village society 
in an advanced form already in the sixteenth century, despite the 
tendency for the Spanish conquest to compress and homogenize Indian 
society. The possibility exists, in fact, that much of the solidarity and 
hostility with which Indian villages confronted outsiders, particularly with 
regard to conflicts over land, may have been the artifice of an outward 
deflection of aggression and strain linked directly to internal social and 
economic d ifferen tia tion .^
V. Labor: The Peonage Puzzle
If  the land tenure situation of New Spain presents a complicated 
picture during the period after 1750, the condition of rural labor presents 
one equally complex. T here is by now little argum ent among historians 
of Mexican agrarian structure that agricultural labor arrangem ents in 
most regions of New Spain followed the sequence encomienda -  reparti­
miento -  free wage labor/peonage, as developed by Charles Gibson in his 
study of the valley of Mexico. Insofar as the growth of commercialized, 
la rg e -sc a le  agriculture in the late colonial period is concerned, despite 
the highly variegated labor situation in Mexico, the m ajor variables 
determining any given labor regimen are clear enough: degree of 
commercialization, size of potential labor force, and availability of land. 
For purposes of the present essay, the most im portant questions to be 
answered about the late colonial rural labor system are two. First, to 
what degree was it dominated by the institution of debt peonage, and 
how widespread and exploitative was the practice? Second, in what way 
did labor, considered as a component of the agricultural production 
process, contribute to late colonial agrarian development?
Viewed as a whole, the evidence on debt peonage suggests that where 
labor was in short supply, either because of a m anpower scarcity or 
because of a strong peasant subsistence sector which offered viable 
economic alternatives to large num bers of potential rural laborers, 
peonage could be relatively harsh. W here m anpower was plentiful, on 
the other hand, the logistics of maintaining a perm anent estate labor
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force might necessitate some degree of debt peonage, but on the whole 
the institution was likely to be less pervasive and less harsh .44 T he major 
study we have for the north in the late colonial period, that of Charles 
H arris, paints a picture of fairly harsh labor conditions under the 
regimen of debt peonage: physical coercion of laborers, high debt levels, 
enforcement of the sanctity of debt, and severe limitation of physical 
mobility. In late colonial O axaca, according to Taylor, debt levels were 
high and physical coercion on haciendas frequent, but indications 
regarding limitation of physical mobility are not abundant. In the first 
case, land in great quantities had been preem pted by large landlords and 
labor was scarce, so that a coercive labor system seemed to make sense 
in order to assure a steady labor supply. In the second, Indian peasants 
-  the potential labor force -  had at least some alternatives to working 
for wages on haciendas, so that high debt levels functioned at least in 
part as a means of recruiting and retaining labor. In areas of central 
Mexico during the late colonial and early national periods, there is much 
evidence to indicate that although laborers may have been physically 
abused with some frequency, nonetheless per capita debt levels were not 
particularly high in terms of what a resident laborer was likely to earn in 
a given time span; that laborers regularly absconded without liquidating 
their debts; that haciendas were just as likely to owe back wages to their 
labor forces as the reverse; and that mobility of laborers was not limited 
in any great degree.4'’
M uch of the most recent research on rural labor during the colonial 
period tends to the view that debt peonage was neither as widespread 
nor as harsh as historians had previously believed, subject, of course, to 
the qualifications stated above regarding regional differences. T here are 
two m ajor reasons for this. In the first place, it has been suggested 
convincingly by Gibson, and substantiated by others, that debt repre­
sented not so much a coercive mechanism on the part of labor -  
recruiting landowners, as a reflection of a strong bargaining position on 
the part of rural laborers, growing out of the la b o r-sc a rc e  conditions of 
the seventeenth century.46 T hus, debt levels would logically vary directly 
with the strength of labor’s bargaining power, the m ajor determ inant of 
which would be the availability of labor. U nder such conditions, one 
would expect to see a decline in overall indebtedness when labor became 
more abundant and a concomitant weakening of the laborers position. 
This is precisely what happened in many areas in the late colonial 
period, when population increased relative to the land base of inde­
pendent peasant farm ing and the needs of expanding commercial agri—
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culture, as in the G uadalajara region in western central M exico.47 The
resultant conditions for rural wage labor might indeed be harsh, but as a
result of the weakening of debt peonage, not its health. In  the second
place, many researchers have noted the increasing relative importance of
tem porary wage labor, drawn in large measure from Indian peasant
villages where shortages of land prevailed at the end of the eighteenth
century. In many areas such laborers were at a disadvantage compared
to resident debt peons, since they enjoyed no perquisites on rural estates,
no protection, and sometimes no regular rations as part of their 
48wages.
T he preceding discussion provides the rudiments of an answer to the 
second question regarding the late colonial rural labor system, that of its 
role in the commercial agricultural expansion of the period. Put simply, 
the growth of rural population and the static land base of peasant 
farm ers and villages increased the available labor pool during the late 
colonial years and insured that rural wages did not rise in money terms, 
thereby effectively depressing real wages. T he evidence for such a trend 
is unequivocal and comes from  all over New Spain, and even parts of 
the north and near north, where labor remained in relatively less abun­
dance.49 Cheap labor thus supported the expansion of commercialized 
large -  scale agriculture and largely eliminated the need for technological 
innovation. Productivity may have remained low, but so did wages, even 
though labor costs made up a high percentage of overall production 
costs. These conditions, in the evocative phrase of Charles H arris, 
created a situation in which ’’the peon pretended to work and the m aster 
pretended to pay h im .”50
VI. M arkets and Regional D evelopment: Stirrings and Shiftings
If eighteenth -  century haciendas were frequently sprawling, under­
utilized properties with markedly patriarchal social structures, they 
nonetheless typically demonstrated a high degree of market participation. 
Sidestepping here the issue of whether such characteristics made the late 
colonial rural estate capitalist or feudal in nature (or both), we can still 
assert that the earning of profits through the maximization of their 
market position seems to have been upperm ost in the minds of hacen­
dados. T he la rg e -sc a le  commercialization of farm ing, indeed, went far 
back into the sixteenth century, as Gibson demonstrated in his study of 
the precocious non -  Indian agriculture of the valley of Mexico. Else­
where in New Spain the market orientation of the hacienda (or of
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labores or other smaller production units) was later in developing due to 
different demographic rhythms and slower rates of urbanization than in 
the valley of Mexico. Seen from this perspective, the apparent ’’feudali- 
zation” of much of Mexican agriculture which set in during the seven­
teenth century in response to population shrinkage and economic decline 
was simply an adaptive response to prevailling conditions, rather than the 
acting out of seigneuriai ideals on a M exican tabula rasa.51 W hen a 
favorable conjunction of circumstances offered itself in the last century 
of colonial rule -  a mining resurgence, increased availability of invest­
ment capital, population growth, and expansion of markets -  la rg e -  
scale agriculture responded appropriately.
T he late colonial trade in agricultural products and livestock is diffi­
cult to trace with any precision, but it is clear that it could extend both 
to regional and inter — regional markets, as well as the more fam iliar 
trans -  oceanic markets for dyestuffs and other rarefied products. H arris 
has traced the long distance trade in sheep from the Coahuila latifundio 
of the Sánchez N avarro family; Serrera Contreras that in cattle and 
other livestock from New Galicia to central Mexico; and W ard Barrett 
the sugar trade from  the Cuernavaca sugar zone to the viceregal 
capital.511 O ne would normally expect that Mexico City, given its size 
and preem inence within New Spain, would be the center of a far -  flung 
hinterland and the crystallization point for a developing commercial 
agriculture, a process recently traced in the work of Kicza and Tutino, 
and in the earlier studies of Gibson and Florescano. By the same token, 
one would naturally expect to see mining centers, with their specialized 
non -  agricultural work forces, emerge as im portant markets for the 
products of the countryside. W hat is less well studied, though hardly 
surprising, is the structure of m ajor intra -  regional markets centered on 
provincial capitals and other cities, which grew considerably, albeit 
unsteadily, as the pace of urbanization advanced in the period after 1750 
or so. Cities such as G uanajuato, Valladolid, San Miguel, Q uerétaro, 
and G uadalajara consumed substantial amounts of maize, wheat, and 
livestock products annually, not to mention the garden crops typically 
supplied by Indian and other peasant farm ers.53 An im portant provincial 
urban market tended to function as the central place around which the 
internal socio -  economic integration of an entire region might crystallize, 
and with it regional political and cultural identity. Furtherm ore the 
structure of local market demand tended to have a strong influence on 
the structure of production and landholding, typically exerting pressure in 
the direction of production and land concentration. Smaller producers,
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among them the Indian farm ers of communal villages and other, 
non -  Indian independent peasants, tended to be at a definite disadvan­
tage vis -  a -  vis the bigger urban markets, though they sold surprisingly 
large quantities of grain in provincial cities and towns, particularly 
maize. Larger producers enjoyed advantages perhaps out of all p ropor- 
tion to the economic efficiency of their farm ing, since they commonly 
were able to exercise control over the market by holding back their 
produce until prices rose, and interfered with the structure of urban 
supply through their political power. 54
Alongside the intra -  regional rearrangem ents occasioned by agricul­
tural expansion in the late colonial period, there also occurred shifts in 
the economic balance am ong the various m ajor regions of the country. 
T he nature of this shift in the economic center of gravity of New Spain 
is not yet clear, but the most notable aspect of it was the emergence of 
the regions of the near -  north and west, particularly the Bajío and parts 
of New G alicia.55 Concomitantly, the earlier settled and more thoroughly 
integrated regions of Puebla and O axaca, to mention the most promi­
nent, fell on somewhat hard times in the late colonial period.56 It would 
indeed be surprising to find that these fundam ental shifts in the internal 
equilibrium of the country were not linked, at least in part, to demo­
graphic and agricultural factors. Some possible lines of explanation 
suggest themselves, though none has yet been thoroughly investigated on 
a country — wide basis. First, of course, the arrastre effect in the silver 
mining areas of the near -  north and west -  that is, the growth oppor­
tunities for agriculture and other activities created by a prosperous 
mining economy -  must inevitably account for some of the northward 
shift. Secondly, a relatively greater demographic dynamism is evident in 
these areas of the country, possibly because of the proportionally lower 
presence of the Indian ethnic component in the population. Finally, 
although the Bajío, other parts of the near north, and New Galicia were 
not themselves frontier areas in the late colonial era, they did offer 
relatively greater opportunities for internal colonization, a kind of fill -  in 
process, especially in agriculture, in which previously marginal areas 
were settled more densely, drawn into production, and integrated into 
local and country -  wide markets. U nder such conditions, it is probable 
that the returns on investment in agriculture would be likely to be higher 
than in older areas with more depleted resources, especially given the 
technological levels of the period. T hus, the more highly saturated 
regions of the center, south, and east would tend to lag behind relatively 
in terms of productivity.
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Conclusion: A  Chiaroscuro Century
T he latter part of the eighteenth century in Mexico, then, was one of 
contradiction, though as I have tried to point out that contradiction was 
more rhetorical or aesthetic than real. A considerable degree of economic 
expansion and prosperity was present, but also an increasing amount of 
rural proletarianization and impoverishment. As Bryan Roberts has 
stressed in speaking of modern industrial development in Latin America, 
the two processes of growth and impoverishment were intimately linked 
to each other, and the one could not have occurred in the absence of the 
other.57 Gross indicators of agricultural prosperity -  rising prices, 
rising tithe collections, increasing stability of ownership of large estates, 
rising levels of profits and investment in large -  scale agriculture -  
pointed to economic growth, but signs of rural im poverishment and a fall 
in living standards for the rural masses in many parts of New Spain 
attested to how that growth was achieved.5^ In terms of the two distri­
butional variables set out above -  vertical (class/ethnic) and horizontal 
(geographic) -  the period saw an ever -  increasing skewing in the social 
distribution of wealth in favor of large landowners and their allies; a 
probable transfer of economic resources from the countryside to the city; 
and a northward shift in the economic center of gravity of New Spain 
as a whole. W hat is not clear as yet is the relationship of these devel­
opments to the situation of Mexico after Independence. O n the whole, 
the conditions of the country until the later nineteenth century 
-  economic decline and stagnation, slow demographic growth, ru ra li- 
zation, political Balkanization and instability -  lend weight to the view 
that a prolonged crisis had begun under cover of the prosperity of the 
late colonial era, and continued for the first half -  century of the repub­
lican period.
At the end of the period under discussion we have the M exican W ars 
for Independence. Given the evolution of the M exican rural economy 
during the last half -  century of colonial rule, it seems impossible to view 
that prolonged violent episode as a mere political epiphenomenon float­
ing freely on the socio-econom ic substrate of New Spain. T he social 
redistribution of wealth noted by so many historians of the eighteenth 
century must surely have played a role in creating pre -  conditions for 
the rural rebellion which was such a  prom inent component of the wars 
of Independence. T he strains attendant upon changes in agrarian struct 
ture in many parts of the country have been noted often. M ore particu­
larly, the embattled status of the independent, landholding Indian village
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and its tendency to assume a hostile posture with regard to outsiders 
becomes increasingly apparent at the close of the eighteenth century.59 It 
seems probable, then, that secular changes in agrarian structure con­
tributed something to the motive force behind rebellion against the colo­
nial regime. But it must also be noted that agrarian issues -  land 
reform , for example -  played very little explicit role in the ideological 
and program m atic expressions of the rebels. T o make the connection 
between long -  term  agrarian conditions and revolt, therefore, one must 
look to intervening variables, and the code of symbolic expression, in 
order to decipher the relationship between the way rural people thought 
and the way they lived.
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4. LA SIT U A C IO N  E C O N O M IC A  EN  LAS C O M U N ID A D ES DE 
LA SIE R R A  C E N T R A L  D EL  PE R U  A FIN ES D E LA EPOCA  
C O L O N IA L
A N O TA C IO N E S A BASE D EL  E ST U D IO  D E LAS C O FR A D IA S 
Albert Meyers
I. Introducción *
U na de las conclusiones más generalizadas al caracterizar la situa­
ción en el Perú a fines de la Colonia es la de destacar el fuerte creci­
miento demográfico en combinación con una situación económica en 
declive, situación que causó mucha inquietud social y dejaba su influen­
cia en las rebeliones indígenas y en los movimientos de liberación 
nacional. Para el sector minero, en cambio, se ha relativizado esta ima­
gen, constatando que ”a partir de 1776, la m inería se extendió y no 
decreció permaneciendo relativamente próspera hasta 1 8 1 2 . La atención 
evidentemente debe concentrarse en el sector agrícola para el cual se ha 
hablado generalmente de un estado de crisis, aunque tam bién aquí con­
tamos con juicios recientes que desaconsejan hacer generalizaciones 
en cuanto a todas las regiones del V irreinato.^ El problema a resolver 
aquí se presenta no sólo en la metodología e interpretación sino tam bién 
en el difícil acceso o la falta de fuentes. Esto vale por ejemplo para el 
sector agrícola no comercializado, donde es difícil hacer cálculos relativos 
al abastecimiento de comestibles y las costumbres alimenticias.
Consecuentemente contamos con más datos concretos calculables y 
estudios sobre la economía de monoproducción (plantas azucareras, 
haciendas de ganado) que sobre la agricultura de subsistencia. Por otra 
parte, la situación de subsistencia de la población a fines de la Colonia 
es mucho más compleja que al comienzo, incluyendo la necesidad de 
algunos sectores populares de poder asegurar su sobrevivencia sólo 
recurriendo a varias fuentes de ingreso y de trabajo , lo que hace aún 
más difícil la descripción de su modo de reproducción en cifras concre­
tas.
En este sentido, lo que a continuación presentamos debe ser consi­
derado como prim er acercamiento al problem a, dejando muchas pre­
guntas abiertas. Prim eram ente se intenta dar una idea de la estructura de
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posesión de tierra y ganado hacia mediados del siglo X V III y de su 
dinámica hasta el fin de la época colonial. Como caso ejem plar se 
tra tará  la cofradía como institución im portante en el proceso de trans­
ferencia de bienes. La segunda parte del trabajo  se ocupará de describir 
la diferenciación intracomunal e intraregional, las relaciones comerciales 
y las fuentes adicionales de ingreso, es decir, la economía diversificada 
que caracteriza al campesinado de la época.3
El valle del M antara, ya por la extensión de su superficie de hasta 
100 kilómetros de largo y hasta diez kilómetros de ancho, situado a una 
altura de alrededor de 3,300 metros sobre el m ar, se destaca de los otros 
valles interandinos de la sierra peruana. En sus tierras fértiles hoy se 
cultivan maíz, cebada, papas, habas, alfalfa y en m enor escala trigo y 
hortalizas. En las vertientes del valle así como en la zona del M antara 
superior (conocida como la Q uebrada) sobresalen los pastos, permitiendo, 
solamente en pequeñas zonas protegidas, el cultivo de plantas. Toda la 
zona está rodeada por las punas a ambos lados de la cordillera occidental 
y oriental, que en el norte se abren en una vasta planicie alrededor del 
lago Jun ín , la cual se extiende casi hasta el centro minero de C erro de 
Pasco. Como pequeño corte en la cordillera oriental se presenta el 
valle de T arm a con un clima moderado influenciado por la montaña 
cercana. A dministrativamente, la región se divide en cuatro provincias, 
Yauyos y H uarochirí (la parte occidental), y T arm a y Ja u ja , el resto, 
siendo la últim a con sus tres repartimientos de H atun Jau ja , L u ri- 
huanca y H ananhuanca el centro de nuestro interés.
Considerando los datos demográficos publicados sobre la región, 
habría que suponer un auge inmenso en el núm ero de habitantes durante 
y a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo X V III. Según las cifras que 
presenta Kubier, en 1754 la provincia de Ja u ja  tenía 21,062 habitantes 
que, según Vollmer, habrían aumentado a 52,286 en el año 1792.^ Sin 
embargo, al revisar la fuente original que data de la época del V irrey 
Amat en la década de 1750, se observa que se habla explícitamente del 
número de indios solam ente.3 Considerando que la cifra de 52,286 
para 1792 comprende más de 20,000 españoles y mestizos, se puede 
suponer que en la década del 1750 el núm ero de habitantes de la 
provincia de J a u ja  seguramente era superior a 32,021, cifra que 
K ubier indica para el año 1628.®
H uelga decir, que todas estas cifras deben ser tomadas con precau­
ción por las inexactitudes conocidas en la aplicación de estos censos. 
Además, por la cercanía a los centros mineros más grandes del virreinato 
en esta época, se puede partir de la suposición de una cierta movilidad
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poblacional. Si se trata entonces de presentar tendencias, me parece más 
adecuado hablar de un ligero incremento de la población en esta regón a 
fines de la Colonia. En apoyo de esta aseveración tam bién están las 
cifras de 1813, que indican una población ligeram ente aum entada, o sea, 
de 55.592 personas en la provincia de J a u ja .7 Esta tendencia coincide 
con lo que Adams ha observado en la comunidad de M uquiyauyo 
perteneciente al curato de H uaripam pa así como con algunas indicaciones 
para una parte de los catorce curatos de esta provincia, donde se ha 
notado incluso un estancamiento o un ligero descenso en la población.8
II. Estructura de posesión de tierra y  ganado
A . El valle m ism o
A fines de la Colonia se podía distinguir entre tres tipos básicos de 
tenencia de tierras:9
1. T ierras de la Corona cedidas a
-  indios tributarios
-  viudos/viudas y ancianos
-  personas solteras
-  caciques
-  la comunidad
2. T ierras de la Iglesia
-  para uso de la Iglesia
-  poseídas por las cofradías y
3. T ierra  privada, poseída por españoles, criollos, mestizos, etc.
De los documentos de la región que hasta ahora hemos estudiado, es 
difícil reconstruir la distribución absoluta y proporcional de la tierra 
según los tipos de propiedad y el acceso del individuo en las comuni­
dades a sus medios principales de producción. De esta m anera, en lo 
siguiente me limito a una descripción general de la situación y a destacar 
algunas tendencias de cambio dentro de la época aquí tratada.
Correspondiente a las condiciones ecológicas y climáticas de los 
Andes, se observa una estricta división entre las tierras de sembrío en la 
planicie y en las venientes de las cordilleras y los pastos de la parte 
superior.10 Según el patrón de aprovechamiento máximo de los pisos 
ecológicos practicado en la época precolonial, tam bién las quince doctri­
nas fundadas en el valle del M antara  en el siglo X V I ejercían el control 
territorial hasta las cumbres de las dos cordilleras respectivas.11 Todos 
los sitios poblados en las punas alrededor del valle pertenecían a estas
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doctrinas o a las doctrinas de los valles costeños al otro lado de la cor-
19dillera occidental en las provincias de Yauyos y H uarochirí .
TABLA I: Repartición de las tierras en M uquiyauyo en 1742
Terrenos Hectáreas %
Tierras a indios y comunidad 329,5 47,1
Tierras de Cofradía 10,9 1,5
Isla (probablemente comunal) 125,0 17,9
Tierras privadas (españoles,
mestizos, caciques, etc.) 234,6 33,5
Total 700,0 100,0
Fuente: Adams, A  C om m unity  in the A ndes , p .20.
Obtenemos una idea de la distribución de la tierra a mediados del 
siglo X V III a través de las cifras que presenta Adams para la vice— 
parroquia M uquiyauyo perteneciente al curato de H uaripam pa (Tab.
I ) .1 ^  Ilustran que alrededor de la mitad corresponde a la comunidad 
mientras que un quinto del total ya se puede atribuir a gente privada: 
españoles, mestizos, caciques, forasteros, etc. Con estas reparticiones, la 
Corona reconocía la costumbre indígena de usufructo común de la tierra, 
considerándose sucesora del Inca en cuanto al derecho de la propiedad. 
Correspondiendo a estas atribuciones, se podía fijar una tasa general de 
tributo generalizada. Se desconoce si había reglas fijas para la distribu­
ción y la extensión de los terrenos, pues en 1742 las 114 familias tribu­
tarias de M uquiyauyo recibían diez topos (alrededor de dos hectáreas), 
las cincuenta viudas y ancianos cinco topos y los setenta solteros y sol­
teras cuatro topos cada u n o .'^  En una ’’razón presentada por el cacique 
alcalde y demás principales” del pueblo de San M artín de Chacas, Con­
chucos, en el norte de la Intendencia de T arm a, en 1798 se habla de la 
costumbre de recibir tres topos cada indio. ^
Según las estimaciones, que una hectárea de tierra cultivable sería lo 
mínimo para asegurar la subsistencia de una fam ilia ’’norm al” (de cuatro 
a cinco personas), los indios tributarios en M uquiyauyo en esta época 
vivían relativamente bien en comparación con el caso mencionado para 
Chacas cincuenta años mas tarde. Las cifras sobre las tierras aparen -
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temente privadas dan una idea de la situación de la gente calificada 
como ”no -  india” en el pueblo, que según una visita pastoral del año 
1760 ascendía al número de ochenta y nueve. ^  Indican que el pro­
medio de tierra por persona era ya más grande (2,5 has.) que en el caso 
de las familias indias.
TABLA II: Repartición de las tierras en M uquiyauyo en 1819
Terrenos Hectáreas %
Tierras a indios y comunidad 109,1 15,6
Iglesia y Cofradía 36,4 5,2
Isla (probablemente comunal) 125,0 17,9
Tierras privadas (mestizos,
españoles, etc.) 429,5 61,3
Total 700,0 100,0
Fuente: Adams, A  C om m unity  in the A ndes , p.21.
Al considerar las cifras que Adams presenta para el año 1819, se 
puede observar un reforzamiento más grande de esta tendencia (Tab.
I I ) .1® Sólo el 15 por ciento de la tierra perteneciente a la comunidad se 
atribuye a los indios, mientras que las tierras privadas aum entaron a más 
del 60 por ciento. Por falta de datos poblacionales del mismo año, es 
preciso recurrir a las cifras de 1835, que indican una población total de 
1100 personas, de las cuales 722 son indios tributarios.19 El resto, que 
habrán sido aproxim adam ente 100 a 150 familias o unidades domésticas, 
se puede considerar como posible dueño de las 4-29,5 has. indicadas 
(Tab. II). Esto, si bien no significa un aum ento en el promedio e la 
relación hom bre -  tierra comparado con 1742, indica una casi duplicación 
de la tierra privada a coste de las tierras comunales. Consecuentemente 
los indios se quejan, que sólo se les había atribuido tres topos de tierra 
en comparación con diez topos en 1742.^®
B. Transferencia de bienes: un ejem plo
Cómo se produjo esta transferencia de tierra? No es éste el lugar 
para referirm e a los muchos intentos de resolver este problem a -  no 
siempre con resultados satisfactorios. M ás bien quiero destacar el rol de
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una institución que hasta el momento ha sido subelevada, tam bién en 
relación al problema que aquí se trata: las cofradías. Esta institución, 
introducida por los españoles como instrumento de misión de los indios, 
fue aceptada por éstos y convertida, sobre todo en el prim er tiempo de la 
época colonial, para servir a los indios a m antener sus patrones de vida 
en un régimen colonial. Esto tam bién incluía el aprovisionamiento de las 
cofradías con bienes económicos en form a de tierras o ganado para 
financiar el culto religioso. Ahora bien, se sabe que aun hasta hoy en día 
el culto religioso de los indios contiene elementos pre -  colombinos, y 
más los tenía en la época colonial. H abría  que ver los rituales dentro del 
ciclo de reproducción, sobre todo de los indios -  campesinos. Así, las 
cofradías ofrecían a los indios la posibilidad de reunirse bajo el pretexto 
de servir al culto católico sin el control inmediato del cura u otra autor­
idad, sirviendo a su propia reproducción, por ejemplo, durante las 
siembras y cosechas en las tierras cofradiales, donde se ofrecían comidas 
y bebidas durante las faenas, e tc .^  Para los españoles no existían moti­
vos de sospecha entonces, pues conocían este sistema de la situación en la 
península, donde las cofradías tam bién poseían extensos terrenos y 
ganados. Pero pronto advirtieron, que las cofradías se habían convertido 
en un arm a de resistencia y así tam bién lo reconocieron los caciques, que 
veían una competencia política en la institución de los mayordomos de 
las cofradías elegidos "libremente.” La reacción de la Iglesia, de lim itar el 
núm ero de cofradías a dos en cada pueblo, ya no podía frenar el proceso 
de proliferación de ellas, que se acentuó en el siglo X V III. Volviendo al 
ejem plo de M uquiyauyo, constatamos que las cinco cofradías registradas 
en 1742 habían aum entado al menos al núm ero de trece a fines de la 
Colonia. En este período se incorporaron entre ocho y diez pedazos de 
tierras al sistema cofradial y la extensión de sus tierras se había más que 
triplicado (Tabs. I y 11).^
La misma tendencia se observa para todo el valle, habiendo crecido 
el núm ero de cofradías en las catorce doctrinas del partido de J a u ja  de 
sesenta y tres en 1750 a por lo menos ochenta y nueve en 1795; y todas 
tenían como mínimo un pedazo de t ie r ra .^  En el pueblo de Sicaya, por 
ejem plo, con 1923 habitantes en el año de 1792, la extensión de las 
tierras cofradiales llega al monto de 163 hectáreas en 1795. Ya que no 
disponemos de datos comparables para la tierra comunal, como en el 
caso de M uquiyauyo, tenemos que contentarnos con una comparación en 
el sector de la ganadería. En el mismo pueblo, el mismo año el ganado 
lanar comunal era de 4250 cabezas, mientras que el de sólo cinco 
cofradías superaba esta cifra contando con 4325 an im a les .^  C uarenta y
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cinco años antes había sido de sólo 1500 cabezas. Este fuerte aumento, 
sin embargo, no se repite en cada doctrina, como se verificará en la 
T abla III. Al contrario, los totales del ganado tanto lanar como vacuno 
de 1750 a 1795 indican un ligero decrecimiento, cifras que sin em bargo 
deben ser aceptadas con reserva, considerando la variación ’’natural” en 
el sector de la ganadería y el margen de errores relativamente alto en el 
censo del ganado.26 Sin em bargo, al com parar con el aum ento del 
núm ero absoluto de las cofradías, se intensifica la impresión de una 
creciente diferenciación tam bién entre las cofradías.
TABLA III: Bienes de ganado de las cofradías del Valle del M antaro  







Ja u ja 4200 3500
Apata 100 1070 70 -  .
La Concepción 
San Gerónimo
400 1790 11 65
de T unán 6904 5794 12 95
Huancayo 2000 413 6 90
Sapallanga 6405 - - 217
Chongos - - 60 224
Chupaca 4472 3082 135 210
Sicaya 1500 4325 36 -
Orcotuna 580 527 115 376
Mito 200 600 115 219
Sincos 320 430 186 198
H uaripam pa - - - -
Comas - - 1052 -
Totales 27161 21531 1798 1694
Fuente: Celestino, La economía pastoral, Cuadros No. 9 y 10, compilados por
el autor.
Antes de profundizar esta constatación volveremos a la pregunta ini­
cial sobre el rol de las cofradías en la disminución de los terrenos 
comunales y en la privatización de la tierra. Originalm ente la C orona y 
la Iglesia asignaban un pedazo de tierra a cada cofradía para  que con 
sus frutos pagara al cura por sus trabajos cúlticos, además de los uten­
silios como cera, aceite, param entos, etc. U na vez establecidas, las
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cofradías aprovechaban de rentas y donaciones por parte de los españoles 
y curacas ricos que vivían en la región, encargando por ejem plo misas 
después de la muerte del donador. Estas legaciones testam entarias, ya al 
partir del siglo X V II eran las principales fuentes de crecimiento econó­
mico de las cofradías.27 La tierra legada por el curaca podía ser consi­
derada como tierra que correspondía al ’’común de indios” por lo que se 
descontaba de los bienes comunales. Los mismos curas más bien ayuda­
ron a convertir a la Iglesia en el mayor terrateniente en el Perú colonial, 
de m anera que ’’procuran y dan orden cuando van a confesar a los 
Naturales enfermos a que hagan los testamentos entre ellos, y les dejen, 
y a las Iglesias y sus santos, sus haciendas, aunque tengan heredores 
forzosos, y con los indios ladinos, sacristanes, fiscales y otros criados que 
tienen en las Iglesias envían a hacer prevención, y que lo persuaden a 
ello ...”28
Entre los documentos sobre legaciones de indios, entre ellos también 
m ujeres, sobresalen las que se limitan a ganado, del cual parecen sacar 
m ayor provecho, pues no sólo sirve para financiar el culto al Santo, sino 
tam bién las fiestas que lo acompañen, sea para  corrida de toros, o 
simplemente para el convite de los cofrades.2® Se puede suponer ya, que 
al aum entar el ganado de las cofradías, tam bién si era donado por gente 
no -  india, y al no alcanzar los pastos, éstos se extendían a costo de los 
pastos comunales.88
C. Comunidad, hacienda y  cofradía en la puna
H asta ahora nos hemos referido a la distribución de tierras en el valle 
mismo. Los pastos de que hemos hecho mención, sin embargo, 
quedaban en las punas cordilleranas. Las cofradías seguían el mismo 
patrón de las doctrinas, practicando la combinación de agricultura en el 
valle con la ganadería en las punas. Pero éstas ya no pertenecían a los 
indios como antes, sino a hacendados españoles atraídos por las minas 
abundantes, así como a los caciques más famosos y ricos, sucesores del 
antiguo señorío huanca.
Estas haciendas y estancias, que se habían instalado aprovechando 
tanto el ’’vacío” dejado por la concentración forzosa de los indios en el 
valle en el curso de la fundación de las reducciones y doctrinas como 
asimismo el descenso de la población, form aban unidades independientes 
del valle, aunque oficialmente dependían de él. T enían sus mayordomos 
e indios trabajando como pastores y arrieros, sus capillas y cofradías y 
autoridades políticas. Solamente el cura de la doctrina madre subía a
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veces del valle para ejercer su oficio.
A fines de la Colonia el valle estaba no solamente ligado con el cen­
tro minero más grande del virreinato, sino tam bién completamente 
rodeado por un sistema hostil de haciendas. En una visita a los pueblos 
adyacentes de la quebrada del M antara, en 1751, el corregidor de 
H uarochirí consta que ”no tienen ellos por sí absolutam ente ni pastos ni 
tierras de sem brar y para m antener sus muías, vacas y ganado de 
Castilla menor los que tienen que ay algunos se valen de los pastos de 
sus amos los mineros que tienen en abajo de los cerros en quebradas 
cercanas a los asientos...”31 En 1813, finalm ente, un observador saca un 
resumen de la situación: "...que hoy apenas disfrutan los pueblos una 
tercia parte de la sum a total que aparece de lanas, y muy poco que 
conservan las cofradías, siendo lo demás de haciendas.”3'1
Se ha escrito mucho sobre los levantamientos como consecuencia o 
resultado de esta situación. Menos frecuentem ente se ha tratado los 
pleitos y otras luchas por la recuperación de los recursos. D urante todo el 
siglo X V III se constata que entre las comunidades del valle, principal­
mente Mito, O rcotuna y Sicaya, y las de la vertiente oceánica de la 
cordillera, como Laraos (Yauyos) y H uañec (H uarochirí), hubo conflictos 
con respecto a los pastos en las punas que dividen las dos regiones. De 
estas confrontaciones aprovechan los hacendados situados en el inter­
medio, pactando alternadam ente con los partidos según sus convenien­
cias. En la prim era mitad del siglo arrendaban muchos terrenos de las 
comunidades, lo que hacia fines del siglo aparentem ente ya no fue 
necesario por haber conseguido entretanto títulos de propiedad.33 En los 
pleitos se enfrentan de m anera alternada comunes de indios entre sí, 
indios y españoles contra indios y caciques, curas, defendiendo los pastos 
de cofradías y comunidades, contra los españoles, e tc.34
En su famoso artículo sobre la evolución de las comunidades indíge­
nas en la sierra central, Arguedas describe la "integración pacífica de las 
castas y culturas en el valle del M an ta ra .”35 Lo explica por la ausencia 
del latifundio que las diferencia radicalmente de las comunidades indí­
genas del sur, donde existían sino dos fuerzas casi nítidam ente enfren­
tadas: la comunidad y el hacendado.35
Si bien el valle del M antara representa un desarrollo excepcional 
comparado con otros valles interandinos, no es por la ausencia, sino más 
bien, me parece, por el enfrentam iento acumulado de tal vez más insti­
tuciones que en ninguna otra región de los Andes. La am algam a tan 
arm ónica entre indios y españoles que el autor nos describe, nos merece 
serias dudas. M ás bien se podría pintar una imagen de los indios a m r
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nazados y diezmados tanto por los mestizos del valle como por los espa­
ñoles dé la puna, o como constata el cura de M ito en 1745: ”...se hayan 
de ausentar y desam parar su pueblo respecto de hallarse sin pastos en 
donde apacentar sus ganados m ayores...”37 A fines del siglo X V III, la
razón entre indios y mestizos en el valle era casi igual y la distinción
i 38entre las dos ’’castas’ muy arbitraria.
III. Diferenciación intracomunal e intraregional
Lo que se ha expresado geográficamente tam bién se puede proyectar 
a la situación dentro del pueblo. Ya se ha mencionado brevem ente la 
diferenciación creciente y ésta tam bién se refleja en el espectro de las 
cofradías, que se pueden dividir según la cantidad de sus bienes en 
cofradías ricas, medianas y pobres.39 Las diferencias se pueden estimar 
tanto al considerar los bienes en tierras como en ganado.49 En las visitas 
frecuentemente se hace constar cofradías ”sin bienes ni venta alguna.” 
Incluso antiguas cofradías como la del Santísimo Sacram ento de Sincos se 
hallan ”en muy crecida decadencia," otras como la de C arm en de Jau ja  
se revitalizan por nuevas legaciones, incluyendo una casa, tienda y solar 
en la esquina de la plaza central.41
Al evaluar la ’’jerarqu ía” dentro de las advocaciones, sin embargo, 
sobresalen la de Nuestro Amo (Santísimo Sacramento) y la de las Ben­
ditas Animas (cofradías de entierro) tanto por sus bienes de tierra como 
de ganado.4‘ Estas son las más antiguas y generalmente reconocen el 
principio de la multietnicidad de sus miembros. Le siguen el gran 
número de cofradías medianas caracterizadas según la ocupación de sus 
miembros, ya sea a m anera de gremios artesanales o, por ejemplo, 
cofradías de los indios pastores, etc. Por más que la estructura pre -  
colombina hubiera cambiado, se puede constatar que las cofradías o las 
asociaciones (herm andades, sociedades) en general reflejan la diferen­
ciación socio -  económica en las comunidades.
Se conoce bastante bien el rol de los curas, corregidores y caciques, 
que, aunque de uno u otro modo pueden ser considerados ’’personas 
extracom unales,” interfieren fuertem ente en la vida comunitaria. Sin 
em bargo, los últimos tienen una posición extraordinaria en toda la 
historia de la región. La razón para ello debe buscarse en los eventos 
relacionados con la conquista española. Desde los inicios de la Colonia, 
los curacas huanca aprovecharon de sus privilegios de poder poseer tierra 
privada (aparentem ente por la ayuda a los españoles durante la con­
quista), para convertirse en los terratenientes más grandes de la región a
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fines de la Colonia. 45 La dinastía Astocuri Apoalaya tenía sus tierras 
concentradas en el suroeste de la región, incluyendo las haciendas de 
Laive e Ingahuasi. Tam bién dom inaban las cofradías más ricas de 
Chupaca y Sicaya, pueblos de su residencia, como principales arrenda­
tarios de sus m anadas y a veces tam bién como mayordomos, manipu­
lando la administración de ellas. En sus métodos para burlarse de las 
autoridades españolas podían contar con la solidaridad étnica de los 
indios financiándoles fiestas pom posas.44 Como ’’recompensa” escondían 
por muchos años a numerosos tributarios aprovechando de sus tributos.45
Los Apoalaya tam bién donaban terrenos a la cofradía prestigiosa del 
C arm en de J a u ja  y hacían trab a ja r a sus indios en el levantamiento de 
un beaterio para pobres que m antenía esta cofradía.46 Esto no sólo da 
cuenta del afán de los indios nobles de hacer méritos para  ser aceptados 
por la sociedad colonial, sino tam bién de la transferencia regional de 
bienes y valores. Si bien J a u ja  no era un gran centro urbano ni menos 
el centro comercial de valle, allí residían algunos hacendados españoles.4^
Entre los ’’pueblos ricos” fuera de Jau ja , hay que mencionar San 
Gerónim o de T unan , Sicaya y C hupaca como ’’capitales” de reparti­
miento que figuran con la mayor cantidad de bienes de cofradías, 
añadiendoel pueblo de Sapallanga que albergaba un obraje im portante.46 
Estos pueblos tam bién tenían un alto porcentaje de mestizos en 1795.
IV . Polivalencia de ocupación y  comercialización en las comunidades
A. La combinación agricultura -  minería
H asta aquí nos hemos concentrado más en los factores internos que 
influenciaban el desarrollo de la sociedad rural. Al hablar de la diferen­
ciación intraregional, surge la pregunta respecto a los impactos prove­
nientes de los centros fuera de valle. T arm a, la nueva capital después de 
la creación de la intendencia en 1784-, al igual que J a u ja  carecía de 
dinámica económica. Esta provenía de dos lugares que políticamente 
perm anecían siendo pueblos: H uancayo y C erro de Pasco.
Del último y de su gran auge a fines del siglo X V III ya se ha 
hablado en la introducción. En las minas del partido de C erro de Pasco, 
sobre todo naturalm ente en el C erro mismo, trabajaban  en 1799 unos 
2470 operarios.49 En las de H uarochirí trabajaben 920, en Yauyos 56 y 
en C astrovirreina (Huancavelica) 231 personas. Todas estas regiones 
mineras eran vecinas del valle de Ja u ja . Vale decir, que la región con­
centraba casi la mitad de todos los trabajadores mineros del virreinato de
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entonces. No se sabe cuántos de ellos venían del valle del M antaro o 
vivían allí. La mita, aunque recién abolida definitivamente en 1812, ya 
no se aplicaba en esta época, fuera de algunos reclutamientos forzosos de 
una cantidad de indios, que se efectuaban en form a rotativa para el 
’’socorro” en las minas, como sucedió por orden del virrey Gil en 1793.^  
Fisher describe la situación de los mineros dueños de las minas de la 
siguiente manera: ”A pesar de que algunos am asaron fortunas como 
consecuencia de haber descubierto ricos filones de plata, la mayoría 
operaba a niveles marginales, con capital insuficiente, y gozaba de una 
cierta reputación de despilfarrar cuanto dinero ganaba en fiestas o 
apuestas.”"’'  En cuanto al capital, dependían de los créditos de com er­
ciantes de Lim a o, a fines del siglo, tam bién locales, sin que ésto hubiera 
llevado a un m ejoram iento decisivo de la tecnología minera prim itiva.5  ^
Si, pese al fracaso de los intentos extranjeros de aportar m ejoras tecno­
lógicas (por ejem plo por la ’’Misión Nordenflicht”), se producía un 
aum ento de producción argentífera, ésto ’’fue posible gracias a la m ejora 
en el suministro de azogue, sobre todo a partir de 1784.”'’"' Aparente­
mente los capitalistas de la época se dieron cuenta, que el auge de las 
minas en la sierra central era sólo un fuego fatuo, que anim aba a algu­
nos aventureros; ellos mismos parecen haber estado conscientes, que lo 
único seguro y continuo en la minería era el interés de la Corona españo­
la en obtener el máximo provecho de los productos, que ellos hacían 
extraer a los indios.
M ientras que los relatos contemporáneos destacan las costumbres de 
los indios de Pasco de gastar el dinero en borracheras -  correspondiendo 
en ésto a la imagen que se tiene de los mineros (por supuesto, cada 
grupo a su propia m anera) -  las indicaciones sobre sus condiciones de 
vida y su paga son escasas y a veces contradictorias. Sin discutir aquí los 
datos en detalle, me parece que la queja de los dueños de minas sobre 
la falta de mano de obra se refiere ante todo al trabajo de los mitayos, a 
los cuales se recom pensaba solamente con pobres víveres que apenas 
bastaban para su alim entación.54 La tecnología típica utilizada aparen­
tem ente desde 200 años no había cambiado mucho. Los socavones fueron 
descritos por viajeros ingleses como ra t-h o le s  (ratoneras) que carecían 
de ventilación y de medidas preventivas para  la seguridad de los opera­
rios:55 Así ”se perdieron trescientas vidas en C erro de Pasco cuando 
cedió la mina que pasó a ser llamada M atagente.”5®
Las informaciones que presentamos sobre el valle de Ja u ja  indican
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que había mano de obra disponible para ser atraída por centros de tra­
bajo que pagaban lo suficiente para el mantenimiento de ellos y de sus 
familias, sin tener que recurrir a los recursos de la agricultura. Sin 
embargo, ésto era un caso rarísimo. La relación con la tierra seguía 
siendo el elemento más estable para garantizarle al indio su subsistencia. 
Por ello, si era necesario obtener ingresos mediante actividades fuera de 
la agricultura, convenía llevar los recursos alimenticios móviles (animales) 
al lugar de trabajo o no dilatar demasiado el tiempo de la separación. 
Los hacendados y mineros se aprovechaban de esta situación, arrendán­
doles sus pastos y endeudándoles para  así contar con mano de obra 
perm anente.5  ^ En los otros casos, al no lograr arrendar tierras contiguas 
al lugar de trabajo  -  lo que era raro tam bién -  había que organizar el 
trabajo de tal m anera, como para obtener un máximo de ganancia en 
un mínimo de tiempo y así no perder el derecho como miembro de la 
comunidad de origen. En esta época comienza la incorporación, a escala 
amplia, del trabajo  asalariado de minas en el ciclo de vida, una carac­
terística del sistema de reproducción de los campesinos de la región que 
perdura hasta hoy día.
Sin embargo, es difícil hacer cálculos exactos del porcentaje de gente 
que practicaba la combinación agricultura -  minería. De los documentos 
que examinamos de los pueblos en la quebrada del M antara (doctrina de 
Yauli, sitio llamado tam bién Nuevo Potosí), se puede deducir, que casi 
el total de la población estaba involucrada en trabajos relacionados con la 
minería o en las haciendas que los rodeaban.58 Para el valle del 
M antara mismo, la situación es distinta. A unque la población es mayor, 
con un porcentaje considerable de gente sin -  o solamente con poca -  
tierra (indios forasteros, mestizos), dudo que hubiera una gran disposi­
ción entre ellos para trabajar como operarios en centros mineros como 
C erro de Pasco bajo las condiciones descritas. E ra ya demasiado lejos del 
valle, considerando que en las cordilleras colindantes con los pastos 
comunales había pequeñas minas que ofrecían la ventaja de practicar la 
combinación minera -  pecuaria que más arriba se caracterizaba. T am ­
poco creo que al valle de J a u ja  se pueda aplicar la aseveración de 
Fisher, que C erro de Pasco haya ejercido una atracción para  los jóvenes 
de los partidos circundantes por la posibilidad de festejos y borracheras 
en los fines de sem ana, pues esta posibilidad tam bién se ofrecía con 
mucha frecuencia en los pueblos del valle, como atestiguan los calen­
darios de fiestas de las cofradías.59
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B. Fiestas, mercados y  comercio
Lo que se consumía en tales fiestas constituye un factor económico 
bastante im portante y muchas veces desconsiderado en los análisis 
económicos. El Intendente de T arm a, en la relación de su visita hecha 
en 1786, destaca el consumo de tres mil botijas de aguardiente al año, 
sólo en el mineral de C erro de Pasco, siendo ’’dicho licor uno de los más 
pingües ramos de comercio que se hace ya de la ciudad de Lim a y de la 
de lea, llegando al extremo de advertirse muchos que con solo sus utili­
dades han llegado a reportar riquesas considerables.”6® El Intendente se 
enorgullece de haber ordenado la reducción de las fiestas tanto en los 
’’minerales” como en los pueblos a dos por año .61 De igual m anera 
m andaba reducir ’’las frecuentes corridas de toros, que se tenían todos los 
años en cada Pueblo del Partido” a cuatro o cinco cada año, las que 
habría que organizar en Ja u ja  ’’costeadas por un asentista que la dirije 
por el lucro de lo que ganase en la mucha concurrencia que ten d rá ...”6  ^
Del dinero ganado en estos festejos exigía crear un fondo para el 
financiamiento de las obras y servicios públicos que faltaban en Jau ja , 
"pues oy se m ira en un estado diam etralm ente opuesto al que tenía antes, 
assi por el aseo de sus calles, como por la extructura de las casas...”63
Esta cita bastará para ilustrar la decadencia visible de esta villa. 
Paulatinam ente, Ja u ja  era sustituido como polo de actividad por un 
pueblo al otro extremo del valle, Huancayo. Este pueblo, en la década 
de 1730, aparentem ente ya tenía una ’’enorm e im portancia comercial”, 
organizando grandes ferias.6”1 No se sabe cuándo comenzó a adquirir 
esta im portancia que conserva hasta ahora, pero considerando la con­
centración poblacional en este rincón del valle (Huancayo, Chongos, 
C hupaca, Sicaya, Comas, Cochangara), hay que adm itir que en 1792 es 
más de la mitad del partido de Jau ja . ¿ Cóm o puede haber crecido un 
tal centro comercial en plena zona rural con presumible agricultura de 
subsistencia?
Al evaluar todas las indicaciones sobre la economía agropecuaria de 
la región, ya no se puede hablar de subsistencia sin considerar el factor 
del mercado. La comercialización no sólo dominaba a m acro -n iv e l, sino 
tam bién en la micro -  economía. Según la relación de Gálvez, el partido 
de Ja u ja  m antenía un comercio considerable con Lim a hacia donde se 
despachaban anualm ente 40000 cabezas de ganado lanar, 2000 cerdos 
’’fuera de mucha porción de huebos, m anteca y jam ones.”65 A Pasco y 
Yauli se m andaban granos, harina y semillas. La form a en que se 
organizó tal comercio está descrita por el mismo autor tratando del
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partido vecino de T arm a; relata que "los mineros y hacendados de pan 
llevar celebran mutuam ente sus respectivos contratos, los unos para  ase­
gurar el expandió de sus cosechas y los otros para que no les falte en sus 
yngenios tan preciso socorro...”®® No se sabe exactamente de qué 
m anera los hacendados comercializaban la lana de sus ganados, pero 
parece que al menos una parte se vendía y trabajaba tam bién en el 
valle.67
Las cofradías comercializaban todos sus bienes agropecuarios, 
cobrando rentas o vendiendo productos ellos mismos. No se sabe lo que 
hacían con la carne de los 400 a 500 toros que que se m ataban anual­
mente en las corridas de sus fiestas.®6
A pesar de que con la eliminación de los corregidores y el sistema de 
repartos forzosos de m ercaderías se "había anulado una de las pocas 
instituciones a través de las cuales se obliga a los indios a buscar trabajo 
asalariado,” para los indios, por muchas razones, seguía siendo de vital 
im portancia tener dinero en efectivo.6® Entre ellas podemos citar las 
siguientes:
Prim ero, lo necesitaban, como dice Gálvez sobre los de T arm a, "para 
el pago de sus obenciones parroquiales y demás dependencias que 
contraen.” 70 Pues la situación en 1786 no había variado mucho en 
comparación con la de 1760, cuando el cacique de Pachachaca lam enta 
que eran "presionados de curas, corregidores, diezmeros, cobradores más 
de lo lícito en ganado como prim icieros...”7*.
Segundo, se puede suponer que ya no producían todo lo que necesi­
taban para su uso diario, tanto en alimentos como en otros utensilios de 
su habitat. Esto vale naturalm ente aún con mayor razón para los mesti­
zos. Jun to  con la reducción de la tierra comunal, tam bién se reducían los 
cultivos y la necesidad imperiosa de obtener dinero los llevaba a 
restringir el sembrío de los cultivos tradicionales como la oca, el olluco, 
la quinoa, para sem brar plantas "comerciables.” Estas eran las que 
tam bién aparecían en las listas de los cultivos de las cofradías: trigo, 
maíz y alfalfa, y de ellas sólo el maíz es una planta autóctona. La alfalfa 
era com prada por los tantos arrieros y comerciantes de muías, el trigo 
se usaba para hacer pan. O tros productos, como las distintas especies de 
papas y hortalizas, se vendían a los no -  agricultores de la comunidad.
A pesar de esta orientación hacia la comercialización, no se practi­
caba la irrigación, al menos no en gran escala, por lo que el Intendente 
ocupa mucho espacio en su relación para argum entar sobre la necesidad
de construir un canal de irrigación, "que sin duda doblará la porción de 
»79cosechas. c En M uquiyauyo hubo que esperar hasta 1846 para poder
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contar con una red de riego.73 Por otra parte, a más tardar en la década 
de 1780, se utilizó el arado de hierro arrastrado por bueyes, lo que 
debería haber aum entado la productividad de la tie rra .7^  Se puede decir, 
de cierto modo, que el grado de comercialización correspondía tam bién 
al sistema cambiado de tenencia de tierra y a la m anera de cooperación 
agropecuaria correspondiente.
Un capítulo del catálogo de actividades económicas de los indios, 
mencionado frecuentem ente, es el arrieraje. Este, al tener relación con la 
minería, por razones obvias se concentraba más en los pueblos vecinos 
de las minas, o sea, la quebrada del valle y la meseta de Jun ín . En 
cambio los arrieros de productos se distribuían por toda la región. 
Arellano, en su análisis de la relación del Intendente de T arm a, sólo ha 
encontrado evidencias para el arrieraje con productos comerciales a nivel 
regional e interprovincial, por ejem plo de tejedores o agricultores, o sea, 
productos de gran escala. Sin embargo supone, que tam bién existía el 
personaje m ercader -  productor, indio o mestizo, que operaba a nivel 
intraregional, como por ejemplo en el valle de J a u ja .75
Todas estas actividades deben ser vistas dentro de una estrategia de 
reproducción, en una situación, en la que para muchos miembros de las 
comunidades la subsistencia basada en un solo tipo de ocupación y de 
ingreso fam iliar ya no estaba asegurada. D entro de esta estrategia, el 
trabajo  en las minas aparentem ente se consideraba en último lugar, 
cuando las demás actividades como comerciante, artesano, arriero, ten­
dero, chichero, etc., ya no prom etían el resultado esperado.
V. Conclusiones
M ás que en el tratam iento de otros sectores económicos, en el análisis 
del desarrollo del sector agrario es preciso indicar el punto de vista al 
hacer juicios generales.
Así, por ejemplo, al hablar de una crisis agrícola en el Perú a fines 
del siglo X V III, se podría distinguir, además de la diferenciación regio­
nal, al menos entre tres niveles: la extracción de bienes agrícolas por la 
C orona española, el abastecimiento de la población no agraria y final­
mente la subsistencia de los productores agrarios mismos. Es evidente 
que los tres niveles están interrelacionados, por ejemplo, por el sistema 
de tributos y del mercado. Sin embargo, al aplicar las ’’leyes de merca­
do,” puede presentarse la situación, que la crisis en un nivel -  por 
ejemplo por el escaso abastecimiento de la población urbana -  signi­
fique prosperidad para el otro al beneficiarse de los altos precios por sus
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productos. De igual m anera se podría suponer el caso, que la alta 
tributación por parte del estado colonial desanim ara a los productores 
para abastecer al mercado urbano.
En este trabajo  se ha enfocado principalmente el nivel de los 
productores inmediatos. H e preferido no hablar de una crisis general, 
pues los datos disponibles indican más bien, que en la segunda mitad des 
siglo X V III al menos no se puede hablar de una productividad agrícola 
fuertem ente decreciente en esta region. U n caso parecido se ha descrito 
para la ciudad de Lim a y sus valles circundantes.76 Como hemos visto 
más arriba, estas dos regiones estaban ligadas económicamente, no sólo 
por la m inería, sino tam bién por los productos agrícolas provenientes de 
esta región que llegaban a Lima.
Sin embargo, el grupo de productores que principalmente usufruc­
tuaba de este comercio interregional, eran, ante todo, los grandes 
propietarios. Los pequeños agricultores, por razones de rentabilidad, 
estaban obligados a limitarse al mercado vecino. Tam bién aquí se 
presenta un paralelo con el valle de L im a.77 Febres indica como causas 
de la crisis agrícola, entre otras, el latifundio, las bajas rentas de la 
tierra y la mentalidad indígena.78 Aquí se hace evidente cuan proble­
mático es tra tar de dos grupos diferentes de productores sin analizar su 
situación específica y sus intereses. Es posible que los latifundistas, al 
orientarse hacia el mercado tanto regional como supraregional, no se 
sintieran motivados para invertir a escala tal como para hablar de una 
explosión del sector agrícola. Tam bién es probable, especialmente en el 
caso de los grandes terratenientes de la nobleza india del valle del 
M antara, que sus intereses no coincidieran con los patrones económicos 
de la sociedad urbana.
De igual modo, los intereses de los pequeños productores indígenas 
no consistían originalmente en lo que Febres en estilo etnocéntrico ha 
caracterizado como ’’los adelantos de una civilización superior:”7® El 
cereal panificable, el arado de hierro, la rueda y el caballo. Viendo que 
estos elementos estaban vinculados con el sistema de dominación y 
extracción de la sociedad colonial, preferían el sistema de producción que 
les garantizaba su propia reproducción, es decir, la m anera autóctona de 
explotar la tierra.
Sin embargo, justam ente en este sistema se producían cambios en la 
época que aquí tratam os, es decir la tierra como base de la reproducción 
se hacía más y más escasa. H asta cierto punto, para decirlo así, se 
podría hablar de una crisis no agrícola, sino de reproducción. U na 
medida contra esta crisis, además de la lucha violenta y jurídica por la
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tierra, fue el aumento de la productividad y la diversificación de activi­
dades económicas. Esta estrategia de los campesinos indígenas fue com­
partida con los mestizos, que constituían gran parte de la población que 
aparentem ente ya había pasado el punto máximo de crecimiento antes de 
las décadas finales del siglo X V III. Es así como las comunidades apro­
vecharon el auge de las actividades mineras en la región a fines de la 
Colonia antes de afrontar los conflictos que se presentarían en las 
prim eras décadas de la república.
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5. L IV E ST O C K  C O M PL E X E S IN  L A TE C O L O N IA L  PE R U  A ND  
N EW  SPAIN: A N  A T T E M P T  A T  C O M PA R ISO N
Nils Jacobsen
In 1817 the Secretary of the Consulado of V eracruz, José M aria 
Q uirós, presented his crude yet novel attem pt to calculate the annual 
value of New Spain’s production and services, or in modern termino­
logy the viceroyalty’s G N P, for the last years before the outbreak of the 
W ars of Independence. It is an impressive testimony to the great 
economic significance of livestock raising during that period. Q uirós 
estimated the value of cattle marketed annually to equal the value of 
both maize and wheat production. Hogs, so tells us the author, contri­
buted as much to M exico’s G N P as the domestic consumption of sugar 
and associated products. In all, prim ary livestock products were estimated 
to account for more than 56 percent of the viceroyalty’s domestically 
consumed agrarian production and about 30 percent of the total G N P .1
Even if Q u iró s’ figures were inflated, there can be little doubt that 
livestock production played a vital role for the economies of Mexico as 
well as Peru during the half century or so before the close of the colonial 
era. For the historian, analysis of this economic sector is at once 
rewarding and difficult because of the multiple functions and corres­
pondingly varied structures of livestock procuction: It served transport 
(mules, horses, donkeys, llamas), provided draft power for agriculture 
and industry (oxen, mules and donkeys), supplied raw materials for a 
wide range of industries (cattle, sheep, goats and cameloids) and contri­
buted much to food production (cattle, hogs, sheep). This multifunctio­
nality of livestock complexes lends their analysis significance not only in 
their own right but also because of the strong linkages to other sectors 
and the consequent diagnostic value livestock production holds for such 
problems as the evolution of various industries, productivity in the agri­
cultural sector and income distribution, as reflected in dietary patterns.
This paper will attem pt to draw out similarities and differences 
between the structure of production, markets and the conjuncture for 
livestock goods in Mexico and Peru during the late colonial period. I will 
suggest that both the ecology and the pre -  hispanic settlement and 
land -  use patterns in M esoamerica and the central Andean region con-
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stitute im portant factors in explaining why by the eighteenth century the 
social distribution of livestock property differed markedly between the 
two viceroyalties: In New Spain production units especially of sheep but 
also of cattle tended to be larger and the role which the Indian peasantry
could play in this sector more limited. In late colonial Peru, on the
other hand, the Andean peasantry still held a m ajor share of the region’s 
livestock population, and livestock estates of creole or peninsular Spa­
niards on the average were smaller -  both in area and in livestock
capital -  than those in New Spain. At the same time prevailing
technologies for raising sheep, cattle and other domesticated animals 
remained similarly tradition bound in both viceroyalties. Yet during the 
eighteenth century the commercialization process and the market struc­
ture for livestock products evinced a greater degree of complexity and 
integration in the northern viceroyalty than in Peru. This at once 
contributed to and reflected broader divergent developments in the de­
mographic and economic structures of both viceroyalties during the late 
colonial period.
I. Ecology and Early Colonial D evelopm ent
Ecological factors and patterns of hum an settlement and land -  use 
determined a divergent development of livestock populations since the 
early days of conquest in Mexico and Peru.
Most of M exico’s greatly varying ecological regions offered propitious 
conditions for livestock. T he plains of the central and northern mesetas 
contained large expanses of semi -  arrid grasslands which without irri­
gation were not apt for crop agriculture. T he lush piedmont of the 
eastern and western Sierra M adre, falling off to the G ulf of Mexico and 
the Pacific Ocean, offered rich grazing lands, as for example in the 
H uasteca and the Pacific slopes of Nueva Galicia. Even parts of the 
southern highlands, with their steeply sloped valleys and narrow ridges, 
as the M ixteca Alta and the O axaca valley system, offered greater 
potential for livestock grazing than for crop agriculture. It is ironic that 
inspite of these favorable habitats, pre -  hispanic M esoamerica counted 
with very few species of large mam mals and the Amerindian cultures 
knew no other domesticated animals than dogs and fowl. T hus much 
grassland remained untouched until 1519 and the sedentary Amerindian 
societies largely limited themselves to crop agriculture in the fertile 
highland basins, river valleys and tropical lowland areas of central and 
southern Mexico.^ This settlement pattern was to have great significance
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for the location and social structure of livestock complexes.
The ecology of the central Andean region placed greater restriction 
on the spread of newly introduced domesticated animals. T he arid Pacific 
coast offered sufficient vegetation -  other than the seasonal verdure of 
the lomas, or piedmont hills -  only in the fertile, narrow river valleys. 
These had been the site of complex irrigation systems for crop agricul­
ture sustaining large sedentary populations. T o the east of the Andes the 
tropical rainforest of the Amazon lowlands without modern veterinary 
practices were not propitious for livestock raising. T he slopes, valleys and 
high plateaus of the Andes, on the other hand, provided large areas of 
grassland. Indeed it was here that the only large domesticated animals of 
pre -  hispanic America, the various cameloid species, such as alpacas, 
llamas and huanacos, were raised. T hus, in contrast to M esoamerica, no 
m ajor regions of virgin grassland existed at the moment of the Spanish 
conquest. T he high plains best suited to maintain large herds of animals, 
such as the Titicaca basin and the plains of Jun in , were densely popu­
lated with highly stratified sedentary populations, whose agrarian society 
rested on a regionally differentiated mixed economy of crop cultivation 
and livestock raising.3
T he story of the rapid propagation of nearly all types of European 
domestic animals in sixteenth century Mexico is well known. D uring the 
first half -  century after conquest horses and cattle propagated at an 
unprecedented rate in most ecological zones of the viceroyalty, from  the 
humid G ulf coast to the central plateau and the northern plains, parti­
cularly in the area of D urango and N om bre de Dios. By the 1560’s 
literally millions of these animals roamed the virgin grasslands of the 
colony in a semi -  wild state. Sheep, uncapable of fending for them ­
selves, followed rather than preceded the advance of colonial settlements. 
While also spreading rapidly until the mid -  sixteenth century in the 
higher regions of southern and central Mexico as fa r north as Q uerétaro  
and Aguascalientes, they only began to flow into the vast northern 
plains of Nuevo León and Coahuila since the last decades of the 
century.^ Nearly from the very beginning livestock raising in New Spain 
was dominated by very large production units. In 1598, for example, 
Rodrigo de Rio de Losa in one year alone is reported to have marketed
60,000 head of cattle from  his H acienda Santiago near Somberete in 
distant Mexico C ity .5 Since the 1570’s New Spain’s livestock popula­
tions, especially that of cattle, quite suddenly began to decline due to 
wasteful and uncontrolled overkilling, rustling and Chichimec raids and, 
most importantly, a decline in livestock fertility at least in the central and
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southern regions.® D uring the mid -  sixteenth century public authorities 
were only concerned about devastating effects of proliferating herds of 
cattle, horses and sheep on food crop production and Indian population.^ 
Since the 1570’s, however, measures for the protection and regulation of 
livestock raising concerning such things as slaughter, sheepwalks and 
limitations of abusive treatm ent of ranchers by local officials were put 
into effect.®
D uring the following century livestock raising in New Spain, parallel 
to the process of hacienda formation, became a more organized en te r­
prise, a certain balance with crop production was reached and the loca­
tional pattern of livestock populations which, grosso modo, was to prevail 
until the end of the colonial era was established. Sheep flocks were 
concentrated east and north of the viceregal capital in a belt stretching 
from Tlaxcala via Pachuca, Cadereita, Q uerétaro  to San Miguel el 
G rande and Aguascalientes; and in the fa r north in Nuevo León and 
Coahuila, with minor populations in some southern areas as the Mixteca 
Alta and the O axaca valley system. Cattle was spread more evenly 
throughout much of colonial New Spain, but im portant concentrations 
were discernible in modern -  day Jalisco, M ichoacán, and the G ulf coast 
north of Veracruz.
Also in the Andean region European livestock species spread rapidly 
since the 1530’s, albeit on a smaller scale than in Mexico.® O n the coast 
the propagation of cattle, hogs, goats and, to a lesser extent, sheep and 
horses, combined with the reduction of the Indian population to lead to a 
changed land -  use pattern in the fertile irrigated river valleys, which in 
pre -  hispanic times had only hosted limited flocks of llamas for the 
transport of guano. Now the more marginal lands ceased to be used for 
crop raising and reverted to grass and carob tree vegetation on which the 
growing livestock populations fed. While these early coastal herds also 
primarily belonged to Spanish colonists, they were of very modest size 
indeed compared with those of New Spain's early colonial cattle 
barons.1® W ith the growing demand for foodstuff in the urban centers of 
coastal Peru and the opening of markets for products such as sugar, 
wine and aguardiente up and down the Pacific coast from  Mexico to 
Chile, the seventeenth century witnessed a renewed dedication of most 
Peruvian coastal valley lands to food and commercial crops. From then 
until quite recently livestock raising was mostly limited to goats and 
mules in the extreme north, hogs in the immediate vecinity of m ajor 
urban markets, as well as the maintenance of alfalfa fields for transport 
and draft animals, which were acquired, together with the cattle and
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sheep for meat consumption, either in the Sierra or from T u cu m án .11
T he introduction of European livestock species in highland Peru had 
different implications due to the previous existence of large herds of 
domesticated animals there. Proliferation of cattle and sheep thus in the 
Andes did not primarily diminish crop fields -  the extent to which it did 
that still requires further analysis -  , but rather led to the displacement 
of cameloid herds, a lo n g - te rm  process which continued at least until 
the mid -  nineteenth century and led to a considerable reduction in the 
extension of the habitat of alpacas and llam as.12 Sheep and cattle 
became numerous on higher valley slopes and puna regions throughout 
the central Andes between Q uito  and Potosí, but the greatest numbers 
were to be found precisely in the areas of the greatest concentration of 
cameloids, the Titicaca basin .1® T he early colonial history of livestock 
raising in the Peruvian Sierra has not been analyzed thoroughly to date. 
It would seem, however, that the few very large herds known to belong 
to the one or the other Spanish encomendero rem ained exceptional. By 
the last third of the sixteenth century Spanish owners of middling 
estancias as well as Indian community peasants and their kurakas were 
the preponderant livestock holders in P e ru .14
II. The Structure o f  Livestock Production D uring the Late Colonial 
Period
W ho were the ranchers in late colonial New Spain and Peru and 
what was the size of their holdings? In Mexico, creole and peninsular 
hacendados as well as religious institutions dominated livestock raising. 
W hile Indian peasants and their communities as well as mestizo ranche­
ros also owned cattle, sheep and mules, in most regions of the vice­
royalty they contributed little to the market for livestock and livestock 
products. Gibson reports that Indian peasants in the valley of Mexico 
showed no great inclination towards cattle raising and even the carnice­
rías in the Indian towns were supplied with steers from  Spanish hacen­
dados.1"’ According to the same author, of all large domesticated animals 
it was sheep which found most acceptance am ong Indians in the valley. 
Gibson estimated herds of Indian peasants to range from a few hundred 
to a few thousand sheep, with caciques owning up to 8,000 sheep .1® Yet 
while he acknowledges that even these herds "were small in comparison 
with the large Spanish herds,” still they must have been exceptional. H ad 
most Indian peasants in the basins of Mexico and Puebla owned herds 
of a few hundred to a few thousand animals, they would have been a
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considerable factor in the market for sheep and wool and a serious 
competition for Spanish hacendados, for which we have no evidence.
In the Intendancy of Nueva Galicia, Indian peasants owned small 
herds of cattle (usually less than ten) and sheep (no more than a few 
dozen) which provided draft animals, meat, hides and wool for their 
domestic economy. Only rarely did they market live animals or their 
products, and if they did, they commissioned owners of large herds about 
to be driven to market to sell their animals for them.*^ H ere cofradías 
held the most im portant herds of Indian cattle and at times even parti­
cipated in the long distance cattle drives.*®
In the southern M exican Intendancy of O axaca, Indian commoners
held little livestock other than a yoke of oxen in the late colonial period,
while sheep and cattle formed the main income of many Indian cofradías
here just as in Guadalajara.*® In contrast to central Mexico, caciques
here maintained a prom inant position in the regional livestock complex,
as many were able to cling to extensive landholdings until the very end
of the colonial period, at times even larger than Spanish pivate and 
90church haciendas. While the estates of convents and orders were nearly 
exclusively dedicated to livestock raising, private Spanish haciendas 
followed a mixed farm ing regime in O axaca. But, in any case, livestock 
herds of church institutions, Spanish hacendados and caciques remained 
relatively small in this southern Intendancy, rarely exceeding 10,000 
sheep and 2,000 head of cattle and equines.^* This size distribution of 
livestock herds stands in contrast to the situation in the m ajor ranching 
areas of central and northern Mexico. W hile recent research has 
corrected the concept of a general dominance of large estates in the 
agrarian structure of eighteenth century New Spain, small haciendas, 
ranchos and laboríos seem to have played a much greater role for cereal 
production than for livestock raising. It is, of course, a simplification to 
speak of livestock estates or maize and wheat growing estates, since 
typically haciendas pursued a mixed farm ing economy with a great 
variety of possible product mixes. To be sure, on those estates which 
raised livestock merely as a supplem entary product, or just for interior 
use as draft and transport animals and for meat provisions of the peones, 
herds might only hold a few hundred heads of cattle, as well as a 
similar num ber of goats and sheep. But among those haciendas whose 
prim ary income potential consisted of livestock, very large units domi­
nated. This was not only true for northern Mexico, where haciendas 
with over 100,000 sheep, as Santa C atarina in D urango, or the Conde 
de Aguayo’s vast latifundium  centered at Patos in Coahuila seem not to
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have been rare by the second half of the eighteenth century. 22 While 
these complexes had already been put together by the mid -  eighteenth 
century, it is presently not clear whether there was a general trend 
towards the agglomeration of vast livestock latifundia in northern Mexico 
precisely during the last five decades of the colonial era, as suggested by 
the case of the Sánchez N avarro in Coahuila described by Charles 
H arris .23
Also in central and western Mexico large production units dominated 
the livestock raising industry during the late eighteenth century. T his was 
true of the sheep and goat haciendas of the Jesuit Colegios of Mexico 
and Puebla. T heir famous hacienda complex Santa Lucia, located north 
of Texcoco, held 128,000 sheep in 1744, with a declining livestock 
population during the last two decades before the o rder’s expulsion. 
D uring these decades it marketed between 5,000 and 20,000 sheep 
annually besides considerable quantities of wool and tallow.2  ^ As far 
south as the M ixteca Baja, the Puebla Colegio owned two sheep raising 
haciendas with livestock capital of about 16,000 and 35,000 heads 
respectively during the 1760’s and a goat ranch near Acatlan with also 
about 35,000 anim als.23 For northern G uanajuato and Aguascalientes we 
have references to privately owned estates with a livestock capital of 
about 100,000 sheep during the eighteenth century.2® The large cattle 
ranches in the Intendancy of Nueva Galicia located in the Ameca valley 
and in the vicinity of Tepic on the Pacific slopes, seem to have held 
between 5,000 and 25,000 cows, steers and bulls during the late eight­
eenth century and were capable of marketing up to 3,000 or 4,000 steers 
annually.22 While the average livestock hacienda in eighteenth century 
Mexico of course held less livestock capital, there can be little doubt that 
such large production units held a predom inant position in the 
commercialization of animals and their products. Serrera Contreras 
reports that four hacendado families contributed 37 percent of all 
licensed cattle exports from  Nueva Galicia to Nueva España between 
1761 and 1800 and that one hacienda, Ciénega de M ata, accounted for 
over 57 percent of legally slaughtered ewes in the partido of Aguas­
calientes between 1767 and 1781.23 According to Eric V an Young, one 
hacienda, San Clem ente, supplied 32 percent of the steers for G uadala­
ja ra ’s abasto de carne in 1780/81, with an even higher concentración in 
the supply of sheep.29
Both the social and size distribution of livestock units was clearly 
different in late colonial Peru. In the Sierra, the all im portant region for 
livestock raising in Peru during this period, Indian commoners,
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kurakas, cofradías and, to a lesser extent, communities still held a very 
signigicant share, in some provinces even the majority, of the livestock 
capital. M agnus M örner reports that in 1786 haciendas only held less 
than 37 percent of sheep in Cuzco’s province of Calca, a region prim a­
rily dedicated to cereal production.30 Detailed livestock statistics for the 
im portant livestock raising province of Azángaro in the Altiplano for the 
years immediately following P eru ’s independence (1825 -  1830) show an 
even stronger position of Indian peasants as owners of livestock: H ere 
they held nearly 60 percent of all sheep and nearly 70 percent of cattle, 
with the rest belonging to haciendas of creoles, kurakas, church institu­
tions and the one or the other corporate com m unity.3* While Indian 
peasants probably held a relatively great share of the livestock population 
throughout southern Peru, it is quite possible that it was declining as 
one proceeded further north to provinces as C ajatam bo, H uam achuco 
and C ajam arca, since it appears that even by the late eighteenth century 
the Indian communal tradition and Indian landholding was considerably 
weaker in the north than in the south.
It may be that the same geographical differentiation also obtained 
regarding the kurakas’ involvement in livestock raising. At least for the 
southern and central Sierra we know that kurakas mayores belonged to 
the owners of the largest livestock haciendas. T he kuraka family Astocuri 
Apoalaya, according to O linda Celestino, was the largest landholder in 
the province of Ja u ja  in central Peru, owning at least 27,000 sheep and
2,000 bovines as early as 1698.3  ^ T he same can be said of kuraka Diego 
Choquehuanca of the Altiplano province of Azángaro who owned eleven 
livestock estates prior to the T úpac A m aru rebellion.33 At least for 
certain areas of Andean Peru we also possess evidence for a considerable 
involvement of Indian cofradías, sometimes as stand -  ins for commu­
nities, in livestock raising: According to Celestino, the ninety -  five 
cofradías of Ja u ja  province in 1795 held 21,531 head of sheep and 1,798 
bovines.3^
W hile it is beyond doubt that Indian peasants, kurakas and their 
institutions in Peru played a much grater role as livestock holders than in 
Mexico, the size distribution of Spanish estates in the Andes is more 
difficult to ascertain. In the most thourough analysis of a regional 
agrarian structure in late colonial Andean Peru published to date, 
M agnus M örner reports that just after 1700 the largest Jesuit livestock 
estancia in the bishopric of Cuzco held 32,000 sheep and that a livestock 
estate in Canas y Canchis with 10,000 sheep and 100 cows had to be 
considered ”muy grande.” In that province, a good part of which had a
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cold puna  climate and specialized in livestock raising, no estate held 
more than 300 cows, admittedly the less im portant species of livestock 
compared with sheep,35 T he mean livestock capital of the 110 estates in 
Azángaro province immediately after Independence amounted to 1,155 
sheep and forty -  seven bovines.36 Large haciendas here held between
5,000 and 10,000 head of livestock.
For the southern Peruvian Sierra there thus emerges a picture of a 
widely dispersed livestock property with a large share of small flocks 
controlled by Indian peasants, many livestock estates with only a few 
thousand sheep and several hundred head of cattle, and at best several 
dozen relatively large haciendas with 10,000 to 30,000 sheep.
It is possible however that a different structure prevailed in the center 
and particularly in the northern Peruvian Sierra, although the evidence 
is scarce. We have already mentioned the large livestock herds owned by 
the m ajor kurakas of Jau ja , and it appears as if the enormous livestock 
estates on the punas and high slopes of the M antara valley which 
became so prom inent in the twentieth century, had reached a consi­
derable size even by the late colonial period.
For the corregimiento of H uam achuco, in the Sierra and ceja de la 
selva o f modern La Libertad and C ajam arca departm ents, W aldem ar 
Espinoza has described a num ber of enormous estates for the late 
eighteenth century, which included lands in all climatic zones, from 
tropical to cold. They could thus produce considerable quantities of crops 
ranging from sugar, bananas and coca to maize and potatoes. But they 
also owned huge flocks of sheep with up to 100,000 animals, whose wool 
was processed in the estates’ own obrajes. T he largest of these estates, 
as San Pedro de Chuquisongo, Santa C ruz de C arabam ba and Chusgón, 
extended for up to 1,940 square kilometers. Several belonged to the 
Augustinians in L im a.37 In the global picture of late colonial livestock 
raising in Peru, the significance of these northern estates should not be 
exaggerated, however, since the largest concentration of stock was 
located in the southern highlands.
How can we account for this different social and size distribution of 
livestock production units both within and between the two viceroyal­
ties? A tentative answer might lie in the interacting influence of regional 
ecological conditions, pre -  hispanic land -  use patterns and colonial 
demographic and settlement patterns on the process of hacienda form a­
tion and land distribution. In those areas in which the environment was 
well suited for livestock raising and where no sedentary Indian peasantry 
offered any resistance, one might naturally expect the swift entrenchment
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of vast Spanish livestock estates, as happened in northern Mexico. But 
why did there develop such a marked difference in the average size of 
livestock estates between central Mexico and the southern Peruvian 
Sierra, both regions of dense population at the moment of conquest? The 
answer seems to rest in land -  use patterns. In central Mexico the 
European livestock could spread rapidly because the declining indigenous 
population withdrew to its best agricultural lands, leaving wide areas 
which could be claimed as sitios de ganado m ayor or m enor by Spanish 
colonists. In the southern Peruvian highlands the very existence of large 
herds of alpacas and llamas belonging to the ayllus placed a limitation on 
the propagation of European livestock and hence, the possibility of 
Spaniards to claim pasture lands as estancias. Throughout the colonial 
period the continued importance of extensive livestock raising for much 
of southern P eru ’s Indian peasantry, even though marked by a gradual 
shift from cameloids to sheep and cattle, allowed them to m aintain a 
strong legal claim and an effective control over much of the region’s 
pasture land. C entral M exico’s Indian peasantry appreciated this nexus 
between livestock raising and control over extensive stretches of land, as 
they attempted to build up communal herds precisely as a means to 
maintain control over what was becoming pastoral land .33 T he hypo­
thesis is further supported by the fact that in the Andes even by the late 
eighteenth century the extension of the mancha india was practically 
identical with what may be called the mancha cameloida both stretching 
from Huancavelica southward through High P eru .39 In other words, the 
survival of an Indian community peasantry was most marked precisely 
where the continuity of Indian livestock raising had been strongest. This 
would also help to explain the greater predominance of large livestock 
estates in the northern Peruvian Sierra. W ith the nearly complete 
displacement of cameloids from the region’s puna, peasants became 
limited to tem perate and tropical climate agriculture, while European 
sheep and cattle conquered the high elevation pastures for their masters.
III. Technology and Organization o f  Livestock Complexes
A striking difference among livestock operations in late colonial 
Mexico and Peru concerns the application of transhum ance for sheep. In 
the northern viceroyalty hundreds of thousands of sheep and goats each 
year at the end of the rainy season in October and November were dis­
placed from their estancias on the arid plateau to lower more humid 
winter pastures. From the valley of Mexico, from  Q uerétaro  and from
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as far north as D urango ranchers moved their flocks over 300 or 400 
kilometers to the area around Lake C hapala and western M ichoacan 
where they paid pasturage fees on the estancias used only for seasonal 
occupation. At least during the seventeenth century several hundred 
thousand sheep from central Mexico were transferred north to Nuevo 
León and Coahuila at the beginning of the dry season to return south­
ward in M arch. T here were also im portant sheep displacements from  the 
plateau to both the G ulf and Pacific coasts.4® T he prevalance of these 
lo n g -d istan ce  sheep movements was one of the key factors explaining 
why, in all the Spanish Indies, only in Mexico it came to the esta­
blishment of the mesta, the ranchers’ association, to whose regulatory 
powers it pertained to lay out sheepwalks or cañadas and try to minimize 
conflicts between the owners of the flocks and cattle herds driven to 
market and the owners of adjoining estates. U rsula Ewald puts the 
significance of this type of long distance transhum ance in perspective, 
when she says that only such arduous, costly and risky transfers of ani­
mals between sum m er and winter pastures allowed the existence of large 
sheep and goat herds.41 T he combination of transhum ance and long 
distance marketing also appears to have fostered specialization of New 
Spain’s livestock economy, as the drive of cattle to dry season pastures 
was often associated with selling the animals to something like a 
’’feed — lot operator,” who fattened the young steers before sending them 
on to distant urban markets. Thom as Calvo has recently shown, how as 
early as the first third of the seventeenth century the seasonal cattle 
drives in Nueva Galicia were articulated through a complex chain of 
intermediaries and credit relations.42
In Peru transhum ance was mostly local within one and the same 
landholding. H ere the m ajor way of dealing with seasonal scarcity or 
fodder consisted in the reservation of special pastures, so called bofedales 
or ahijaderos, with a peculiar vegation, which preserved moisture 
throughout the year, for feeding during the dry months. This regime was 
used in the sierra as much for sheep as for cattle.43 W hile not totally 
absent, transhum ance from the sierra to the piedm ont and lomas on the 
Pacific side and to the ceja de la selva on the Eastern slopes of the 
Andes played a minor role.
Concerning the use of additional fodder besides natural pasture, here 
again one gains the impression that Mexican practices had become more 
complex than Peruvian ones. O n the haciendas of central and western 
Mexico stubble grazing seems to have been comm onplace.44 T he sowing 
of alfalfa fields as additional feed for cattle and equines seems to have
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increased gradually during the eighteenth century, although New Spain’s 
Jesuits showed great reluctance in this regard. T he use of legumes and 
cereals as fodder found most application for mules and horses as well as 
for hogs during fattening. But at least the Jesuits also fed their cattle 
and even sheep with maize in times of scarce pastures.4'’
W hile there is some evidence for stubble grazing at least in the 
central region of the Peruvian sierra during the period under considera­
tion, its use was very limited, both because only the viceroyalty’s relati­
vely small cattle herds profitted from it and because the m ajor livestock 
herds were located in the punas quite fa r removed from  the Andean 
valley bottoms dedicated to crop raising.4® Alfalfares were planted in the 
more im portant Andean river valleys and throughout the coast. But 
again they only benefitted the cattle herds kept for raising draft animals, 
as well as mules, horses, and the animals being fattened for urban 
markets, particularly in the vicinity of Lim a, as for example in the 
C hancay valley.47 Among cereals and legumes in Peru, only barley 
attained any importance as forrage during the colonial period, but its use 
was limited to mules and horses.4® In sum, P eru’s m ajor livestock 
populations, especially sheep, but also those cattle herds not specifically 
maintained to provide draft animals, for all practical purposes had to 
rely exclusively on natural pastures as fodder. This was certainy true for 
one of the most im portant Peruvian livestock regions, the Altiplano, even 
as late as around 1900.
W hat very well might be lurking behind the greater willingness of 
M exican ranchers to experiment with additional forrages to supplement 
natural pastures was the growing pressure on pasture resources felt in 
many parts of central and southern Mexico during the late eighteenth 
century. According to U rsula Ewald, shortage of pastures perennially 
plagued the administrators of livestock haciendas belonging to the Jesu its’ 
Colegio Espíritu Santo in Puebla.49 Growing demographic pressure in 
areas as the valley of Mexico, the Bajío and central Nueva Galicia led to 
what David Brading has called internal colonization. New land was 
opened up for maize and wheat cultivation and hacendados undertook 
small irrigation projects. As G uadala jara’s population tripled between 
1760 and 1803, its foodshed, according to Eric V an Young, moved 
outward and cattle herds were displaced to more outlying, drier pastures. 
W hen in the latter part of the eighteenth century large livestock 
haciendas, as for example La Erre in G uanajuato, were rented in small 
parcels to tenant rancheros, these were likely to switch emphasis of pro­
duction to crops.®9 These developments led to a scarcity of pasture for
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livestock in central and southern Mexico and favored the growing use of 
additional fodder.
For late colonial Peru a tentative appraisal would suggest that in the 
Sierra, the m ajor livestock producing zone, pastures were not becoming 
scarce yet. D uring the 1820’s the livestock density on pastures in 
Azángaro province hovered around 1 to 1.5 units of sheep (ovejas 
madres en reducción) per hectare, with an estimated carrying capacity of 
about 2 units of sheep per hectare.51 W ith population growth just 
having set in since the second third of the eighteenth century -  as 
compared to New Spain, where this process had been under way since 
the mid -  seventeenth century -  , there is also not much evidence for 
"internal colonization,” or any significant effort to extend acreage for 
crops.511 In any case, since P eru ’s m ajor livestock populations were 
located in the cold climate puna regions, herds and crops often did not 
compete for the same land.
Besides competing demands on land resources for food and cash crop 
production, the other factor influencing the relative scarcity o r abun­
dance of pastures or, put more generally, livestock density, was of course 
the development of the size of livestock populations. D ata on this 
problem are fragm entary at best for both viceroyalties. Several scholars 
coincide in suggesting declining livestock populations, particularly of 
cattle on private estates in N ueva Galicia and O axaca, as well as on 
haciendas of the Jesuit Colegios of Mexico and Puebla since the 
mid -  eighteenth century. Only herds of draft anim als were increasing, 
responding to the growing food crop production.55 Indeed it appears that 
in the more densely populated areas of central, western and southern 
Mexico the declining size of cattle populations was a direct consequence 
of the shrinking land resources allotted to pasturage. In the words of 
G uadala jara’s wealthy m iner and hacendado M anuel Calixto Cañedo, 
"...expanding the tillage restricts the livestock dangerously...”54 In those 
parts of Mexico which felt the pressure of a growing population on food 
production, livestock populations by the mid -  eighteenth century 
apparently were fully exploiting the carrying capacity of available 
pastures. Any reduction in the size of pastures thus automatically needed 
to be accompanied by reductions in the size of the herds. This con­
sequence could only have been averted through greater investments in 
anim al husbandry with the aim  of achieving higher levels o f productivity 
(increased carrying capacity of pastures, fencing, reduction of livestock 
mortality). But, as we have seen, internal colonization and capital 
improvement projects were increasingly chanelled away from  livestock
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raising into the production of wheat, maize and cash crops as maguey. 
T he lo n g - te rm  decline in the reproductive rate of sheep, and possibly 
cattle, reported by K onrad for Santa Lucia during the eighteenth 
century, may well have been a consequence of overgrazing due to 
shortages of pasture while at the same time contributing to the stagnation 
in the size of herds.55 Only in the less densely settled areas was it still 
possible to achieve increased production both of crops and livestock 
simultaneously.56
We may thus ask w hether the balance of New Spain’s livestock herds 
shifted icreasingly towards the northern plains during the late colonial 
period. For the early and mid -  eighteenth century this seems likely, at 
least as far as sheep are concerned. The expansion of wool processing in 
Q ueré taro ’s obrajes during this period, coinciding with a marked decline 
of the more southerly earlier m anufacturing centers, can be viewed as 
adaptation to the growing importance of the northern plains as source of 
raw wool, as Richard Salvucci has suggested.5  ^ Yet, if H arris’ data on 
the Sánchez N avarro’s livestock operations in C oahuila are representative 
at all for the northeast, one would have to conclude, that herds there 
also stagnated since the 1780’s. Since the last years of that decade, the 
Sánchez N avarro 's annual lam bing crop reached a plateau not to be 
surpassed before the 1840’s. In Nuevo León, Coahuila and C hihuahua a 
further buildup of herds may have been ham pered since the 1770’s by 
the increasing intensity and frequency of Apache raids and a spell of 
particularly severe droughts (1 7 7 4 - 77, 1 7 8 4 -8 5 , 1790 and
1798 -  1802).58 For nearly all regions of New Spain impressionistic 
evidence points to a stagnation or, in some areas, even a decline of 
livestock populations since the 1780’s, with the one exception of draft 
animals.
For Peru we also have circumstantial evidence to suggest declining 
livestock populations at least in the southern Sierra region since 1780. 
Inspite of M agnus M örner’s warning not to exaggerate the economic 
damage caused by the T úpac A m aru rebellion, I would like to insist on 
its great impact at least as far as livestock populations are concerned.59 
There are too many scattered reports about large num bers of sheep and 
cattle requisitioned by troops on both sides, plundering of estates and 
surreptitious sales in cities.66
While livestock populations naturally could recover quite fast within a 
decade or two after such a m ajor depletion, it is my impression that this 
did not occur between the 1780’s and the outbreak of the W ars of 
Independence in the southern Peruvian sierra for reasons connected to
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the depressed market conditions, particularly for sheep. R ather than 
build up their stocks, hacendados preferred to sell as much as the annual 
crop allowed on the level of the reduced herds, in order to m aintain a 
standard of consumption which could underwrite their social status.
Production techniques, at least as far as the better documented sheep 
ranches were concerned, seem to have been similar in both viceroyalties, 
although the Mexican livestock haciendas tended to be better equipped 
and evidenced greater care in the execution of m ajor tasks in the annual 
production cycle, such as lam bing, shearing and slaughtering. Sheds, 
special corrales for lam bing ewes, copper kettles and other costly equip­
ment for processing the tallow from slaughtered animals, while appar­
ently common in Mexico, were not used in Peru. A meticulous regime of 
flocks, separated according to age and sex, was conventional practice in 
M exican sheep ranches, but in the southern Peruvian sierra had been 
adopted only on Jesuit estancias.61 Inspite of such differences, the scant 
information on productivity of sheep raising enterprises would suggest 
similarly low levels for both viceroyalties.6“1 A telling example for the 
relative backwardness of cattle raising in late colonial Peru appeared in 
an article in the ’’M ercurio Peruano” in 1792. A citizen of lea, concerned 
about the scarcity of beef in that town, suggested as an utter novelty 
that instead of slaughtering cows as practiced heretofore, from now on 
only steers should be slaughtered so that the region’s stock might 
increase. In Mexico, on the other hand, the exclusive use of steers for 
meat production had been commonplace since the late sixteenth century, 
when it was sanctioned by a viceregal ordinance.6,1
In sum, while ranchers in both viceroyalties used the same type of 
traditional production technology, M exican livestock estates tended to be 
organized more effectively and probably were also more highly capital­
ized.
IV . T he  Structure o f  M arkets and Conjunctures
W ith regard to livestock and their products the structure of the late 
colonial market in Mexico had become highly integrated and complex. 
Livestock producers from  the most distant regions participated in the 
supply of centers of consumption up to 500 or 600 miles away. The 
Mexican livestock market had become sufficiently complex for producers 
to have choices as to which center of consumption presented the most 
lucrative conditions for sale at any given moment. Cattle producers from 
Nueva Galicia not only could choose w hether they wanted to sell their
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steers directly to merchants in Mexico or Puebla holding a contract for 
those cities’ abasto de carne or try their luck at one of the annual live­
stock fairs in Puebla, T laxcala or Toluca. Increasingly they also 
compared the benefits derived from a difficult cattle drive to central 
Mexico with the conditions prevailing on G uadalajara’s own urban 
market.®5 Coahuilan sheep ranchers as the Sánchezz Navarros could 
choose between selling their animals to livestock traders as those in San 
Miguel Allende or directly to the merchants holding Mexico C ity’s abasto 
de carne. ®®
T he Peruvian market for livestock products appeared much less 
integrated. R ather it mostly consisted in a series of isolated relations 
between one production zone with one center of consumption, usually not 
more than 100 kilometers distant from  each other. This pattern 
characterized the supply of urban centers on the coast with sheep, hogs 
and, to a much smaller extent, cattle for m eat consumption, as well as 
the supply of coastal estates with draft animals from livestock raising 
zones in the adjoining area of the sierra. H ighland wool production was 
processed mostly in local obrajes to be found in nearly every serrano 
partido with sizeable sheep flocks between C ajam arca and the Titicaca 
basin.
Carlos Sempat Assadourian has recently presented a complex model 
of the ’’Peruvian space” during the early seventeenth century, in which he 
posits the precarious integration of a vast region stretching from the 
Kingdom of Q uito  to T ucum án, Chile and even Buenos Aires through 
commercial flows primarily set in motion by the secular expansion of 
silver production. Clearly Sempat comes to rather different conclusions 
about the Peruvian market for livestock products during the early 
seventeenth century than we do for that of the late eighteenth century. 
H e stresses the importance of the long distance trade in tallow and 
cordobans from  Piura and Chile to Lim a as well as to Alto P eru’s 
mining centers via Arica, the remittances of leather from  Tucum án to 
Potosi and the large -  scale distribution of mules from  various parts of 
the R iver Plate region throughout U pper and Lower Peru.®^
Principally two reasons allow us to hold a rather different view of 
P eru ’s livestock markets 150 years later. In the first place, Sempat 
him self stresses that between the late seventeenth and the nineteenth 
centuries both internal and external processes lead to a desintegration of 
the ’’Peruvian space” and the growing escisión of vast regions on its rim 
that gradually reoriented their commercial flows to centers outside of its 
space. This desintegration was caused first by the crisis of U pper P eru’s
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silver mining production and, in the course of the eighteenth century, the 
growing strength of the Atlantic economy, and the pursuant separation 
of the viceroyalties of N ueva G ranada and Rio de la Plata from  Peru, a 
desintegrating process which culminated in the rise of subnational export 
economies during the nineteenth century. By the late eighteenth century 
Chile, although still being tied to the commercial circuit dominated by 
L im a’s m erchants, had ceased to be a m ajor supplier of livestock 
products for Peru. T he remittances of mules to U pper and Lower Peru 
from Cordoba and Tucum án via Salta were recovering by the 1790’s 
after a protracted crisis during the mid -  eighteenth century. Yet the 
export of hides, tallow and salted m eat from  Buenos Aires gained 
increasing im portance for livestock producers even in some of the interior 
provinces of the Viceroyalty of Buenos A ires.68 At least since its 
administrative separation from  Peru the R iver Plate formed a distinct 
economic center of gravity outside the ’’Peruvian space.” In as much as it 
had pulled U pper Peru into its own network of market relations, it even 
contributed to the weakening of commodity flows between that old 
center of silver production and the southern intendancies of Peru. These 
shifts had a particularly debilitating impact on the commercial circuits for 
livestock and livestock products, since they had constituted such a 
conspicious part o f the commodity flows on the axis Lim a -  Potosí -  
Buenos Aires.
T he second reason for viewing P eru ’s livestock market as less inte­
grated during the late colonial period than Sem pat does for the early 
seventeenth century rests on the following argum ent: Long distance trade 
in livestock and derivated products was only directed towards a few 
large centers, prim arily Lim a and the U pper Peruvian m ining districts. 
But most regions and smaller provincial towns were supplied with meat, 
tallow, hides and wool from nearby livestock growing regions. W ith not 
much evidence for agricultural colonization in late colonial Peru, there is 
correspondingly also no indication that livestock herds were removed to 
more isolated, less densely populated regions. In  contrast to late colonial 
New Spain, then, livestock raising rem ained a rather dispersed economic 
activity in Peru, with short supply lines to most urban markets. The 
m ajor exception to this predom inance of a ra ther localized pattern of 
commercialization concerned the mule trade from  Tucum án. It was the 
only branch of the Peruvian livestock business the size and complexity of 
which surpassed the corresponding M exican trade in the late colonial 
period.6^
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As for many other aspects, our information on the size of the Peru­
vian market for livestock products is very limited until now. If we are to 
believe statistics from the M ercurio Peruano for 1791, which easily might 
be inflated, the northern Altiplano marketed the largest num ber of 
sheep, with 120,000 head being sold in the Intendancy of Cuzco, and at 
least 100,000 head in the Intendancy of A requipa, besides large amounts 
of chalonas (dried sheep carcasses), as well as considerable quantities of 
wool, tallow and other livestock products.70 Some of the other livestock 
trade routes with relatively high volumes of transactions concerned the 
supply of Lim a with 80,000 sheep annually from  the Intendancy of 
T arm a, and the sale of up to 100,000 goats from  Piura for the produc­
tion of soap and cordobans in Lam bayeque.71 T he least developed 
segment of the viceroyalty’s livestock trade concerned cattle, as urban 
beef consumption was minimal and the demand for draft animals 
rem ained largely limited to a few hundred coastal and hardly any more 
highland haciendas, while most of the indigenous peasantry continued to 
cultivate their land with a digging stick.7^
In Mexico, on the other hand, the cattle trade had a large volume,
since urban beef consumption was considerable and there existed a great
demand for for draft animals not only from  the estate sector but also
from the peasantry in central and southern Mexico. As H orst Pietsch-
mann has shown, in a region like Puebla, the sale of cattle contributed
the m ajor share of the corregidores’ repartos de bienes to Indian 
73peasants.
Tw o factors probably played a crucial role in accounting for the 
different structure of the market for livestock products in New Spain 
and Peru: 1. the demographic structure and the scale of urban centers 
and 2. transport and transaction costs.
By the late eighteenth century New Spain’s central and western 
regions, from the basins of Puebla, T laxcala and Mexico to the Bajío 
and central Jalisco, contained extended areas with a rapidly growing 
population density. As we have seen earlier, this development lead to a 
switch from livestock production to crop agriculture. Consequently 
ranching activities moved to more outlying areas. This tendency towards 
the separation and distancing of densely populated crop growing regions 
and livestock raising complexes must have expanded the marketing net­
work for livestock products and created additional demand for draft 
animals, tallow, hides, etc. in the crop growing regions which could not 
be met locally any more. At the same time, concomitant to the increas­
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ing population density, quite a few cities were growing at a fast rate 
during the late eighteenth century.74 By the 1790’s there were six cities 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants within a radius of 300 kilometers 
from Mexico City and at least another nine cities of this size further 
distant from  the capital. Together they offerred urban markets amount­
ing to more than 400,000 people, of which 270,000 belonged to the cities 
within the 300 kilometers radius around Mexico City (including the 
capital’s population itself). This represented, for the eighteenth century, 
a large aggregation of urban demand which favored an extension of 
trade networks for wool, tallow, live animals and hides and required a 
complex commercial structure.
In Peru, on the other hand, with a much lower population density 
than New Spain (obviously excepting the provincias internas ), during 
the late eighteenth century no comparable agglomeration of urban 
demand existed. T he eight o r nine cities with more than 10,000 inha­
bitants (four more, if we include Alto Peru) were dispersed widely 
throughout the whole viceroyalty. T he city of this size nearest to Lima 
(with the possible exception of the mining camp C erro de Pasco) was 
H uam anga, at a distance of nearly 600 kilometers from the capital while 
the second and the third largest cities of the viceroyalty, Cuzco and 
Arequipa, lay more than 1,000 kilometers from  Lim a. Mexican second­
ary cities also tended to be considerably larger than those of Peru.
The second factor helping to explain the difference of the market 
structure for livestock products between the two viceroyalties concerns 
transport costs.7® T o be sure, roads were bad in both New Spain and 
Peru. T ransport consequently could add enormously to the final price of 
a product in the market place. Yet there is good reason to think that this 
problem was graver in the Andean region than in Mexico, a distinction 
suggested by the very physical geography of both regions. O ne bit of 
evidence for this assertion comes from  the difference in the price of 
livestock products between areas of production and centers of consump­
tion. Eric V an Young reports that during the second half of the eight­
eenth century live cattle driven from  central Jalisco to Mexico City, a 
distance of some 600 kilometers, was sold on the average for about twice 
the price to wholesalers in that city which it was worth in the producing 
region.7® For live sheep the price differential between producing regions 
as fa r north as Coahuila and central M exican markets may have been 
even sm aller.77 In Peru the difference in the price of sheep between a 
m ajor producing area as the Altiplano and the Lim a market could 
apparently reach 200 percent.78 As late as the 1860’s the price of wool
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doubled between the production zone in the northern Altiplano and the 
wholesale warehouses in Arequipa, a distance of some 350 kilometers.^® 
-  Mules appear to have been considerably cheaper in New Spain than 
in Peru during the late colonial period, a factor which necessarily had a 
direct impact on transport prices for all types of merchandise, including
Of)
livestock products.
Although these varying prices and price -  differentials are only drawn 
from scattered and unsystematic price data and need to be interpreted 
cautiously, they are very suggestive. W ith transport costs likely to have 
been considerably higher in Peru than in New Spain, the integration of 
the market for livestock products and, for that m atter, all other 
merchandise as well, must have been much more tenuous in the Andean 
region than in the northern viceroyalty. D ue to higher transport costs the 
radius beyond which rural products such as wool, tallow, hides, etc. 
became prohibitively expensive must have been smaller in Peru than in 
New Spain. Only those goods which could be shipped by sea, as for 
example tallow from  P eru’s north coast, would have escaped this 
dilemma.
Before concluding this comparison, let us briefly consider the con­
juncture for livestock products in the two viceroyalties during the late 
colonial period. Again the Mexican case has been studied much better 
than that of Peru. In New Spain the long term constellation shaping the 
price development for many livestock products during the last fifty or 
sixty years of the colonial era consisted in the scissor -  like cleavage 
between stagnating or declining livestock populations and simultaneously 
growing demand for some key products, caused by increasing urban and 
rural populations, greater use of draft animals in agriculture and the 
growth in the physical output of mines. All authors coincide that prices 
for live cattle and beef were rising no later than the 1760’s in central 
and western Mexico. Beef prices in Mexico City, undoubtedly the 
largest market for cattle as well as sheep to be found anywhere in Latin 
America during the eighteenth century, even rose steadily since the 
1720’s. T he termination of the repartos by corregidores in 1786, which 
halted the sale of draft animals to peasants for a num ber of years, does 
not show up as a dip in the price of live cattle in the producing areas. 
For O axaca, Taylor reports essentially stable livestock prices throughout 
the eighteenth century with short -  term  upward and downward fluctua­
tions.®^ T here are some indications that sheep prices remained stationary 
somewhat longer than cattle prices. A fter a short inflationary movement 
during the drought years of the m id -  1780’s, they remained depressed
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in the Mexico City market until the mid -  1790’s. D uring the last fifteen 
years until the outbreak of the insurgent movements, live sheep then 
brought rapidly rising prices in the Mexico City market. Scattered 
information on prices for raw wool also suggest a rise only since the last 
years of the eighteenth century.®®
W ith the im portant exception of E .T ande ter’s and N .W achtel’s . 
recent study on prices in Potosí, we are still forced to make conjectures 
on the conjuncture for livestock products in late colonial Peru. T he study 
on Potosí suggests rising m eat prices (both for beef and charqui ) 
between the 1720’s and the m id -  1750’s, followed by a long period of 
stagnation turning into decline between the early 1790’s and 1804. The 
following decade saw a doubling of beef prices in Potosí. W hile the 
inflection of the price curve was upward for the three decades preceding 
1755 and flat or downward during the second half of the century, the 
mean level of m eat prices was twice as high between 1755 and 1790 as 
between 1721 and 1752.®4 T he steep decline of cattle prices on P eru ’s 
central coast between the late seventeenth century and the 1740’s, 
reported by Cushner, if it is not a quirk of a statistically too limited data 
base, might represent a prolongation of declining price trends observed 
for Potosí by T andeter and W achtel for the period between 1690 and 
1721 and does not preclude the possibilty of a price recovery on the coast 
during the following decades.®®
W ith growing urban populations in cities as Lim a, A requipa and 
Cuzco, it is quite possible that beef prices staid at a high level during the 
last few decades of the century also in Lower Peru, as livestock popu­
lations declined. Evidence from  lea for the year 1792 indicates that not 
only the price of beef but also that of mutton was rising there.®® But 
another market -  of greater relative significance in Peru than in Mexico 
due to the predominance of sheep in that viceroyalty’s livestock popu­
lation -  seemed to be collapsing since the 1780’s: I am referring to the 
demand for wool. For just about every region for which we possess 
inform ation, we hear of a decline in the production of woolens and 
hence a diminished demand for the raw material. T here were multiple 
causes for this problem ranging from  destruction of the installations, to 
the separation of Alto Peru from  the viceroyalty and, most importantly, 
the growing am ount of European textiles entering the colony. It was this 
last problem which in 1816 Abascal adduced as cause for the ruin of 
P eru ’s livestock estancias.®7
T andeter and W achtel found a drastic decline in the price of woolen 
textiles shipped from C uzco’s obrajes to Potosi setting in as early as the
133
first decade of the eighteenth century, with a precarious stabilization 
between the 1740’ s and 1781, and a further slide in the following
decade. T he short -  lived recovery during the renewed wars with great 
Britain, 1 7 9 6 - 1804, was more pronounced for cotton textiles than for 
woolen bayetas,88
It is evident then that the secular trend of demand for livestock 
products did not only vary between the two viceroyalties, but also
between different products. For live cattle and beef prices appear to have 
been considerably higher both in New Spain and in Peru towards the 
end of the eighteenth century than they had been fifty o r a hundred 
years earlier. But while the M exican case was characterized by rising
prices during the last four decades of the century, in the Andes prices
stagnated as early as the 1750’s. This suggests a smaller price elasticity 
for live cattle and beef in late colonial Peru. W e may wonder whether 
we are here encountering a reflection of the greater scarcity of circulat­
ing currency in late colonial Peru which forced m ajor groups of consu­
mers of cattle to alter their pattern of consumption and curtail invest­
ments in draft animals as early as the 1750’s.
For the case of Peru it is also evident that the commercialization of 
sheep and wool suffered under declining prices and increasing volumes of 
textile imports from Europe throughout much of the eighteenth century. 
While it cannot be ruled out that rising wool and sheep prices in New 
Spain between 1794 and 1808 only represented a brief recovery due to 
disruptions of the transatlantic trade, it at least appears plausible that the 
Mexican market for sheep and wool withstood European competition 
better both due to rapid population growth and modernization in the 
strongest centers of obraje production (Q uerétaro  and, possibly, San 
Miguel el G rande and G uadalajara). In one im portant aspect, however, 
the structure of livestock conjunctures showed no difference between both 
viceroyalties: They were much less affected by the short -  term  climatic 
cycles than agricultural products.89
W hat about the increasing silver production in Bajo Peru? C an we 
assume, as John  Fisher has done, that it stimulated all other economic 
sectors, including livestock production?98 T o be sure the partidos 
immediately adjacent to the two most im portant mining centers with an 
increasing production, C erro de Pasco and Hualgayoc, did experience an 
increasing demand for their livestock. It is interesting to note that in the 
case of the partido of C ajam arca growing demand for sheep and hogs 
in Hualgayoc led to a discontinuation of the partido’s trade in these 
animals with the coastal city of Trujillo , in other words to a further
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localization of the livestock trade. But booming silver production did not 
lead to increased demand for livestock products in other regions outside 
the immediately adjoining partidos either in C erro de Pasco or in H u a l- 
gayoc.®* T he growth of mining also failed to lead to an increased obraje 
production and hence demand for wool even in the very Intendancy of 
T arm a. In short, the stimulus of the mining centers on P eru ’s livestock 
production remained very modest indeed.
Conclusion
Inspite of being ruled by the same colonial regime, and inspite of 
similar systems of social stratification and even comparable levels of 
technology, the livestock complexes of New Spain and Peru during the 
final phase of Spanish rule showed im portant differences concerning the 
social distribution of the factors of production (land and animals), the 
structure of commercialization, and the conjunctures for the main 
products. For the purposes of the comparison we may have overdrawn 
these differences, but on the limited and uneven basis of presently 
available data, they appear no less real at that.
Broadly speaking, the Mexican livestock business was characterized 
by larger units of production dominated by private and corporate Spanish 
owners, in contrast to a more even distribution of livestock capital in the 
most im portant ranching areas of Peru, where Indian peasants and 
kurakas held a m ajor share of cattle and sheep until after independence. 
T he Mexican market for livestock products appeared more integrated and 
complex than that of the Peruvian viceroyalty, which in some respects 
appeared to be suffering a process of involution of its commercial circuits 
since the collapse of H igh P eru’s early seventeenth century mining 
boom. While the commercial upswing of the Bourbon reform  era is 
reflected in high price levels at least for cattle and derivated products in 
both viceroyalties, the growth in dem and in the Andes could not be 
sustained since the 1750’s. In  any case, the conjuncture for sheep and 
wool, of greater relative importance for Peru than for New Spain, was 
deteriorating in the Andes throughout most of the eighteenth century.
W e have sought explanations for these divergent structures and 
developments primarily in the different ecological and land -  use patterns 
since pre -  hispanic times, as well as in the impact of different demo­
graphic constellations and transport costs. These lines of argum ents, it is 
hoped, have demonstrated the diagnostic value of changes in the livestock 
sector for broader developments in the viceregal economies. Conversely,
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at least with regard to regional land tenure patterns, the crucial im por­
tance of different social distributions of the livestock capital to other 
subsystems of the economy is evident.
By the end of the colonial period, no later than 1783, to be precise, 
Peru’s livestock industry had entered into a long -  term crisis from  which 
it was not to recover before about 1860. T he Mexican case is more 
puzzling. While demand for livestock products grew right up to the out­
break of the struggle for independence, the producers seem to have failed 
to increase output correspondingly. T he stagnation of livestock popula­
tions suggests that New Spain’s ranchers were enjoying the strengthening 
conjuncture without reinvesting their growing returns. By the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, the seeds for the post -  colonial decline 
thus also seems to have been laid for M exico’s livestock industry.
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C O M M E N T A R Y
Friedrich Katz
Com parative studies between the Andean region and Mexico have 
interested historians, anthropologists and economists for a long time. The 
two regions have enough in common to make a comparison viable, and 
sufficiently striking differences to make it fascinating. Both regions con­
stituted the only great empires of pre -  hispanic America. Both were 
based on a juxta -  position of powerful emperors and a large nobility at 
the top and communal organizations at the bottom (though not at the 
rock bottom) of society. Both ruling groups of these empires, the Incas in 
the Andean region and the Aztecs in Mexico, only emerged about a 
century before the coming of the Spaniards. Both of these powerful 
empires crumbled under the assault of only a few hundred Spaniards.
Nevertheless, both empires also manifested profound differences. The 
Inca em pire was far more integrated than that of the Aztecs. In fact 
many Mexicanists refuse to label the territory ruled by the cities of the 
triple alliance, Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan, an em pire at all. 
T he Incas attempted to garrison their em pire, sent administrators to all 
the regions under their control and carried out extensive resettlement of 
populations. Attempts were made to set up a common religion, a 
common ideology and Q uechua was to be the common language of the 
whole empire. At the same time the Inca em pire attempted to preem pt 
the redistribution of wealth by absorbing the surplus that the local 
population produced and redistributing it in part to the Inca nobility, in 
part to the subject population. No comparable structure emerged in 
Mexico. The Aztecs sent garrisons only to border regions, did not 
attem pt to homogenize the religion, the language and the culture of the 
regions they ruled nor did they seek to adm inister them from  their capi­
tal: T he Aztecs did absorb a large part of the surplus that the common 
people produced but they did so only with the aim  of supporting the 
cities of the triple alliance. Redistribution of goods was largely carried 
out by trade in Mexico while the state assumed that function in Peru.
Differences within the two empires existed not only at the top but at 
the bottom of society as well. The village community seems to have been 
fa r more widespread and above all more egalitarian in Peru than it was 
in Mexico. T here were no periodic redistributions of land within the
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community in Mexico as there were in Peru, nor was the Mexican 
community (i.e. the calpulli) obligated to care for widows and orphans 
and the poor as the Peruvian community (i.e, the ayllu) did. T he result 
of these social and economic differences as well as the ecological varia­
tions (there was more intensive agriculture in pre -  Colum bian Peru than 
in Mexico and the inhabitants of the Andean region, unlike those of 
Mexico, practiced livestock raising before the Spaniards came) was that 
Mexico in contrast to the Andean region was affected by periodic 
famines which produced a large degree of mortality.
As a consequence of these differences, large segments of the subjects 
of the Aztec Empire considered it as tyranny that had very little legiti­
macy. In Peru, by contrast, the Incas seemed to have been much more 
profoundly embedded among the population. T he results of these dif­
ferences in legitimacy could be clearly seen during the conquest and 
afterwards. In Mexico, H ernán Cortes rode the crest of a popular 
uprising against the Aztecs. No similar popular revolt supported the 
Spanish conquest of Peru. The myth of a golden Aztec past has never 
existed in Mexico nor has it had any relevance to later uprisings. In 
Peru, by contrast, every m ajor social upheaval until today was linked to 
the belief in an age of justice and glory during the Inca period.
A further factor of insecurity of the Aztec empire in contrast to its
Andean counterpart was the existence of a large hostile frontier on its
borders. T he nomadic and semi -  nomadic inhabitants of northern 
Mexico constituted a far greater threat to the stability of Aztec, o r for 
that m atter all, central Mexican rulers that had preceded them , than the 
closest Andean equivalent to this frontier: the inhabitants of the Amazon 
jungle.
Did these differences continue into the Spanish colonial period or did 
Spain succeed in homogenizing both regions and creating a similar type 
of entity? T he Spaniards certainly attemptd to do so. T hey introduced 
the same religion, the same ideology, the same institutions, and
frequently the same people were in charge first of one, then of the other
region. Both regions, the Viceroyalty of New Spain and the Viceroyalty 
of Peru, became the mainstays of Spanish colonial rule in the Americas. 
Similar crops and techniques were introduced in both regions. Both were 
affected by a similar catastrophe: massive Indian mortality in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In both the population decline was 
reversed by the eighteenth century and in the latter years of Spanish 
colonial rule both the Andean region and Mexico underwent the greatest
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popular uprisings in the history of the Spanish empire.
T he three essays by Nils Jacobsen, Eric V an Young and Albert 
Meyers clearly show the new and old type of similarities and differences 
that emerged in the two regions during the colonial period and above all 
at its end.
Nils Jacobsen compares both the reception and the effects of livestock 
raising in both regions. Both Eric V an Young and Albert M eyers deal 
with a similar subject, the social changes and the crisis in the countryside 
of Mexico and Peru at the end of the colonial period. O ne difficulty of 
a comparative nature that the latter two papers have is the fact that 
while Eric V an Young deals with the whole of New Spain, Albert 
Meyers only concentrates on a limited region of Peru, the M antaro 
valley which is not necessarily typical of the whole of the Viceroyalty of 
Peru. Nevertheless, all three papers do make it possible to assess some of 
the main similarities and differences between the two regions.
Nils Jacobsen’s fundam ental thesis, which I fully agree with, is that 
in Peru livestock raising at least to a degree was absorbed into the Indian 
economy. In New Spain by contrast it rem ained outside the Indian 
economy and to a large degree began to disrupt it. Some of the funda­
mental reasons for this discrepancy that Nils Jacobsen lists are very 
convincing: the fact that Indians in Peru had raised livestock prior to the 
conquest made it much easier for them  to do the same afterw ards. 
Another fact of an ecological nature that Jacobsen cites, namely that in 
many of the stock raising regions agriculture could only be practiced to a 
limited degree and thus was not displaced by the new livestock industry 
is also very clear and convincing. W hat I feel M r. Jacobsen should have 
insisted on more is to show that both Indian communities and the 
Indian nobility were fa r more powerful in Peru than in Mexico. The 
reasons for this discrepancy had to do with a num ber of factors both 
historical and ecological. In historical term s the Incaic ayllu seems to 
have been both more widespread and above all fa r more structured and 
pervasive (with its profound care for orphans, widows, those who could 
not work, etc.) in the pre -  hispanic period than the Aztec calpulli where 
these social functions do not seem to have existed. Another difference 
was that in Mexico the center of Spanish settlement was identical with 
the center of Aztec rule: the Valley of Mexico. In Peru, by contrast, the 
Spaniards tended to settle above all in the coastal regions and in the 
mining region of Potosí and less so in the Cuzco region of the southern 
highlands, the old center of Inca power. As a result, the Inca nobility 
retained a far greater m easure of control than the Aztec nobility did. Its
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power was also strenghtened by the fact that in linguistic and cultural 
terms, the Incas had achieved a fa r greater degree of homogeneity on 
the eve of the conquest than the Aztecs had. As a result, the Q uechua 
language was fa r more widespread in Peru than N ahuatl was in Mexico 
and the legitimacy of Inca rule was far more recognized. Not only the 
tradition of cattle raising but the greater power of this Inca nobility and 
of the village community in Peru allowed it to play a greater role in such 
an im portant and at times decisive part of the economy as livestock 
raising. In Mexico by contrast, this even more im portant segment of the 
economy became a non -  Indian domain and as a result not only the 
Indian communities but the Indian nobility in most parts of the country 
(with conspicuous exceptions such as in O axaca) became marginalized in 
economic and social terms. This in turn would help to explain the far 
smaller role that both Indian communities and Indian nobles played in 
the m ajor social upheavals in New Spain in com -  parison to Peru.
Another difference between the two regions that Nils Jacobsen 
stresses is that livestock raising caused much more profound economic 
and social changes in Mexico than in Peru. O ne reason is simple and 
obvious, livestock had not existed in pre -  Colum bian Mexico as it had in 
p re -C o lu m b ian  Peru. Perhaps even more im portant though is the fact 
which Jacobsen also mentions, that in Mexico in contrast to Peru, thanks 
to livestock raising, immense new territories, i.e. the northern part of 
Mexico that had only been inhabited by nomadic Indians before, were 
now settled. This in turn profoundly transform ed the whole character of 
Mexico and accentuated its differences with Peru. Northern Mexico 
constituted a freer and more modern segment of the country’s society: 
Nothing similar to northern Mexico developed in Peru. W hile its impact 
during the colonial period was limited, during the nineteenth and above 
all early twentieth centuries, M exico’s northern frontier would become a 
center of modernization as well as a center of social revolution that in 
the years 1910 -  1920 would overwhelm all of Mexico and leave its 
profound imprint on the whole of society. T he Revolution of 1 9 1 0 - 1920 
whose influence on Mexico can still be felt and which propelled Mexico 
into a development not only different from  that of Peru but from  all of 
Latin America was inconceivable without the livestock raising that first 
helped to populate the frontier where all victorious armies in 1 9 1 0 - 1920 
originated.
Inspite of the profound social economic differences between the 
Andean region and Mexico, both suffered from  a crisis similar in many 
respects in the last years of Spanish colonial rule.
146
W ith respect to New Spain, Eric V an Young aptly characterizes this 
period with the words ’’growth without developm ent.” T here was growth 
of agriculture, industrial and mining production. T here was the general 
demographic increase and the population of the cities rose at a fa r more 
rapid pace than that of Mexico as a whole. Nevertheless, the living 
standards of the mass of the population fell. In  contrast to other authors, 
V an Young does not attribute this evolution primarily to the Bourbon 
reforms, but to a combination of demographic increase and limited 
access both to land for cultivation and to pasture lands. As a result, 
peasants were forced to sell their labor at increasingly cheaper rates and 
to m igrate to the cities whose population increased dramatically. This in 
turn led to an increasing demand which stimulated agricultural produc­
tion on the larger estates. As the estates found demesne agriculture to be 
more productive than share cropping, more peasants were displaced and 
the living standard decreased even more. As a result the death rate 
increased and the growth of population, though not stopped, diminished 
significantly in the last years of Spanish rules in New Spain. V an Young 
does not dismiss the Bourbon reforms altogether but he considers them 
as secondary to the combination of demographic increase and insufficient 
land which in turn led to a  transfer of wealth from  the peasants to the 
landowners, and from the countryside to the cities. T he Bourbon reforms 
may on the one hand have stimulated some aspects of mining produc­
tion which created a larger market for agricultural production. O n the 
other hand, they may very well have slowed economic development by 
increasing taxation and the transfer of revenues from New Spain.
Did similar developments occur in the Andean region? Albert 
M eyers’ description of the evolution of the M antaro Valley definitely 
shows that a series of developments were common to both the Vice­
royalty of New Spain and that of Peru: an increase of an agricultural 
population owning insufficient lands of their own to subsist. In the 
M antaro valley, it was above all the control of pastoral lands by the 
large estates that produced increasing shortages and lack of land among 
the peasants of the region.
As in New Spain mining production as well as production of 
commercial crops on large estates increased. As in New Spain overall 
economic activity seems to have increased in the M antaro valley and in 
the viceroyalty of Peru as a whole. Unlike Eric V an Young, Albert 
M eyers does not attempt to assess to w hat degree these tendencies were 
due to the Bourbon reforms, and to what degree population increase and 
ensuing impoverishment of the poorest segments of the rural community
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were responsible for many of these developments.
A comparison between Eric V an Y oung’s and Albert M eyers’ papers 
indicates several areas of contrast between Mexico and Peru, i.e. at 
least between New Spain and the M antaro valley that are worth explor­
ing further: In contrast to V an Young, Meyers never speaks of famines 
in his region. Does this indicate that the pre -  hispanic contrast between 
Mexico and Peru subsisted into the colonial period and that for a num ­
ber of ecological and perhaps social reasons fam ines could be fa r more 
easily avoided there than in Mexico?
M eyers coincides with V an Y oung’s assertion for New Spain that 
forms of forced labor were receding in the eighteenth century because of 
the increase in population. T here was a sharp decrease in debt peonage 
in Mexico and of the m ita in Peru. Nevertheless, Peruvian miners 
seemed to have had more difficulties than Mexican miners (except in the 
more inaccessible frontier regions) to attract free labor. M eyers does not 
see the main cause of this in a lack of landless laborers (such as existed 
in the sixteenth and perhaps in seventeenth centuries), but rather in the 
low salaries paid by the miners. H e implies that many mines were run 
by small marginal operators who may not have had the capital to pay 
these wages. W hy was this the case at a time when the Spanish state 
was attem pting to revive mining by every means at its disposal? W hat 
viable alternatives did the landless laborers who did not work in the 
mines have to find their sustenance?
O ne fascinating contrast between late colonial New Spain and late 
colonial Peru concerns land expropriations. I fully agree with Van 
Y oung’s statem ent that massive land expropriations took place in New 
Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when most of the Indian 
population had died, and not on the eve of Independence. Meyers 
seems to indicate that something very different occurred in Peru. H ere in 
the last years of Spanish rule, cofradías on the one hand and land­
owners of the other seem to have confiscated a very large am ount of 
Indian lands. O ne explanation, for which I have found no evidence up 
to now, might be that Indian mortality was smaller in Peru than it was 
in sixteenth and seventeenth -  century Mexico. As a result more Indians 
would have remained on their land. A second explanation, which may 
make more sense is that less Spaniards emigrated into the densely settled 
Indian regions of highland Peru than they did into the core areas of 
highland Mexico. As a result, Indian communities and nobles retained 
more of their land. W ith increasing commercialization and land values 
rising in the eighteenth century, incentives to expropriate Indian lands
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may now have increased.
O ne obvious difference between New Spain and Peru on the eve of 
Independence was the fact that at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century a m ajor popular uprising, the T upac A m aru revolt, had already 
occurred in Peru and been crushed, while the great lower class revolt in 
Mexico, the Hidalgo revolt, had not yet taken place. Did the crushing of 
the Indian revolt in Peru mean that the landowners now felt strong 
enough to appropriate the lands of the vanquished? This would lead to 
another set of interesting comparisons between Mexico and Peru for the 
defeat of the H idalgo and Morelos revolts in Mexico did not lead, at 
least in the short run, to any massive attack on Indian property rights. 
T he contrast is all the more interesting since the M exican state that 
assumed power shortly after the defeat of H idalgo and Morelos was far 
less committed to m aintaining the integrity of Indian lands than the 
Spanish state that still retained power in Peru for about forty years after 
the end of T upac Am aru revolt. T he contrast might conversely be due to 
the fact that the weak M exican state that followed independence simply 
did not have the kind of power that the Spanish state in Peru still 
possessed to crush peasant resistence against expropriation. Above all, 
the newly created Mexican state did not have the authority and means to 
create the kind of order that was necessary in order to allow and 
encourage the type of economic boom that made land expropriations 
worthwhile in an economic sense in the first place.
These are just a few of the comparative problems for which these 
excellent papers have laid the basis and which I feel require a large 
am ount of additional research.
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IV. T H E  A RTESA N A L A N D  M A N U FA C T U R IN G  SE C T O R
6. T H E  C O T T O N  T E X T IL E  IN D U ST R Y  O F  COCH ABAM BA , 
1 7 7 0 - 1810: T H E  O P P O R T U N IT IE S  A N D  L IM IT S  O F
G R O W T H
Brooke Larson
Though it would be trite to describe eighteenth century Cochabam ba 
as a region of paradoxes, there is perhaps no other way to account for 
the contradictions and discrepancies of so many European reports on the 
region. Reliable and astute colonial observers like the Intendants Fran­
cisco de V iedm a, Francisco Paula Sanz and the Czech naturalist Tadeo 
H aenke at times seemed to view local society through stereopticons that 
rarely brought the two images into sharp focus.1 After touring the val­
leys, European observers would often adm ire the ’’opulent haciendas of 
maize and w heat” and ’’excellent pastures that nourish multitudes of 
sheep,” while lam enting the region’s cash -  hungry hacendados. V iedma, 
for example, described in detail C ochabam ba’s craft industries and 
bustling peasant markets. Yet he characterized the peasants and urban 
plebe as chronically idle and slothful. And while he invariably noted the 
strong acculturative forces at work in the largest ’’mestizo province” of 
Alto Peru, he warned against the ’’indigenization” of colonial customs and 
language, as Q uechua increasingly ’’contam inated” the speech of the 
creoles. And, finally, the very statistics on trade and prices that V iedm a 
compiled in the 1780’s and 1790’s seemed to contradict his own genera­
lizations about the region’s alleged over -  abundance of wheat and 
maize in most agricultural years as well as his assumption that Cocha­
bam ba exported little grain or cotton cloth to the markets o f the Alti­
plano.^
T o be sure, eighteenth century C ochabam ba did not ’’fit” the domi­
nant Andean mold -  if indeed there was one. It was neither an Indian 
region, like the neighboring province of C hayanta where hacendados 
never displaced nor marginalized Indian village society; nor was it an 
intensive monocultural zone like the nearby coca -  producing province of
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C hulum ani.^ Since the sixteenth century the cereal haciendas had 
become the dominant agrarian structure, originally producing for the 
silver mines of Potosí and, to a lesser extent, O ruro. By the eighteenth 
century the regional economy had experienced something of an economic 
involution, as landowners’ commercial profits were pinched by the 
long -  term  contraction in demand for their foodcrops at the highland 
mines and as the hacendados faced growing competition from peasant 
smallholders. T he proliferation of small -  scale wheat, maize and potato 
cultivators who (crop yields perm itting or scarcity dictating) regularly 
participated in the product and labor markets were, of course, internally 
differentiated. And a narrow layer of peasant producers managed to 
prosper and accumulate; but their m eager gains rarely spelled peasant 
proprietorship and freedom from rent.
In fact, material conditions probably deteriorated for most valley 
peasants over the course of the eighteenth century, as colonial authorities 
imposed new burdens and liens on the peasant household. T o wit, the 
rural population of Cochabam ba supported one of the largest (in absolute 
terms) legal yearly repartos (or forced distribution of merchandise) 
between 1754 and 1780.  ^ And after the Bourbons systematized tribute 
collection in the late 1770’s, they levied tax (at six pesos, two reales -  
one of the stiffest rates in Alto Peru) on the forasteros of the province.'' 
In addition, rapidly growing population in the valley of Cliza and other 
parts of the region placed more pressure on productive resources and 
swelled the ranks of the impoverished and rootless. These ’’structural 
factors” placed a downward pressure on many peasant households and 
cut into the thin margin of social insurance most families relied upon in 
their struggle against the endemic uncertainities o f agrarian life, where 
normally grain harvests could double and halve from  one year to the 
next.
I. Agrarian Origins o f  Industry
How did peasants on valley haciendas shape their economic lives to 
guarantee themselves a stable livelihood from  one year to the next? 
Despite all the liens that the state, the church and individual landlords 
placed on the surplus product of peasant labor, peasants who inhabited 
hacienda lands in the central valleys were commercially oriented when­
ever nature afforded them  an abundant or good harvest. T he small­
holders of Cochabam ba were notorious for their commercial activities 
and networks of ferias which provided the mechanism for the distribution
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of food crops, seeds, and m anufactured goods throughout most of the 
region.*’ But while small -  scale peasant marketing certainly undermined 
landlord monopoly, farm ing alone usually offered little chance for most 
households to radically improve their standard of living. T his was 
especially so as population pressure increased in the late eighteenth 
century in the central valley and agricultural prices throughout Alto Peru 
tended to stagnate during the latter part of the eighteenth century, 
according to a prelim inary study of commodity prices over the course of 
this century.^ O ut of the countervailing forces of population pressure and 
local commercial opportunity, many peasants began to diversify their 
economic activities and turn to petty crafts and trade. Capital -  poor and 
land -  short, country people channelled their labor (”the idle hands” for 
which local authorities had such contempt) into industry.® Alongside 
producción parcelaría in the central valleys arose multifarious cottage 
industries: chicha making (in Cliza and the Cercado), lum ber and 
carpentry (in Sacaba), soap, g lass-b low ing  and gunpowder workshops 
(in Cliza) and, most importantly, cotton textiles (in Quillacollo and the 
Cercado).®
C ochabam ba’s primitive cotton textile industry developed late, during 
the second half of the eighteenth century. Unlike the production of 
woolens which predom inated in the western provinces of the Altiplano, 
cotton m anufacturing in the valleys was a dispersed, cottage industry that 
sprang up in the towns of C ochabam ba, T ara ta , and Quillacollo and 
the surrounding countryside.10 It did not entirely displace textile manu­
facturing in obrajes, where rural laborers were engaged as spinners and 
weavers under deplorable conditions, at the comm and of their landlord or 
employer who owned the looms and other instrum ents of production. 
O n many haciendas peasants were forced to spin and weave, as well as 
to cultivate their lord’s lands. In  the 1780’s, the male tenants of the 
hacienda C aporaya in the Calliri river valley, for example, had to 
sentence their wives to the workshops of the hacienda where they turned 
wool and cotton into yarn and wove cloth, all as part of their labor 
ren t.11
But on most haciendas, including Caporaya, peasants wove bayetas 
and other rustic woolen cloth, under orders of their landlord, mainly for 
home consumption. Cochabam ba had few commercial obrajes in the late 
eighteenth century, and as a result, the region imported from  distant 
provinces most of its rustic woolen cloth.
A sample of one fifth of the colonial goods that entered the province 
in various years between 1777 and 1808, which were taxed and regis-
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tered in the royal alcabala accounts, reveals that rustic cloth destined for
peasant consumption was the principal item of import. 12 V arious types
of bayeta generated almost 30 percent of the tax value of the total
num ber (1,313) of goods sampled. Rustic clothing imports added another
12 percent of the tax value, so that cheap woolen cloth and clothing for
peasant consumers represented almost half of the value of all taxable
merchandise that entered the province. O brajes and workshops in the
highland provinces of La Paz and north of Lake Titicaca, especially
around Cuzco, supplied the Cochabam ba valleys with most of its woolen 
1 3imports. T hus, while the cost of cotton textile production was generally 
higher than spinning and weaving woolen cloth, especially where there 
was no local supply of raw cotton, the competition from  the small 
workshops (chorillos) and obrajes of the highlands compelled the artisans 
of Cochabam ba to turn to tocuyo p roduction .^
Tocuyo  was the cloth of the laboring poor. It was a rustic, undyed 
cotton textile that Indians and mestizos used .15 T he Intendant of the city 
of Arequipa, another center of tocuyo m anufacture, explained in his 
M em orias ’’that the plebe  wears tocuyo cloth as undergarm ents.”15 
Tocuyos were considerably cheaper than the dyed cotton cloth of Q uito, 
and after 1780 local rustic cotton cloth edged the fam ous quiteño textiles 
out of the m arket.17 But the crude and plain cloth never spontaneously 
replaced the finer cottons and woolen textiles imported from Europe. 
T he prosperous consumers in the valleys continued to purchase European 
cloth in abundance, "draining the province of scarce m oney,” Intendant 
Francisco de Viedm a complained in 1788.18 C ochabam ba’s tocuyeros 
sent some of their product to distant markets, but stiff competition from 
European textile m anufacturers restricted their markets to the local ones. 
Local producers were even more hard put to overcome the logistics of 
transit time, weight, bulk and profitability entailed in long -  distance, 
overland trade once Spain opened Spanish ports in 1778, including the 
great port of Barcelona, for direct trade with Buenos Aires. T he C row n’s 
’’free trade” policy and state subsidies for Spanish textile m anufacturing 
stimulated the rapid growth o f cotton cloth production in the metropolis. 
In only a decade (1775 to 1784), the production of cotton textiles in 
Spain increased threefold, and Barcelona became a m ajor cloth supplier 
to the Viceroyalty of La P la ta .19 Furtherm ore, the tocuyeros of Cocha­
bam ba confronted British contraband traders who introduced cheap, 
m ass-p ro d u ced  cotton textiles from the factories of M anchester and the 
rustic calicoes from India .20 T he relatively late development of the textile 
industry in C ochabam ba, its primitive nature, the crude quality of the
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cloth, and the difficulty of procuring raw cotton from distant sources of 
supply created formidable obstacles which (without drastic disruption of 
international trade) neither enterprising artisans nor shrewd merchants in 
Cochabam ba could hope to overcom e.21 U nder ’’norm al” circumstances, 
then, the textile industry of Cochabam ba was oriented toward the con­
sumption of the laboring classes, both urban and rural, and subject to 
the constraints of a narrow market.
C ontem porary sources defy precise estimate of the num ber of people 
who were engaged in cloth production and marketing in C ochabam ba. In 
1788 Viedm a mentioned that 500 cholos and mestizos occupied them­
selves in cloth m anufacturing in the parish of Q uillacollo.22 But a 
plethora of small workshops also peppered the parishes of the Cercado 
and T arata . M any years later, in 1804, Ju an  Carillo de Albornoz made 
reference to some 3,000 tocuyo weavers in the province.23 T he num ber 
of women and children engaged in spinning, dyeing and marketing 
tocuyos probably trebled that estimate, so that perhaps eight or ten 
thousand people were involved in one o r another stage of production or 
distribution during peak output. This m ay well be a conservative esti­
mate. In his 1827 report on potential market and investment opportuni­
ties in Bolivia, the British envoy John  Barclay Pentland estimated that as 
many as 20,000 people in the province fashioned raw cotton into 
tocuyos during the 1790’s.2^ In any event, we can say with reasonable 
certainty that Cochabam ba fa r surpassed the province of A requipa, its 
closest competitor, in the volume of tocuyo production in this period. 
T he Intendant Barriga reported in the late 1780’s that in the town 
environs of A requipa weavers produced at least 124,000 varas of cloth 
each year.25 This output hardly compared to the 300,000 varas of cloth 
that merchants in Cochabam ba dispatched to distant marketplaces in the 
same period.26 And that estimate apparently excludes the bulk of the 
cloth destined for local consumption. Cochabam ba was probably the 
largest producer of tocuyos in the Andes. Tadeo H aenke, the Czech 
naturalist who resided in Cochabam ba for many years, apparently 
thought as m uch:”...th e  Province of C ochabam ba ... consumes [as much 
cotton] in its looms as all the other [provinces] com bined.”22
For all the growth and promise of the textile industry in C ochabam ­
ba, curiously little information was left to us about the industrial organ­
ization of tocuyo production. Haenke often referred to the primitive 
conditions under which people worked. ”As I mentioned earlier,” he 
wrote in 1799, ’’one finds industry in these towns in its first infancy ... 
T he utensils, instrum ents, and some of the looms are poorly constructed
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and lack the use of those [English] machines that facilitate and abbrevi­
ate the different tasks”.28 T he power looms and other machinery that 
would have speeded up and standardized cloth procution in Cochabam ba 
was, of course, turning the cities of M anchester and Belfast into textile 
workshops of the world and launching England’s Industrial Revolution.
But in these Andean pockets of commercial textile production, 
non -  capitalist social relations predominated. T he labor process was 
divided essentially into three phases: the preparatory work of cleaning 
and plying and spinning cotton; weaving cloth on the treadle looms; and 
stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. In many cases this last process 
was eliminated, and unbleached, undyed tocuyos were sold and used. A 
rudim entary division of labor existed, as workers engaged in one or 
another of the stages of production. W omen and children performed 
what H aenke called the ’’auxiliary tasks” of cleaning, spinning the wool, 
and stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. These tasks were more time 
consuming, and fem ale spinners generally outnum bered male weavers 
by more than three to one.2**
At first, spinning and weaving was subsidiary to their work on the 
land. Peasants sometimes turned to artisanal activities when farmwork 
slackened. But I suspect that as opportunities for commercial gain 
increased, particularly in the 1790’s, a population of professional weavers 
sprang up in the towns and loosely associated themselves in craft 
guilds.30 As the demand for yarn increased, women also allocated less 
time to agricultural chores. This was particularly so because short -  
fibered cotton was more cumbersome than wool to manipulate. It 
required more labor and concentration to align the fibers and turn cotton 
into yarn than to spin wool. Unlike Andean women of the highlands 
who spun wool as they watched over their herds, the cotton spinners of 
C ochabam ba could not easily combine spinning and shepherding. 
Demand for cotton yarn must have drawn peasant women off the land 
into their huts and to the river banks where they cleaned the cotton or 
stretched the fabric to be dyed with imported indigo.3* T hus, while rural 
people initially turned to handicrafts to supplement and complement 
agricultural activiities, as one of the few economic strategies available to 
peasants unwilling to emigrate to eastern plantations or other parts, the 
prospects o r possibility of earning their subsistence entirely from  craft 
production impelled some people to devote themselves entirely to their 
trade. At a certain point, certainly in the year 1799 when H aenke wrote 
his report on the province’s industry, ’’inferior classes of people [were] 
able to earn the better part of their subsistence from this industry.”32
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For the moment, at least, some peasants had managed to diversify 
their household economy in ways that presaged the diverse, comple­
mentary commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities of the valley 
smallholders of Cochabam ba in the mid -  twentieth century.
T he expansion of textile production was not exclusively the conse­
quence of spontaneous peasant economic diversification into artisan 
activities, however. Large num bers of smallholders shifted their produc­
tive efforts towards industry probably because merchants provided 
incentives (or exported pressures) for them  to do so. Particularly in the 
1790’s, when political and economic circumstances changed radically as 
we shall see shortly, merchants and enterprising landlords probably 
deployed credit devices to stimulate textile production and increase their 
control over the distribution of woven cloth. Yet the material records 
leave few traces of a fullscale putting -  out system in operation, except 
for an occasional notarial entry showing a m erchant seeking repayment 
from a tocuyo spinner who had accumulated a debt to the claim ant.3^
T he relatively minor role that C ochabam ba’s merchants played in the 
organization of textile production contrasts sharply with the dominance 
of merchant capital in cotton textiles in the Puebla region of Mexico 
during the late colonial period. As G .P .C . Thom son discusses in his 
article in this volume, m erchant capital virtually controlled the cotton 
cloth industry in Puebla throughout the late eighteenth and early nine­
teenth centuries. Though ’’...m erchants’ interest in the [Mexican] indus­
try fluctuated, ... even in the worst periods of recession ... m erchant 
capital can be found fom enting cotton agriculture, financing the trans­
portation and distribution of raw cotton, financing weavers’ production, 
and marketing their products.”35 Puebla’s textile industry was older, 
more capitalized and vertically integrated, and more highly specialized 
than the tocuyo industry in the southern Andes in the same period. 
Indeed, Puebla’s merchants and artisans in the early eighteenth century 
already had staked out a corner of the textile market in that colony by 
orienting production around a specialized, high -  quality garm ent, the 
rebozo, which benefitted from  silk weaving techniques known to local 
artisans, who learned to apply them to cotton weaving. Puebla’s looms 
produced a product that was marketable fa r beyond the boundaries of 
the regional economy. Set against the entrenched, specialized industry of 
Puebla, textile m anufacturing in C ochabam ba appeared to be a preca­
rious industry still fairly atomized am ong an artisanry which had strong 
ties to the land. M erchant capital never exercized the same degree of 
control over tocuyo production in Cochabam ba that it had achieved in
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the Puebla industry by the early eighteenth century. Even when com­
mercial conditions changed for the better in the late 1790’s, C ochabam ­
b a ’s m erchants failed to capture control of the industry or alter its 
structure of production in any enduring way.
II. W ar and the Textile Bonanza
Although Viedm a was a Physiocrat at heart, he never doubted the 
im portance of developing C ochabam ba’s industry. O ne of his pet charity 
projects, in fact, was the resurrection of a wool textile factory in the 
old, abandoned obraje of Hulincate located in the Sacaba valley. It was 
to be state -  run and financed (through a provincial tax on chicha 
consumption) and designed to employ poor and marginally productive 
m embers of society. Like the Indians of the jungle ex — mission villages, 
these industrial workers were to learn the ’’arts” of spinning and 
weaving.36 Yet, however laudatory his proposal for this obra pía  and his 
plan to provide employment for the hum ble classes, V iedm a was 
unwilling to challenge Spain’s restrictions on industrial growth in the 
colonies, even as the tide of Spanish trade in textiles to the Viceroyalty 
of La Plata grew heavier in the 1780’s. ’ ' A fter 1778, European textiles 
and the calicoes of the East Indies stiffened the competition that itinerant 
peddlars of inferior tocuyo cloth inevitably faced in distant marketplaces. 
It was not until w ar tem porarily halted that transatlantic trade flow that 
V iedm a and a few local investors seriously considered local industry as a 
solution to the chronic problems of idleness, under — employment, and 
capital shortage.
Cochabam ba experienced an extraordinary m anufacturing bonanza 
between 1796 and 1802, when trade between Europe and the southern 
Atlantic pons collapsed as a result of w ar and the breakdown of Spanish 
military control of the La Plata river basin. In 1796, after Britain 
declared w ar on Spain, the superior British navy moved into the mouth 
of La Plata and sealed off the port of Buenos Aires from the outside 
world. Sudden economic isolation in the midst of Spain’s im perial crisis 
afforded a tremendous stimulus to the Viceroyalty’s fledgling 
industries. Across the pam pas, in Chile and Alto Peru, urban consu­
mers of all social classes now turned inward to local sources of supply 
for their cotton, woolen and linen textiles.39 Those regions like Cocha­
bam ba, C órdoba, T ucum án, and A requipa which already possessed a 
local industrial base, however primitive in organization, had a new lease 
on their economic lives.40 T he event of w ar and its side effects provided
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more incentive, theoretically at least, for peasant households to diversify 
their economic activities, local m erchants to invest more capital in 
long -  distance trade in cloth, and established artisans to put more spin­
ning wheels and treadle looms into use. But whether strong and sudden 
market incentive had a more profound and lasting effect, either upon the 
internal reorganization of textile production into capitalist or semi -  
capitalist enterprises or upon the regional class structure, is an entirely 
separate question that merits comparative research on specific regional 
economies. The textile bonanza of Cochabam ba is a case study of rapid 
industrial growth in the absence of any real transform ation in social 
productive relations.
A fter 1796, C ochabam ba became one of the main suppliers of rustic 
cotton textiles to cities throughout the Viceroyalty of La Plata. In  his 
1788 report, V iedm a had estimated that cloth worth 60,000 pesos left 
Cochabam ba for ’’outside provinces” (excluding the eastern districts of 
M izque, etc., which absorbed abour 15,000 pesos worth of tocuyo). In 
1798, Pedro Canals, the provincial treasurer, stated that registered tocuyo 
exports for the year 1797 had been valued at 88,085 pesos (at the unit 
price of two reales per vara, the same unit price V iedm a recorded in 
1793).41 This represented a 47 percent increase over the 1793 estimates. 
T he treasurer further estimated that in the first three months of 1798, 
tocuyo exports were worth 46,156 pesos. This was more than three times 
the tocuyo exponed in a three -  month period in 1793. Increasingly, 
tocuyo was in demand in distant markets. In 1799, the registry of the 
Alcaldía of Buenos Aires listed m erchants importing large amounts of 
tocuyo from  C ochabam ba.42
T he increasing dem and for tocuyo beyond the boundaries of the 
province was reflected in the gradual increase in its local price. In the 
1780’s it rarely sold for more than one and a half real; in 1793 its price 
was two reales. By 1799, a vara of tocuyo usually sold for two and a 
half reales. In Buenos Aires in 1798, the price was sometimes as high as 
three and a half reales.4  ^ U nder the stimulus of external dem and more 
looms were employed in cotton textile production. T he opening of the 
markets at Potosí and Buenos Aires for tocuyo cloth during a period 
when less silver was drained out of the Viceroyalty by Spanish and 
British m erchants seemed to offer the solution to C ochabam ba’s eco­
nomic anem ia. England’s belligerency had ostensibly created favorable 
trade conditions which would channel currency to the province and trig­
ger an economic boom for spinners, weavers and merchants in Cocha­
bam ba. It soon became clear, however, that the windfall profits many
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had hoped would enrich them overnight were not to be realized unless 
new supplies of raw cotton were found.
T he overnight boom in tocuyo production made the region increas­
ingly dependent on the raw cotton produced in the Peruvian coastal area 
around M oquegua and in the vicinity of Arequipa. V iedm a estimated 
that in 1788 Cochabam ba imported about 11,000 arrobas of cotton at 
two pesos, four reales per arroba.44 In 1798 he reported that the pro­
vince annually consumed about 30,000 arrobas of cotton. T he best 
quality cotton came from the coast and cost as much as six pesos in 
1798.45
C ochabam ba’s dependence on imported cotton concerned V iedm a and 
other officials and m erchants who saw that much of the income from 
tocuyo only left the province in the pockets of cotton traders. In 1798, 
V iedm a reported that 180,000 pesos flowed out of the region to Arequi­
pa and the coast.46 It was the cotton planters of coastal Peru who 
seemed to be reaping the greatest profits from the tocuyo boom. Viedma 
petitioned the Viceroy and king for permission to cultivate cotton in 
Santa Cruz.
Perhaps the greatest exponent of local cotton production was the 
naturalist, T adeo Haenke. H is famous 1799 essay (published in the 
Telégrafo M ercantil of Buenos Aires in 1801) explained the benefits of 
growing cotton in C ochabam ba’s semitropical frontiers. H e urged the 
Crown to allow the province to break its economic dependence on coastal 
Peru by becoming se lf-su ffic ien t in cotton. H e estimated that the 
province alone consumed 30 to 40,000 arrobas of cotton each year, not 
to mention the cotton needed for tocuyos the region exported. Haenke 
made a strong case.
[This cotton] is the fuel for the tocuyo trade which not only brings consi­
derable benefits to this city; it also provides employment for the inferior class 
of people who earn the better part of their living from this industry... The 
tocuyos of Cochabamba are so inferior and backward that they are compar­
able to cotton cloth from  Asia. D uring the present war, tocuyos have been the 
only resource of these interior provinces. W ith the end of communication 
with Europe and the complete lack of [Spanish, English and Asian] textiles, 
many individuals would have found themselves naked had it not been for 
C ochabam a’s tocuyos. In consideration of all the circumstances of these 
colonies and of the moral character of their inhabitants, it is not only use­
ful, but necessary, to foment the cultivation of cotton in every way possible 
and to develop the cotton textile industry which presently is in its infancy.47
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Hacnke went on to enum erate the reasons why the Crown should 
perm it the large -  scale production of cotton and tocuyo in Cochabam ba. 
His main argum ent was that Spain’s own textile industry would not be 
harm ed by his proposal. H igh transport costs and royal taxes on the 
export of raw cotton to Spain and more taxes on imported Spanish tex­
tiles made the cloth a relatively high priced item of consumption; its 
market in C ochabam ba was consequently restricted to the upper class. 
Haenke argued that other European nations, namely England, realized 
the benefits accruing to the metropolitan country of having abundant 
supplies of raw cotton produced in its overseas colonies, in North 
America and India. T he cotton produced in India was woven into cheap 
calicoes, some of which was exported by the Philippine Com pany to the 
Spanish colonies. Furtherm ore, Haenke argued, the textile factories in 
Spain could not meet the needs of all the Spanish colonies, whose 
population was rising steadily. Only the growth of manufactories in the 
colonies would begin to meet the needs of the poor for cheap cloth.4®
T he naturalist offered one further argum ent for royal sponsorship of 
local cotton cultivation and tocuyo m anufacturing. H e expounded on the 
need to develop a m anufacturing sector to absorb the growing population 
of landless mestizos and cholos in C ochabam ba. Outside of agriculture, 
he said, there was no industry to absorb the growing population of 
underemployed peasants and laboring poor and the large floating mass of 
vagrants. The growth of a rustic textile industry, Haenke argued, would 
absorb a vast num ber of the region’s poor. Like the neo -  mercantilists 
of his day, Haenke believed that a healthy economy depended on the 
employment of its population in industry or specialized agriculture. He 
appealed to the Crown to consider the benefits accruing to the state with 
the citizens of ’’these kingdoms” industrious and usefully em ployed.49 
This was to be the great panacea for the indolence and economic stag­
nation which Viedm a had publicly deplored in his 1788 report.
T he great campaign for local cotton cultivation and development of 
the tocuyo industry -  a campaign that probably peaked in 1801 with the 
publication of H aenke’s essay -  seemed to have burned itself out by 
1804. T he British lifted their blockade in 1802. By 1804 and 1805 royal 
income from alcabalas levied on imported European goods increased 
sharply.'’9
This probably indicated the entry into the province of large quantities 
of Spanish goods, particularly textiles. W hether they were actually sold 
in those years cannot be determined. But this is indirect evidence of the 
contraction of C ochabam ba’s export trade in tocuyos.
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As the new decade opened, the inspired and optimistic economic 
proposals of V iedm a and H aenke probably seemed futile to most obser­
ver. A new sense of realism seemed to pervade. T he few proposals for 
economic reform  written after 1802 were fa r less innovative than the 
earlier schemes. O ne of the longest reports was w ritten in 1804 by creole 
m erchant and adm inistrator (a regidor of the local Cabildo), Ju an  
Carrillo de A l b o r n o z . He  wrote of the European competition which 
had silenced many of the region’s 3,000 looms. But Carrillo de Albornoz 
did not even consider the issue of establishing cotton plantations in the 
eastern lowlands. His proposal centered around the need to impose 
tighter regulations on the quality of tocuyo woven in Cochabam ba. It 
was as if the vision of C ochabam ba’s progressive administrators had 
dimmed after the repeated opposition they had encountered not only 
from  the Crown, but from  the Audiencia of La Plata as well. W ith the 
end of the blockade, the industry seemed doomed. Carrillo de A lbornoz’s 
proposal to improve and standardize the quality of tocuyo cloth by 
regulating the size and num ber of combs in the looms was less the aim 
of an enlightened adm inistrator than the medieval remedy offered by a 
myopic m erchant who hated to see his profits from  tocuyo exports 
dwindle in the face of European com petition .^  Stricter regulation over 
the local guild of tocuyo weavers was a conservative m easure that 
threatened neither the Crow n, nor the Audiencia of La Plata nor the 
entrenched planter class on the Peruvian coast. O n the other hand, his 
proposal to restrict cloth production to those weavers who met municipal 
regulations presumably would improve the quality of the finished cloth 
and raise tocuyo prices.
T he proposal of Carrillo de Albornoz reflected his class biases. For 
the wholesale m erchant, like Carrillo de Albornoz, who wanted a com­
modity that continued to be marketable in Potosí and Buenos Aires after 
the blockade was lifted, a price rise of several reales would probably 
make little difference. But for the weaver and petty trader who depended 
on the mass consumption of local Indians and mestizos for their returns, 
tighter guild regulations and standardized production could spell ruin. 
W hen the plan came before the Consulado of Buenos Aires in 1806, the 
ministers came down on the side of the m erchants by approving 
measures to restrict and control tocuyo production . ^  Yet, despite these 
new measures, most administrators and m erchants realized that the 
tocuyo industry and merchants would w ither and turn inward once again 
to supply the local p l e b e . The  new age of prosperity, an age that 
V iedm a and H aenke hoped would rival early colonial times when
161
C ochabam ba nourished the silver mining towns with grains, was not to 
be realized.
Conclusions
W ho were the beneficiaries of this brief expansion in tocuyo exports? 
W as there any perceptible shift in wealth distribution as a result of the 
boom? According to rough contemporary estimates, about 1,000 weavers 
joined the ranks of the tocuyo producers during the boom. T here was 
more employment or semi -  employment in this industry because of the 
flourishing export trade. If  there were approximately 3,000 weavers in 
Cochabam ba by 1800 and most were mestizos or cholos, as Haenke 
reported, then about seven percent of the total mixed blood population 
(as estimated by V iedm a in 1788) was engaged in tocuyo weaving 
alone.55 Most profits, however, were generated in the distributive rather 
than productive process, in the long -  distance, wholesale trade in tocuyo. 
It is difficult to calculate the average rate of return from the wholesale 
export of tocuyo to Potosí or Buenos Aires. But it was undoubtedly less 
than 50 percent. D uring the campaign to get royal consent to cultivate 
cotton in the Intendancy of C ochabam ba, local officials argued that the 
lower cost of locally grown cotton would allow m erchants to realize a net 
profit of 50 percent on the sale of tocuyo in Buenos Aires (at the 
current market price of three and one -  half reales per vara). Officials 
arrived at this estimate simply because the market price in Buenos Aires 
was about 75 percent higher than in the local m arket.'’®
T he profits from this trade accrued mostly to a small group of 
merchants who monopolized control over the carriage trade. T he serious 
shortage of pack animals in the Cochabam ba province since the 1780’s 
threw long -  distance trade into the hands of wealthy m erchants and 
landowners who owned mule trains or commissioned muleteers to bulk 
and carry the cloth to those markets. In 1801, several sub -  delegates 
registered complaints with the Consulado about the monopolistic cloth 
merchants. Even when they agreed to carry cargoes for other traders and 
artisans, they charged freight prices far in excess of the stipulated rates 
and they demanded cash advances.57 This situation virtually excluded all 
but a few wholesalers from  participating directly in the lo n g -d istan ce  
tocuyo trade. Few artisans, if any, were in a position to experience 
bootstrap mobility or to turn their workshops into small factories 
employing wage workers.
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If the profits of the tocuyo boom accrued to but a handful of local 
merchants and thus further concentrated wealth within the elite, who 
precisely were these merchants? Notarial books and wills show that the 
sons of large landowners who held property themselves made large 
investments in tocuyo exports to Buenos Aires and other cities. Cocha­
bam ba’s largest tocuyo wholesalers were not only large landowners; their 
prestige and power also rested on high positions in the local militia or 
political office. Francisco G arcía Claros, for example, was a large tocuyo 
exporter and held the position of Royal Receptor of Alcabalas; Juan  
José Eras y Gandarillas, a large m erchant who inherited rich maize land 
(maicas) on the outskirts of Cochabam ba and who owned haciendas in 
Quillacollo in 1808; Francisco V entura Valiente, probably the largest 
tocuyo merchant, was a lieutenant in the militia; and Ju an  Carrillo de 
Albornoz, a large tocuyo exporter and the advocate of guild regulations, 
was a perpetual m em ber of the Cabildo. Those who reaped the profits 
from the trade were clearly not merchants moving up the social ladder. 
They were w ell-estab lished , respected mem bers of landed society who 
exercised power in the province. These merchants occupied the upper 
stratum  of provincial society which managed to hold on to its landed 
properties. They composed part of the landed elite which speculated in 
tithes, bonded one another, and married endogamously. It was this small 
group of m erchants in the last years of the colonial period who were the 
only substantial money lenders aside from the monasteries. W hat little 
wealth they accumulated from  the textile bonanza was probably sunk into 
usurious ventures, land, and tithes. Few merchants were willing to 
invest mercantile capital in cash -  crop agriculture in the eastern 
lowlands, as V iedm a had hoped they would. N or were the merchants 
interested in revolutionizing the textile industry. T he windfall profits 
from tocuyo expons seemed only to tie them more tightly into the local 
rentier economy.
T hus, the great tocuyo export boom of 17 9 6 - 1802 did not signal the 
beginning of a transition towards capitalist enterprises in the region. 
M erchants did not plough their new -  found wealth into the productive 
process, altering either the forces or relations of production. Despite their 
financial capacity and the new political climate in which Haenke wrote 
his famous tract on the benefits of industry, the moneyed middlemen 
remained locked in their old ways, unwilling to diversify their invest­
ments or restructure the textile industry. This is certainly not surprising, 
given the opportunities and constraints they faced, particularly the fluc­
tuation in market dem and for tocuyos in distant cities. Indeed, they
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seemed only too aware of the evanescence of the lucrative, lo n g ­
distance trade in tocuyos. Beneficiaries of an artificial situation, that 
underm ined the very principles upon which the colonial regime rested 
and that would end the moment the British interlopers were expelled, the 
m erchants had little incentive to establish the kind of factories that 
Haenke prescribed. Furtherm ore, the progressive, pro -  industry forces in 
the region ran up against resolute opposition from the Viceroy and the 
Audiencia to their efforts to promote cotton plantations in the semi -  
tropical lowlands of M izque and Santa C ruz. Raw material costs and the 
difficulties of procuring cotton from coastal traders on a steady basis 
placed a dead weight on industrial expansion, apart from the shifting 
winds of the market.
If the textile bonanza marked the failed  transition to nascent capitalist 
development in this Andean region, it must have left an indelible 
im print on the political consciousness of many people in the region. 
Artisans and m erchants alike witnessed the spectacular commercial 
opportunities afforded by the naval blockade. For one ephemeral moment 
the provincial elite saw some of the barriers to regional economic 
growth begin to crum ble. T he ’’chronic idleness” of C ochabam ba’s 
sub -  altern classes seemed to evaporate before their eyes, as peasants 
and urban artisans turned their energy into spinning and weaving as 
never before. And for the first time, a few mem bers of the elite capi­
talized on the rustic cottons. T he ideological implications of their collec­
tive experience could not have been lost on even the most staunch 
royalists. It is surely no coincidence, moreover, that following Inde­
pendence the m erchants and artisans of Cochabam ba collectively were 
the young nation’s strongest advocates of protectionism against the 
onslaught of British traders.
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Cholos 2,883 ( 2 % )
Whites 20,089 (16%)
Blacks, Mulattoes 6,212 ( 5 % )
125,245 (100%)
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7. T H E  C O T T O N  T E X T IL E  IN D U ST R Y  IN  PU EBLA  D U R IN G  
T H E  E IG H T E E N T H  A N D  EARLY  N IN E T E E N T H  
C E N T U R IE S
Guy Thom son
From the mid -  sixteenth century until quite recently textiles have 
been the main industry of Puebla. V ery broadly, there have been three 
overlapping stages in the organizational development of the textile 
industry. T he first, the m anufacture of fine woolen broad -  cloth, was 
established by im m igrant Spanish weavers soon after the foundation of 
the city in 1532. This obraje -b a s e d  industry, concentrating all the 
processes of m anufacture under one roof, enjoyed a century of growth 
and prosperity but entered a decline from the 1630’s in part due to the 
prohibition on inter -  colonial trade -  Peru had been the city’s prin­
cipal market -  , but chiefly due to the northward movement of wool 
production giving a cost advantage to the obrajeros of Mexico City and 
the towns of the Bajío to the northwest. T he Puebla and T laxcala obraje 
woolen industry did not disappear, surviving at a greatly diminished 
level into the age of the modern factory, producing rough and inferior 
cloth.
The second stage, which is the subject of this paper, was the growth 
of the home -  based cotton textile industry, with spinning in the hand of 
Indian, often rural households, and weaving controlled by Spanish or 
occasionally mestizo weavers, backed by m erchant capital, competing 
with and partially supplanting traditional Indian rural cotton weaving. 
This industry had its origin in Puebla during the late seventeenth 
century when the silk w eavers’ guild fostered a cohort of Spanish and 
mestizo cotton weavers under its jurisdiction. O ver the eighteenth century 
the industry grew rapidly in size, extending to most of the towns and 
villages of the central region of the province and beyond to the cities of 
A ntequera, Mexico, Valladolid and G uadalajara. By the time of the 
Napoleonic wars, which for several years blocked the supply of European 
textiles to the markets of Spanish America, Creole weavers were able to 
supply the M exican market with plain unbleached cotton cloth (manta), 
ordinary to very fine silk cotton shawls (rebozos) and, as a result of the 
irregular supply of C atalan cotton prints, M exican weavers had begun to 
produce these too.
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T he third stage in the industry’s development arose from the crisis in 
cotton spinning and weaving brought about by the collapse of the 
Spanish mercantile system that had sustained the industry and by 
increasing competition from  East Indian printed cloth and British factory 
yarn from  the early 1800’s, From the early 1830’s, Mexican merchants 
chose to follow the British by introducing spinning machinery which by 
1842 had largely replaced home spinning and yarn imports, giving the 
home weaver a reprieve until the 1890’s when factory weaving replaced 
the home loom.
T his paper examines the second stage in the organizational develop­
ment of the industry. At first an explanation is offered for why the 
Puebla region provided a favourable context for the early development of 
the industry -  it w asn 't until the second half of the eighteenth century 
that creole cotton weaving grew significantly beyond the province. The 
second part of the paper examines in some detail the commercial and 
productive structure of the industry. Finally, home — based cotton 
weaving and spinning is seen within the broader context of the late 
colonial economy, the crisis it underwent after 1800 and the changes 
which followed Independence in 1821.
I.
T he Puebla region has an ancient history of cotton cloth m anufac­
ture; the Indian cities of Cholula, Huejozingo and Tlaxcala, among 
others, possessed thriving cotton textile industries at the time of the 
conquest.* Spanish encouragem ent to the silk industry and cochineal 
production during the sixteenth century was therefore a response to an 
existing m anufacturing tradition. Indian population collapse, however, 
underm ined both the indigenous cotton and the Spanish silk weaving 
industries while uncontrolled sheep and cattle grazing destroyed the cacti 
upon which the cochineal industry depended. By the mid -  seventeenth 
century Indian cotton weaving was confined to the regions where cotton 
was grown in the tierra caliente and to certain remote and mountainous 
areas where a weaving specialization had survived, such as the Misteca 
Alta of O axaca. T here appears to have been no direct link between the 
indigenous, possibly extinct, cotton m anufacture of the region and the 
Spanish -  mestizo industry which emerged in the city of Puebla towards 
the end of the seventeenth century. T he circumstances of the origin of 
’’creole” cotton textiles in Puebla rem ain mysterious.
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Ja n  Bazant, in ”La evolución de la industria textil poblana,” still the 
only study of Puebla’s cotton industry, asks the question, "¿Como y por 
que se transform ó un trabajo tem poral de la m ujer campesina e indígena 
en un trabajo  perm anente del hom bre urbano y aparentem ente 
mestizo?,” drawing attention to what must be one of the most significant 
developments in colonial M exican history:^ the emergence of specialised, 
differentiated and commercialised cotton textile industry for mass 
consumption, in which the interests and activities of Spanish merchants, 
Spanish and mestizo weavers and Indian caners and spinners became 
closely intertwined. W hy should this development have occurred in 
Puebla at least fifty years earlier than in other provincial capitals? How 
relevant to the case of Puebla are the demographic and economic argu­
ments used to explain ’’proto -  industrialisation” in parts of northern and 
central Europe? Does the M exican pattern perhaps more resemble the 
growth over the same period of East Indian cotton textile production in 
response to the commercial stimulus of European trading companies? 
How im portant were ethnic and cultural factors in determ ining the 
hierarchy that emerged in the industry and in influencing its pattern of 
development? W hat direct influence, if any, existed between the new 
cotton industry and the decline of obraje woolen m anufacture, or, 
between American cotton m anufacture and its emerging Spanish penin­
sular counterpart?
Bazant offers four explanations for the early growth of the industry 
in Puebla, all of which are useful pointers but don’t go far enough.^ H e 
argues that the decline of the woolen industry left a large, unemployed 
urban proletariat available for the labour intensive work of cotton 
m anufacture. Little evidence has been found, however, of any direct link 
either commercially or in the labour force between the decline of 
woolens and the growth of cottons. By the early eighteenth century the 
obraje labour force in Puebla was composed almost entirely of free or 
enslaved negroes, mulatos o r pardos who were prohibited by guild ordi­
nance from cotton or silk weaving.“^ This, it appears, blocked their 
admission to the art, for in 1768, of the 184 cotton weavers serving in 
the urban militia, 155 were Spanish, twenty were mestizo and only nine 
were pardo, although they were well represented in other crafts, parti­
cularly wool w e a v in g .In  any case, the decline of the woolen industry in 
itself would not have left a sufficiently numerous labour force for the 
fa r greater labour demands of the cotton industry. T here were more 
compelling demographic reasons, shortly to be suggested, why Puebla 
offered a suitable environment for the growth of the cotton industry.
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Bazant puts forward a second explanation for the growth of cotton 
weaving in Puebla which, while pointing at an im portant feature of the 
industry -  the predominance of Spanish and mestizo weavers over 
Indians and other castes -  , does not adequately explain why this was 
so. H r observes that cotton weaving in Puebla originally fell under the 
jurisdiction of the silk w eavers’ guild, the Gremio del A rte  M ayor de la 
Seda, arguing that this gave cotton weaving a respectability which it 
otherwise would have lacked, having hitherto been shunned for being an 
Indian art.
It seems, however, that as cotton weaving increased, very few 
weavers joined the silk weavers’ guild which remained Puebla’s most 
restrictive and exclusive guild over the eighteenth century, only admitting 
to its ranks silk -  cotton shawl (rebozo) makers examined in the intrica­
cies of silk spinning, dyeing and weaving.® T he rebozo weavers grew to 
form a separate caste within the weaving artisanate as shall be shown 
later in the paper. T he cotton weavers rem ained until the end of the 
eighteenth century marginal to the guild system. Only towards the end of 
the 1790’s did they establish their own guild, independent of the silk 
weavers, when competition from other provinces of Mexico for the first 
time made it necessarry to restrict production to those examined in the 
a r t .7 Spanish and mestizo weavers were undoubtedly concerned for the 
respectability of the art, particularly with regard to the exclusion of 
African racial mixtures, but few weavers could harbour any illusions 
about the economic status of an art which was subject to such great 
instability and was so subordinate to m erchant control and which, except 
during short periods of boom accompanying Atlantic war, barely kept a 
cotton weaving family at the level of subsistence. T he disproportionate 
representation of weavers in the urban militia regiment and their massive 
participation in both the royalist and insurgent armies during the W ars 
of Independence seems to confirm this last point. D uring this period in 
Puebla being a soldier and a cotton weaver were almost synonymous. 
Not withstanding their poverty, cotton weavers were nevertheless far 
freer than woolen workers within the obraje system, which, despite con­
tinuous regulation and inspection, continued to be regarded in the 
popular imagination as prisons. T he cotton weaver owned his loom, 
bought his yarn -  generally on credit -  and employed his own 
apprentices. H e was oppressed only by poverty and this fact perhaps 
more than any other explains both the origins and the growth of the 
industry in Puebla.
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Bazant mentions two more reasons for the early development of 
Puebla’s cottons. The first is Puebla’s geographical location on the two 
principal trade axes of southeastern Mexico for access to the cotton 
growing areas of V eracruz and O axaca and to the markets of the 
interior. T he other is that in V eracruz ’’the Spaniards of Puebla had 
good relations,” pinpointing the commercial nexus which was. so instru­
mental in establishing and sustaining the industry over the eighteenth 
century and eventually in transform ing it during the nineteenth century.® 
O ver the eighteenth century, for reasons which require closer exami­
nation, it suited merchants to have cloth production concentrated in a 
central place on the Altiplano rather than in the Indian settlements of the 
tierra caliente or in the inaccessible mountain districts of the Sierra 
M adre O riental. T here is a clear circumstantial relation between the 
decline of the cotton manta  industry of the Misteca Alta, the only 
rem aining area of pre -  conquest volume cloth production for an external 
market, the general decline of repartimiento  trade in that area, and the 
growth of mercantile involvement in cotton and other industries in the 
cities and towns of the A ltiplano.9
W hat made the cities and towns of the Altiplano an attractive focus 
for investment and what drew artisans and m erchants to Puebla consi­
derably earlier than to the capitals of other provinces? Studies of 
proto -  industrialisation in Europe have laid stress upon how demographic 
factors combined with the inadequacy of the agricultural subsistence 
base, compelled families to engage in domestic m anufacturing for the 
market. Particular emphasis has been placed upon ’’the demographic 
peculiarity of m anufacturing families: their high fertility, often in con­
ditions of dire and unrelieved poverty, marking the end of the M althu­
sian balance, the collapse of the checks and preventions which had once 
maintained the traditional peasant village in a state of relative equili­
brium  and structural stability.’’10 Regrettably there has been no work 
done on the history of the fam ily in eightenth century Mexico, although 
there exists a sufficient num ber of parish dem ographic studies for the 
valley of Puebla to suggest tentatively some relation between relative 
rates of population growth between ethnic groups, favouring Spaniards 
and mestizos over Indians, a numerical im balance between Indian men 
and Indian women, and patterns of out -  migration that would have been 
conducive to the development of domestic m anufacturing .11
T he cotton textile industry took root in the region over a period when 
both the Indian and non -  Indian population of the city and province 
was growing rapidly after well over a century of the near demographic
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collapse o f Indian society. Between 1650 and 1735 G ünter Vollm er has 
shown that, as result of declining mortality and fewer epidemics 
combined with accessibility to land and cheapness of food, the Indian 
population of the central region of the province increased steadily, 
doubling between 1700 and 1 7 3 5 . The  Spanish and mestizo population 
certainly matched, perhaps even exceeded this rate, the city of Puebla at 
the end of the seventeenth century having a population of between 70 
and 100,000, rivalling Mexico in size.444 T he great epidemic of 1 7 3 6 -3 7  
interrupted this pattern of Indian population recovery, demographers 
arguing that the impact of this epidemic could still be detected in the 
demographic structure at the end of the century, since, for reasons which 
are still not clear, adult Indian males suffered a disproportionately high 
mortality. The municipality of Puebla lost over half of its population 
over the decade of the 1730’s not recovering to its form er size until the 
late 1840’s .44 T he neighbouring city of Cholula lost two thirds (16,926) 
of its population in 1737 while in the same year the parish of Santa Inés 
Zacatelco, thirty miles to the north, lost two fifths of its adult popula­
tion .4“’ T hereafter, between 1737 and 1810, the Indian population of the 
parishes studied remained stagnant or in decline as a result of the 
demographic imbalance left by the 1737 epidemic and the much more 
frequent occurrence of epidemic disease experienced between 1737 and 
1850 than over the period 1650 to 1735. Demographic studies show that 
although the Indian population retained the higher level of fertility, 
which had been responsible for its recovery before 1735, high mortality 
in the frequent epidemics and high rates of male migration from villages 
and towns to haciendas and cities within and beyond the region, 
combined to keep the Indian population of Puebla’s villages and towns, 
as well as that of the city itself, stagnant or in decline between 1737 and 
1810.16
T he picture for the non -  Indian population was different. The 
Spanish and mestizo population grew steadily over the eighteenth cen­
tury, most notably in Indian villages and towns where previously it had 
been only weakly represented. Santa Inés Zacatelco, a village in which 
cotton textiles became firmly implanted over the century as an empresa 
española, had in 1724 a non -  Indian population of only 142 persons in 
twenty -  one households, am ong a sea of Indians num bering 6,700 souls. 
Furtherm ore this non -  Indian population was characterised by im per­
manence and great mobility, as though, as Claude M orin suggests, ”se 
siente incómoda en una comunidad indígena dem ográficam ente agresiva.”
174
By 1795 however, the picture, although not reversed, was very differ­
ent. Among a smaller num ber of Indians than there had been in 1724, 
the non -  Indian population now stood at 569, occupying 100 households. 
T he greater fertility of the non -  Indian population is revealed in the 
parish records of Santa Incs between 1783 and 1821, when the relation 
of non -  Indian births over deaths was 225:100 while for the Indians it 
was only 108:100. Non -  Indian households were significantly larger than
Indian households, and village households larger than hacienda house- 
1 7 *holds. Finally, the 1790 census shows that villages with significant 
num bers of non -  Indians employed in m anufacturing and services, such 
as Santa A na C hiautem pan, Naticitas and M artin Texm elucan, had 
substantially positive rates of immigration in contrast to agricultural 
districts where rates of emigration for all ethnic categories were high.*® 
W hy should these changing population patterns have proved so 
conducive to the growth of domestic m anufactures, particularly cotton 
textiles, over the eighteenth century? T o answer this question, more 
needs to be said about the wider economic circumstances confronting the 
city of Puebla and its surrounding agricultural regions. O ver the second 
half of the seventeenth century and the first three decades of the eight­
eenth centuries, running against all the population trends was a marked 
decline in the traditional sources of Puebla’s agricultural, commercial and 
industrial wealth. Puebla’s cereal agriculture, the first in New Spain to 
become fully commercialised and geared to an extra -  regional market, 
entered an eighteenth century of stagnation, punctuated by short periods 
of windfall demand from Crown purveyance orders of wheat flour for 
the C aribbean fleet and garrisons, alternating with periods of 
depression.*® M oreover, the interior market for Puebla’s wheat flour in 
Mexico City and the mining cities beyond had been lost to the Bajío by 
the early eighteenth century. Regional demand by itself was inadequate 
to maintain a large hacienda sector, Puebla’s commercial agriculture 
becoming a byword for bankruptcy over the century. T he decline of the 
other traditonal export staple, woolen cloth, has already been mentioned 
and when placed alongside the commercial decline of the city as a result 
of the monopoly exercised by Mexico City merchants over the im port -  
export trade, the closure of Puebla’s silver mint and the transfer of the 
administration of the mercury monopoly to the viceregal capital, the 
desperation of Puebla’s economic predicament by the 1740’s can be 
appreciated.'*®
T he Franciscan friar Ju a n  Villa Sanchez observed and recorded with 
great accuracy the crisis that beset the city of Puebla in the 1740’s. He
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remarked that the city, now abandoned by its merchants and woolen 
clothiers, had become locked in the clutches of a body of rentiers who 
farm ed the alcabala, C rown monopolies and revenues of the municipal 
government, noticing that the tax yield had risen in inverse proportion to 
the visible economic decline of the city: T he collector of alcabalas was 
taxing all and sundry, even Indian dealers in palm mats and baskets, 
legally exempt from  sales tax. M erchants and shopkeepers were leaving 
the city ”to where the alcabala is more benign.” H e described a city of 
widows and of young girls, unable to find spouses, driven to the spinning 
wheel. T he streets teemed with ragged beggars, women abandoned to 
their fate, artisans desperate to sell their wares and petty criminals 
everywhere so that ”no estén seguras las tiendas de los mercaderes de 
que las quemen, que no estén libres las casas que las asalten, los 
conventos de las religiosas de que los escalen...” In 1744 a tax placed on 
spinning wheels so provoked the population of the barrios of the city 
that the spinners deposited their wheels in the security of the parish 
churches as the poor came by the thousands to the main square, the 
occasion perhaps indicating the limits of the ’’rentability” of the city.21
There were two principal responses to the region’s economic decline. 
O ne was m igration, all the parish studies confirming this pattern for 
Indian and non -  Indian population alike. People migrated to Mexico 
City, where the barrio de los poblanos was well populated by the 1740’s 
and brim m ing over by the end of the century, and to the economically 
more dynamic provinces to the northeast, particularly G uadalajara and 
G uanajuato .22 T he other response can be observed in the growth of the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, particularly in cotton textiles and mule 
transport. H ere the Spanish and mestizo population succeeded in gaining 
a substantial advantage in terms of ownership, employment and income 
over the Indian population.This was a result of Indian demographic 
vulnerability from the 1730’s onwards, the penetration of non -  Indians 
into Indian towns and villages, the reorientation of local m erchant capital 
from  agriculture and foreign trade into domestic manufactures, transport 
and inter -  regional exchange, the introduction of European technology, 
particularly the Castilian loom and the spinning wheel, and the occasio­
nal use of discriminatory guild legislation. T he case of the Tlaxcala 
cotton weavers guild, which during the 1770’s attempted quite illegally to 
stamp out Indian cotton weaving, illustrates this last point.2  ^ T he 1791 
census reveals the extent of Spanish and mestizo advance not only in the 
provincial capital and the larger towns of the province such as Tlaxcala, 
Huejozingo, Tepeaca, San Andrés Chalchicomula, but in the smaller
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villages as well. T he census reveals a rem arkably small percentage of the 
rural and small -  town Spanish and mestizo population involved in 
agriculture and a high degree of occupational differentiation, with a 
concentration of employment in work related to transport and commu­
nications -  blacksmiths, muleteers, carters, cart -  makers, tanners and
saddlers -  and textiles, cotton weaving having become the chief occu- 
24pation in many areas.
A third response to economic crisis might have been expected: a drift 
into sm a ll-sca le  farm ing with the fragm entation of estates into smaller 
holdings, as a result of the commercial decline of hacienda agriculture. 
This did not happen. Instead, a rigid agrarian structure, based upon 
large estates occupying the best land, very few ranchos and the Indian 
and labouring population residing in Indian communities lacking 
adequate land, rem ained almost unchanged over the eighteenth century. 
W hy the absence of significant agrarian change? It seems that the 
interm ediate Spanish and mestizo population, which might have been 
expected to turn to small farm ing, were deterred from  doing so firstly by 
the economic hazards which plagued commercial agriculture: low prices 
and the scarcity and elusiveness of the Indian labour force, and, 
secondly, by the inescapable fact that Indians despite their demographic 
instability, still made up by fa r the majority of the region’s population, 
fully occupying the pegujalero  (sm a ll-sca le  peasant producer for the 
market) category. T here is little evidence of significant subdivision of 
great estates before the W ars of Independence although multiple rental 
agreements, largely among Indian resident peons, were not uncomm on in 
T laxcala as the century came to a close.25
It seems therefore that the Spanish and mestizo population that stood 
between the small patrician class of hacienda owners, merchants, clergy 
and bureaucrats and the mass of impoverished Indians, if they chose to 
rem ain in the region, instead of bidding for land, settled in the capital 
and sm aller towns as artisans, muleteers or petty merchants. T he cotton 
textile industry therefore proved to be particularly well suited to the 
peculiarities of the region, m erchant capital and enterprise linking an 
independent and culturally distinct creole artisanate to a dependent Indian 
labour force, providing a solution to the problem of subsistence of this 
growing Spanish and mestizo population and of the demographically 
fertile yet disease -  ravaged Indian population. T he structure of this 
industry must now be examined more closely.
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II.
There is no better description of the structure of the cotton industry, 
from  the cotton field to the m erchant’s counter, than that of Ju an  Villa 
Sanchez in the early 1740’s:
”A los tejidos de algodón m inistra ingente porción de cargas de este fruto 
que viene a esta ciudad de la costa del Sur y jurisdicciones de Teutila, Cosa— 
m aloapan, Tuxtla y otras; sirve al comercio en greña, a los encomenderos 
que lo reciben, a los muchos tenderos que lo m enudean, y de aquí pasa a las 
manos de la gente más miserable; es la últim a apelación de la pobreza el 
hilado de algodón; es el mesquino socorredor, especialmente de pobres 
doncellas y viudas, que puestas de sol a sol a la rueda de un  torno, que es el 
de su corta fortuna en aquel diuturno trabajo, logran escasamente el esti­
pendio, más para enferm ar que para m atar el ham bre; es el signo evidente, 
es la demostración palpable de la mucha pobreza que hay en La Puebla, no 
se pasa por calle alguna donde no se oiga el repique general (no de fiesta, 
sino de gran trabajo) de los bastones o cañas con que azotan el algodón; y 
las onzas que hilará una pobre m ujer en el día le vendrán a rendir el precio 
de un real de plata. De estas miserables manos pasa a la de los tejedores, o 
de m antas que suplen el lienzo para camisas, o de paños de reboso o del que 
llam an chapaneco para forros y otros semejantes: tam bién es cortisimo y no 
correspondiente al trabajo la ganancia de este oficio. De estos pasan los 
géneros a los comerciantes, que remiten muchas porciones de ellos a tierra 
adentro y otras partes para provisión de varias ciudades, pueblos y hacien­
das. ”26
Since it was the greater degree of commercialization which distin­
guished the growing urban cotton industry from  its Indian counterpart, it 
is appropriate that the role of merchants and m erchant capital be 
examined first. The ladder of commercial activity between the cotton 
growing regions of V eracruz and O axaca and the market for Puebla’s 
cloth in the tierra adentro was a complex and changing one but, for the 
sake of simplicity, it possessed, very broadly, the four levels which Villa 
Sanchez observed: 1) Cotton merchants in the growing districts, known 
as aviadores de algodón; 2) Raw and spun cotton dealers and regraters 
in the city of Puebla and the weaving districts of the central valley, 
known as algodoneros or regatones de algodón; 3) Wholesale dealers in 
finished cotton cloth, mercaderes or almaceneros de ropa de tierra, who 
dispatched it to the fourth stage; 4) the fairs, small retailers and 
hacienda and mine stores of the interior.
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A . Aviadores de Algodón
These were merchants in Puebla or in towns closer to the cotton 
growing areas who invested in cotton agriculture through repartimientos 
or more directly by advancing avíos in cash or m anufactured goods to 
cotton growers at annual cotton fairs. Little money changed hands, as 
raw cotton was exchanged for soap, cocoa, wine, aguardiente, bread, 
biscuits, maize, finished cloth and, occasionally, silver reales.27 M any of 
these products were m anufactured in Puebla. T he lo n g - te rm  effect of 
encouraging specialization in the tierra caliente, and of the mechanisms 
used to achieve it, was to render these sparse populations increasingly 
dependent upon m anufactured goods from the Altiplano cities. H um boldt 
noted that the Indians of the vanilla and quinine producing districts of 
V eracruz received in exchange ’’con particularidad telas de algodón 
fabricadas en la P ueb la ...”28 T he subdelegado of Tlacotalpam  noted at 
the same time that Indian women bought European or highland cloth 
having ’’olvidado la costumbre que tenian de aprender a teger algodón 
para ... su antiguo traje  ... y vestidos de sus maridos. Solo las viejas 
saben hacerlo, y hablar el M exicano, que ignoran las otras y los 
hom bres.”2®
Aviadores received commercial backing from and often were agents 
for the large import — export m erchants of Puebla, O axaca and V era­
cruz. V eracruzano merchants in particular, over the second half of the 
eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, became a key factor 
in setting the pace of activity in Puebla’s cotton textile industry. These 
m erchants were geographically well placed to monitor and respond 
swiftly to the dram atic fluctuations effecting New Spain’s external sector 
caused by Anglo -  Spanish and Franco — Spanish wars and by changing 
commercial legislation with its generally unanticipated consequences (the 
asientos, the flotas, the registros, the exemptions from  alcabala to 
encourage the importation of slaves and tropical agriculture, particularly 
cotton for C atalan m anufacturers, etc.).
From the early 1740’s, with foreign trade interrupted by the W ar of 
Austrian succession (1 7 3 9 -4 8 ), V eracruzano m erchants becam e in­
creasingly interested in fom enting cotton agriculture for the expanding 
Altiplano industry now protected from  competition from  European 
m a n u f a c t u r e s W ith peace restored, the dem and from  S pain’s own 
expanding cotton industry made sustained investment in cotton agricul­
ture profitable. D uring the 1790’s merchants became involved more 
directly in cotton farm ing as the external sector became increasingly
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unstable during the Napoleonic wars, as dem and and cotton prices rose 
and as labour scarcity and the introduction of ginning machinery made it 
necessary to supervise production more closely.31 O ther Veracruzano 
m erchants moved inland to settle in Puebla where wartime trade could be 
conducted to greater advantage. T iburcio U riarte, José Alday, Pablo 
Escandón, M anuel Olaguibel and Ju an  Luis Palacios became large 
dealers in raw cotton and local cotton m anufactures while continuing to 
import goods when the opportunity arose.32 D uring the W ars of Inde­
pendence this migration of merchants inland continued, forging close 
commercial ties between V eracruz and Puebla which became crucial in 
underscoring the survival and revival of Puebla’s cotton manufactures 
during the 1820’s and 30’s. The case of Estevan de Antuñano is the best 
known example of this pattern. H e was the son of Spanish merchants of 
V eracruz and moved to Puebla to establish an imported cloth business 
in 1816. D uring the 1820’s he reconstructed agriculture and trade in 
cotton while establishing his own gins at Tlacotalpam  and a small spin­
ning factory in the city of Puebla. In the early 1830’s he borrowed 
money from the V eracruz m erchant Paso y Troncoso to invest in 
M exico’s first operational modern cotton spinning factory.33
B. Algodoneros and Regatones de Algodón
These were dealers who bought raw cotton from  the merchants and 
muleteers who transported the unstripped, seed -  bearing fibre from  the 
lowlands, selling it in turn to the spinners or to weavers who managed 
their own spinning. Spinners and caners paid cash for the raw cotton, 
generally in very small amounts sufficient for a day’s work, selling it 
back to the algodoneros, to weavers o r to cloth merchants. Spinning in 
Cholula during the 1790’s earned less than the individual’s subsistence. 
”Es tan poco lo que ganan, que no pueden alimentarse; tres cuartillas 
emplean en algodón y después de ocupar todo el dia en preparando e 
hilarlo, no les queda mas utilidad que otras tres.”34 As mentioned, some 
weavers managed their own cotton preparation and spinning but most 
relied heavily on credit either from the algodonero or, more likely, from 
the retailer or wholesaler of the finished cloth. As the eighteenth century 
proceeded, algodoneros and regraters increased their control over the raw 
and spun cotton business much to the disgust of some of the more 
established Spanish and mestizo guild cotton weavers who hitherto had 
managed this stage of the business.33
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However the once well established ’’patrician” guild weavers might 
have resented their loss of control over spinning and access to raw 
materials, the poorer unexamined weavers must generally have benefitted 
firstly as a result of the underm ining of the authority of guild officers 
and masters and secondly as a result of the more regular employment 
which this concentration of mercantile wealth no doubt provided, parti­
cularly once the business had reached such a considerable size by the 
1790’s that monopoly would have been impossible.36 An incident in 1795 
reveals the close vigilance which algodoneros kept on each others acti­
vities. Don R afael Parra  and Doña Ignacia Alatriste purchased raw 
cotton from  Don José M ones, algodonero, which they judged to be of 
inferior quality not comm ensurate with its price, therefore deducting 161 
pesos from  their account, a decision supported by almaceneros, witnesses 
to the case.3  ^ These were years of great prosperity as Estevan de Antuñ 
ano later recorded. ’’For the w ar in 1797, the weavers were dressed in 
fine cloth and velvet, gold and silver buckles and buttons, and the spin­
ning women with skirts of muselin at 5 pesos the y a rd ...”38 Records for 
cotton entering the city during the last three months of 1799 show that 
the algodoneros were joined in these years by some of the principal 
almaceneros of the city, who, turning away from  the depressed import 
trade, invested in the flourishing cotton industry: T iburcio U riarte, 
Joaquim  H aro y Portillo, Dionisio Fernandez Pérez etc.3®
T he role of the algodonero was a crucial, albeit disreputable one: 
linking the two principal agents of production -  the weaver and the 
spinner -  , and linking the capital of the province with the towns and 
villages where much of the weaving and most of the spinning was done. 
Competition from  the turn of the nineteenth century brought algodoneros, 
hitherto confined to supplying the weaver with raw m aterials, into 
marketing their products. M anuel Flon, in his survey of the city’s com­
merce in 1603, makes no distinction between the two functions in the 
twenty -  eight almacenes de ropa de tierra he counted in the city that 
year.46 T he next logical stage in the commercial development of the 
industry would have been the mechanization of spinning, but there 
appears to have been no serious contemplation of this option with the 
renewed onslaught from  im ports after the Peace of Amiens, reducing the 
num ber of cotton dealers to eighteen by 1807, a reduction of ten from 
1803.
W hy was there apparently no consideration of the mechanization of 
spinning in Puebla when the technical know -  how, the capital and even 
official encouragem ent were all in evidence? M erchants in Mexico and
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Celaya had, after all, introduced mechanical deseeding and carding 
devices in the early 1770’s .4* Puebla’s cotton guild, opposed to mecha­
nical spinning, claimed that the great reputation of Puebla’s rebozos and 
m anta  was in part due to the caning of the cotton by the spinners which 
these devices replaced.4  ^ Furtherm ore, when mechanically ginned cotton 
was sent up to Puebla from  V eracruz in 1807, it proved to be unsuita­
ble for the city’s spinning wheels which responded better to caned cotton 
with its fibre more intact.43 H ad transform ation of the preparing 
(ginning) stage of production not been interrupted by the W ars of Inde­
pendence, then the mechanization of spinning would almost certainly 
have proceeded apace. But so unstable and unpredictable was the e x te r­
nal sector over the first thirty years of the century that investment in the 
cotton growing regions rem ained sporadic. In  these circumstances, the 
advantages of the traditional system of production, involving very limited 
fixed capital investment and the employment of a flexible and sub­
sistence (largely female) labour force were obvious. So the unstable 
economic conditions and general poverty which had nurtured the early 
growth of the industry during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
also account for its survival in a traditional form  over the first thirty 
years of the nineteenth century.
C. Mercaderes and Almaceneros de Ropa de Tierra
Unlike the woolen clothiers of Puebla of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries who often managed both the wool supply and the 
marketing sides to their businesses to markets as fa r distant as Peru, few 
cotton weavers possessed the capital, enjoyed the contacts or could 
afford the delay in paym ent which long distance trade involved.44 The 
marketing of Puebla’s cottons in the more remote parts of the province 
and beyond was therefore managed by wholesale merchants.
V illa Sanchez in the 1740’s records how the mercers of the city were 
almost all outsiders ( ultrones), who did not know the city. ”Se ven andar 
los oficiales rogando con ellas por todas las tiendas y por todos los 
mesones, porque no hay que esperar que se vengan a su casa a buscar­
las. ”43 O ver the second half of the eighteenth century the trade in 
Puebla’s ropa de tierra becam e a much less improvised affair than this 
statem ent suggests. T he m erchants who grew to specialise in ropa criolla 
settled in and around the mesones to the northeast of the plaza mayor, 
where the dealers and muleteers would stay en route to the tierra 
adentro, the Calle de Mesones itself becoming the centre of the trade, a
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Street dubbed the ’’Calle de la Bolsa de Londres” at the turn of the
century when Puebla’s cottons reached the peak of their colonial devel- 
46opment.
These merchants through their ability to advance credit to weavers, 
extended their influence beyond the weaving barrios of the city to the 
entire central region of the province over the middle and later decades of 
the eighteenth century. T he pattern of growing m erchant influence and 
declining independence of weavers is very similar to what occured in 
India over the same period.47 In neither India or Mexico were 
merchants interested in establishing a putting -  out system and in Mexi­
co, as in India, the weaver never entirely lost his independence. There 
was nothing legally to prevent him  from  receiving cash advances from 
several merchants or from selling to whom he pleased, since he con­
tinued to own his loom and his raw materials even if they were acquired 
on credit. In practice, however, as the forthcoming discussion of the 
inventory of Carlos C havez’s almacén de ropa de tierra reveals, cotton 
cloth paid for in advance of m anufacture belonged to the m erchant, not 
to the weaver. And, if the experience of the cotton weavers’ guild of 
T laxcala is representative of the general plight of the more independent 
and ’’patrician” caste of creole weavers, then this group suffered a con­
siderable loss of authority, since guild ordinances were everywhere being 
disregarded. At the same tim e its economic status declined, since m er­
chants appropriated the economic control which the creole weavers once 
exercised over unexamined weavers and the cotton spinners. T he records 
of the T laxcala guild’s litigation between 1744 and 1790 reveal vividly 
the erosion of the guild officers’ and cotton m asters’ legal authority and 
economic influence. They had once been able to live well from their own 
work and from marketing the finished goods of unexam ined and Indian 
weavers from  the outlying small towns. By the 1790’s, however, whole­
sale merchants ’’from the cities of Mexico, Puebla, H uejozingo, and 
other areas, (are buying) woven goods in such quantities that even indi­
viduals who have shops in these towns and have supplied the officials in 
[Tlaxcala] cannot find any.”4®
T he chief market for Puebla’s cloth was in the provinces north and 
west of the valley of Mexico, referred to in Puebla as the tierra adentro. 
C hihuahua and Coahuila consumed Puebla’s manta  and cotton shawls 
before the W ars of Independence shattered the commercial structure 
which had made such lo n g -d is tan ce  trade possible.4® G uadalajara had 
developed its own manta production by this time, though it still imported
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TABLE I: The Im pact o f  W ar Upon ’Exports’ From Puebla 
and Im ports From Spain, 1785 -1 8 1 2
Periods 
of w ar 
and per -  
m ission fo r  
’n eu tra ls ’ 
to trade
Y ear
E n try  o f 
Puebla cloth 
to M exico 
C ity  custom s 
(tercios -  
175 lbs.)
(1)
E n try  o f 
European  
cloth to 





F lour from  
V eracruz 





H a m , L ard , 
Soap and 




Im port of 
Spanish 
Soap, H am , 
Lard and 




Peace 1785 4384 12800 _ . _
1786 4013 8258 5286 - -
1787 4732 6662 4861 - -
1788 4811 7872 12714 - -
1789 (no fig.) 6244 9635 - -
1790 4879 8015 14616 - -
1791 5206 8270 17787 - -
1792 6158 7315 11610 - -
W ar w ith 1793 6046 6420 29505 - -
France 1794 6426 5477 19585 - -
1795 6938 5019 13833 - -
Peace 1796 6917 6571 35665 - -
1797 6980 2188 (no fig .) -
N eu tra l 1798 6576 1624 (no fig .) - -
T rad e  and 1799 7517 3323 (no fig .) - -
W ar w ith 1800 7097 2942 (no fig .) - -
GB 1801 7626 2725 (no fig .) - “
Peace 1802 5672 9446 22858 163004 3165
1803 6334 12842 19660 127717 6019
W ar 1804 6482 6433 26371 119158 4088
w N eu tra l 1805 6401 3358 3968 20391 10650
i T  rade 1806 (no fig.) (no  fig .) 2669 106351 4728
t
h
1807 (no fig .) (no  fig .) 5574 101059 (no fig .)
GB 1808 (no fig .) (no fig .) 21073 110390 (no fig .)
F rench 1809 4768 5120 26724 196858 (no fig .)
Invasion 1810 ( J a n - J u n e ;  6 m onths)
1452 3388 16033 153280 11160
M exican 1810 (Aug, Sept, N ov, Dec)
W ars of 1786 1455
Indepen  - 1811 ( M a r c h - J u ly ; 5 m onths)
dence 603 2413 9701 55830 22806
1812 (no fig .) (no  fig .) 1558 22028 42397
Sources:
(1) & (2) Figure? for 1 7 8 5 -  1805: Gaceta de México, Vols. I - X I I I .
Figures fo r  1 8 0 9 -  1811: Correo Semanario Político Mercantil,
V ol. 1 p. 16, 35, 78, 110, 1 4 9 -  50;
Vol. 2 p .45, 7 9 - 8 0 ,  108, 1 3 8 - 3 9 ,  178, 223, 295;
Vol. 3 p. 1 0 6 -  7, 149, 180, 328, 402.
(3) Figures for 1 7 8 6 -  1796: Gaceta de México, Vols. I I - V I I I ;
Figures for 1802 -  1812: M iguel L erdo de T a jad a , Comercio exterior de México
(1853), (M exico, 1967).
(4) & (5) M iguel Lerdo de T e jad a , Comercio exterior de México  (1853), (M exico, 1967).
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large quantities of Puebla’s rebozos (in 1803, 12,910 dozen valued at 
119,490 p e s o s ) .R e c o rd s  of ropa de tierra from  Puebla passing through 
Mexico C ity’s customs house between 1785 and 1811 (see T able I) 
reveal a steady increase in volume over the 1780’s and 90’s, clearly 
substituting European cloth between 1797 and 1802 (when Puebla’s 
weavers were reported to be imitating even the finest European cloth), 
levelling off after Amiens and slipping back to the level of the 1780’s by 
the end of the decade. Mexico City customs house reports for the years 
1809 -  11 show that very little of Puebla’s cloth was consumed in Mexico 
City (see T able II), probably because the capital had acquired its own
TABLE II: Cloth and R aw  Cotton Entering M exico C ity Custom s 
House, 1809


















within city 4282 114 206 1029 12614
Passed through 
to other markets 829 4680 - 525 772 1193
Total 5111 4794 206 2326 13807
Source: Correo Semanario Político M ercantil, Vols I & II.
cotton textile industry competing with P uebla’s since the 1760’s. M ost of 
P uebla’s cloth went to provincial tailors and store keepers in the towns, 
villages and haciendas of the interior (scrutiny of the avíos advanced to 
agricultural labourers in these regions would doubtless reveal a propor­
tion of goods m anufactured in Puebla). T he inventory of Carlos 
C havez’s dry goods and cloth warehouse -  a specialist in rebozos -  
reveals credit to 360 individuals in over fifty towns, villages and hacien­
das stretching from Tabasco in the southeast to León, Lagos and Silao in 
the Bajío, varying in size from  two pesos, the value of yarn supplied to 
M aestro V argas, weaver of Puebla, to 6,000 pesos, the value of metal 
goods and textiles supplied to a m erchant resident in the fair town of
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Lagos in G uanajuato. These credits were valued at 94,891 pesos while 
his debts to fifty -  five import houses, cotton m erchants, brokers, store­
keepers and the customs amounted to 115,486 pesos 3 reales. A favour­
able balance of 8,224 pesos resulted when his stock, various pawned 
items, thirty -  two lengths of m anta still on the loom but already paid for 
in advance and 2,600 head of cattle received from  the tierradcntro were 
taken into account. A part from coin, principal item of exchange in the 
cloth trade with the interior was cattle, particularly mules and horses, 
arriving at Puebla’s ejidos in November and December, attracting buyers 
from  all over the southeast from as fa r as G uatem ala.51
T here appears to have been no exclusive specialization in dealing in 
ropa de tierra. Inventories for a wide range of dealers reveal merchants 
who, purporting to specialise in European goods, at the same tim e held 
quantities of local m anufactures, as well as almacenes de ropa de tierra 
which kept European goods in s t o c k . A  m ercer’s degree of specialisa­
tion would depend upon the kind of specialization of the wholesale 
warehouse with which he held credit, or the kind of direct involvement 
he might have with local producers. T he inventory of a m ercer’s shop 
operated by two men in partnership illustrates this point (see T able III).
This inventory illustrates well the complementarity existing between 
the trade in imported goods and dealing in ropa de tierra, and, given the 
instability of the export sector, it would have been im prudent for a
m ercer to concentrate exclusively on either branch of trade.
W hen the prolonged commercial crisis accompanying the W ars of 
Independence gradually receded, wholesalers and retailers of ropa de 
tierra significantly show a higher survival rate. O f the eighteen whole­
salers and retailers of ropa de tierra active in the city in 1807, seven 
were still in trade in 1820. O f the thirty -  four dealers in European cloth 
resident in 1807, only nine remained in 1820.55 Both bodies, of course, 
had suffered greatly from  the collapse of the colonial credit and 
mercantile structure, the disruption this caused in the market o f the 
tierradentro and from contraband imports undercutting domestic m anu­
factures in price.
It was the failure of the external sector to recover even to its uneasy 
pre -  w ar equilibrium that finally persuaded both m erchants dealing in 
imported goods and those still trading in domestic manufactures to seak a
more perm anent and, so they hoped, a more stable outlet for their
investment in the mechanization and transform ation of cotton preparation 
and spinning. Once this movement was underway by the mid -  1830’s 
there was very little space left for the algodonero or the spinner, and
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TABLE III: Tienda de Ropa, Calle de Mercaderes, Puebla, Belong­
ing to the C om pany Formed Between José  Maria Infante  












(Cotton cloth from Sultepec) 2,959 1
Prendas 5 3 1/4
Debts of Indians through 
Repartim iento 602 1 4 granos
5,706 pesos 7 1/8
LIA BILITIES
Debts owed to three mercers, 
dealers in European goods (José 
Antonio Cardoso, José Manuel 
Lara and Francisco Javier 
M anzano) and rent. 2,113 pesos 5 3/4
Cash 230 pesos 4 reales
Cortes’ investment 2,000 pesos
Source: A N P Not. No. 7, 1829 f. 357.
many mercers and almaceneros saw their liquidity vanish as they 
wrestled with the problems of introducing and operating profitably the 
new technology. W here the trade in domestic cotton did not change 
significantly over the period of the mechanization of spinning was at its 
two extremes, namely those merchants financing cotton agriculture and 
dealing in scarce cotton for the new factories and those wholesale ware­
houses dealing principally in imported goods but prepared also to stock 
local manufactures. Both groups became the usurious creditors to the 
new industry."’4 T he handloom weaver survived the entire period of 
decline and transform ation, providing indeed its vital productive force, 
though with his independence much reduced now that spinning was fully 
mechanised and yarn only available at the factory counter.
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D. Weaving
T he focus so far has been on the commercial activities surrounding 
the productive work of spinners and weavers. T he impression given is 
perhaps of a large num ber of people, struggling to subsist, who were the 
passive instruments of mercantile calculation, largely for the m erchant’s 
benefit. Closer examination of guild proceedings, census returns, mort­
gage loans and wills reveals, however, that weavers were fa r from being 
an undifferentiated and impoverished mass.
In the depressed years of the early 1830’s, before the wave of 
investment in modern spinning factories had brought about the recovery 
of the weaving artisanate, contemporaries tended to exaggerate the 
degree of prosperity of the late colonial weaver. This was often deliber­
ate propaganda put out by protectionists to persuade governments that by 
protecting Mexican industry a prosperous and stable social order would 
be restored. Alternatively it was designed to convince underemployed and 
impoverished weavers of the virtues of the mechanization of spinning, 
guaranteed to restore them  to their past prosperity. Francisco Jav ie r de 
la Peña, in his annotations to his reedition of Villa Sanchez’ Puebla 
Sagrada y  Profana in 1835 places the weaver firmly among the m erchant 
class as a beneficiary of the late colonial cotton boom. The industry had 
divided the city’s population into two classes, the first containing ”la 
escarm enadora, azatadora e hilandera ... quienes ... ganaban de tres a 
cinco reales diarios, sin dejar atender a  sus labores domésticas,” and the 
second, ”al oficial, al comerciante, al encomendero, al arriero, etc. ... 
quienes llegaron a jun ta r capitales de diez, veinte, treinta y cuarenta mil 
pesos.” De la Peña then describes the tastes and lifestyle of the latter 
group, singling out two artisans whom he knew well. T he description has 
the precision of an inventory (and may be usefully compared to the 
inventory of Dn. José G arcía Aragón, rebozo weaver, in T able IV):
” ...yo conocí a dos maestros, uno sombrerero llamado Don M anuel Cadena y 
otro tejedor de lienzos de algodón Don José Aguilar, con toquillas de onzas 
de oro en los sombreros, botones de las mismas y escudos en sus vestuarios, 
sillas de m ontar m agníficas, con fustes guarnecidos de plata maciza, y el 
ruedo de higas de las anqueras de la propia: sus mujeres estaban ricamente 
adornadas, y rivalizaban con las señoras de primera clase,... sus casas eran 
espaciosas y m uy curiosamente adornadas: en las salas había hermosas 
arañas de plata, y no pocos utensilios de servicio, siendo tan común el uso 
de este m etal, que en algunas accesorias de oficiales honrados, se le daba 
agua a la persona decente que la pedia en el ’jarro de p la ta’. . .”55
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Such men were clearly in the minority within a corps of weavers 
num bering perhaps 2,500 at the turn  of the nineteenth century.56 But 
did they represent a significant portion of the weaving population and 
was the gap in wealth and status which separated them  from  the mass of 
weavers one of substance or of degree?
In terms of the ethnic identification of weavers, indicated by what 
they told the censor in 1791, this was very much a hispano — mestizo 
occupation. In  the main weaving Barrio de San Francisco, of the few 
non -  Spanish or mestizo weavers, most were indios caciques from 
Tlaxcala, which says little, as most Indians from  Tlaxcaia appear as 
caciques.^  In the pream bles to the census returns of the main weaving 
towns of the valley made in 1792, and also in the short description of 
these towns made by M anuel Flon in 1803 in all expect Cholula, weav­
ing appears to have been explicitly the occupation of gente de razón, 
Indians being occupied in other crafts or in agriculture.
But while the possession of a loom and working indoors might have 
perm itted a small -  town Spaniard or mestizo to become differentiated 
from  the surrounding Indian population, for most of its practitioners, 
cotton weaving offered only the barest subsistence. T he censors’ phrases 
in the pream bles bear this out: ”Lo pasan m iseram ente en la fatiga de 
sus telares;” ’’cuyos miserios productos se sirven pocas tiendas;” ’’muy 
corta utilidad para la carestía de m ateriales;” ”la gente de razón que no 
ejerce algún oficio subsiste con el hilado de algodón,” and so forth. 
T here is evidence that weavers in these towns were worse off than their 
counterpans in the capital. D uring the 1780’s and early 90’s, when 
production in the city of Puebla was expanding fast, the neighbouring 
town of C holula’s industry was in full decline. O f the 300 looms active 
there in 1784, only 200 rem ained in 1791 and of those "no se emplean 
todos por falta de auxilios.” (In 1804 Flon reported that production in 
C holula had recoverewd substantially with encouragem ent from  P uebla’s 
almaceneros.) T laxcala’s weavers in 1791 were obliged to carry their 
cloth the twenty miles to Puebla where they received a paltry seven 
reales for their three days of labour in weaving a piece of cloth, surely 
accounting for why migration to Puebla from  that area was so common. 
H uejozingo’s weavers in 1802 had to sacrifice one real for each piece of 
m anta  they produced, as commission charged by P uebla’s almaceneros, 
who marketed the tow n’s cloth in the interior.58
W eavers in the capital, while they might have been better placed for 
access to credit and in closer touch with markets than their small -  town 
counterparts, felt the pinch just as much when the dem and dropped, as
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TABLE IV: Inventory o f  the Estate o f  Don José  García de Aragón, 
Cotton Cloth Weaver, at his Death (1781)
ASSETS ps. rls. gr-
One Story House in Calle de la Puerta del Costado 
de la Iglesia de N tra. Sra. de la Merced 1,896 0 0
Furniture: 1 Painted Dais, 12 Chairs, 12 Stools,
1 Glass -  topped Table, 4 Cedar Boxes, 1 W ardrobe,
1 C arpet, 8 Paintings of Saints, 1 Statue of N tra.
Sra. del Refugio, 4 M irrors, 3 Pairs of Candlesticks,
6 Canvases with Images of Saints, 1 Green Bed with 
embroided and guilded H eadboard, 1 Folding Screen,
3 Toys, Assortment of V enetian and Puebla Glass, 
C hina and Talavera Plates, Ja rs , Flasks and Tankards. 171 0 0
Clothes: 1 Poncho for Outside, 1 Cloth Cape with 
Velvet Interior, 1 Camlet cloak, 1 Old Cloth Cloak,
2 Black Velvet Suits, 1 Camlet W aistcoast, 1 Old M antle. 86 0 0
Gold and Silver: 7 Silver Spoons, 1 Silver Ju g  and
1 Silver Knife, 2 Strings of Pearls, 1 Pair of
Gold Barrings, 1 Pair of Gold Earrings with Diamonds. 119 5 6
Other Valuables: 1 Shot G un, 2 Pistols, 1 Sword, 
2 Saddles, 4 Fine red Baize H ats (Militia),
Brass Instrum ents. 71 7 6
D yer’s Shop: 1,781 2 6
of which: 990 lbs. of Indigo Dye (1,640 4 0)
Calderons ( 90 6 6)
32 Ja rs of Odd Dyes ( 40 0 0)
Looms and Cottons: 85 0 6
of which: 2 Looms with 2 Heddles 
and 2 Redinas ( 20 0 0)
W arping Frame, Wooden Stand 
and Trestles ( 2 0 0)
7 Heddles with their Beams ( 1 0 0)
Cotton on First Loom (7 lbs. 9 oz.) ( 8 3 6)
Cotton on Second Loom (5 lbs.) ( 5 5 5)
18 lbs. 12 oz. of Blue Cotton on Spindles ( 18 6 0)
12 lbs. of Blue Cotton in Bundles ( 12 6 0)
8 lbs. of W hite Cotton ( 7 4 0)
Cash: Reales, plus 325 ps. 5 rls. 3 grs., 
value of 49 arrobas of cocoa de Guayaquil 1,326 4 0
Owed from those supplying the dye shop and 
money advanced to Spinners 169 1 0
Debts of Grandm other and Grandsons, suspended ( 824 4 0)
5,707 4 6
Funeral, Debts, and other Costs 1,079 6 6
L IQ U ID 4,627 6 0
Source: AN P, Miscellaneous Judicial.
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TABLE V: Textile E m ploym ent in the Barrios de Santa Cruz, 




Spanish Mestizo M ulatto Indian Total
W eaver 323 264 26 71 684
Carder 1 3 4 79 87
Spinner 
Silk Spinning/
3 8 5 52 65
W eaving 3 - - - 3
Printing/D yeing 
O ther Textiles
5 13 1 13 32
(H em p, Blankets, 
Ribbons, etc.)
6 7 - 11 24
TO TA L 
(19.1 percent 
of labour force)
341 295 36 226 898
Source: AAP, Padrones, Vols. 1 2 8 -  129.
it did very sharply after peace was signed with Britain in 1801. The 
frantic activity of the cotton w eavers’ guild in 1803 was but one of the 
consequences of the sudden renewal of imports after five years of almost 
unprecedented protection afforded by the war. T he guild officers 
expressed concern about the ’’total desarreglo en que se halla el Gremio 
de Texedores e H ilanderas de Algodón,” and proceeded with a general 
inspection of the art throughout the entire city. W hat they found was an 
almost D arwinian struggle between and within the different levels of the 
cotton trade described above. Starting at the base of the production 
pyram id, spinners were inserting pieces of dam p bread and cardboard in 
their skeins of spun yarn, defrauding weavers and algodoneros; the 
algodoneros in turn were giving short m easure to the spinners by using 
worn wooden weights; weavers were bypassing the algodoneros and going 
out to ’’las garitas y aun fuera de ellas, a encontrar los Indios, y otras 
personas de razón, para comprarles allí a menos precio sus hilados;” 
many unexamined officials had set up looms in their own houses, 
’’algunos en crecido num ero;” other unexamined officials ’’están protexidos 
y fomentados por maestros del Arte, y otros por comerciantes;” many 
weavers were making cloth which was ’’enteram ente viciado;” this cloth 
was being sold illegally on the edge of the city. T he guild officials agreed
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with the Council’s Fiel Ejecutoría that general application of the harsh 
statutory penalties would provoke an uprising and chose instead to 
administer stern punishments only to two weavers. José Aguilar, an 
unexamined weaver, working two looms with his two sons, had them 
confiscated and burnt in the main square. Pablo C arm ona, unexamined 
official and weaver of faulty cloth, had his two looms confiscated and 
was ordered to work with a m aster of the art until ready for exam ina­
tio n .^  (Pablo C arm ona, after the abolition of the guild in 1813, was to 
represent the city’s cotton weavers on the Junta  de Artesanos established 
by the council in 1821.)60 These were the last official proceedings of the 
cotton weavers’ guild, as fa r as is known, all guilds being finally abol­
ished ten years later by decree of the Cortes.
T he proceedings of the guild in 1803 reveal the desire of certain 
masters of the art to reduce and control production in a period of 
recession following a boom when guild controls had been thrown to the 
wind. T he depression itself, however, proved to be much more effec­
tive than the half -  hearted enforcement of guild ordinances in slimming 
the industry down. These were years of almost unprecedented migration 
from Puebla to Mexico City, Carlos Aguirre noticing two im portant 
cycles of population expulsion, 1 8 0 1 -4  and 1 8 0 6 - 10. Among those 
swelling the numbers of the barrio de los poblanos in Mexico City, 
textile workers predominated.*’*
M any weavers, however, rem ained in Puebla, despite the deepening 
of the economic crisis during the W ars of Independence. W eavers 
represented the dominant occupational category in both the 1822 and the 
1830 census returns, although they were a smaller proportion of the 
labour force than in 1791.62 T he case of one weaver who remained will 
be briefly examined to give us a better idea about the hierarchy which 
existed within the weaving profession and the factors determining it.
In 1791 Don Francisco A rm enta was fifteen years old and already 
working for his father in a substantial two storey house in the Barrio 
Alto de San Francisco. In that year the A rm enta household was com­
posed as follows:
T he Arm enta Family, 1791, Barrio Alto, Puebla.
Don Ju a n  Antonio A rm enta, Español, Tejedor, 60 years
D oña M aria C asiana Gonzalez, Española, 40 ”
with seven children:
Da. M aria de la Luz A rm enta 18 ”
Dn. Francisco, Tejedor 15 ”
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Da. M aria Faustina 13
Dn. Thadeo 8
Da. M aria de la Luz 4
Dn. José M ariano 2 ”
O ne infant
Two servants:
Francisco Tepechichino, Indio cacique de Tlaxcala 15
José M anuel Carvallo, Español 17
T he Arm entas were well established in the barrio. T here were four other 
branches of the family living nearby, all of them with at least one of 
their members engaged in weaving.®^
In 1835, while Francisco Jav ier de la Peña was lam enting the decline 
of Puebla’s cottons, which he put down partly to the bad faith and poor 
workmanship of the city’s weavers losing them  the trust of merchants, 
he is reminded of Don Francisco A rm enia who ’’está fabricando en el dia 
excelentes cordoncillos, listados, manteles y servilletas, y paños de 
algodón y seda de superior calidad; sus esfuerzos son muy loables y 
dignos de aprecio.”®’*' In 1833 A rm enta employed twelve oficiales in his 
workshop. Inventories of commercial establishments in the 1830’s and 
40’s list rebozos Arm enia, valued at ten pesos each while ordinary cotton 
rebozos were worth only nine pesos a dozen!
This case grants us some insight into what permitted differentation 
within the weaving artisanate: extensive family ties, scale of production 
and value and quality of the finished product. Rebozo  m anufacture was 
therefore one way in which a weaver might increase his income and 
social status, and since both guild ordinance and the skilled nature of the 
art required that the rebozo weaver both spin and dye his own yarn, 
rebozo weaving appears to have been less exposed to mercantile control 
than ordinary manta  production.
Bazant mistakenly implies that the rebozo was not, like the manta, 
’’the object of mass production.”®® Yet it seems clear that by the end of 
the colonial period rebozo m anufacture had become a bulk industry as 
shown in Puebla’s exports of this textile to G uadalajara. Also much of 
the large volume of ropa de tierra passing through M exico’s customs 
house, would have consisted of rebozos, given that manta m anufacture 
by this time had proliferated throughout southern, central and north­
w es t-cen tra l Mexico.®7 Rebozos were also sent from Puebla to G uaya­
quil and Peru before Independence. T he unit of production of rebozos 
had grown in size by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a trend 
evident in other industries, particularly hat -  making, tanning and soap 
m anufacure. This trend continued in the m anufacture of cotton shawls
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throughout the nineteenth century. In 1852 there were twenty -  three
rebozerias with 193 looms, employing 413 oficiales, not including the
masters. T he largest belonged to Cayetano Aguilar and employed 132
oficiales on twenty -  three looms; the smallest was owned by José de la
68Luz Alvarado and had three looms employing seven oficiales.
T he masters of rebozo weaving were not the only relatively wealthy 
weavers in Puebla. M anta  was also being concentrated in larger and 
larger units by the 1800’s and the m erchants and weavers who controlled 
these obradores were able to generate the volume of production neces­
sary to yield a surplus and to afford a higher level of consumption for 
themselves than was possible from  the labour of a solitary manta weaver 
on a single loom. M aster cotton weavers working their own looms in 
their homes earned only two to three reales a day in 1823, oficiales 
earned one real, cotton spinners half a real. A m aster glass maker, 
however, owner of his own factory, earned thirty -  two reales; a master 
potter, also a factory owner, earned sixteen reales and m aster h a t-  
m aker José C adena, employer of twenty -  two oficiales, earned tw enty- 
eight and one half reales a day.®®
T he picture, then, is of a city containing a prosperous body of 
weavers and masters of other trades who constituted a privileged and 
prosperous artisanal aristocracy. Individual craftsm en could achieve such 
a status due to a variety of circumstances, among which the following 
seem especially im portant: their control of guild offices; their expertise 
and specialization; their ability to control the entire process of production; 
their ability to control the production of other artisans; concentration of 
labour into larger production units, or possession of real estate and the 
attending ability to raise mortgage loans. Such prosperous weavers and 
other m aster craftsm en were much better equipped to w eather periods of 
recession and crisis than the mass of their fellow artisans with whom 
they competed, and who lived much closer to the level of subsistence. 
From the evidence of daily income for the arbortive income tax of 1823, 
the gap between these two sections of the artisanate appears to have 
been very wide and the proportion of rich to poor very small indeed.70 
1823 was, it should be said, a year of severe economic crisis, but then so 
were many years of the long period discussed in this paper.
III. Conclusion
Historians looking for pointers in the structure and perform ance of 
colonial industry that might indicate a potential for ’’transform ation” or
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’’sustained growth” are almost unanim ous in rating the chances of New 
Spain’s m anufacturing industry rather low. Diego López y Rosado sees 
in the home -  based m anufacturing, examined in this paper, an obsolete 
production process, ’’which failed due to the competition of Indian 
m anufacture, the control of raw materials by m erchants and too high 
prices; lack of direct contact between the weaver and the consumer; lack 
of capital, and, principally, by the appearance of the obraje or 'em brión 
of the modern factory .’”71 Jorge Angulo and Roberto Sandoval show 
how misleading Luis Chavez O rozco’s ’’modern factory” label is for the 
obraje, stressing the more traditional ’’rural” character of Q ueré ta ro ’s 
obrajes at the end of the colonial period.72 In Puebla, of course, the 
obraje, although the dom inant form  of production during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries in the woolen industry, was much diminished 
by the early eighteenth century, though it survived in a state of low 
equilibrium (four to five establishments with six to ten looms) through to 
the end of the period studied (1850). By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century Puebla’s obrajes were no longer ’’closed” work houses but 
employed free wage labour. T his transition probably had occurred over 
the first half of the the eighteenth century. T heir owners were not averse 
to technical transform ation, Puebla’s first steel looms being introduced 
by a C atalan, Francis Puig, into his obraje in the early 1820’s .73 T he 
technical transform ation of wool spinning accompanied the revolution in 
cotton spinning during the 1830’s, receiving some resistence, not from 
m erchants but from  artisans who destroyed the machinery of the first 
wool spinning mill to be established in T laxcala .74
T he obraje form  of production was not used in Puebla’s cotton 
m anufacturing because of the great volume of labour involved, its 
availability and cheapness. O ver much of the eighteenth century expan­
sion of production appears to have taken the form  which Angulo and 
Sandoval argue was the principal feature of growth in colonial workshop 
m anufacturing, the multiplication of small units of production. From the 
late eighteenth century, however, there are clear signs of concentration of 
production in larger units, fomented by m erchant financiers and domi­
nant cotton masters. This trend was greatly accelerated after the slump 
in the industry over the 1810 ’s and 20’s. By the late 1840’s, although 
many one to two loom workshops rem ained, there were several large 
weaving shops with between twenty and 100 loom s.75
Diego López Rosado accepts Lobato Lopez’s conclusion that work­
shop m anufacturing was ’’systematically denied all credit from the clergy 
and merchants, the bankers of the colony.”76 It has been shown, how­
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ever, that the injection of m erchant capital at all levels of the cotton 
industry was of its very essence. T rue, m erchants’ interest in the indus­
try fluctuated, but even in the worst periods of recession, such as the 
early 1820’s, m erchant capital can be found fom enting cotton agricul­
ture, financing transportation and distribution of raw cotton, financing 
w eavers’ production and marketing their products.77 And the more 
established and propertied artisans borrowed freely on the ’’mortgage 
market” from convent and m erchant alike, particularly in periods of 
instability, when cash was short or when sudden demand for their 
products was fe lt.78
M any authors concur with the idea that the legal, administrative, 
political, even the ideological environment for colonial industry was a 
hostile one. Ja n  Bazant argues in the conclusion to his "Evolución de la 
industria textil poblana” that what was inhibiting the transform ation of 
the industry was not lack of enterprise, which he argues Puebla’s artisans 
possessed in abundance, but, rather, the Spanish cultural and ideological 
enviroment -  "cierto concepto hacia la vida en general y la economia y 
la sociedad en particular.” This ill-d e fin e d  inhibition he feels restrained 
both colonial and metropolitan industrial transform ation. Political inde­
pendence, he argues, removed this impediment: ”La rapidez con que 
cunde la revolución industrial de México después de la Independencia, se 
debe en parte tam bién a la desaparición de las inhibiciones inherentes al 
dominio español como español, no como colonial.”79 John  Coatsworth, 
in a more recent interpretation of the same period, also grants promi­
nence to administrative, political and cultural inhibitions, related to the 
nature of the colonial state. ’’The interventionalist and pervasively arbi­
trary nature of the institutional environment ... favoured those with poli­
tical influence, [while] small enterprise ... was forced to operate in a 
perm anent state of clandestinity always at the margin of the law, at the 
mercy of petty officials, never secure from arbitrary acts and never 
protected against the rights of those more powerful ... T his system of 
government made ’free’ enterprise impossible.”89
T he evidence from  Puebla over the eighteenth century suggests that 
C oatsw orth’s and Bazant’s argum ents are more applicable to the first 
half of the century than to the second. T he prohibition of trade with 
Peru, officious obraje inspections, over -  zealous exaction of the alca­
bala, contemporaries argued, had caused Puebla’s economic decline, 
though, almost certainly, these simply hastened a process which had 
other causes.81 O ver the second half of the eighteenth century, however, 
trade liberalization and specific incentives greatly improved the admin­
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istrative environment for trade and m anufacturing. M easures designed 
to encourage the C atalan cotton textile industry -  the prohibition on 
Asian cotton and silk imports, the removal of the alcabala on raw 
cotton, the prohibition of cotton cloth imports from  other European 
countries -  all redounded to Puebla’s favour, particularly in time of war 
when Atlantic trade was in terrupted.8  ^ At the same time the granting of 
licenses for neutral powers to trade with New Spain in 1804 brought the 
first bulk imports of ordinary cottons onto the M exican m arket, and 
gave Puebla’s cotton merchants and weavers a foretaste o f the increased 
competition they would face after Independence.88
T he principal obstacles to the further growth, development and 
transform ation of the m anufacturing industry in Mexico at the beginning 
of nineteenth century had very little to do with ’’Spanishness,” ’’attitudes 
to life,” Leviathan -  like colonial states or tyrannous and interventionalist 
petty officials. Nor was the putative unwillingness of m erchants to 
involve themselves more directly in m anufacturing processes a significant 
cause of the absence of technical and organizational strides in the cotton 
industry before Independence. These advances came sure enough, when 
the time was ripe, in the mid — 1830’s, largely financed and executed by 
merchants.
Three factors may be held principally responsible for restraining the 
growth and development of P uebla’s cotton textile industry, and 
M exico’s industry generally, in the first years of the nineteenth century 
-  and again, in the 1850’s, after a renewed period of growth during the 
later 1830’s and 40’s. Briefly, these factors were silver, w ar and physi­
cal and hum an geography. 1. Silver, M exico’s principal export and the 
chief attraction for m erchant capital, had a profound im pact upon 
m anufacturing production. Fluctuation in the level of mining production, 
coinage and in the degree of silver retention, influenced by w ar, had a 
direct effect upon dem and for m anufactures. T he accumulation of coin 
in periods of interruption to Atlantic trade undoubtedly spurred m anu­
facturing growth, but renewed exports of silver when peace was signed 
deepened the trough in dem and for domestic m anufactures facing the 
renewal of imports. Scarcity of medium and debasem ent of coinage after 
Independence deterred imports, protecting domestic m anufactures and 
making the investment boom in mechanised industry o f the late 1830’s 
and early 40’s possible, but the recovery of silver mining production 
after the American W ar caused m erchant capital once more to desert 
industry. 2. It will have become evident from  this paper, that w ar was 
more than a merely incidental factor affecting M exican m anufacturing.
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The growth of the cotton textile industry in Mexico during the eighteenth 
century owed much to the frequent interruption of trans -  Atlantic trade 
caused by war. H ad peace prevailed, C atalan industrialisation would 
have surged ahead much earlier, the M exican market would have been 
more directly exposed to competition from its products, and the higher 
price and wage level in Mexico — the result of the ’’mining constitution 
of the country” -  would have greatly restrained the capacity of expan­
sion of creole -  mestizo m anufacturing in the cities. Raw cotton would 
have been drawn off into exports, rather than being sent on expensive 
mule -  backs inland. 3. Finally, complex geographical and socio -  cultural 
facts of Mexican life greatly limited the rate at which m anufacturing 
production might expand. These were the fragm entation of the national 
market caused by great distance between many of the principal areas of 
population and high overland transport costs (accentuated after Inde­
pendence by the steady demonetarization of the economy); the limitation 
of the range and depth of the market due to the existence of a large and 
impoverished Indian peasantry; finally, erratic and limited dem and even 
in the principal market areas, the provincial capitals, mining towns and 
haciendas, a consequence o f the general poverty and low level of con­
sumption of the mass of the labouring or vagabond population.
These then are three reasons which help to explain why Mexican 
m anufacturing did not grow, develop, transform  itself and reproduce its 
social relations in other areas of economy and society in the way that 
industrialisation perform ed these functions in other societies. Mexican 
industry over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was characterised 
by a very unstable growth pattern -  periods of rapid growth, followed 
by periods of slump, explained, for the late colonial period, by a most 
unstable external sector; by the introduction of technological and organ­
izational advances in a very piecemeal way so that traditional forms of 
production, existed side by side with modern techniques and organization; 
by a declining rather than growing degree of regional specialization -  
even after factory production was introduced during the 1830’s, each 
region sought its own paper mill, iron foundry and textile mills. Finally, 
M exican industry failed to transform , even to significantly modify, the 
essentially export -  import orientation of the country’s dom inant com­
mercial and financial interests; a result of the impact of international 
demand for M exican minerals, particularly silver.®“^
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8. LOS O B R A JES H U A M A N G U IN O S Y SUS IN T E R C O N E X IO ­
NES C O N  O T R O S  SE C T O R E S E C O N O M IC O S EN  EL 
C E N T R O  -  SU R  PE R U A N O  A FIN ES D EL  SIG L O  X V III
M iriam  Salas
Los obrajes son las unidades productivas, tal vez, más desconocidas 
de las que surgieron en la colonia.* Sobre ellos se han levantado 
algunos supuestos que hoy pretendemos corregir. Uno de ellos es la 
creencia de que los obrajes funcionaron como verdaderas ’’islas” gracias a 
su autosuficiencia en insumos productivos como de consumo. Por lo cual 
se supone no habrían tenido gran significación en la vida interna de las 
regiones donde fueron asentados. Tipificándoselos, en form a genérica, 
como ’’estancia la n a r -o b ra je  textil.” Sin em bargo, nosotros creemos que 
la realidad fue otra. De allí que el propósito del presente trabajo  sea 
presentar cuales fueron las verdaderas relaciones que los obrajes esta­
blecieron con su región a través del estudio de sus necesidades de mano 
de obra y de medios de producción, y la posterior comercialización de 
sus m anufacturas acabadas. Esta en sí estará determ inada por la pro­
ducción y otros factores concomitantes como la estructura de la propie­
dad, el ambiente geográfico donde fueron instalados, y el servicio que 
éstos prestaban a la estructura social dominante.
Su influencia no se limitó a las zonas donde fueron instalados. Los 
obrajes huam anguinos tuvieron la cualidad de integrar económicamente a 
diferentes regiones, pues establecieron relaciones comerciales dentro y 
fuera de la región para  suplir las carencias habidas en la suya que de 
ninguna m anera se podía declarar económicamente independiente al no 
gozar de solidez individual. Por lo que, no podían aislarles, sino más 
bien participar de las relaciones e intercambios interregionales ya habidos 
y crear nuevos movimientos y redes comerciales de acuerdo a sus pro­
pias necesidades. El crecimiento y crisis de las m anufacturas huam an- 
guinas se nutrieron de estos contactos. Por tanto, la referencia a ellos se 
hará  obligatoria en el presente trabajo.
I. Geografía de la producción textil en Huamanga
Los centros m anufactureros de la provincia de H uam anga estuvi­
eron localizados en cuatro de los céntricos barrios de la ciudad de 
H uam anga, en los valles de los alrededores de aquélla, como en
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Huam anguilla y Pacaicasa, en la provincia de Vilcashuamán y en 
H u an ta .1 Pero, los centros artesanales de la ciudad de H uam anga, 
algunos de los valles de los alrededores y los de la provincia de H uanta, 
en realidad no fueron obrajes en el verdadero sentido de la palabra, aun 
cuando sus propietarios insistían en bautizarlos de tales, como el de la 
Colpa en H uanta. Pues, al leer sus inventarios constatamos que no 
tenían batán, principal elemento de diferenciación entre obrajes y los 
llamados chorrillos. Asimismo, carecían de las instalaciones precisas, 
materiales y de la mano de obra suficiente constituyendo en realidad 
tejedurías de carácter doméstico o centros artesanales montados por los 
conquistadores. Lo mismo sucedía con los que se instalaron en el seno de 
la misma ciudad, porque como nos lo hacen saber constantemente sus 
libros de Cabildo, el agua elemento vital para darles movimiento a los 
batanes escaseaba y apenas llegaba a satisfacer las necesidades de la 
población; por tal motivo aun hoy las industrias no pueden progresar 
allí.
Los obrajes más im portantes de la región durante el período colonial 
estuvieron localizados en la provincia de V ilcashuam án. Estos habían 
sido eregidos en los años setenta del siglo X V I, por los ’’encomen­
deros-vec inos y cabildantes:” Antonio de O ré, que fundó el de C anaria 
y luego el de Chincheros; H ernán Guillén de M endoza que erigió el de 
Cacam arca, y finalm ente el de Pomacocha fundado por el Arcediano D. 
Francisco de O ré, hijo del prim ero.“1 En la zona hubieron otros obrajes 
como el de C ochapata, pero los primeros fueron los más representativos 
y los que lograron sobrevivir durante los tres siglos de vida del virreinato 
peruano.
Vilacashuam án, ubicada en la región Q uechua, entre los 2972 y 
3200 metros sobre el nivel del m ar, es zona montañosa. Donde la 
m ayoría de sus pueblos no tuvieron otras posibilidades de asentamiento 
que en las faldas de los cerros, que limitó sus posibilidades de expansión 
tanto en terrenos cultivables como para vivienda. A lo que se sumó la 
escases del agua, que se agravaba por el hecho de ser en algunos secto­
res salobre.11
Dadas estas características, y a pesar de que su clima era bastante 
templado y propicio para que crescan en ella la más variada gam a de 
alimentos, y como para que en algunos de sus parajes, los menos 
calientes, pasteen gran núm ero de cabezas de ganado, las limitaciones del 
terreno lo im pidieron.* Por lo que, los encomenderos no encontraron en 
esta provincia ningún recurso que se destaque por su abundancia y/o 
por su posibilidad de convertirse en dinero en el mercado. O tra  conse—
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cuencia era que los naturales no pudiesen cum plir muchas veces con toda 
la cuota del tributo en especie a que tenían obligación y que no tuviesen 
como pagar la parte del tributo en dinero que les correspondía. D ada 
esta situación adversa los encomenderos, haciendo uso de su gran espíritu 
empresarial inicial y de sus extensos privilegios como miembros de la 
élite de la sociedad huam anguina, optaron por la fundación de obrajes. 
Donde capturaron inteligentemente la excelencia textil de los ”m it- 
m aquna” que poblaban la provincia, y donde además los naturales de la 
región pudieran pagar su tributo en dinero con su traba jo .5 Empeño, en 
el que se vieron, aún más motivados por el descubrimiento de las cer­
canas minas de H uancavelica y C astrovirreyna que actuarían como 
futuros mercados de sus productos.
En la fundación de estos centros m anufactureros contribuyeron 
tam bién aquellas mismas condiciones ambientales tan adversas para  el 
desarrollo de la agricultura y ganadería, pero que, en el caso de los 
obrajes se tornaban ventajosas: En prim er lugar, su topografía, que al 
ser extrem adam ente montañosa favorecía la formación de fuertes caídas 
de aguas que se estrellaban en las ’’hondanadas”, en los ’’pozos” donde los 
obrajes se fundaron, con cuya fuerza motriz se movían las pesadas 
ruedas de los batanes y molinos. Y, en segundo lugar, su clima tem pla­
do, porque para el trabajo  que se desarrollaba en estos centros m anu­
factureros, ya sea, en una mayor proporción, en posiciones inertes o 
desplegando una gran actividad, el clima no podía ser extrem adam ente 
frío que los agarrotase, no caluroso que los agotase. Sin em bargo, estas 
mismas condiciones ambientales hicieron que la lana, principal materia 
para su funcionamiento, escasease. Por eso se planificó de irlas a resca­
tar, como en los tiempos pre -  hispánicos, a las punas y mesetas regio­
nales e interregionales, bajo diversas form as de intercambio.
En esas regiones donde abundaban los ganados, no pudieron surgir 
los obrajes, por su topografía generalmente plana que no favorece la 
formación de caídas de aguas para los batanes. De la mism a form a que 
su clima extrem adam ente frío impedía su surgimiento. Sin em bargo, la 
producción textil no estuvo ausente de estos lugares y se especializaron en 
la producción de telas burdas. A la vez se convirtieron en abastecedores 
de otras zonas, entre ellas V ilcashuam án, gracias a sus excedentes lane­
ros. Así, como tam bién de esta mism a m ateria prim a sem iclaborada, 
bajo la form a de maquipuskas o hilazas.
205
II. Estructura de la propiedad
Los tres grandes complejos m anufatureros en los que principalmente 
basaremos nuestro estudio -  Chincheros, Pomacocha y C acam arca -  
discurrieron por una larga existencia que se rem ontaba a los años setenta 
del siglo X V I en que fueron fundados por miembros de la élite 
huam anguina. Estos al haber capturado el poder y la riqueza de la 
ciudad fueron consecuentemente los únicos hombres capaces de m ontar 
todo tipo de negocios. Les im prim irán en su transitar una técnica con­
secuente con sus ideas la mism a que será acogida por sus descendientes, 
y por lo tanto, m arcará el desenvolvimiento de la vida de los obrajes.
Sus fundadores, con las rentas que les generaron sus múltiples 
em presas, se dedicaron a em ular a los nobles castellanos. Este padrón 
involucraba, además de la adqusición de algún título, la realización de 
una vida citadina llena de suntuosidad y placidez, y el servicio a Dios 
dentro de la ’’república de españoles.” Esto les exigía la fundación de 
centros religiosos, actidud que originó su descalabro como grupo domi­
nante. Luego del esfuerzo inicial, para alcanzar lo que se proponían, 
adoptaron una actitud pasiva frente a sus em presas, como si esa coyun­
tura inicial que ellos como grupo generaron se fuese a m antener en 
form a inalterable y su futuro les estuviese asegurado de por vida para 
ellos y sus hijos. Ello, la expiración de las vidas en que se les sancionó el 
disfrute de las encomiendas, la extensa prole de que cada una de estas 
familias se llenó y la llegada de Toledo que atacó cada uno de sus 
privilegios, hicieron que estas familias caigan en un gradual empobreci­
miento pese a que se tom aron algunas medidas para socorrerlas, como la 
creación de pensiones en sus ex -  encom iendas.6
Los heredores continuaron con la mism a política de sus padres en la 
dirección de sus empresas, haciendo limitadas inversiones en su funcio­
namiento y sobre todo pretendiendo hacer descansar todo el proceso 
productivo en los indios como en el pasado. A tales pretensiones se 
oponían la aguda despoblación que afectó a H uam anga, la pérdida de las 
encomiendas y la participación de la m ano de obra indígena de mayor 
núm ero de personas.7 Para  afrontar la situación el obraje de Chincheros 
optó por completar la yanaconización iniciada por su fundador Antonio 
de O ré .8 A partir de ese instante tanto los trabajadores como los d irec- 
tores del obraje no tuvieron mas nexo con las comunidades que el pago 
del tributo, situación que imposibilitó el que esta unidad de producción 
continuó descargando sobre ellas los más variados gastos tanto en el 
sostenimiento de la masa trabajadora como en el aporte de determinados
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insumos necesarios para el proceso productivo y finalm ente en la con­
strucción y/o reconstrucción de sus instalaciones.® Continuando los here­
deros con la costumbre de no invertir mucho en sus propiedades, impo­
sibilitados por su declinación como grupo social, o impulsados por sus 
deseos de obtener una renta segura sin mayores trabajos, el obraje de 
Chincheros fue arrendado durante el siglo X V II a diferentes personas 
por cifras muy inferiores a los 5600 pesos alcanzados en el siglo X V I .10
Los obrajes de C acam arca y Pomacocha se verían igualmente afec­
tados por la despoblación que se presentó en la región en el siglo X V II. 
Como consecuencia el obraje de C acam arca recibirá, alrededor de los añ 
os treinta de ese siglo, tan solo seis trabajadores de los 120 a que estaba 
acostumbrado, y el segundo, el de Pomacocha, habituado a traba ja r con 
gente voluntaria, quedaría prácticam ente paralizado. La despoblación y 
la defenestración de la antigua élite de la sociedad de H uam anga, invo­
lucraron a los obrajes en una severa crisis que se prolongaría hasta las 
últimas décadas del siglo X V II.
La decadencia se produjo, porque los obrajes no contaban con la 
m ano de obra necesaria, que llevó a sus dueños a considerar que sus 
predios estaban extenuados. Las consecuencias de este descuido eran la 
degradación física de los mismos por la falta de inversiones, la ausencia 
de jurisdicción de los nuevos administradores sobre las comunidades y 
todos los beneficios que para ellos podía acerrar, a  si como el fraccio­
nam iento en que algunos habían sido sometidos por disputas familiares. 
Esta crisis, cuyas causas serían esencialmente de carácter social y políti­
co, se produjo en una época que podría ser considerada como coyuntu- 
ralm ente favorable para el funcionamiento y desarrollo de los obrajes, al 
encontrarse las plazas mineras sino en su máximo esplendor del siglo 
X V I, sí en auge y en una situación bastante positiva para los mercaderes 
y cuando, como nos lo hace saber Pierre C haunu, la adiministración 
española tenía enormes dificultades para organizar el servicio de Indias 
en su área m onopolística.11 Desde 1610 el núm ero de buques de la 
carrera de Indias fue descendiendo regularm ente hasta alcanzar el 
mínimo tonelaje en 1640.
A fines del siglo X V II los obrajes de C acam arca y Pomacocha ya 
pertenecían a órdenes religiosas por sendos donativos que les fueron 
efectuados. El prim ero pertenecía a las monjas Carm elitas del Convento 
de Santa Teresa, por donación que les hizo el Tesorero D. Ju a n  de la 
M aza a quien los herederos de D. H ernán Guillén de M endoza se lo 
vendieron a mediados del siglo X V II, y el segundo a las Clarisas que 
luego de su fundación por Antonio de O ré recibió cuantiosos donativos
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que las convirtieron en las dueñas de más de la mitad de las propiedades 
de H uam anga. Estas instituciones ensayaron entre darlos en adminis­
tración a curas para que los administren por ellas o arrendarlos. Situa­
ción en la que continuaron con una variante en el estilo que la constituyó 
el de Cacam arca, que se decidió en 1685 cederlo en arrendam iento 
enfitéutico por cien años al Noviciado de Lima por 4000 ps. aun 
bastante bajos en comparación a los que alcanzó el obraje de Chincheros 
en el siglo X V I, y más aun, si tenemos en cuenta sus importantes 
instalaciones. Pero su mano de obra escaseaba. Al comienzos el obraje 
de Chincheros, luego de una vida bastante inestable en el siglo X V II, 
fue vendido a la familia de la Vega y C ruzat, que form aba parte del 
nuevo grupo de poder instalado en la ciudad. Su cabeza, el General D. 
Joseph M anuel de la Vega y C ruzat tenía activa participación en la 
dirección de la ciudad a través del C ab ild o .^  De este modo volvía a la 
dirección de los obrajes por lo menos en este caso el antiguo molde ya 
apreciado en el siglo X V I: poder político vs. posesión de la riqueza.
G racias al gran poder económico, político y religioso que las insti­
tuciones religiosas habían logrado en la sociedad, alcanzaron en aquellos 
años de tan aguda crisis poblacional cédulas que les permitieron contar 
con la mano de obra de los indios Condes de Pacomarca. A base de 
estos privilegios los yanaconizaron siguiendo el ejem plo de los directores 
del de Chincheros en lo que encontraron el respaldo de la Corona que 
los reservó de cualquier otro serv ic io .^  El cambio de propietarios pasivos 
a activos que, además, les inyectaron capital, la pervivencia en impor­
tancia de los centros mineros a donde acudían, la yanaconización de los 
trabajadores que les permitió a estos centros productivos lograr una 
continuidad en sus requerimientos de mano de obra especializada, junto 
con otros sistemas laborales que surgieron del pasado y nuevos que se 
inauguraron, coadyudaron para que los obrajes de V ilcashuamán alcan­
zaran un repunte inusitado. Este "despegue” que tiene lugar entre fines 
del siglo X V II y mediados del siglo X V III, se produce cuando las plazas 
m ineras de Potosí y O ruro, que habían reemplazado a Huancavelica, 
acusaban una secular línea descendente en su producción argentífera y 
un descenso parálelo de su población. No obstante, todavía eran bastante 
atrayentes para los productores y en especial para  los vilcashuam angui- 
nos, pues sus m anufacturas alcanzaron los más altos precios de su 
existencia.
Dentro de una nueva coyuntura, a fines del siglo X V III, el obraje de 
Chincheros tuvo que cam biar de dueños, cuando los que lo poseían 
cayeron en los mismos vicios que sus dueños primigenios, quienes ante
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su colapso se vieron forzados a venderlo al M arqués de Feria. El obraje 
de Pomacocha continuaba en poder de las Clarisas, que proseguían 
cediéndolo en arrendam iento. Y, el de C acam arca, que era de las 
Carm elitas, pero sujeto a un arrendam iento enfitéutico en favor de los 
Jesuítas, pasó a manos de la Dirección de Tem poralidades a partir del 
año 1767, cuando aquéllos fueron expulsados, hasta que cumplian los 
100 años estipulados por el contrato. A parentem ente, el cambio de 
propietarios en este último nos haría encontrar fácilmente en ello las 
razones de su descalabro. Pero hurgando más allá y viendo la situación 
en conjunto de los obrajes, veremos que en estos momentos las causas de 
su crisis no se encontrarían como en las prim eras décadas del siglo 
X V II en la propiedad, sino en la coyuntura económica por la que 
atravezaba la región.
III. Estructura de la producción
Los obrajes de H uam anga asentados en la provincia de V ilcas- 
huam án, continuaban siendo a fines del siglo X V III unidades de 
producción de tipo mixto, característica que se había acentuado, por sus 
mayores necesidades tanto de insumos productivos como de consumo. Sus 
propiedades anexas se incrementaron am pliam ente, en base a im por­
tantes inversiones que sus nuevos poseedores hicieron en ellas. El obraje 
de Pomacocha contaba con las haciendas anexas de C ham i y C h am p a- 
cancha; el de Chincheros con las de Llocolla, Pacom arca y Ucuscha; y el 
de C acam arca con San Joseph de Q ueques, Astania y la Colpa que 
aunque en realidad se dedicaba a la producción de otro producto alta­
mente comercializable como el azúcar, era considerada hacienda anexa al 
obraje seguramente porque para la producción de sus aproxim adam ente 
300 panes anuales no se necesitaban de mayores insumos ni de traba­
jadores.
Así, a los obrajes podríamos dividirlos en cuatro claros sectores: uno 
dedicado al abastecimiento alimenticio de los trabajadores; otro a la ela­
boración de artículos destinados al mercado; un tercero destinado al 
acarreo de los insumos necesarios para  el proceso productivo y de los 
resultados de éste al mercado, aunque los administradores lo involu­
craban en el sector anterior; y yo, finalm ente, me atrevo a nom brar otro 
constituido por las capillas que se erigieron en todos los obrajes, y que, 
a pesar de los fuertes gastos que generaron, constituían un im portante 
mecanismo de sujección de los trabajadores. Todos en conjunto confor­
m aban la estructura de producción de estos núcleos productivos.
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1. Sector de la subsistencia
Los requerimientos de mano de obra de los obrajes eran menores que 
los de las minas, pero mucho mayores que los de las estancias gana­
deras, agrícolas y plantaciones de caña en los Andes. El volumen de la 
población trabajadora ya no giraba alrededor de los 500 como en el siglo 
X V I, ahora se ubicaba entre los 200 y 300 personas. Estas cifras 
envolvían a los controladores de la producción, adm inistrador, m ayor­
domos de las haciendas anexas, capellán, etc.; los yanaconas y sus 
familias; los trabajadores alquilas estacionales; los mozos blancos y 
mestizos; y los presos destinados a los obrajes como castigo. Debemos 
señalar, que fuera de sus instalaciones en los pueblos aledaños y en el 
Collao había buen número de personas que en sus casas trabajaban  para 
los obrajes de V ilcashuam án elaborándoles m aquipuskas o hilazas, aun 
cuando su subsistencia no dependía del obraje. Sería interesante descu­
brir cuantas personas se em peñaban en estos trabajos y que tiempo les 
exigía el envío anual de estas maquipuskas a  los obrajes. Sus altos 
valores pagados exclusivamente en dinero les servían a estos hiladores al 
igual que a los alquilas para  pagar el tributo o los repartos de merca­
derías que les hacían los corregidores. Por lo que esta contribución de los 
pueblos para con los obrajes era netam ente compulsiva. Sin embargo, 
para  los corregidores los obrajes se constituyeron en una segura fuente 
generadora de sus ingresos. Los arrieros sería otro grupo que desde fuera 
trabajaría  activamente en el desarrollo de los obrajes.
A pesar de que a los controladores de la producción sus salarios les 
fueron tazados en pesos, muchas veces se les daba a cambio de ellos los 
frutos que salían de las haciendas anexas y del obraje mismo en precios 
que excedían a los del mercado y en este sentido su situación era equi­
parable a la de los trabajadores indios, y los alejaba del administrador. 
A los yanas la mayor parte de su salario se les pagaba con especies a 
excepción del tributo, obenciones, diezmo, misas y uno que otro peso 
que los trabajadores recibían directam ente cuando tenían a su cargo las 
tres o cuatro fiestas que se celebraban en los obrajes anualm ente, aun­
que en realidad estos pesos junto a los otros rápidam ente revertían a la 
economía española. Sus sueldos se les completaban con lotes de tierra 
que se repartían a los jefes de fam ilia, quienes destinaban a ellos parte 
de los cereales que recibían como semilla. No obstante todo ello, los 
yanas vivían prácticam ente al nivel de subsistencia. A los presos se les 
mantenía en las condiciones pésimas. A los trabajadores alquilas, que 
generalmente se les pagaba en vales para el corregidor, una parte de su
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sueldo, destinada a mantenerlos durante su estancia en el obraje o 
haciendas, se les pagaba en especies.
Se acostumbró, por tanto, que toda la producción de las haciendas 
anexas estuviera destinada al pago de sueldo y al pasto diario de la plana 
administrativa. Aun cuando muchas veces su producción fuese mayor a 
lo necesitado, se prefiría alm acenarla que venderla con el fin de prever 
una posible escases en el año siguiente. Esta política se derivaba de las 
cíclicas sequías, a veces excesiva abundancia de aguas o plagas de 
langostas que azotaban la provincia cuya escasa tecnificación hacía que la 
producción dependiese ampliam ente de la naturaleza. Solamente bajo la 
presión de los negativos fenómenos naturales y ante la necesidad de 
completar los volúmenes de alimentos necesarios para  la subsistencia de 
sus trabajadores, los administradores acudían al mercado para abaste­
cerse de los alimentos necesarios, ya sea por dinero o el trueque de 
aquellos por telas. Los obrajes a diferencia de las minas no generaron en 
este sector grandes efectos de arrastre económico ni regional ni inter­
regional, porque se buscó producir la más variada gama de alimentos, 
con el fin de evitar al máximo todo contacto con los mercados que les 
significasen desembolsos monetarios. Sólo la sequía, inundaciones o 
plagas, y la necesidad de productos accesorios los frenaban en su empeño.
La producción agropecuaria en las haciendas anexas estuvo organi­
zada y determ inada por los hábitos de dieta de la población trabajadora. 
La m ayor atención la ponían en la producción del elemento base de la 
alimentación, es decir, el grano constituyendo la base de la dieta de los 
yanas y sus familias y de los demás trabajadores inferiores, que los 
consumían por su alto valor calórico. El trigo, en el siglo X V III, había 
dejado de ser consumido en form a exclusiva por los españoles y los 
indígenas habían asimilado ya su consumo. Las cosechas de este cereal 
eran compartidas tanto por los controladores de la producción como por 
los trabajadores. Las cosechas del trigo eran tan solo un poco inferiores a 
las del maíz que continuaba siendo el principal pilar de la dieta de los 
naturales, sin que después de tan largos años de convivencia con el 
indígena los criollos y españoles hayan aceptado en su mesa a este ali­
mento. La cebada, si bien se cultivaba, no era consumida por ninguno 
de los dos grupos; ésta se destinaba a la alimentación de los caballos y 
muías y sólo se recurría a ella como alimento de humanos cuando los 
otros cereales escasaban. La dieta de los trabajadores era completada con 
muy escasa carne de vacuno fresca la que se les repartía con ocasión de 
las fiestas, que coincidían con las épocas de cosechas cuando igualmente 
se les repartía abundantem ente los cereales. En este punto la d iferen-
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dación social se hacía nuevamente presente, porque el gasto de carne 
fresca de vacuno y de carnero que para los naturales se lim itaba a los 
días de fiesta, en la mesa diaria de la plana administrativa no faltaba y 
ocasionalmente se la reem plazaba por la más apreciada carne de ave. A 
los indígenas su porción de carne se les completaba con cecinas elabo­
radas en las mismas estancias, las que generalmente se les repartían 
acompañadas de papas, ají y sal. Estos dos últimos productos eran de 
procedencia foránea. El ají se com praba en Cocharcas o H uam anga y la 
sal procedía de las salinas de los pueblos del obispado de H uam anga. El 
cebo, que obtenían de la m atanza de las reses y carneros, tam bién se 
aprovechaba en el reparto para sus funciones religiosas en porciones tales 
que era para lo único que alcanzaba. Tam bién se usaba en el alum­
brado de las oficinas de los obrajes. Este reparto se completaba con algo 
de cera de Piura que se adquiría en Lim a o en H uam anga. Los pro­
ductos lácteos procedentes de sus estancias eran ampliam ente utilizados 
en la alimentación de uno y otro grupo, constituyendo para el indígena 
otro im portante rubro para  su dieta. Las frutas y hortalizas que tam bién 
se cosechaban en sus huertos se les repartía escasamente. El uso de 
azúcar tomó diferentes rumbos en cada uno de los obrajes. Curiosam ente 
en el de Chincheros donde no se producía se la intercam biada por telas 
para repartirla, o, por último, se la com praba. Pero en el de C acam arca, 
donde sí se la elaboraba, se repartía a los indios solamente los residuos 
de su producción bajo la form a de mieles, alfeñiques y guarapos, para 
que los volúmenes comercializables de las arrobas de azúcar no dismi­
nuyan y se utilizasen racionalmente aquéllos con poco valor adquisitivo 
en el mercado.
Era en las fiestas religiosas, cuando se repartía a uno y otro grupo 
los vinos y aguardientes de uso tan generalizado, que necesariamente 
tenían que comprar, ya sea en lea, Palpa, H uam anga o Cocharcas. La 
coca, como producto alucinógeno y reparador de energias, repartida 
frecuentem ente a los obrajeros durante el siglo X V I, había desapare­
cido de los repartos.
Asimismo, todos los trabajadores estaban obligados a hacerse cargo 
de una parte de los tejidos manufacturados en los obrajes. Con los 
mismos, que se les pagaba a los maestros especializados en determinados 
oficios, como: tejeros, purgadores del azúcar, albañiles, carpinteros, etc. 
que ocasionalmente llegaban a estos centros productivos. Las frazadas 
sólo se repartían a los indios que como mayordomos tenían a su cargo 
las festividades, para que con ellas pudieran com prar toros y otros 
menesteres para  sus fiestas. El sistema de funcionamiento de los obrajes
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apoyaba o más bien incentivaba este tipo de dispendio porque los 
trabajadores con el afán de obtener lo necesario para éstas se convertían 
en seguros agentes de ventas de sus productos. A éstos del mismo modo 
se les repartía ruanas, bretañas, cintas, etc. importadas para  sus dis­
fraces, con lo cual todo este sistema de reparto, dio lugar a un folklore 
tan particular en cada una de las regiones.
Por tanto, el sueldo de la mayor parte de los trabajadores incluía su 
subsistencia que se les pagaba en especies sobrevaloradas. Los productos 
del obraje y los que se com praban se les cargaba por regla general al 
doble de su precio puesto en el mercado. Para los trabajadores vanas, 
gentes desarraigadas de sus comunidades por completo, incluía, además, 
un pedazo de tierra de cuyo uso podían disfrutar sólo mientras su trabajo 
en la unidad de producción fuese activo, sin que la causal de su inacti­
vidad sea el encontrarse en la categoría de impedido en cuyo caso el 
disfrute continuaba. Si para el personal directivo el resto de su salario 
que no era cubierto por especies se les pagaba en dinero libre de todo 
gravam en, para los yanas éste estaba destinado a pagas fiscales y ecle­
siásticas que se les habían impuesto en form a obligatoria y compulsiva y 
una muy pequeña fracción para solventar las fiestas religiosas, sistema 
con el que el dinero retornaba rápidam ente a la economía de los 
españ oles y tam bién algunas especies que se les repartía exprofesa- 
mente. El trabajo  en los obrajes quedaría reducido a un sistema 
general de trabajo  compulsivo donde la presión económica y extra -  
económica lo hicieron posible. Por último, por este sistema salarial que 
se seguía en los obrajes, éstos necesitaron estar íntim am ente in ter- 
conectados a la agricultura y ganaderia para  poder subsistir.
2. Sector de la producción
Si hemos visto que con los insumos de consumo las interrelaciones 
con el mercado regional fueron casi nulas con los insumos de producción 
sucederá todo lo contrario, y a medida que pasaron los años fueron 
creciendo dado que buscaban de m ejorar la calidad de sus tejidos. Así, 
las telas que se fabricaban en el siglo X V I, como el sayal, cordellate y 
las jergas de factura bastante ordinaria, en el siglo X V III los obrajes de 
V ilcashuam án ya no producían las dos prim eras y se había llegado hasta 
a desconocer su técnica de fabricación. Estas telas se habían reducido a 
la producción casera y Ja u ja  se había especializado en ellas. Los obrajes 
de H uam anga habían reem plazado esos géneros por bayetas, pañetes y 
continuaban fabricando la jerga como salida a las lanas de deshecho que
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a todo obraje llegaban.
En Vilcashuam án, pese a que existían rebaños de ganados de todo 
tipo y de propiedad tanto de indios como de españoles, no se cubrían 
todas las necesidades de lana de los obrajes porque los hatos de ganados 
no sobrepasarían las 2000 cabezas, necesitando los obrajes de muchísi­
mas más, como más adelante veremos. Los obrajes desde el siglo X V I, 
como una respuesta racional frente a las perspectivas que la naturaleza 
les brindaba, se organizaron como verdaderos complejos productivos 
donde se yuxtapuso la agricultura y la ganadería al servicio de la acti­
vidad principal de la unidad, la fabricación de telas. Esta predom inaba 
sobre los otros sectores por estar destinada su producción al mercado 
citadino y extraregional. En los primeros años de su existencia los dueños 
de los obrajes destinaron los cereales y frutos de sus sementeras a 
satisfacer los salarios de los trabajadores y a enviar sus cereales y los 
procedentes del tributo a las punas de los alrededores, carentes de ellos 
por sus mismas condiciones ambientales, a rescatar lanas .1“1 Así P arina- 
cochas, Chocorvos, Vilcancho, Cangallo, Onqoy, Pacomarca, Castro— 
virreyna y Huancavelica se convirtieron en sus principales 
abastecedoras.1®
A fines del siglo X V I, este ventajoso sistema de intercambio fue 
reemplazado por otro que les traería mayores beneficios, por el que se 
hacían llevar la lana hasta el mismo obraje por mercaderes españoles o 
indios. A estas les pagarían meses después con tejidos elaborados con su 
propia lana y con el escasamente recompensado trabajo de los indios. 
M ientras el proceso productivo duraba, los cereales podían ser com er­
cializados en el mercado de la c iudad.1® Y, al reducirse a muy poco la 
inversión de sus poseedores en este sistema de cambio, sus ganancias 
podían ser mayores.
Sin em bargo, luego de producirse la aguda crisis poblacional en la 
región, y habiéndose optado por la yanaconización en la mayor parte de 
los obrajes y con la abolición del tributo en especies, la inversion en los 
insumos de producción tendrá que crecer necesariamente. Porque los 
granos y frutos que salían de sus sementeras estarán destinadas a partir 
de este momento a satisfacer la subsistencia de sus trabajadores.
Por ello, la lana en una tercera y larga etapa tendrá que ser adqui­
rida generalmente a cambio de dinero, aun cuando el pago fuese a pla­
zos. Son muy raros los casos en que hayamos encontrado el trueque 
como medio de transacción; éste sólo renacerá en la aguda crisis desatada 
en los últimos años del siglo X V III. Desconocemos por que motivo 
exacto las punas de los alrededores de H uam anga fueron dejadas de lado
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y se fue a rescatar lanas a regiones muchísimo más apartadas, convir­
tiéndose en sus principales abastededoras las mesetas de Bombón y el 
Collao. La zona de influencia de la prim era alcanzaba toda la provincia 
de Lima, un poco más al norte, y hasta Ayacucho por el sur. La del 
Collao abastecía los obrajes del centro -  sur peruano incluida H uam anga, 
Cuzco, A requipa y el mismo Puno.
Las lanas del Collao eran tipificadas por los obrajeros como las 
mejores; las preferían porque las lanas de Bombón eran más grasicn­
tas. Por lo tanto, m erm aban mucho más y, además, porque estas gene­
ralmente venían mezcladas con piedras, paja , y otras ’’porquerías” con lo 
que el valor de la arroba de lana subía al mismo ritmo que el de la 
m erm a. Pero no solamente por ello eran menos apreciados las lanas de 
la Sierra central, sino porque sus dueños la cotizaban a precios más altos 
que la del Collao. El arrieraje, por otro lado, a pesar de que las dis­
tancias eran más cortas costaba, igualmente, más. A lo que se sum aba la 
reticencia de los arrieros, a transitar esa ru ta a la que habían bautizado 
de ’’camino tormentoso.” Por ello, y a pesar de que las lanas blancas del 
Collao les irrogaban mayores gastos en el teñido, pues se tenía que 
gastar más tintes, salarios, lejías y leñas que dependía de la existencia 
constante de alfalfa para  las muías chamiseras, en el balance general se 
preferían.
Si apreciamos los C uadros Números I y II, corrobaremos todo lo 
dicho. Para el obraje de C acam arca la principal zona abastecedora era la 
del Collao y los mayores volúmenes de lana que entraban eran de la 
lana blanca sobre la negra. Los años donde más m erm a se produjo 
fueron el 1767 que no puede ser considerado normal porque ese año se 
produjo la transferencia de la propiedad de los Jesuítas a T em porali­
dades, y las lanas que se encontraron estaban picadas y podridas. 
Igualmente, en el año 1774 la m erm a fue grande, a pesar de que toda la 
lana fue del Collao. Ello se debió a que el obraje ese año tuvo dos 
administradores, cada uno de los cuales le im primió un rum bo diferente. 
En los años 1771 y 1 7 8 0 -8 3  la mayor cantidad de la lana procedía de 
Ja u ja  y la m erm a fue realmente considerable. A hora bien -  ¿p o r qué se 
rescataba lana de Ja u ja  no obstante que se conocía su desventaja? Estas 
son al respecto las palabras de un adm inistrador de este obraje, M anuel 
Ruiz de Ochoa, vertidas en el año 1782: ”...la  mala calidad de la que 
dentra de Jau x a  y este es otro perjuicio que sufre la administración ... 
pues lavada m erm a mas de un 100 por ciento quando las del Collao la 
mas de ellas un 20 por ciento m enos...” A un cuando la m erm a de la 
lana de J a u ja  ni la de Callao alcanzaban esos porcentajes como hemos
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probado, los administradores eran conscientes del perjuicio que signifi­
caba para ellos el adquirir la prim era. Sin em bargo, las condiciones 
atmosféricas y políticas los obligaban a acudir a ella sin la cual la 
m anufactura no podía andar. Así, los años 1771 y 1 7 8 0 -8 3  fueron 
coincidentemente años de sequía, a lo que se sum aría a partir del año 
1781 la revoluvión de T úpac A m aru que imposibilitó toda la comunica­
ción con el sur.
Las sequías tenían una incidencia negativa en el abastecimiento 
normal de las lanas para  los obrajes, porque éste corría a cargo de las 
recuas de muías de los arrieros que eran habilitadas por los adminis­
tradores do los obrajes en los últimos meses del año anterior a iniciarse 
el proceso productivo, para que puedan salir a rescatarlas, una vez que 
hubiesen efectuado sus siembras. El camino lo recorrían en los últimos y 
primeros meses del año, pues buscaban completar el circuito en la esta­
ción de lluvias, que cubría la ru ta de pastos, imprescindibles para 
avituallar a las muías que desde el siglo X V II habían reemplazado a las 
llamas. La escases de lluvias y consecuentemente de pastos ocasionaban 
el enflaquecimiento y m uerte de las recuas, quedándose las cargas tiradas 
por el camino, lo que perjudicaba la norm al m archa del proceso 
productivo. Las lluvias tampoco eran una bendición total, pues las 
torrenteras con su furia desbarrancaban a animales, peones y carga. No 
obstante, era preferible v iajar en época de lluvias. La experiencia se lo 
demostraron a los administradores y las cifras nos lo dem uestran a 
nosotros, cuando vemos que las m erm as en los viajes de rescates de 
lanas, sólo alcanzaban una media de 2.2 por ciento, sobre el total de 
recibos.
Para los obrajes vilcashuamanguinos las mesetas señaladas eran sus 
principales abastecedoras, aunque los obrajes de Chincheros y P om a- 
cocha, todavia acudían a las punas de los alrededores porque contaban 
con menos recuas de muías propias, y tentaban la utilización de sus 
exiguos ganados lanares para completar los volúmenes de lanas que 
necesitaban para su producción. Sin em bargo, lo máximo que pudieron 
conseguir fueron diez arrobas, mientras que el obraje de C acam arca que 
contaba con alrededor de 600 cabezas, jam ás se tomó la molestia de 
usar un gramo. Para obtener 1000 arrobas de lana en esa época se 
necesitaba trasquilar aproxim adam ente 17000 cabezas de ovejas, lo que, 
además, nos dem uestra los bajísimos rendimientos de los animales que 
eran de tipo ’’churro,” y a que el fino merino no ingresó al Perú. Aun 
así, estos rendimientos no eran tan bajos como los de C ajam arca donde 
la esquila de 23700 rendía sólo 529 a rro b a s .^  Por ello pensamos que
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deben haber existido muchos obrajes en el espacio del virreinato peruano 
que necesitaron abastercerse de arrobas de lanas extras si querían hacer 
crecer su producción, y por lo tanto promovieron en su consumo de lana 
relaciones comerciales o interregionales, como en el caso de los de 
V ilcashuam án, aun cuando se encerrase en el mismo complejo la pro­
ducción de la lana y su m anufactura. Las grandes necesidades de lanas 
de los obrajes quedan ejem plificadas en el C uadro No. I.
M ientras se esperaba la llegada de las lanas, se efectuaban las siem­
bras tanto en las haciendas anexas como en las parcelas de los yanas. 
Asimismo, se aprovechaba el tiempo para  ’’calzar” todos los utensilios del 
obraje como del trapiche (si lo tuvieran) y de las herram ientas de las 
haciendas anexas. Es aquí, donde intervienen el acero de corconilla de 
M ilán, el fierro platina y el bergayón de Viscaya, el estaño y el cobre. 
Los tres primeros venían de Europa vía Lim a -  H uam anga y el cobre 
de producción interna lo com praban a los indios Q uerobam ba de O ruro 
y otros.
De las cardas que anualm ente se debían renovar, solamente se 
im portaba el hilo de fierro para hacerlas aquí. Lo mismo pasó, con los 
herrajes que se necesitaban para habilitar las recuas de las muías 
chamiceras o de carga.
U na vez ingresadas las lanas, inm ediatamente se lavaban. Las 
m erm as que se producían en este sentido eran bastante cuantiosas y 
alcanzaban una media del 45.4 por ciento sobre el total, lo que casi 
duplicaba su precio. En la formación de su precio se debía tener en 
cuenta ello, así como la poca cantidad de mano de obra que se necesi­
taba para su explotación, y tam bién los escasos insumos que requerían a 
diferencia de lo que sucedía con los obrajes. Finalmente creemos que la 
idea de una sobreabundancia debe ser dejado de lado, pues su abun­
dancia en un lapso de tiempo determinado no debemos extenderla en 
form a genérica y simplista a todo el virreinato.
Luego del lavado, cardado y hilado de las lanas venía el tejido de las 
telas. Con las hilazas de los alrededores o del Collao, que eran más finas 
y consistentes, se preparaba la urdiem bre y con las arrobas de lana en 
bruto se hilaban las tram as en los tornos que eran menos perfectas.
Los volúmenes de telas tejidas en el obraje de C acam arca entre 
1767, que sólo engloba el trabajo  de tres meses, y 1785 oscilaron entre 
51335 y 2480 varas en el penúltimo año del ciclo, aunque no está demás 
señalar que en 1756 su producción alcanzó las 70177 varas. El de 
Chincheros entre 1777 y 1799 produjo en su momento más alto 28940 
varas para descender a fabricar en el último año del ciclo tan solo 1536,
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mientras que el obraje de Pomacocha en 1769 bordeaba las 30000 
v aras .1® Estos volúmenes de producción de los obrajes de V ilcashuam án, 
en un periodo que puede ser considerado de declive, se verían engro­
sados por buen número de centros artesanales medianos y pequeños y 
por las telas de lana y algodón de factura casera. Por lo tanto, creemos 
que a la luz de las cifras, se debe reconsiderar todas las apreciaciones y 
especulaciones que sobre la producción de los obrajes del virreinato se 
han hecho hasta el momento. Esto vale en especial para la zona de Vil­
cashuam án a la que los historiadores económicos, cuando tangencial­
mente se refieren al tem a, la obvian o simplemente la consideran poco 
significativa por el hecho de carecer de lanas.1®
Según nosotros hemos observado en el obraje de C acam arca no todas 
las telas que se tejíian se beneficiaban y teñían totalmente, quedándose 
un buen volumen en la condición de ’’xergas.” Así del total del ingreso 
conformado por las tejidas del año y las existencias de los años anteriores 
sólo se teñía un 42.9 por ciento.20 La etapa del teñido era de las más 
costosas y pesadas. Las telas de los telares pasaban al batán para  ser 
desengrasadas y tupidas, apelmasadas con tierra alcalina, colpas blancas 
y negras, disueltas en agua caliente y orín, para  finalmente pasar a 
lavarlas y teñirlas. El abastecimiento de colpas a los obrajes era un 
negocio exclusivo de los pueblos de indios Q uilla, Coica y otros, a 
cambio casi exclusivamente de dinero, aunque en épocas de crisis no les 
im portara recibir por ellas telas. La magnitud de las necesidades de colpa 
eran bastantes considerables.
De toda la masa de telas beneficiadas del año, sólo un 6.0 por ciento, 
constituido por las piezas de jergas, no se teñían. Eran las bayetas y los 
pañetes los únicos que recibían tal baño. Los materiales con respecto al 
siglo X V I se habían enriquecido, pues el uso del añil y del brasil, que en 
ese prim er siglo no se untilizaron, era corriente. Estos venían por las 
dos ’’costas.” Lim a monopolizaba la venta del que venía por el Pacífico, 
y los de la otra costa fluían librem ente por el sur. Sus precios eran 
bastantes elevados, m uchas veces escaseaban y esta escases ocasionaba un 
alza desmedida, por lo que, se buscaba tener una buena cantidad de 
existencias para  asegurar la continuidad de la producción.
El obraje de Chincheros utilizó además del brasil el magno, producto 
regional cosechado por los naturales. La tara, otro producto regional, 
tam bién se empleó y en mayor proporción que cualquier otro colorante 
por su baratura. Los obrajes se abastecían de ella a través de los indios 
de H uanta, V iñaca y de los arrieros que por su cuenta tam bién la com­
praban en los pueblos de indios de los alrededores y luego la vendían a
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los obrajes junto con la sal.
En base a estos tintes los obrajes de V ilcashuam án alcanzaron gran 
variedad de colores llegándose a lograr ocho tonalidades por año. Muchas 
veces, se dieron el lujo de florear sus telas para  conseguir mejores pre­
cios y ventas. Los administradores tenían muy en cuenta los gustos de 
cada una de las plazas a las que iban dirigidas sus telas, de acuerdo a los 
que preparaban exprofesam ente las remesas.
Los obrajes, como hemos visto, fueron grandes consumidores de 
insumos de producción y en este caso el arrastre económico regional o 
interregional es bastante significativo. Estancias laneras dependieron de 
ellos y de los chorrillos, exclusivamente, en su m archa. Muchos pueblos 
de indios estaban supeditados al abastecimiento de diversos insumos que 
les pudieran hacer, para pagar sus tributos, repartos y otras cargas civi­
les y religiosas, así como para generarse algunos ingresos extras. No 
debemos dejar de mencionar aquí que, por otro lado, los obrajes fueron 
las más im portantes unidades de producción de la provincia de Vilcas­
huam án y a donde acudían la m ayor masa reclutada entre la población 
para satisfacer el tributo. Este y el resto de exacciones que les fueron 
impuestas a los indios por los españoles los obligaron a participar en la 
creación y desarrollo del mercado interno.
Creemos que con este breve panoram a del proceso productivo hemos 
demostrado los grandes esfuerzos que los obrajes tenían que hacer para 
abastecerse de las materias prim as y sem ielaboradas necesarias. Un 
autoabastecimiento total era imposible por la variada gama de productos 
que precisaban, no igualada por ningún otro tipo de unidad de produc­
ción. Ellos se abrieron a la economía regional e interregional, abarcaron 
zonas vastísimas para lo que m ontaron la infraestructura de transporte 
imprescindible, de la cual al decir de los administradores dependía la 
vida de ellos. Las regiones a donde acudían con sus recuas, las desen­
cerraron para  sí, tanto como las de los alrededores que fueron impor­
tantes abastecedoras de ellos. Sin em bargo, sus extensas relaciones 
regionales internas no los librarían de sus necesidades de productos 
extra -  virreinales. Los obrajes desde el siglo X V I fueron creadores de 
circuitos comerciales y del mercado interno y los que nutrían de la 
mercancía dinero a las provincias, al ser las minas sus más im portantes 
plazas.
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3. D e la comercialización
Las telas fabricadas en los obrajes de H uam anga tenían como destino 
principal el mercado, seguido por la necesidad de cubrir los sueldos de 
sus trabajadores y una débil utilización en implementos como costales, 
prensa, etc.
En la economía colonial dada la estrechez del mercado y la poca 
vinculación entre una región y otra, así como por el elevado grado de 
autosuficiencia de las economías campesinas, el productor obrajero tenía 
que organizar y llevar a cabo diferentes labores de comercialización. Esto 
era necesario tanto para abastecerse de insumos como para la venta de 
sus productos. Para cum plir con esta últim a función, los obrajes debían 
tener sus propios ’’factores” en las plazas mineras y ciudades, enviar sus 
peones a las ferias, contar con sus propias recuas de muías o tom arlas en 
alquiler, lo que les irrogaba fuertes gastos, y, finalm ente, preocuparse 
por conseguir compradores dentro de la gran competencia que se produjo 
entre los mismos obrajes, entre éstos y los chorrillos, y entre los dos 
últimos y las telas europeas, aunque la presión de éstas fuese más leve.
La producción de los obrajes de V ilcashuam án se mantuvo más o 
menos estable desde las últimas décadas del siglo X V II hasta las postri­
merías del siglo X V III en que comenzó a  decaer. Su crecimiento se 
debió al gran aliciente que para ellos representaron los mercados de 
Potosí, pero sobre todo el de O ruro, los mercados regionales y el de los 
corregidores. Las plazas mineras desde los años ochenta del siglo X V II 
fueron su principal impulso. Pese a que ellas ya no estaban en pleno 
auge, los productos de los obrajes alcanzaron precios bastante altos que 
no se alejarían mucho de los buscados paños de Q uito . Pero a medida 
que la crisis m inera se fue acentuando, el declive de los obrajes la 
acompañó. Potosí en el periodo que estudiamos había sido completa­
mente abandonada como plaza, porque ésta en 1776 ya no era la sombra 
de lo que había sido. Su población había disminuido en un 80 por 
ciento con respecto a los días gloriosos del siglo X V II .21 Lo mismo 
sucedía en O ruro. Por ello las ropas tanto del Cuzco como las de 
H uam anga no podían tener rápido expendio ’’...asi por lo calamitoso del
tiempo como por la cortedad del lugar, y su deplorable constitución y
«oatraso del m ineral y comercio... Por ello el precio de las varas de 
telas había descendido a menos de la mitad de lo que se vendía a 
principios del siglo.
En el siglo X V III el libre comercio, el contrabando y las im porta­
ciones de los produtos especialmente m anufacturados se dejaron sentir en
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todo el virreinato, pero evidenciándose en prim er lugar en las regiones 
mineras. Muchos autores encontraron en este ingreso de ropas del otro 
lado del Atlántico la razón de la decadencia de las m anufacturas locales. 
Sin embargo, la situación exige un análisis más profundo que involucre 
las relaciones regionales internas. Al revisar las cuentas de los factores de 
obrajes en O ruro, vemos que la mayor parte de la ropa salida de ellas 
estuvo destinada a la masa trabajadora. Los principales compradores de 
ropa al por mayor en las plazas mineras eran corregidores, gobernado­
res, hacendados, etc. para repartirla o darla a los indios en parte de pago 
de sus sueldos. La ropa europea tenía precios inalcanzables para el 
trabajador indio. A unque si la abundancia de textiles importados los 
obligaba a bajar, ésta en cadena forzaba a la ropa peruana a descender. 
En el ahora corto mercado de los minerales la principal competencia 
para  las telas de los obrajes la constituyeron, no los géneros europeos, 
sino la ropa de los chorrillos y de factura casera esencialmente por su 
baratura, pues costaban menos de la mitad de los ya bajísimos precios de 
telas de los obrajes. Como el testimonio de un enterado en la venta de 
ropa de obrajes, vertido en el año 1777, lo corroborará: ”...no  es 
dudable que el estado en que se hallan las cosas de veinte años a esta 
parte por lo que ha bajado el precio de la ropa de los obrajes a causa de 
los muchos chorrillos que se han erigido en todas partes no tiene cuenta 
el laboreo de estos...
Esta competencia se produjo porque aquí no existieron gremios como
en Europa que agrupen a los diferentes productores para protegerse
contra la aparición de nuevos centros m anufactureros que al inundar el
mercado con grandes volómenes de telas ocasionaran la caída de los
precios y por tanto de su beneficio social. Por el contrario, todos los
productores actuaban como verdaderas islas que se hacían la competencia
unos a otros lo que im pedía la formación de un precio de monopolio 
94como en el mundo feudal.
En el siglo X V I, evidentemente, hubo un monopolio del mercado 
ejercido por el grupo encomendero. Pero las cosas fueron cambiando con 
el paso de los años, especialmente, para la producción textil. Si bien en 
el sector de bienes alimenticios continuaron siendo los terratenientes los 
principales abastecedores del mercado al habérseles cercenado cada vez 
más la propiedad sobre la tierra a las comunidades, en el campo textil el 
monopolio pudo ser roto por la aparición de tejidos de fabricación 
casera, comunal o de los chorrillos. Esto fue factible por la habilidad 
generalizada de los indígenas en el tejido, porque para ejecutarla en las 
condiciones en que se llevaron a cabo, no se necesitaba de grandes
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espacios de terreno, ni de mayores bienes de capital. M ás bien utilizaron 
en la producción la lana de sus carneros de la tierra que los obrajes, 
como ya hemos visto, no emplearon y tintes vegetales que abundaban en 
la región. M aterias primas, que al no tener salida y/o valor en el mer­
cado fueron racionalmente utilizados por ellos. El uso de estos materiales 
y el coste del trabajo  fam iliar o comunal que no lo tom aban en cuenta 
al momento de form ular el precio, hicieron que sus productos sean 
sustancialmente más baratos.
Si la producción de uno de estos centros podía ser cincuenta o más 
veces menor que la de un obraje, y por lo tanto, no representar indivi­
dualm ente mayor peligro, sí lo eran, porque en realidad éstos brotaron 
por todas partes y el volumen sumado de todos es el que ocasionó el 
descalabro de los obrajes. A lo que se añadió la supresión de los repartos 
de los corregidores, la contracción del mercado minero y las cíclicas 
crisis agrícolas, como la que se dejó sentir el año de 1780 y que se 
agudizó en el de 1783.
¿Cuál fue la reacción de los obrajes frente a esta situación? En 
prim er lugar, la m archa de los obrajes continuó a ritmo normal. La 
producción de estos centros m anufactureros le llevó largam ente la 
delantera al consumo, lo que acarreó la generación de grandes existen­
cias, que se acumularon año tras año. No existía una adecuada relación 
entre la oferta y la dem anda, había un predominio de la prim era sobre 
la segunda, porque el productor continuaba fabricando para  un cliente 
desconocido. No se estudió o se quizo ignorar la m archa del mercado 
persistiéndose en fabricar sin antes asegurarse la venta de toda la pro­
ducción. Y al no frenarse la utilización en algún porcentaje de las fu e r­
zas productivas, que hubiese sido lo sensato, se ocasionó el abarrota­
miento de los almacenes con sus mercancías.
El hecho de que guardarán sus productos en los almacenes no 
obedecía a que los quisiesen proteger de la caída de precios, sino a que 
no podían vender ni siquiera a los bajos precios existentes, porque otros 
productores los tenían aún más baratos. Aquí no funcionaba el mercado 
del vendedor sino el del comprador.
Aun viviendo dentro de esta severa crisis de fines del siglo X V III, se 
mantuvo el ritmo productivo acostumbrado. Posteriormente, para 
am inorar los obstáculos se pretendió, prim ero, m ejorar la calidad y 
encontrar nuevos compradores y luego, dism inuir bruscamente la 
producción.
En el C uadro No. IV  vemos que la principal plaza para el obraje de 
C acam arca la constituía el mercado de O ruro  con una media de 37.4
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por ciento sobre el total de las ventas. Pero todo lo que se rem itía no se 
vendía inm ediatamente sino años después y todas las ventas que se 
lograban hacer eran en plazos. En consecuencia los stocks de mercaderías 
de este obraje en O ruro  eran m uy altos ya en 1767. Sin em bargo, se 
persistió en el envió, porque se estaba acostum brando a  tenerla como 
principal mercado. Se creyó en un prim er momento, que la causa estaría 
en el cambio de administración de la de los jesuitas a la de Tem porali­
dades. Por ello se buscó seguir la mism a técnica em pleada por ellos y se 
m antuvo a todo el personal especializado o se trató  de m ejorar éste. Se 
ensayaron m ejoras en la calidad y variedad de los tintes, en el enfurtido 
y en el grosor de las telas. De la mism a form a se buscó tra ta r de im itar 
los paños de Q uito  que a la sazón ya no llegaban a H uam anga. Pero la 
necesidad de importantes inversiones de capital en telares, lisos, y gente 
especializada frenó los arrestos en C acam arca. No así en Chincheros, 
donde se ejecutó el proyecto pero sin que se hubiera alcanzado los 
resultados esperados.
Por lo pronto, si observamos detenidamente el C uadro No. III, 
vemos que a partir de 1775 hay una tendencia a utilizar insumos de 
m ejor calidad. En el caso de los tintes se reemplazó a la tara  que hasta 
ese momento se utilizaba proporcionalmente más, por un m ayor uso del 
añil y brasil, cuyos costos eran mucho más elevados que el de la prime­
ra. Empero, paralelam ente hay un descenso en la utilización de enjebes. 
¿ P o r qué se produjo ésto? ¿P ara compensar los gastos o por que la 
técnica les indicaba que a mayor tintura las telas necesitaban menos 
enjebes?
Paralelam ente, se persistió en continuar con la producción a ritmo 
normal y hasta acelerado, no obstante los grandes stocks que existían en 
las tiendas de sus factores y al interior del mismo obraje, que con el 
correr de los años se harán más voluminosos. H abía una sobreproducción 
que no es característica del momento sino que acompañó la producción 
de los obrajes desde el siglo X V I, aunque en este momento había 
alcanzado dimensiones insospechadas.25 D entro de esta coyuntura hubo 
un adm inistrador que, deseando hacer producir la m aquinaria constan­
tem ente, salvando todos los imponderables, no encontró otra salida que 
echar mano de los colchones de la casa para que la producción no se
O C
paralize.
Sincrónicamente, desde los burócratas de Tem poralidades en Lim a, 
pasando por sus delegados en H uam anga hasta el adm inistrador y 
mayordomo, se preocuparon por encontrar otros mercados que reem pla­
zasen las plazas m ineras, y lo prim ero en lo que se detuvo su njira fué
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en los corregidores. Si nosotros vemos C uadro No. IV , notaremos que a 
partir del año 1776 hay una clara variación del rum bo, se va dejando de 
lado O ruro  y se vende más a  los corregidores de los alrededores o zonas 
más distantes. En el afán por venderles se les llevaba la ropa hasta el 
lugar donde se iba a efectuar el reparto.
Para capturar este mercado se buscó influir en los nombramientos de 
estas autoridades con el fin de que recaigan en gente allegada, pero 
sobre todo que le deba favores, y así lograr un mayor expendio. En caso 
contrario, desde el preciso momento en que recibían sus cargos en 
Lim a, se les acosaba para  demostrarles las bondades de sus productos, se 
les hacía ofrecimientos o regalos, y por último se les am enazaba con 
sanciones de tipo social, político y religioso: ”...si el provisto corregidor 
de Anadaguaylas ... aspira a un buen nom bre y  salvación deve coger 
ropa de C acam arca.. Pero en esta carrera no se encontraba sólo el 
obraje de C acam arca sino todos los de la región que se declararon una 
guerra a m uerte, que no cejaba hasta el momento mismo de poner en 
manos del corregidor las telas. Aquí tam bién los chorrillos y la pro­
ducción casera les jugarían  una mala pasada a los obrajes, porque los 
corregidores la preferían por sus bajos precios sin importarles su mala 
calidad ni el rechazo de los naturales de la región que preferían la de 
Cacam arca, por ser más durable. Para  los corregidores esto no consti­
tuía una cualidad sino un defecto, ya que los repartos de telas no 
podían ser continuos, con lo que sus márgenes de ganancia se reducían 
por partida doble, por volumen y por diferencia de precios. Los 
repartos de tejidos en las zonas productoras no estaban ausentes como 
se piensa. En la provincia de V ilcashuam án se acostum braba a repartir 
16000 varas de ropa que correspondía a un reparto per cápita de 2.7
n o  t t t
v a ra s /  Aun cuando esta provincia era obrajera, no toda su gente 
trabajaba en obrajes, y por tanto el reparto se les podía efectuar sin 
dañar los intereses de las unidades de producción.
A partir del año de 1781 los mercados mineros y los corregidores 
dejarán  de tener toda significación para  los obrajes de la región. A la 
decadencia de los minerales de O ruro  se sumó, a raíz de la rebellion de 
T úpac A m aru, el corte de toda comunicación con las provincias del 
sur -  este, ’’tierras de arriba” como se las denom inaban en H uam anga, y, 
como su consecuencia la supresión del reparto mercantil de los corregi­
dores. Por lo tanto, la búsqueda de nuevos mercados se tornó obsesiva. 
Se optó por Lim a, a donde se remitió un considerable volúmen. En lo 
que quisiéramos destacar es que casi inm ediatamente a su llegada toda la
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ropa se vendió. Por eso nos preguntamos -  ¿cuáles fueron los motivos, 
aparte de lo dificultoso del camino, para que no se ensayará antes con 
este mercado? ¿Es qué se prefirió prim ero agotar toda posibilidad regio­
nal que aminorarse los costos del transporte? ¿O  es qué antes las telas 
huam anguinas no tuvieron posibilidad de venderse allí al encontrarse 
colmado el mercado limeño por las telas quiteñas, y sólo a partir de los 
años setenta en que dejaron de llegar, el campo quedó libre para éstas? 
Las respuestas quedan aún por esclarecerse. Sin embargo, sabemos que 
H uam anga y sus alrededores tam bién reem plazaron a los antiguos m er­
cados. Como podemos observar a través del C uadro No. IV , la masa de 
telas vendidas en ella, a partir de ese año, sería mayor.
Agravada la situación desde el año de 1780, el obraje de C acam arca 
para  hacer frente a los bajos precios que obtenía por sus productos y las 
pocas posibilidades de venderlos en el comprimido mercado, optó por 
hacer menos inversiones de capital en los insumos de producción, sin un 
cambio parecido en los de consumo. Del mismo modo hizo descender sus 
volúmenes de producción.^® Si la utilización de los tintes continuó más o 
menos pareja, se debió a los stocks almacenados de los años anteriores. 
Pero la maquipuska  que anualm ente se com praba, a partir de este año 
fue completamente dejada de lado. Con esta medida el ahorro anual 
sería de cerca de mil pesos. O bviam ente la calidad de las telas bajó.
En 1785 el obraje de C acam arca retornará a sus antiguas dueñas, las 
M onjas Carm elitas, y afrontaría nuevos problemas como la inestabilidad 
por la transmisión del mando, despojo de las haciendas anexas que 
fueron de los Jesuítas y otros. M ientras tanto, los de Chincheros y 
Pomacocha seguirían con su m archa a trompicones, con la esperanza de 
encontrar salidas a sus productos. El de Chincheros, que en 1777 
producía 28940 varas, fue bajando su producción gradualm ente hasta el 
año 1799, en que sólo produjo 1536 varas, que en su casi totalidad 
estuvieron destinadas a solventar los gastos de los trabajadores.
El C uadro No. IV  nos m uestra igualmente que el mercado interno de 
la región era bastante débil, pero que se mantuvo más o menos estable 
y constante para los obrajes de C acam arca, Chincheros y Pomacocha. 
Este estuvo representado por la ciudad de H uam anga y sus alrededores, 
y las ferias de Cocharcas y C hapi. El impacto de importaciones de 
m anufacturas europeas en los pueblos rurales de la provincia de 
H uam anga no se había dejado sentir ni en la última década del siglo 
X V III. Las apariciones de estas m anufacturas eran muy esporádicas y 
débiles, m ientras que los paños de Q uito  habían dejado el campo libre a 
las de fabricación regional. Las ferias regionales, de creación religiosa
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que derivarían hacia las prácticas mercantiles aprovechando la concen­
tración de la gente, eran importantes mercados de com pra -  venta de los 
productos regionales, como tam bién eran las ventanas de ingreso a la 
región de los importados. Sin em bargo, sus altos precios con respecto a 
los regionales los tornaban accesibles sólo a  determinados estratos de la 
sociedad y no así para la masa indígena. Los volúmenes de telas expen­
didos en el mercado interno fueron menores a los enviados a O ruro  y 
vendidos a los corregidores. Pero su real im portancia sólo la podremos 
m edir hasta que conoscamos cuál de los dos sectores aportaban más en 
su sostenimiento con auxilios pecuniarios rápidos derivados de las 
mayores o menores ventas a plazos o al contado en cada uno.
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A N E X O : TABLAS O B R A JE S D E C A C A M A R C A  I -  IV
C U A D R O  I: Lanas, Aprovisionamiento
R E G I  O N E S A B A S T E C E D O R A S
Huancavelica Ja u ja  Collao
Blanca Negra 
A ño a Ib. a Ib. %
Blanca Negra Blanca 
a Ib. a Ib. % a Ib. %
1767 - - 0.0 - - 0.0 831.00100.0
1768 - - 0.0 - - 0.0 2293.21 100.0
1769 - - 0.0 200.00 1436.23 38.8 2580.00 61.1





















1775 75.00 75.00 5.0 450.00 11.6
(27.00) 
2352.00 79.8
1776 - - 0.0 - 400.00 11.6 3040.00 88.3
1777 - - 0.0 - - 0.0 2079.00 100.0
1778 0.0 400.00 9.1
(500.00) 
3470.00 90.8
1779 - - 0.0 - 300.00 11.2 2372.00 88.7
1780 - - 0.0 - 600.00 17.9 2379.00 82.0
1781 _ .. 0.0 1800.00 300.00 78.4 *577.00 21.5
1782 - - 0.0 2400.00 1000.00 100.0 0.0
1783 - - 0.0 638.00 1327.00 100.0 0.0
1784 - - 0.0 - - 0.0 0.0
1785 - - 0.0 - - 0.0 0.0
Media 0.9 28.8 70.3
Fuentes: ADA; AGN(P); BNP;
Datos en paréntesis: M iriam  Salas.
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.sigue C U A D R O  I: Lanas, Aprovisionamiento
T  O T  A L E S











1767 831.00 100.0 0.0
1768 2293.21 2293.21 - 0.0 2293.21 100.0 - 0.0
1769 4216.23 4216.23 - 0.0 2780.00 65.9 1436.23 34.1
1770 3212.00 3212.00 - 0.0 3012.00 93.8 200.00 6.2
1771 4066.10 3723.10 343.00 8.4 2548.00 68.4 1175.10 31.6
1772 4970.00 4970.00 - 0.0 4320.00 86.9 650.00 13.1
1773 4103.00 3618.00 485.00 11.8 3139.00 86.8 479.00 13.2
1774 2510.06 2477.04 33.02 1.3 2288.04 92.4 189.00 7.6
1775 2979.00 2952.00 27.00 0.9 2427.00 82.2 525.00 17.8
1776 3440.00 3440.00 - 0.0 3040.00 88.4 400.00 11.6
1777 2079.00 2079.00 - 0.0 2079.00 100.0 - 0.0
1778 4370.00 3870.00 500.00 11.4 3470.00 89.7 400.00 10.3
1779 2672.00 2672.00 - 0.0 2372.00 88.8 300.00 11.2
1780 3339.00 3339.00 - 0.0 2739.00 82.0 600.00 18.0
1781 2677.00 2677.00 — 0.0 2372.00 88.8 300.00 11.2
1782 3400.00 3400.00 - 0.0 2400.00 70.6 1000.00 29.4
1783 1975.24 1965.20 14.04 0.6 638.00 32.5 1327.20 67.5
1784 - - - - - - - -
1785 - - - - - - - -
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C U A D R O  III: Telas tejidas: Volúmenes de Producción y  Existencias
Año
C A R G O T O T A L D  E S C A R G O







S a l d o  
varas %
1767 16089 30.7 36220 69.2 52309 8723 16.6 43586 83.3
1768 45815 51.2 43586 48.7 89401 52810 59.0 36591 40.9
1769 45700 55.5 36591 44.4 82291 50679 61.5 31612 38.4
1770 34577 52.2 31612 47.7 66189 50009 75.5 16180 24.4
1771 48460 74.9 16180 25.0 64640 45526 70.4 19144 29.5
1772 51335 72.8 19114 27.1 70449 38009 53.9 32440 46.0
1773 43480 57.2 32440 42.7 75920 32900 43.3 43020 56.6
1774 37131 46.3 43020 53.6 80151 17807 22.2 62344 77.7
1775 42160 40.3 62344 59.6 104504 41689 39.8 62815 60.1
1776 47540 43.0 62815 56.9 110355 50770 45.8 59585 53.9
1777 51188 46.2 59585 53.7 110773 31000 27.9 79773 72.0
1778 41780 34.3 79773 65.6 121553 51555 42.4 69998 57.5
1779 41480 37.2 69998 62.7 111478 55953 50.1 55525 49.8
1780 41080 42.5 55525 57.4 96605 35745 37.0 60860 62.9
1781 24040 28.3 60640 71.6 84680 22040 26.0 62640 73.9
1782 15734 20.0 62640 79.9 78374 16800 21.4 61574 78.5
1783 15480 20.0 61574 79.9 77054 24838 32.2 52216 67.7
1784 2480 4.5 52216 95.4 54696 37159 67.9 17537 32.0
1785 2800 13.7 17537 86.2 20337 4815 23.6 15522 76.3
M edia 40.5 59.3 42.9 56.9
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C O M M E N T A R Y
Jo h n  H . Coatsworth
These three papers demonstrate the fragility and backwardness of 
Latin A m erica’s textile business in the late colonial era. In Peru, the 
m anufactories (obrajes) of H uam anga employed debt peons (yanaconas) 
to produce rough woolens with backward implements for a market that 
depended on forced sales to unwilling consumers by corrupt officials. In 
Bolivia, the Cochabam ba boom in cottage cottons relied on wartime 
conditions to open markets that would otherwise have found better qual­
ity products at lower prices from  foreign suppliers. In Mexico, the 
woolen industry virtually disappeared over the course of the eighteenth 
century, while the revival of cotton textile production in Puebla depended 
on poverty, rather than technological advance, and nearly succumbed to 
peace and free trade well before Independence.
T he case of the H uam anga obrajes, ably sketched by Salas, may be 
the most depressing of all. T he  decline of the industry in the seventeenth 
century provided ample opportunity for closing these enterprises once 
and for all. D ata are lacking on the dimensions of the eighteenth century 
revival before the 1760’s, but the importance of bloc sales to the
corregidores (which Salas’ data may underestim ate, since a portion of the 
market sales may also have gone to these officials) brought the boom to 
an end when the T úpac A m aru revolt forced the abolition of the
repartimientos. In Mexico, where forced sales were less common, the
woolen industry died a natural death much earlier, as Salvucci’s recent 
study has show n.1
T he cotton boom in Cochabam ba, by contrast, did not depend on 
official favor. Indeed, as Larson shows, colonial governments could not 
be persuaded to help the industry at all. Permission to grow cotton in the 
area, to free the industry depended at least as much on government 
decisions taken in M adrid, for it boomed only when Spain blundered into 
w ar with Britain in 1796. Unlike H uam anga, however, tocuyo produc­
tion rem ained a cottage industry that purchased inputs, hired labor, 
borrowed capital, and sold products in competitive markets without the 
aid of political controls and coercion.
Taken together, these two case studies demonstrate the hopeless
malaise of Andean industry. Neither official favor, nor market forces
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proved sufficient to stimulate the development of an enduring industrial 
base. Primitive technology produced goods of inferior quality and higher 
cost than foreign competitors. Woolens could even be displaced by 
decently made domestic cotton cloth, as Salas points out. Cochabam ba 
cotton cloth had difficulty competing with imports from  Q uito , let alone 
Britain. Together, these studies highlight the fate of marginal industries 
in the more backward regions of Spanish America.
T he case of Mexico is more complicated. As T hom son’s superb case 
study shows, Puebla’s cotton textile production lasted longer, developed a 
more complex division of labor, and produced goods of higher quality 
than H uam anga or C ochabam ba. Although cotton production declined 
when peace broke out in the 1810’s, and declined further during the first 
decades of Independence, it did not disappear. Factory production began 
to displace artisans as early as the 1830’s and boomed during the 
Porfirian era. In  Peru, the first cotton factories were not set up in Lima 
untii the 1850’s, and quickly went bankrupt when the government 
abandoned protectionist tariffs.^ Puebla’s advantages over H uam anga 
and Cochabam ba merit more extended discussion.
Although Thom son cites the limitations of the market for Puebla’s 
cottons as a factor in its unsteady growth and late colonial decline, 
M exico’s market appears to have been fa r larger and much more stable 
than in the two Andean cases. At least part of the reason for this 
contrast may lie in the different levels of productivity of the two regions. 
W hile precise data for Peru are lacking, qualitative evidence suggests 
that per capita product was substantially lower in the Andes than in 
Mexico in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. A ndean textile 
industries thus faced a much smaller market, consisting mainly of urban 
laborers earning cash incomes until forced sales (H uam anga) and war 
(Cochabam ba) created tem porary booms. In Mexico, on the other hand, 
Puebla marketed its products throughout the colony to a more numerous 
clientele and the industry’s success promoted textile development in 
competing centers like Q uerétaro , G uadalajara and Mexico City. In 
short, the greater productivity of the M exican economy and the con­
sequent higher per capita income of its population, helped to stimulate a
Q
larger and more stable industry.
I t is also possible that Puebla’s cotton textile industry made more 
productive use of its resources. U nfortunately, none of these studies 
present sufficient data for measuring industry productivity. T hus, it is 
impossible to compare them to each other or to the European textile 
industries of the same period. W hile both Larson and Thom son may be
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on solid ground when they cite foreign competition as a critical variable 
in determ ining the success or failure of the industries they study, a 
quantitative test of this proposition could produce interesting results. 
Neither study provides a detailed analysis of the cost structure of cotton 
production. T he conventional inference -  that backward technology was 
at fault (and thus shortage of capital or entrepreneurial unreason) -  
does not, however, explain much. W alker’s brilliant study of the M ira - 
ñores factory in the 1840’s and 1850’s demonstrated that the high price 
and uncertain supply of cotton (and political conflicts over im port p n r- 
hibitions on the raw material) were mainly to blame for this pioneering 
failure in M exico.4
W hile none of these papers depart radically from conventional 
accounts of the failure of industry in colonial Latin America, together 
they assault a num ber of commonly -  held beliefs about the causes of 
that failure. M ost interesting in this regard is L arson’s perceptive 
analysis of the C ochabam ba case. Cotton production in this area 
expanded dramatically after 1796. No lack of capital, manpower, 
equipm ent or even raw material impeded the expansion. G overnm ent 
support was lacking, but then so was government interference. In the 
case of Puebla T hom son’s study demonstrates a similar elasticity. 
O pportunities to expand production found avid entrepreneurs, abundant 
capital, and a plentiful supply of labor. Even in H uam anga, the owners 
of the obrajes managed to increase production rapidly, within fixed limits 
at each installation, beginning in the 1760’s. All this suggests that some 
of the constraints on industrial growth, alleged in the literature, especially 
lack of capital, entrepreneurship, m anagerial skill and labor, need to be 
substantially revised.
Thom son offers an interesting alternative model to explain the failure 
of the Puebla industries to continue growing after the w ar years. He 
follows other analysts in linking textile production to factors affecting the 
competitiveness of Puebla’s industry in the face of foreign competition. 
In periods when silver exports increased the colony’s capacity to import 
and when peace faciliated foreign trade, Puebla’s production fell. W hen 
silver production declined or international w ar prevented its export and 
simultaneously impeded im ports, Puebla grew. In this, Puebla shared 
with C ochabam ba an inability to face British competition (though the 
Cochabam ba industry was much less durable).
Thom son adds two other elements to the model: physical and hum an 
geography. The physical geography of Mexico impeded trade and frag­
mented markets by making lo n g -d is tan ce  commerce costly. By hum an
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geography Thom son means the poverty of the mass of the population. 
These two factors operated as constants to depress the general level of 
the economy and therfore of Puebla’s production possibilities. H ere, too, 
M exico’s fate was shared by that of the Andean colonies, though it 
appears that transport costs and general poverty were greater in the 
Andes (and industry, therefore, more fragile and backward).
T hus to explain the relative backwardness of the Puebla cotton 
industry Thom son cites two constants that put a ceiling on expansion 
possibilities and two variables that explain fluctuations over the short 
term  in the industry’s fortunes. T he relationship between Thom son’s two 
constants is problematical, however, because transport costs contributed 
to the low level of productivity of the economy, and thus to the poverty 
of the population. T hat is, hum an geography derived in part from 
physical geography. But geography alone cannot explain the relative 
backwardness of the economies of colonial Latin America. And the 
problem is not solved, of course, by adding foreign competition. A full 
theory would need to explain why Spanish colonial industries were vul­
nerable to foreign competition in the first place, why M anchester led the 
industrial revolution, not Puebla. G eography (hum an or physical) is a 
start, but it is not sufficient. Perhaps, although Thom son rejects the 
notion explicitly, the archaic institutional famework of colony and mother 
country alike can add a critical element to the analysis.
Thom son argues persuasively that Puebla’s textile production was 
favored, rather than harm ed, by the policies of the colonial state in the 
eighteenth century. Prohibitions on the import of Asian cotton and silk, 
the removal of the alcabala on raw cotton, and the prohibition on the 
import of cotton cloth from  other European countries helped to protect 
the Puebla industry, though they simultaneously encouraged competition 
from C atalan cottons. Thom son offers no m easure of P uebla’s net 
benefits from  these policies, so it is possible, if unlikely, that Puebla’s 
gains were more than offset by those of Catalonia (indeed, that was the 
objective of the policies). But the only evidence Thom son cites of state 
intervention in the industry that did not encourage output involved the 
arrest of a few weavers for violating guild rules that usually went unen­
forced.
O n the other hand, since his argum ent depends so critically on the 
assumption that narrow consumer markets retarded the industry, 
Thom son now needs to examine more fully the relationship between 
poverty and the full range of public policies before passing final judge­
ment on the im portance of the state in impeding industrial growth. The
236
Bourbon state, for example, used colonial revenues to promote the min­
ing industry in a period of rising marginal costs. T he effect was to drain 
resources from other sectors of the economy to keep mining output ris­
ing.5 And the effect, Thom son says, of high silver production in peace­
time was to favor foreign competition and depress Puebla. Suppose the 
viceregal government had ended subsidies to the mining industry and 
used fiscal revenues to improve the deplorable condition of the colony’s 
highway network instead of exporting the surpluses to subsidize Spanish 
rule in the C aribbean and the Phillipines. Thom son’s analysis suggests 
that such policies would have encouraged cotton textile production. If  the 
colonial state systematically distorted resource allocation, as I believe it 
did, and in so doing diminished productivity and thus depressed incomes 
in its colonial possessions, then one need not find police sm ashing looms 
to conclude that industrial development suffered as a result.6 After 
Independence, as W alker has shown, ’’what might have in other 
circumstances marked the birth of a M exican [industrial] bourgeoisie 
resulted stillborn -  the empresarios and their enterprises were caught up 
and strangled by the contradictions of an enduring superstructure that 
refused to be superceded.”^
In all three cases, these studies emphasize the technological back­
wardness of colonial industry. Production methods in H uam anga and 
Cochabam ba scarcely changed over the eighteenth century (although the 
C acam arca obrajes abortive attem pt in the 1760’s to increase the 
quality of its product is suggestive), while cotton ginning lost out to 
traditional carding in Puebla because ginned cotton was less suited to the 
backward spinning techniques of the industry. In short, new methods 
remained either untried or rejected in all three cases.
This technological backwardness of these three textile industries, 
especially in contrast to the British, continental and North American 
cotton textile industries, deserves a final comment. None of the three 
operated at, or even near, contem porary world technical standards. The 
most advanced of the three was the Puebla industry, but the changes 
wrought there involved organization rather than technique, as Thom son 
points out, Puebla rejected mechanically ginned cotton at a time when 
the continental industries used nothing else. Mechanized spinning had 
replaced cottage and hand work in Europe and the United States decades 
before Antuñano created M exico’s first spinning factory in the 1820’s. 
By the time he did, the New England mills had already adopted the 
power loom and mechanized weaving, a development that did not occur 
in Mexico until the 1840’s (and did not become widespread and
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successful, according to Thom son, until the 1890’s). In short, the most 
advanced of the three industries studied here operated at roughly two 
decades to a half century behind the world standard.® T he reasons for 
this technical backwardness require investigation separate from  the ana­
lysis of the rate of growth in production. Increases in output without 
technological advance do not make for successful industrializations. The 
reverse is also true: despite their presumed advantages, both in costs and 
in the quality of output, most of the early factories established in 
Mexico in the 1830’s and 1840’s went bankrupt. Im porting new 
technologies did not guarantee success.
Nonetheless, the continuity in the location of textile production in the 
Puebla region from the era of cottage spinning and hand looms to the 
factory installations of the late nineteenth century suggests a m ajor 
difference between this industry and that of the Andean cases. The 
H uam anga and Cochabam ba industries were marginal operations that 
could only flourish in the artificial hot houses created by forced sales and 
international war. T he Puebla industry, however, was more than that. 
Thom son does not make the standard infant industry argum ent in his 
account of Puebla, and quite rightly. Infant industries in the modern era 
are those that require protection both to increase output and to achieve 
technological parity with foreign competitors. Puebla’s output rose in 
wartime and mining depression (inadvertant protection, to be sure), but 
technological advances failed to materialize. This case, then, resembles 
more the European phase of ’’proto -  industrialization,” characterized 
mainly by organizational rather than technological change, than it does 
the infant industry phase of modern factory development where techno­
logical advances march hand in hand with increases in output. The 
history of textile industry development in Mexico thus suggests points of 
comparison and contrast with the European experience that would richly 
reward the historian, though such an effort would require a separate 
study of quite different scope. T he three studies in this volume, by 
suggesting comparisons across regions withing Latin America, contribute 
in im portant ways to advancing prospects for broader work.
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9. IMPERIAL POLICY TOWARDS THE PORT OF VERACRUZ, 
1788- 1808: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MADRID, CADIZ 
AND HAVANA INTERESTS
Jacques A. Barbier
Charles IV ’s commercial policy towards the port of V eracruz is well 
known. Indeed, historians interested in the m atter are peculiarly well 
served as they have available Jav ier O rtiz de la T ab la ’s Comercio 
exterior de Veracruz, 1788 -1821 : crisis de dependencia. * T hat work 
provides both a general outline and most particulars of the subject in the 
form  of a succesful narrative account. Thanks to it, our understanding 
is soundly based. T he facts being well established, however, we can now 
aspire to go beyond the political events themselves and study the hidden 
dynamics of policy formation.
In what follows, I contend that policy towards the port of Veracruz 
was shaped by the divergent economic interests of three non -  Mexi­
can cities: M adrid, Cádiz and H avana. M y objectives are firstly, to 
define the nature of H avana’s problems, and point to V eracruz’s 
potential role in solving them; secondly, to give an overview of late 
eighteenth century commercial policy form ation, and indicate that it was 
characterized by an attem pt to reconcile the needs of central and coastal 
Spain; and thirdly, to provide a new analysis of H avana -  V eracruz trade 
in the closing years of the colonial era, an analysis based on the inter­
play of the three centers indicated. T he central thrust of the argum ent is 
that contradictions inherent to imperial financial and commercial policy 
were brought to the fore by prolonged w arfare, and that the inevitable 
consequence was a growing incoherence between the two elements, an 
incoherence conducive to English and American economic penetration.
I.
H avana’s penetration of the V eracruz market was a  contentious issue 
during all of Charles IV ’s reign. T he C uban port’s ambition has been 
rightly seen as the natural result of economic growth. T hus Ortiz de la
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T abla notes:
La libertad  de com ercio de 1765 acrecen tó  el trá fico  m arítim o de la isla; la 
g u erra  de independenc ia  de las T rece  C olonias lo aum en tó  a ú n  m ás; la 
rebelión  n eg ra  de S an to  D om ingo en  1791, la  creación  de la  Sociedad 
Económ ica de A m igos del País de la  H a b a n a  en  1793 y la  del C onsu lado  en 
1794, las m ejoras técnicas y los g randes capitales invertidos en  la  ag ricu ltu ra  
fu e ro n  las causas princ ipa les del auge  económ ico cubano , cuya eclosión 
com ercial d a ría  como resu ltado  el in ten to  de g an ar el m ercado v e ra c ru za n o .. .2
T he crucial link between development of export -  oriented agriculture 
and demands for commercial intercourse with Mexico was coinage. To 
pay for slaves, machinery, packing supplies, and foodstuff C uba needed 
a constant inflow of foreign earnings and outside capital. In addition, the 
highly commercialized agriculture of the island required an adequate 
supply of circulating m edium .3
As is well known, colonies which specialized in agricultural exports 
always had difficulties keeping enough coinage in circulation. T his latter 
phenomenon accounts for Anglo -  American experiments with paper 
currency, the French W est Indies practice of accepting coins by tale and 
not weight, and the debased plata macuquina  of the Spanish Indies. In 
C uba, however, as its metropole would not allow it a legal "provincial” 
coinage, the problems of media of internal and external exchange tended 
to be one and the same. Further, given the pro -  species bias of Spanish 
monetary police, it seemed to C ubans that the only viable solution was 
to find some means of keeping Mexican silver pesos flowing smoothly 
through the island’s economy.
H avana was by fa r the most im portant C uban port. Its customs 
receipts and trade balances can be used to characterize the colony’s 
overall experience with overseas commerce in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. W hat such data reveals is that the ebb and 
flow of this trade was highly responsive to the stimulation of reform  and 
war, and that the island was wont to suffer from  a balance of trade 
deficit.
The form er point is easily demonstrated by the 1765 -  1804 receipts 
of the H avana customs houses (see Table I). T he years of peace which 
followed the 1765 proclamation of comercio libre (with its reduced tax 
rates), saw a steady increase in average yearly government revenues 
from this source. This phenomenon, of course, was but a reflection of 
the dram atic rise in the volume of sea -  borne trade. T he most dynamic
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performances, however, were turned in years of revolution and war. 
Spanish participation in the W ar of American Independence boosted 
revenues and trade to unprecedented levels. These soon subsided to lower 
values, albeit they rem ained above those of p r e - w a r  years. T he time 
of troubles unleashed by the onset of the French Revolution, however, 
allowed C uban commerce to resume its vibrant growth. T he crisis in 
Saint Domingue stimulated C uban production and drove customs receipts 
upwards to the levels previously reached during the American war. This 
rise in trade and revenue continued, although at a slower tem po, during 
Spain’s w ar against revolutionary France (1 7 9 3 - 1795). T he most 
impressive growth, however, came with the start of Charles IV ’s w ar 
with G reat Britain (1 7 9 6 - 1802), after which revenue volumes subsided 
once again, although at a higher plateau than heretofore. And in all of 
this, trade deficits were endemic, even in peacetime.
TABLE I: Demonstración de los rendimientos efectivos que ha produ­
cido la administración general de rentas de m ar (de la 
Habana) ... desde 1765 ... hasta 1804, inclusive (en pesos 
fuertes).
Years T otals Y early A verages
1 7 6 5 -  1769 1,510,477 302,095
1770 -  1774 1,708,536 341,707
1775 -  1779 2 ,130,124 426,024
1 7 8 0 -  1784 3 ,330,433 666,086
1785 -  1789 2,485,730 497,146
1 7 9 0 -  1792 2 ,012,837 670,946
1793 -  1797 3,738 ,617 747,723
1 7 9 8 -  1801 6 ,839,840 1,367,968
1 8 0 2 -  1804 2 ,441,587 813,862
Source: A G I, S an to  D om ingo , leg. 1686.
As rising customs receipts resulted from higher volumes of trade, so 
were the latter a reflection of increased production of such goods as 
sugar and tobacco. Increased production of tropical goods, however, 
could only be achieved through substantial investments in machinery, 
works and, most particularly, slaves. T he rhythm  of C uban im porta­
tion of blacks, boosted by the proclamation of comercio libre de negros 
in 1789, is a significant indicator of this investment (see T able II). As is 
obvious, although trade in general responded positively to wartime
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conditions, the slave trade reacted negatively. This is perhaps because 
slave ships were more restricted as to sources of supply and sailing 
routes, and thus far less able to respond then other vessels to the hazards 
of war. In  any event, m ajor investments in m anpower took place in 
peacetime. These soaked up profits and savings, leaving H avana rela­
tively naked in the face of the immense balance of trade deficit which 
came with any w ar time boom in commerce.
TABLE II: Slave Arrivals in Cuba, According to A lexander von 
H um boldt, 1 7 9 0 -1 8 0 7
Y ear N u m b e r of Slaves Y ear N u m b er o f Slaves
1790 2,534 1799 4,919
1791 8,498 1800 4,145
1792 8,528 1801 1,659
1793 3,777 1802 13,832
1794 4,164 1803 9,671
1795 5,832 1804 8,923
1796 5,711 1805 4,999
1797 4,452 1806 4,395
1798 2,001 1807 2,565
Source: A lexander von H u m b o ld t, Ensayo político sobre la isla de Cuba (H a b a n a ,
1960), p p .2 0 5 -2 0 6 ;  as found  in  H e rb e rt S. K le in , The M iddle Passage 
(P rinceton , 1978), p .214.
T he year 1805 may be taken as characteristic of the perform ance of 
C uban external trade under w ar conditions (see T able III). As may be 
seen, C uba suffered from  an extraordinary deficit situation. Foreigners, 
and particularly North Americans, greatly profitted from  a situation 
where they were able to send to C uba twice the value of the goods which 
they received in return. T his produced a net outflow of coins from  the 
island, which helped to pay for the United States’ trade deficits but 
produced a shortage of coinage in C u b a .’*
C u b a’s m onetary problems were not inherently different from  those 
of other colonies whose economy was based on expon -  oriented agri­
culture. Elsewhere I studied the case of V enezuela.5 T here, the same 
difficulties arose, although complicated by the C row n's expon of treasury 
surpluses (in the form  of specie) towards the peninsula. T rade with
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V eracruz and with foreign colonies helped somewhat to replenish 
C aracas’ coinage supplies, albeit inadequately by the late eighteenth 
century. In Venezuela, the essential challenge was to find some means of 
reconciling the state’s thirst for funds with the economy’s need for a 
circulating medium. T hat challenge was tem porarily met thanks to 
ingenious bills of exchange transactions. Until the C row n’s fiscal 
problems becam e all -  consuming, a coalition of business interests was 
able to work out reasonable compromises with reform  -  minded admin­
istrators, arrangem ents which allowed the colony to enjoy an adequate 
circulating medium.
TABLE III: Balance o f  Trade for Havana, 1805 (in Pesos Fuertes)
Im ports Exports T o tal B alance
M etropo litan  Spain  
S pan ish  C olonies 













11,780,210 5, 107,017 16,887,227 6,673 ,193
Source: A G I, S an to  D om ingo , leg. 1687.
Some of the solutions adopted for C aracas were also applicable to 
H avana. As it did on various occasions in Venezuela, the Crown strove 
to take out its C uban profits in kind -  in this case, in tobacco. T here is 
also evidence that the eastern end of the island shipped cattle to French 
Saint Domingue, and V eracruz was a significant trading partner. For 
both Venezuela and C uba, however, V eracruz was an open port only for 
ships carrying colonial products.® N either was to be allowed to become 
an entrepot for European goods destined for the M exican m arket. How 
then was C uba to obtain or retain needed specie? As noted, H avana, like 
Venezuela was granted limited access to foreign colonies (and to the 
U nited States, which continued to be treated like a foreign colony), and 
officials promoted the export to Mexico of one of its natural products (in 
this case, wax). In fact, the government went so fa r as to encourage the 
island to im port silver from  places other than V eracruz.^ Despite such 
palliatives, however, the C row n’s true solution was entirely different, but 
quite direct. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the C uban 
economy in these years was the continuous inflow of Mexican funds to
24-4
pay for the expenses of the plaza, apostadero, fortification program m e, 
arm y and navy units tem porarily stationed in H avana, and other official 
activities. T o this one must add monies destined for the United States 
and situados for outlying G ulf and C aribbean locations, funds which 
were routed through H avana but not always sent onward in the form of 
cash. H avana may have wished to earn its specie through trade. 
G overnment silver, however, was undoubtedly of some consolation and 
served to reduce the p o rt’s need for full access to the V eracruz m a r­
ket.
T he problem with this solution, of course, was that it placed H avana 
at the very nexus of the inner contradiction which threatened, in time of 
w ar, to vitiate the central thrust of the Bourbon reformist effort: the 
belief that both trade and treasure could be obtained from  the colonies. 
To grasp this fact, however, one must first examine the nature of the 
peninsular interests served by the reforms of Charles III and C h ar­
les IV.
II.
As I have had occasion to argue, two distinct coalitions of interests 
dominated colonial policy -  making in the late eighteenth century: the 
C ourt and peninsular cadres on the one hand, the entrepreneurial elites 
of Cádiz and the Spanish coast on the o ther.8 T he C ourt had an innate 
thirst for treasure shipments, the coast an inherent need for trade. In the 
time of Charles III (1759 -  1788), fiscal and economic reforms 
combined to satisfy both groups. T he existing literature, however, tends 
to take the C row n’s need for specie for granted, but to closely scrutinize 
its novel economic policies. In  consequence, the reform s which touched 
the interests of Cádiz and the coast are well understood. Those that 
relate directly to the fiscal interests of M adrid rem ain obscure.
For Cádiz and coastal Spain, the principal thrust of colonial policy 
had to be the development of the Indies trade. Ultimately, policy makers 
were to favour economic growth in the Spanish periphery: stimulating 
metropolitan productive and finishing operations by opening American 
markets; lowering peninsular costs and increasing re -  export volume by 
boosting the output of colonial mining, ranching and agriculture; and, 
lastly, keeping at home the profits of trade and transport.
As is well known, of course, monopolists of the Consulado of Cádiz, 
the middlemen between European m anufacturers and Spanish American 
consumers, fought reform tènaciously. It must be understood, however,
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that their loss was not necessarily that of their city. T rade reforms did 
not cripple Cádiz, which continued to dominate colonial trade.® In part, 
this was due to the moderation of Charles III who saw to it that 
comercio libre was imposed only gradually. From 1765 to 1777 the new 
policy was applied only in C aribbean zones marginal to the Cádiz trade. 
O ther areas remained subject to the traditional register ships (navios de 
registró) and convoys (flotas) .10 T herafter, more homogenous laws were 
enacted, but the crucial V eracruz market was still exempted from  the 
general regulation of 1778.** Special tonnage restrictions preserved some 
of the existing guarantees up to 1789. Lastly, even after the removal of 
quantitative limitations, exceptional rules regarding the V eracruz 
inter -  colonial trade continued to restrict competition.*^ Overall, it must 
be granted that Cádiz m erchants were given ample time to adjust to 
trade reform. By the start of the reign of Charles IV , therefore, coastal 
Spain was united in defense of its exclusive access to colonial ports. T he 
C ourt’s concern with patriation of specie was, for the coast, a source of 
mixed feelings; for although it kept the state solvent at the expense of 
someone else, it also caused unease as the source of these surpluses was 
often monopolized items of trade.
T he param ount aims of the C ourt were the security of the state and 
the extension of its services. T o meet these objectives a healthy level of 
Crown revenues was imperative, but none was prepared to sacrifice Old 
Regime privileges to fiscal needs. T he obvious solution was to obtain 
external funds: colonial treasure and taxes on the Indies trade. The 
Crown understood, of course, that efficient administration was more 
likely to be effective than predatory policies. T hus, a compromise 
between bureaucratic and business objectives could be achieved. The 
difficulty, however, was that behind the concerns of the C ourt lay the 
interests of M adrid and much of central Spain. Indeed, a dispropor­
tionate share of state income was spent in the capital, and that expend­
iture in turn generated a significant proportion of economic activities in 
central Spain .13 This situation ensured that, in times of trouble, when 
difficult choices had to be made between trade and treasury, the struggle 
over Crown policiy would be between central and peripheral Spain, 
between two different modes of economic life.
As I have already shown elsewhere, during the reign of Charles IV , 
the Crown was increasingly driven to sacrifice its economic goals to its 
financial ones.*“* This was no free choice, of course. It resulted from a 
fiscal situation which had been steadily worsening ever since the W ar of 
American Independence.*3 In any event, sacrifice of ’’economic” to
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’’financial” goals really m eant the sacrifice of the coast to M adrid ’s 
awesome need for government expenditure. Indeed, for a  command 
economy such as that of central Spain, government solvency was the 
very lifeblood of agriculture, trade and manufacturing.
III.
W hat does this type of analysis reveal about the evolution of policy 
towards H avana -  V eracruz trade? I believe that, here again, one sees 
the gradual dissolution of the entente which made the reforms of Charles 
III possible. As long as that entente was in place, and to the degree 
possible, H avana had to be denied access to Veracruz. As the entente 
broke down, however, and as the Crown became more intent upon the 
objective of patriating American funds, C ádiz’s dem and that H avana not 
become an entrepot became less and less compelling. Further, as the 
government became serious about monopolizing treasure for M adrid, it 
had to try to cut C u b a’s links with the M exican treasury. T his, of 
course, would have deepened H avana’s coinage problems, unless com­
pensation was offered in the form  of broadened access to V eracruz.
T he chronology is suggestive. T he years following the death of 
Charles III saw the completion of the reform  process.16 A Real Decreto 
of February 28, 1789 removed all tonnage restriction on M exican and 
Venezuelan trade, allowed half of the goods carried to be foreign and 
reduced duties by 10 percent for ships carrying only national products. 
T he order signified the extension of comerco libre to Mexico and 
V enezuela. O n the other hand a Real Ordenanza  of August 16, 1790 
forbade trans -  shipping of European products to V eracruz via H avana, 
and another of M arch 12, 1791 insisted that, unlike other ships of 
comercio libre, those going to V eracruz might not make stopovers in 
other colonial ports (those of Venezuela excepted). Cádiz objected to all 
such interm ediate stops, but was given satisfaction only as regards the 
M exican p o rt.17 W hat the Crown was indicating by these m easures was 
that it was not prepared to treat V eracruz and H avana entirely in the 
same way as other ports. The trade of V eracruz was too valuable, 
H avana too well -  placed to underm ine mercantilist expectations. In 
short, the growth of H avana as a colonial center could not, in the 
governm ent’s view, be based on the role of the entrepôt. It had to be 
founded on its traditional military function and on its growing vocation 
as a sugar center. This latter possibility, in fact, particularly appealed to 
the men in command in M adrid, who showered the island and other
247
C aribbean regions with beneficial legislation. Foreign iron machinery was 
allowed to enter duty free, the rules for the black slave trade were 
liberalized, and the commerce of the puertos menores largely freed of 
fiscal obstacles. Most significantly, at the behest of C uban lobbyist 
Francisco de Arango y Parreño, H avana was conceded special liberties 
for its trade in cotton, coffee, indigo, sugar, aguardiente and slaves, the 
decisions being taken in full Council of State, with the King presiding.18
Despite such a favorable predisposition, with the start of w ar with 
France in 1793 another set of Crown reservations about H avana began 
to come to the fore -  the fear that C uba was going to absorb funds 
needed in the peninsula. In  a secret order the Viceroy of New Spain was 
instructed to be careful about sending money to C uba to sustain its 
naval forces, as this should be done ”con la mayor economía por ser las 
atenciones de Europa mas urgente.”1® Similarly, fearful that H avana 
would retain funds found aboard Spanish bound warships which stopped 
in C uban waters, M adrid ordered the intendant ’’que con ningún motivo 
no pretexto detenga los caudales que lleguen a aquel puerto.’’^  The 
Viceroy of New Spain Count of Revillagigedo, however, had already 
foreseen the new circumstances. Sending the frigate ’’M inerva” to Spain 
with cash, he gave its captain very clear orders:
prevengo a  V m d. con la  m ayor estrechez que  es posible evite el llegar a  la 
H a b a n a  con m otivo de reponer ag u a , . ..  pero en  caso de que  esto no  pueda 
verificarse no  se d e ten d rá  en  aquel pu erto  m as que el tiem po preciso para  
e jecu tarlo ; adv irtiendo  a  V m d. que  a u n  en  el caso de rec ib ir a lg u n a  o rden  del 
s eñ o r com andan te  general (de m a rin a ) de aquel puerto  p a ra  e n tra r  y 
p e rm an ece r en  el, con tinue  sin  em bargo  su v iaje a  E s p a ñ a .21
T he C uban authorities, however, held a junta  de generales when the 
’’M inerva” came into port, quashed the viceregal orders, and took off the 
3,000,000 pesos fuertes which the ship carried. Despite concerns over 
having to share funds with H avana, however, M adrid continued to grant 
ever more extensive commercial privileges to the port city.'111
As these developments were taking place, the growth of C uban ties to 
the U .S. market made H avana’s trade with Mexico all the more 
problematical. In part, the development of such ties was due to the 
Spanish government itself, which ordered its diplomatic agents to ship 
foodstuffs on American ships to its various C aribbean bases, although 
the initiative shown by local officials in interpreting royal orders was 
more generally to blame. W ith peace all such contacts were banned by 
R .O . of January  21, 1796. O n O ctober 6, 1796, however, Spain
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embarked on the first of two consecutive wars with G reat Britain. The 
Spanish defeat at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent (February 14, 1797) 
guaranteed the effectiveness of the British blockade and H avana soon 
was thrown open to neutral ships, by local action, long before the Crown 
agreed to the neutral flag trade as a general principle. In fact, of 
course, the Consulado of H avana asked for this wartime m easure in 
Septem ber of 1796, the month before w ar was d ec la red .^  At about the 
same time, H avana interests resumed their pressure for full access to the 
V eracruz market. Both of these phenom ena have been well documented 
and need not be reviewed here. It is essential to understand, however, 
that the two are causally related. Indeed, as indicated above, as the 
receipts of H avana customs indicate, the p o rt’s trade boomed in wartime 
along with the exports of the island’s agriculture. W ith greater economic 
activity came a heightened need for circulating medium. Access to 
V eracruz became ever more im portant, particularly as the heretofore 
dependable M exican situado became increasingly sporadic.
As we know, M adrid resisted H avana’s pressure all through the first 
British war. W ith the coming of peace, however, the situation did not 
return to norm al for the Crown was not prepared to resume its generous 
support, from  M exican sources, of the C uban treasury. As the Inten­
dant of H avana was informed by M inister of Finances M iguel Cayetano 
Soler:
Y a es tiem po que aquella  isla ta n  fé rtil trib u te  lo necesario  p a ra  subsistir sin 
necesidad de situado, sino que lo proporcione a  los parages contiguos y deje 
sobrantes capaces de com pensar a  la  m etrópo li.24
As Soler’s commercial policy was based on a  return to full m ercanti- 
listic rigor, of course, the H avana treasury was hardly likely to measure 
up to his expectations.
W ith the resumption of w ar with G reat Britain in late 1804, H avana 
faced difficulties once more which could best be resolved by M exican 
silver. By April of 1806 C uban interests were able to induce officials of 
the ministry of finance to prepare orders opening V eracruz to the 
Habaneros. Miguel Cayetano Soler refused to sign them , how ever.^  
T he deadlock was only broken when interim Intendant R afael Gomez 
Roubaud complained in August 1806 directly to Godoy, the steadfast 
champion of C uban interests, who supported the in tendant’s request for 
H avana -  V eracruz t r a d e . I t  is significant that the intendant’s petition 
was exclusively directed at solving H avana’s balance of trade deficit. 
Gomez R oubaud, with the trade statistics of 1805 in hand, pointed p a r­
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ticularly to the 6,088,666 pesos fuertes of deficit with foreign ports (see 
Table III). H e insisted that only access to V eracruz would bring silver 
back into H avana, a city in which the ordinary circulating medium seems 
to have become Portuguese gold coins -  a most peculiar circumstance 
for a Spanish colony. It is a dossier started with this letter that produced 
the R .O . of M ay 10, 1807, allowing the r e - e x p o r t  from  H avana to 
V eracruz of European goods. ^
In conclusion, what is one to make of the affair? I believe that the 
Bourbon reform er’s policy towards the port of V eracruz was designed to 
boost the economy of coastal Spain even as it was meant to safeguard 
the flow of funds on which that of the M adrid region was based. This 
double -  edged policy limited the economic growth of C uba, as it did not 
allow an adequate flow of coinage to the island. As the interests of 
C entral Spain slowly gained primacy, however, those of Cádiz and the 
coast could then be sacrificed. T he mom ent of truth was delayed by 
ideologues such as Soler, but by 1807 there was no longer any reason to 
prevent H avana from serving as an A n g lo -A m erican  conduit to Mexi­
co. T he commercial policy characteristic of the Bourbon Reform s was no 
more.
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10. ARISTOCRACIA EN VILO: LOS MERCADERES DE LIMA 
EN EL SIGLO XVIII
Alberto Flores Galindo*
”...p a ra  el bien del Estado y del Comercio 
que hoy es el alm a del Universo”*
I. Lim a y  la M ar del Sur
D urante la prim era mitad del siglo X V III, el monopolio comercial 
hizo del Callao el único ’’puerto m ayor” en la M ar del Sur y de Lim a 
casi la única metrópoli en Sudamérica. Puerto y ciudad estaban en defi­
nitiva unidos y ambos se constituyeron en un centro de acopio y redis­
tribución mercantil. Esta imagen fue recogida, tiempo después, por 
Jo rge Ju an  y Antonio de Ulloa:
Luego que el com ercio del P erú  se restituye a  L im a, después de h a b e r  con­
cluido sus com pras en Portobello , todos g en eralm en te  a b ren  sus tiendas y 
ponen  alm acenes p a ra  em pezar las v en tas, y sup lir a los que  b a ja n  de las 
provincias in terio res y de toda la sierra a em p lear su corto c au d a l.2
Desde que la economía peruana se reestructuró después de la prolongada 
depresión que recorrió casi todo el siglo X V II, su estructura pareció 
reposar en dos pilares: de un lado, los intercambios marítimos, teniendo 
como escenario el Pacífico, desde Panam á hasta el C abo de Hornos, y, 
de otro lado, el vasto espacio andino. U n territorio evidentemente dila­
tado, casi podríamos decir desmesurado, para  una ciudad que bordea los 
50000 habitantes, pero imprescindible de organizar, porque sólo la unión 
de escenarios tan diversos -  como Valparaíso, Lim a o Potosí -  podría 
compensar la debilidad del mercado interior y superar esas rém oras que 
eran la persistencia de la economía natural y la escasa división del tra­
bajo. Edificar un mercado interno colonial fue el desafío que debieron 
afrontar los comerciantes lim eños.3
El monopolio comercial convirtió a Lim a en la sede de un poderoso 
grupo de comerciantes, vinculados a familias de la aristocracia metropo­
litana o a casas mercantiles españolas, que se dedicaron a las actividades 
de importación -  exportación de mercaderías. Inicialmente fueron, para 
utilizar un término de la época, ’’cargadores.” U n ejemplo sería José
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M aría Enrile, quien había iniciado su giro comercial en Cádiz, desde 
donde estableció posteriormente sólidos intereses con el comercio limeño, 
como im portador de telas.4 O tros, como los Q uerejazu , se afincarían 
definitivamente en Lim a, aunque teniendo ramificaciones de sus empre­
sas en localidades tan distantes como La Paz, mientras que los Condes 
de C asa J ijó n  prefirieron m antenerse en la península, en Cádiz, desde 
donde podían controlar m ejor sus intereses y negocios tanto en Lima 
como en Q u ito .5 Los Condes de San Isidro siguieron en posesión de 
haciendas y casas en Santander, lejano respaldo para sus actividades 
lim eñas.6 Los Sancho Dávila no olvidaron que descendían de los M a r ­
queses de V elarde, en San R om án. Antonio y José M atías de Elizalde 
fueron dueños de la casa solar de Echeverría (N avarra). En 1770, 10 por 
ciento de los testamentos limeños son dictados por nacidos en España; 
en 1810 aum entan a 14 por ciento.^ Entre los cincuenta personajes de la 
’’clase alta” limeña que figuran más adelante (T abla IV ), quince nacie­
ron en la península. De hecho, un funcionamiento eficaz de los negocios 
exigía contar con relaciones personales o de parentesco en Cádiz o cual­
quier otra localidad española. Sin negar la im portancia de ese puerto 
sureño, los nuevos comerciantes, como el conjunto de la clase alta peru­
ana, crecieron tam bién al compás de las migraciones procedentes del país 
vasco -  navarro: de allí vendrían, entre muchos otros, los herm anos 
mencionados líneas atrás, Antonio y José M atías Elizalde, los Castañeda, 
R am írez de Arellano, Izcue, M endiburu, Ferrer, Abadía, L arre ta ... En 
Lim a tuvo su centro de operaciones la compañía Sobrinos de Aguevere y 
Lostra.® Entre los testamentos de 1770 y 1810, como lugares de naci­
miento figuran N avarra, Santander, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, junto  con 
Cádiz, Sevilla y Cataluña. Todo esto fue expresión de un movimiento 
migratorio más vasto: de los pasajeros que pasan al Perú entre 1787 y 
1814, 70 por ciento vienen de las provincias norteñas de España y 46 por 
ciento eran vascos. En los negocios, dos factores decisivos para la for­
mación de empresas fueron las alianzas familiares y la procedencia 
común (los paisanos). A la postre, el comercio limeño acabó bajo control 
de estos migrantes de prim era o segunda generación, que consiguieron 
imponerse a las familias criollas e incluso a linajes tan antiguos como los 
Aliaga, descendientes de los primeros fundadores de la ciudad.®
El intercam bio de metales preciosos de las minas peruanas por 
productos manufacturados europeos sería continuado mediante el desa­
rrollo del comercio intercolonial. La relativa autosuficiencia del espacio 
americano -  subrayada, entre otros, por Carlos Sempat Assadourian -  
terminó por conferir cierta independencia económica a las colonias y por
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acicatear el tráfico mercantil entre ellas. Dentro de este contexto debemos 
entender las relaciones entre Lima y el Reino de Chile.
Chile fue una colonia tardía. Todavía en el siglo X V III era una zona 
de frontera, pero entonces el nuevo territorio se había expandido desde 
los fértiles valles centrales tanto hacia el norte, donde la minería con­
quistó tierras al desierto, como hacia el sur, donde a pesar de los arau­
canos se pudo desarrollar una im portante actividad ganadera. El motor 
para la incorporación de estas ’’tierras nuevas” persistía en la región 
central de Valparaíso y Santiago, donde, de acuerdo con Vicuña 
M ackenna, el trigo pasaba a tener el rol hegemónico que antes tuvieron 
el cebo o los metales preciosos. Aunque el nuevo cultivo desem peñaría 
un papel decisivo en la expansión del mercado interior chileno, su p ropa- 
lación fue un efecto inducido por la dem anda de una economía más 
poderosa: en otro lugar nos hemos referido a los cambios en el paisaje 
agrario de la costa peruana y el impulso creciente al intercambio de 
azúcar por trigo.
Este comercio intercolonial permitió la hegemonía de los mercaderes 
limeños en el Pacífico. En efecto, ocurre que ese tráfico mercantil sólo 
podía organizarse a partir de un núcleo poderoso de comerciantes. Se 
trataba de productos difíciles de transportar, que por su cantidad y peso 
requerían de naves de gran calado. Esta limitación se acentuaba teniendo 
en cuenta que la distancia entre Callao y Valparaíso no era nada des­
preciable y sólo podía navegarse durante seis meses del año. En invierno, 
los riesgos de naufragio aum entaban. Estos desde luego, no desapa­
recían en las otras estaciones ni en otras rutas, por lo que no son raros 
los casos de comerciantes que perdían sus naves y m ercaderías.^  En los 
préstamos marítimos el interés comercial tenía la justificación suficiente 
para  duplicarse de 6 a 12 por ciento. Algo similar acontecía con los 
seguros, que durante las guerras de la independencia ascenderían hasta 
15 por ciento.1  ^ Superar cualquier riesgo exigía un costoso manteni­
miento de las embarcaciones y algunos propietarios -  ’’navieros,” para 
volver a utilizar un térm ino dieciochesco -  term inaban por disponer de 
pequeñas flotas privadas, como fue el caso de Ju an  Miguel de Castañeda 
con sus naves ’’T eresa ,” ”E1 Aguilar” y ’’Serena”; el de Francisco de 
Izcue con las embarcaciones ’’G ram puz,” ’’C arm en” y ’’Nancy”; o el de 
Miguel de M endiburu, dueño de las fragatas ’’Begoña,” ’’Santa B árbara” 
y del bergantín ’’Perla”.
El comercio peruano -  chileno exigió el desarrollo de una numerosa 
flota mercante en el Pacífico. T anto  ésto como la construcción y mante­
nimiento de barcos de gran calado (navios y fragatas), garantizaron que
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esos intercambios se volvieran coto privado de los grandes comerciantes 
limeños. Si bien las ganancias no eran despreciables, los costos en las 
operaciones reservaron a una minoría el ejercicio del gran comercio. 
Entre 1812 y 1818 -  poco antes del declive definitivo -  en el Callao 
pudieron contarse ochenta y uno fragatas, setenta y seis bergantines, 
trece goletas, dieziseis paquebotes y otras dieziocho embarciones meno­
res. Años antes, en 1789, un recuento de la flota surta en la M ar del 
Sur proporcionó estas cifras: ocho navios, once fragatas, catorce paque­
botes; trenta y tres en total, de los cuales, según el M ercurio Peruano, 
veintinueve pertenecían a empresarios limeños, dos a navieros de 
Guayaquil y dos a chilenos; desde luego, estas cuatro últimas em barca­
ciones eran las de menor calado, aptas para  el tráfico de cabotaje, de un 
puerto a otro, pero inútiles para  transportar un cargam iento demasia­
do pesado. O tra  fuente señala que el tráfico entre Perú y Chile era 
realizado específicamente por veintiún navios y fragatas limeños. En 
1790 anclaron en el Callao veintisiete navios procedentes del sur: diezi­
ocho venían de Valparaíso, siete de Concepción y dos de ambos 
14puertos.
Casi todas las embarcaciones salían por las mismas fechas del Callao: 
’’Por lo regular salen de este puerto en una mism a tem porada, con sólo 
la diferencia de días; y su regreso es con igual diferencia.”*® Los navie­
ros limeños lograron compatibilizar sus intereses estando todos agrem ia­
dos en el T ribunal del Consulado, ”la columna del estado y el apoyo más 
firme y recomendable de los gobiernos,” en el interior del cual form a­
ban un grupo específico.*® A los mencionados líneas atrás, podemos aña­
dir al Conde de T orre  V elarde, el Conde de San Isidro, la Condesa de 
Vista Florida, el Conde de Santa Ana, Félix C olm enares, Vicente de 
Larriva, Domingo de L arrea, Ortiz de Foronda, etc. Todos ellos consi­
guieron im poner precios tanto en Lim a como Santiago. Aquí está el 
origen de una prolongada rivalidad entre esas dos ciudades, reconocida 
incluso por el cabildo limeño: ’’Siempre reclama Chile del reprobado 
arbitrio en que los Navieros de Lim a se coaligan estudiosamente en 
detener sus buques, para  estrechar a los cosecheros y com prar el trigo 
al precio que les sugiere su voluntariedad...”*  ^ T iem po después, una 
versión similar sería esgrim ada por el historiador chileno Benjam in 
V icuña M ackenna, quien en su historia de V alparaíso recurrió a com­
parar la cohesión de los comerciantes limeños con ’’una sola m ano,” de 
m anera que a Chile term inaría llegando e imponiéndose, en definitiva, 
un único comprador.*® Pero, al m argen de las exageraciones, conse­
cuencias de la escasa sim patía que congregaron los comerciantes tanto
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en Lim a como en Santiago, lo cierto es que se trataba de un sistema 
monopólico que term inó por reducir a Chile a la condición de una 
subcolonia peruana. Se form aron, en el transcurso, algunas ’’com­
pañías,” como la de Elizalde y Larreta (1792). Hemos indicado en otro 
lugar que estas empresas m antuvieron un carácter fam iliar.
El control sobre los barcos fue acompañado con la edificación de 
grandes bodegas en el puerto del Callao, donde los comerciantes podían 
alm acenar y conservar sus mercaderías. La abundancia perm itía, al 
mismo tiempo, controlar los flujos de ida y venida de los barcos. En 
1782, por ejem plo, los navieros se resisten a partir, esperando que el 
Cabildo decrete una alza en el precio del pan. Al igual que Domingo 
Ram írez de Arellano, muchos otros comerciantes fueron tam bién pro­
pietarios de bodegas que term inaron emplazadas en la localidad de 
Bellavista, casi a mitad de camino entre Lim a y el puerto. Allí se instaló 
una fundición, indispensable para la reparación de los barcos, y un 
hospital consagrado al cuidado de los tripulantes.
Los barcos, en conclusión, fueron el instrum ento para el dominio de 
Lim a sobre Chile. Siempre fueron construidos en América, al norte del 
Callao, en el puerto de Guayaquil, donde funcionaba el mayor astillero 
de toda la M ar del Sur. G uayaquil disponía de una rada adecuada para 
la construcción de naves de gran calado, además de contar con todos los 
insumos necesarios: maderas, brea, tela de los obrajes de Q uito  para las 
velas, etc. El astillero contaba entre 250 y 320 operarios.^®
Pero Guayaquil no sólo fue, en definitiva, el astillero de Lim a. Era 
tam bién el puerto de ingreso hacia Q uito , y del espacio formado entre 
esta ciudad y ese puerto se im portaban m aderas para las construcciones 
urbanas, cacao, telas y tejidos procedentes de los obrajes quiteños. A su 
vez, desde el Perú se internaba en esos territorios azúcar y vinos. Lima 
seguía oficiando, hasta 1778, como centro redistribuidor de mercancías. 
Por eso, de Chile, además de trigo, se prosiguió importando el cebo para 
las velas de la ciudad, que, a su vez, se reexportaba a Q uito. A veces, 
Santiago desem peñaba tam bién la función de interm ediario con otros 
espacios coloniales. O ccurría con la yerba del Paraguay, por entonces de 
gran consumo en Lim a, que venía por tierra desde Buenos Aires. Es así 
como el intercambio de azúcar por trigo perm itió dinam izar algunas 
actividades m anufactureras (el astillero, al lado de la construcción, es la 
industria clásica de las sociedades precapitalistas) y, además, articular 
una dilatada cadena de intercambios. El T ribunal del Consulado de 
Lim a, cuya Ju n ta  G eneral tenía 200 miembros, se convirtió, con este 
sustento, en la mayor corporación empresarial de la época. En 1815, sus
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capitales fueron calculados en cerca de 5.000.000 de pesos, muy por 
encima de los que podía disponer la C aja  de Censos, la R enta de 
Tabacos e, incluso, la C aja  Real o la C asa de M oneda.21 En 1791
• • 99fueron censados en Lim a 393 comerciantes.
Los protocolos notariales perm iten aproxim arnos a las condiciones 
materiales (deudas, préstamos, capitales, esclavos, propiedades, etc.) de 
un sector de la población. Es evidente que estaba más predispuesto para 
un inventario o para  testar quien tenía algún bien o algo que dejar a sus 
descendientes. Pero este juicio puede matizarse teniendo en cuenta que, 
en 1770, sobre 230 casos fichados, catorce son hijos naturales, 50 por 
ciento no saben firm ar, 13 por ciento se declaran pobres, 62 por ciento 
no poseen ni siquiera un esclavo. Los testamentos confirm an el rol 
hegemónico de los comerciantes, quienes, al parecer, concentraban el 
escaso capital dinero circulante. Las mayores fortunas legadas en 1770 
(ver T abla I) corresponden a mercaderes. Excepción hecha de un curaca, 
un religioso, un pobre (?) y otro que no indica oficio, los catorce testa­
dores que dejan dinero en efectivo son comerciantes. Las cantidades van 
desde los 2.000 pesos hasta los 60.000 pesos. En 1810, de veintitrés 
testamentos en los que se deja dinero, seis son de comerciantes. En 
términos absolutos han disminuido, aunque la proporción se mantiene.
TABLA I: Testamentos, Lim a, 1770
C ap ita l/d in ero  en  efectivo F recuencia  y origen social
50 pesos 1 (curaca)
215 1 (sin esp .)
800 1 (pobre)
E n tre  2.500 -  3.000 3 (2 com erciantes 
y 1 religioso)
4.500 1 (com erciante)
6.000 1 ( ” )
7.000 1 ( ” )
12.000 1 ( ” )
22.000 1 ( ” )
27.000 1 ( ” )
43.500 1 ( ” )
60.000 1 ( ” )
Fuen te : A G N , Protocolos N otaria les, T estam en to s , 1770.
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Pero las fortunas alcanzan niveles inferiores a cuarenta añs antes: desde 
113 pesos hasta un extremo solitario de 63.056 pesos. Para d ibujar con 
mayor claridad las dimensiones de estas riquezas monetarias, debemos 
considerar que 60.000 pesos equivalían aproxim adam ente a 120 escla­
vos.
El esplendor mercantil tuvo también otras expresiones mensurables. 
Las enum erarem os brevemente: (a) Se incrementaron las alcabalas y el 
alm ojarifazgo, (b) En general, las rentas de la C aja  Real de Lima 
aum entan hasta la década d e 1770. (c) Entre 1760 y 1795 se duplican 
las acuñaciones monetarias en marcos de plata. En los anexos incluimos 
las cifras correspondientes a las emisiones de oro y plata hechas en la 
C asa de M oneda en Lima. La curva ascendente, que podría trazarse 
hasta fines del siglo X V III, refleja de muchas m aneras el aumento en 
los intercambios y la consiguiente dem anda de una moneda que, por su 
alto valor, era apta no para  el pequeño comercio sino para las grandes 
transacciones, esas que iniciaron el apogeo fugaz de los mercaderes 
lim eños.23
Finalmente se produjo un cambio en la fisonomía misma de la 
ciudad. Lim a se extendió llegando a las 400 hectares. Se elevaron nuevas 
construcciones, como la plaza de toros (1768) o el Paseo de Aguas 
(1773). Aparecieron los primeros cafés, empezando por el llamado del 
Comercio: en total sum arían siete, signos de una vida urbana que se 
renovaba. O bviam ente, el hecho más im portante fue la reconstrucción de 
casi toda la ciudad, arrasada por el terrem oto de 1746. Las antiguas 
construcciones de piedra y ladrillo fueron reem plazadas por las nuevas, 
hechas de un material menos apreciado socialmente -  caña de G uaya­
quil, barro y adobe -  pero más resistente a los movimientos sísmicos. A 
pesar de la catástrofe de 1746, con el consiguiente descenso demográfico 
en esa década, la población de Lim a consiguió recuperarse, no obstante 
que, como veremos, persistían frecuentes epidem ias.24
TABLA II: La Población de Lim a, 1 7 4 6 - 1820
añ o 1746 1755 1791 1812 1820
población 60.000 54.000 52.627 63.900 64.000
Fuen te : A G Í, In d ife ren te  G eneral, 1527;
. C órdoba y U rru tia , Estadísticas..., (L im a, 1839), 1,33.
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II. El Mercado Interior
La moneda -  escasas acuñaciones y de muy alto valor -  traslucía 
una profunda grieta en la estructura económica colonial: la coexistencia 
del gran comercio con las áreas de economía natural. En Guayaquil se 
tiene que perm utar géneros de Castilla, vinos y aguardientes por m adera 
y cacao. Este último producto en ocasiones term ina sustituyendo a la 
moneda, como ocurre en Chiloé con los jam ones y en algunos parajes de 
la sierra con la coca. En T arapacá  no queda otro recurso que la venta 
”al fiado:” ”La provincia estaba, como lo está hoy, y ha estado siempre 
sujeta a venderse muy poco al contado y casi todo al fiado,” aunque en 
este caso se trata más de crear dependencias que de compensar la 
ausencia de m o n ed a .^  Se podría argum entar que en los ejemplos men­
cionados estamos ante territorios distantes de Lim a, pero casos similares 
se repiten en los tambos de los valles próximos a la capital y entre los 
documentos contables del comerciante Ram írez de Arellano hemos 
encontrado, por ejem plo, el recibo de venta de un esclavo pagado en 
zurrones de yerba del Paraguay, otro producto que, por su dem anda y 
escasez, term inaba siendo una especie de moneda natural.
Los comerciantes advirtieron, desde luego, todos los inconvenientes y 
dificultades que se podían derivar de un mercado sum amente estrecho. 
La proximidad entre Lim a y el m ar facilitaba los intercambios con la 
península y los espacios coloniales vecinos, pero una vez que las merca­
derías arribaban al puerto comenzaba el problem a más difícil: cómo 
introducirlas en el interior de un espacio que, aunque vasto, ofrecía 
múltiples obstáculos para la comunicación.
De Lim a partían diversas rutas. Prim ero hacia el norte, bordeando el 
m ar y recorriendo los poblados costeños, como C hancay, H uacho, en 
dirección a Trujillo; ruta difícil cuando en los meses de verano crecía la 
descarga de los ríos arrasando con los improvisados caminos o destru­
yendo los puentes, como casi todos los años ocurría en Santa o Jeq u e te - 
peque. Entonces habia que am pararse en la navegación caletera, con la 
ayuda de buenas radas y puertos, como el de H uanchaco. U na situación 
similar se repetía en la costa sur donde incluso era preferible recurrir al 
m ar para transportar desde Pisco a Lim a las botijas de aguardiente, 
sorteando así los peligros del desierto. Pero más al sur la costa se tornaba 
escarpada, con puertos tan deficientes como el de Q uilca, de m anera 
que, prácticam ente, esos territorios perm anecían cerrados al intercambio 
marítim o hasta Arica. Desde allí a su vez salían por lo menos tres rutas: 
una hacia la región m inera de T arapacá, otra en dirección a la ciudad de
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A requipa y de allí al Cuzco y, finalm ente, la que llevaba a La Paz y 
Potosí. El poblado vecino de T acna, contando con las facilidades de un 
valle fértil, se convirtió en sede de ”un gremio de arrieros de mucha
consideración” y en sus alrededores se podían ver pastando hasta 5000
i 97 muías.
Desde la propia Lim a salían otras tres rutas que, ascendiendo la 
cordillera, se internaban en el abrupto espacio andino: por el valle de 
Lurigancho y de allí a C anta, donde un abra de la cordillera perm itía el 
acceso a C erro de Pasco; otra ru ta rem ontaba el curso del río R ím ac y, 
pasando Chosica, M atucana, San M ateo, llegaba a las alturas de Yauli y 
M orococha, para luego descender al fértil valle del M antara y arribar a 
la ciudad de Ja u ja , escala obligada en una eventual m archa hacia 
H uam anga o incluso Cuzco; la tercera era una ruta sustitutoria que 
ascendía la cordillera desde el vecino valle de Pachacam ac, pasando por 
los pantanos de Cieneguilla y por el pueblo de H uarochirí, para desem­
bocar tam bién en la sierra central.^® Todas estas rutas exigían del con­
curso de muías y arrieros. Pero este medio de transporte tenía criaderas 
muy precisos que se ubicaban en los lejanos territorios de Salta y Ju juy . 
Desde allí se abastecía de acémilas a todo el virreinato, impulsando el 
funcionamiento de una dilatada ruta, trajinada sobre todo a partir de la 
segunda mitad del siglo X V III, mediante la que se unía Lim a con 
Buenos A ires. ^
Estas rutas no pudieron ser improvisadas. Siguiendo a veces antiguos 
caminos prehispánicos, fueron edificadas siempre por el tráfico secular de 
los arrieros, superando cada año los inconvenientes que podían derivarse 
de los derrum bes, en un espacio escarpado y con bruscas precipitaciones 
pluviales. Sin em bargo, estos obstáculos físicos no fueron los únicos ni 
los más difíciles. Para el T ribunal del Consulado, la principal barrera  se 
encontraba en esa especie de autosubsistencia en el interior de la cual se 
esforzaba por persistir la m ayoritaria población indígena. Aparentem ente 
no necesitaban bien alguno, ’’pues ellos no visten ropa de Castilla, sino 
de la tierra, que ellos mismos trabajan , y la tienen en abundancia ...”®® 
Pero donde esta escasa dem anda parecía quebrarse era en algunos cen­
tros urbanos, como Cuzco y A requipa, bordeando cada uno los 30.000 
habitantes, y, desde luego, en los campamentos mineros. El siglo X V III, 
contra algunas suposiciones, fue escenario de la recuperación minera 
peruana: los rendimientos se duplicaron, especialmente entre 1776 y 
1812. Esta fase ascendente se había iniciado tiempo antes, a partir de 
1720 en Potosí, pero, a medida que transcurrió el siglo, los centros más 
dinámicos estuvieron en el Bajo Perú, en C erro de Pasco, H uarochirí y
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Yauli, sin olvidar en el norte los yacimientos de Hualgayoc. En 1791, la 
población de Pasco fue calculada en 6.776 habitantes, pero el em padro­
nador precisaba que ”en esta doctrina los mas de sus habitantes no son 
estables, a causa que la subsistencia en ella pende del fruto de las minas,
y según es mas o menos este, así a proporción crece o disminuye el 
✓ 2 1 . . .  num ero de las personas... Todas estas circunstancias perm iten en ten-
der que Lim a buscase prioritariam ente su articulación espacial tanto con
Cuzco y Arequipa, en el sur andino, como con los espacios mineros de la
sierra central o del actual altiplano boliviano.
Sin embargo, conviene no exagerar el rol que pudo desem peñar la 
dem anda m inera. En el Perú, esta actividad difería sustancialmente de la 
minería en Nueva España. Aquí se trataba de un conjunto de medianas 
y pequeñas empresas, dirigidas por mineros que llegaban ’’apenas a 
cubrir sus gastos,” subordinados a los comerciantes a quienes recurrían 
solicitando préstam os.3  ^ En el Bajo Perú los mineros mayormente eran 
dueños de uno o dos ’’pozos” trabajados por un promedio de doce ope­
rarios, ubicados en lugares apartados, ya sea por los desiertos circun­
dantes, como ocurría en el mineral de G uantajaya, o por la elevada 
altitud, como en Morococha y C erro de Pasco. Algunos casos se alejaban 
e esta imagen endeble, como el minero M iguel de Espinach en H ual­
gayoc, con 167 operarios y diezisiete ’’pozos,” o M atías de U rita, con dos 
’’pozos” pero 243 operarios.33 Pocos comerciantes limeños tuvieron la 
audacia suficiente para incursionar directam ente en la minería, como 
Pedro Abadía, factor de la C om pañía de Filipinas e introductor de la 
m áquina a vapor para el desagüe de las m inas.3^ O tras dos excepciones 
fueron Isidro de Abarca, prior del T ribunal de M inería, y Ju a n  de 
A rrieta, minero en C ajatam bo. En 1770, en los testamentos de Lim a, 
sólo encontramos a un minero y en 1810, dos.33
El conjunto de la minería peruana llegó a reclutar a 18,000 opera­
rios, pero estos trabajadores, por su escasa concentración y evidente 
dispersión geográfica, no crearon la dem anda suficiente para im pulsar de 
m anera espontánea el comercio interno. En estas circunstancias, los 
propios mercaderes limeños tuvieron que buscar los medios para  expan­
dir la estrechez del mercado colonial. Conviene a esta altura desechar la 
imagen rutinaria de un capital comercial estéril y parasitario. Los 
comerciantes limeños supieron desarrollar una capacidad inventiva casi 
hasta el límite permitido por las circunstancias, al edificiar, desde la 
capital, una intricada red mercantil que pretendía abarcar las provincias 
del interior. Esta red articuló circulación y producción.
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Como funcionaba la red? Dos fueron los instrumentos más im por­
tantes. Prim ero, se trató del empleo de un mecanismo clásico en una 
sociedad colonial: la imposición del m ercader sobre el consumidor, e je r­
cida a través del ’’reparto” a que tenían derecho los corregidores. Estos 
últimos eran una combinación entre jueces y comerciantes; autoridades 
provincianas que, en compensación a su trabajo  y los costos del cargo, 
tenían la potestad de colocar diversos productos (muías, telas, rejones) en 
los lugares que estaban bajo su jurisdicción, de acuerdo a un arancel 
que, en la mayoría de las veces, era violado, especialmente cuando se 
obligaba a los indios a com prar productos de los que podían prescindir.
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Los corregidores, desde que ascendían al puesto, m antenían relaciones de 
dependencia con los comerciantes. Ellos les prestaban el dinero necesario 
para postular al cargo y luego los ’’habilitaban” de mercancías, poniendo 
a su disposición las reservas de sus bodegas o adelantándoles el dinero 
que necesitasen. A su vez, los corregidores generaban nuevas dependen­
cias, en particular con los indios, directam ente o a través de alguna 
autoridad local, como el c u ra c a .^
Jun to  a este conducto impositivo, que a la postre desembocaba en el 
consumidor indígena, los mercaderes edificaron un complicado sistema de
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intermediarios que tenía como principal eslabón a un comerciante 
itinerante: un pequeño em presario que, ya sea por préstam o monetario o 
habilitación, se surtía de mercaderías en Lim a, con ayuda de los arrie­
ros partía hacia las provincias, donde a su vez, mediante nuevos présta­
mos, adelantos o perm uta, entregaba esas mercaderías a un comerciante 
provinciano, a un hacendado o al dueño de un cam pam ento minero. 
Estos, a su vez, empleando a veces tam bién la compulsión o nuevos 
endeudamientos, term inaban colocando los productos entre los consu­
midores indígenas. T anto  en el caso de los corregidores como en el de los 
comerciantes itinerantes, el sistema de comercialización se am paraba en 
medios extraeconómicos, como los lazos de parentesco o las relaciones de 
dependencia que se form ulaban en el interior de las haciendas o los 
campamentos mineros.
Podríamos ilustrar lo dicho con la mención de algunos casos concre­
tos. U n grupo de pequeños comerciantes, habilitados en un gran almacén 
de Lima, form aron una ’’com pañía” que se traslada al puerto de Arica. 
Allí se dividen en tres grupos. U no recorre La Paz, O ruro, Chuquisaca y 
Potosí; el otro, M oauequa, T arapacá e Iquique; y el tercero establece 
en T acna ’’tienda y casa en calidad de m atriz para surtirlos de lo que 
necesitan.”37 De m anera similar procedieron otros dos empresarios. En 
julio de 1775, uno de ellos, M anuel Gómez, parte para la villa de Pasco 
llevando diversas mercaderías. Allí vende todo, instala una tienda y re­
gresa a Lim a trayendo dinero y ’’piñas” (plata recién extraída). Form a 
una ’’com pañía” con Lorenzo Camelo, que aporta 1.000 pesos, de los 
cuales se invierten 800 en adquirir nuevos productos, y entonces vuelve a 
salir el 18 de setiembre para  llegar a C erro de Pasco cinco días después. 
T erm inadas las ventas, baja  a la capital el 15 de noviembre, para  al 
poco tiempo regresar llevando aguardiente, jabón, telas, pescado seco, 
yerba del Paraguay, pasas y otros productos.33 U n ejem plo más podría 
ser el de Pascual de Am aya, teniente de infantería y comerciante, que 
llega al cerro de Yauricocha transportando telas y aguardiente, allí 
entrega todas sus mercaderías al minero y hacendado Joseph Barrientos, 
atendiendo a que, por su perm anencia en el lugar, encontraría los 
medios para vender esos productos. Pero éste, a su vez, term ina contra­
yendo otras deudas con los mineros de la región, a quienes debe 
adelantar telas o aguardiente y que, en el m ejor de los casos, term inan 
pagándole con plata p iña.39 Esta relación acabó en un juicio entre el 
comerciante y el minero. Resultan muy frecuentes, tanto en la audiencia 
como en el cabildo, los litigios por incumplimiento o dem ora en el pago 
de deudas. En 1810, en plena crisis mercantil, en los testamentos treinta
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y nueve indican algún tipo de préstamo y cuarenta admiten deudas. Un 
comerciante debe 3.685 pesos, un noble 9.000 pesos y un labrador 
14.000. O tro préstamo asciende hasta los 168.065 pesos.
U na variante de los casos mencionados anteriorm ente podría ser 
Toribio Silva. Com pró al fiado o al contado efectos de Castilla a  diversos 
comerciantes, como el Conde San Isidro, M anuel de Saldivar, Miguel 
M aticorena, y los remitió al Cuzco para expedirlos en la tienda de su 
socio M auricio de Clavos. Vicente Fernández siguió la ruta opuesta. Fue 
hasta Piura transportando efectos que pertenecían a Benito Pereira entre 
ellos paños de Inglaterra, tafetanes de Italia, listonería de Nápoles, 
junto a una variedad de productos locales, todos los cuales sum aban 
15.887 pesos. U na tercera parte de las ventas serían para el comerciante 
que seguía en Lima.
De esta m anera, el crecimiento comercial que experim enta la 
economía peruana entre 1750 y 1780 no es sólo atribuible -  como cree 
Jü rgen  Gölte -  al comercio impositivo de los corregidores. Intervinie­
ron tam bién los propios grandes comerciantes limeños, los arrieros y los 
comerciantes itinerantes o viajeros, como se les denom inaba por enton­
ces. Es probable que desde el interior mismo de las comunidades se 
produjeran algunos cambios, entre otros un sensible incremento en la 
división del trabajo , acorde con el crecimiento demográfico que, al 
parecer, evidencia la población indígena: 610.000 habitantes en 1750,
700.000 en 1800 y 760.000 en 1820.40
Jav ier T ord, en un decisivo artículo, ha mostrado gráficam ente cómo 
los ingresos por concepto de comercio se triplican en la C aja  Real de 
Potosí y ascienden casi verticalmente hasta 150 por ciento tanto en O ruro 
como en La Paz. U na curva similar se repite en Arequipa, y en Cuzco 
se incrementan cinco veces m ás.41 Es la expresión en gráficos y números 
del proceso de imposición de la capital sobre las provincias del interior 
o, si se quiere, de la edificación de un espacio mercantil. Pero nada de 
esto pudo estar exento de conflictos. El país se levanta contra Lim a, 
m ejor dicho, los campesinos contra la explotación mercantil. Proliferan 
los motines contra los corregidores y, precisamente entre 1750 y 1780, se 
agolpan la mayoría de alzamientos y rebeliones rurales del siglo.4  ^ La 
revolución tupam arista encontrará aquí uno de los motores que perm iten 
congregar en su derredor a amplias capas sociales. Aunque fue derrota­
da, se produce luego la sustitución de los corregidores por los intenden­
tes. Esto no significa, necesariam ente, la desaparición de los odiados 
repartos. En algunos casos serán ejecutados por las nuevas autoridades, 
al margen de cualquier reglamentación, pero la necesidad del sistema,
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que nacía no sólo de la imposición de Lim a sino tam bién del limitado 
mercado interior, queda en evidencia cuando la Corona discute con el 
T ribunal del Consulado la posibilidad de organizar otro mecanismo 
similar al reparto.
La red mercantil limeña no funcionó nunca como un mecanismo de 
relojería. Rápidam ente acabaron contraponiéndose los intereses m ercan­
tiles de provincias con la acción de los corregidores. Ambos sistemas, el 
comercio itinerante y el comercio impositivo, entraron en competencia. 
En Arequipa, los mercaderes locales interpusieron un proceso ante el 
T ribunal del Consulado contra el corregidor Fernando de Piélago, que 
pretendía obligarlos a que se abastecieran en el almacén propiedad de 
esa autoridad.^3 En Arica hubo un enfrentam iento similar.
Pero, a pesar de todos los inconvenientes y obstáculos enumerados, 
los grandes comerciantes limeños comenzaron a crecer amparados no sólo 
en el comercio de exportación -  importación, sino recurriendo tam bién al 
mercado interno. Sin em bargo, la edificación de este espacio recién 
em pezaba y los lazos que los unían al país eran bastante débiles. Raro 
era el m ercader limeño que no viajase a la península para supervisar sus 
negocios, visitar parientes o enterarse de las novedades de M adrid, 
donde algunas grandes tiendas encontraban en ellos espléndidos consu­
midores de ropas y objetos de lujo, atentos siempre a las últimas modas 
europeas.44 Pero esto contrastaba con el escaso contacto que m antenían 
con los pueblos en el interior del país. Allí se lim itaban al recurso de los 
intermediarios. Para la aristocracia, el comercio no era un deshonor, 
siempre y cuando no se ejerciera con las propias manos.
Aparte de las provincias, la propia ciudad de L im a era un im portante 
mercado, pero allí tam bién fue necesario introducir algunos mecanismos 
que acelerasen la circulación comercial. Las ventas corrían a cargo ya 
sea de los tenderos o de los cajoneros (propietarios de pequeños puestos 
de abasto ubicados alrededor de la Plaza M ayor o en sus cercanías). En 
cualquier cajón podían encontrarse los más diversos productos: martillos, 
alam bre, fierro, junto con cintas, chompas francesas, además de té, 
café, yerba del Paraguay, aguardiente, incluso "chafalotes” (entre espada 
y puñal) y, a veces, libros. U na variedad similar se podía encontrar en 
las pulperías. En cambio, los tambos tendían a especializarse en el 
expendio de vinos y aguardientes. Al igual que en otros casos, los gran­
des importadores no m antenían relaciones directas con los pequeños 
comerciantes, sino que recurrían a un interm ediario llamado corredor, 
quien por lo general pagaba en efectivo. Pero a él no le quedaba otro 
recurso que em plear el sistema de adelantos y deudas para colocar los
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productos. U na práctica admitida era que el corredor ocultase el nombre 
del almacenero o mayorista que lo proveía; a su vez, el com prador debía 
evitar la curiosidad de preguntar.
M uchos miembros de la aristocracia mercantil llegaron a diversificar 
sus intereses en otras actividades. O ficiaban de prestamistas, cómo los 
herm anos Elizalde o Agustín Q uijano . En 1770, 23 por ciento de los 
testadores limeños se habían beneficiado como prestamistas, m ientras 31 
por ciento tenían deudas al momento de morir. Los préstamos más 
frecuentes eran de 1.000 a 1.500 pesos, pero podían ascender hasta los 
2.200 pesos.4® Los comerciantes incursionaban eventualmente en algunas 
actividades m anufactureras. Elizalde, por ejemplo, tenía una fábrica de 
lona (abastecía a las naves del comercio). No existía especialización 
mercantil. O tra  form a de paliar los riesgos. La actividad más frecuente 
fue el arriendo de cajones, tiendas o pulperías. Mencionaremos algunos 
casos: El M arqués de M ontem ira era propietario de una tienda en el 
portal de escribanos.4® M atías de Elizalde le arrendaba una pulpería a 
José Linares. Ju an  de Encalada arrendaba otra al convento de Santa 
Rosa. Lo mismo hacía José Gonzales, Conde de Fuente Gonzales. Los 
eslabones de la cadena proseguían cuando el arrendatario llevaba ade­
lante su pequeña em presa con un ’’partidario ,” alguien que aportaba con 
su trabajo. Linares, por ejem plo, recurría a un ’’partidario” que vendía 
los productos de su tienda en pueblos, haciendas y tambos de los alre­
dedores de L im a.4^
La relación más frecuente recibió el nom bre de ”al partir.” Alguien, 
por lo general un acaudalado comerciante, colocaba el dinero, arrendaba 
la tienda o el cajón y otro, a cambio de adm inistrar el negocio, tenía 
derecho a la mitad de las utilidades. Así funcionaba la bodega de Miguel 
de C astañeda sita en la calle de Pescadería, y la fábrica de lona pro­
piedad de éste y de su hijo político Joaquín  de Asín, teniendo como socio 
”al partir” de utilidades a un tal Q u in ie la .4® En otros casos, el propie­
tario se lim itaba a arrendar el negocio, como ocurrió por ejemplo con la 
panadería que tenían la Condesa de Vista Florida y el Conde de T orre 
V elarde. José M aría Sancho Dávila fue propietario de hasta once tien­
das.4® De estos contratos no siempre quedaba constancia notarial.
Es así como entre la aristocracia mercantil y los sectores populares 
emergieron heterogéneas capas medias, en apariencia independientes pero 
en realidad subordinadas, de una m anera u otra, al capital comercial. 
Arriendos, adelantos, sistemas de ”al partir” o préstamos (al interés del 6 
por ciento), garantizaban esta dependencia. En Lim a fueron censados 
287 pulperos, además de cuarenta y ocho abastecedores y sesenta fabri­
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cantes, a los que deberíamos añadir el núm ero indeterm inado de pana­
deros y molineros, para tener así una idea aproxim ada del artesanado y 
el pequeño comercio. Pero en las capas medias deben incluirse tam bién 
los labradores (más de 300), medianos propietarios en los valles cercanos 
a la capital; la burocracia, compuesta, entre otros sectores, por más de 
4-00 empleados; y finalm ente los intelectuales, bajo cuyo nom bre habría 
que incluir a médicos (21), abogados (91), estudiantes (366), cirujanos















M arinos 2 1
Abogado 1
Pobres 6
No se indica 31 55
Fuente: AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, testamentos e inventarios.
Nota: Las cifras se refieren únicam ente a los testamentos realizados por
hombres. Hacendados equivale a gran propietario y labrador a 
mediano o pequeño terrateniente; en ocasiones los dos términos se 
em plean como sinónimo. Algunos declaran más de u n a  ocupación.
(56), notarios (13), escribanos (58), periodistas, etc.®® Volviendo a uti­
lizar los testamentos , después de comerciantes y hacendados, las ocu­
paciones más frecuentes son artesano, religioso, burócrata, escribano, 
m arino (ver T abla  I I I ) .51
Al margen de las críticas tímidas que algunos escritores realizarían a 
la administración colonial (el abogado Baquijano frente al V irrey
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Jáuregui), en general este sector social no pudo desarrollar una praxis 
independiente y propia. Crecieron al am paro de los grandes comercian­
tes. Muchos de ellos -  panaderos y pulperos, por ejemplo -  eran 
igualmente peninsulares. C om partían la fidelidad al monarco y la 
defensa de los intereses metropolitanos. La biografía del médico Hipólito 
U nanue, fiel a la causa realista hasta el final (consejero de Abascal, 
emisario de Pezuela), aunque al poco tiempo colaboraría con San M artín 
y después con Bolívar, no fue un derrotero excepcional. Simboliza 
claramente a un grupo social que quedó a la deriva, cuando no fue 
arrastrado al remolque de la aristocracia, m ientras otros miembros, 
paralelam ente, se desgajaban y caían en las capas sociales más bajas de 
la ciudad.
III. E fím ero esplendor
La historia de la clase alta colonial tuvo un episodio previo. Al 
comenzar el siglo X V II, desde Lim a un conjunto de comerciantes y 
banqueros, muchos de ellos portugueses, desplegaron empresas y nego­
cios. El punto de partida fueron los asientos de esclavos, mediante los 
cuales organizaban, desde Portugal, el tráfico negrero entre Africa y 
América. Luego vino la adquisición de haciendas y minas y, finalmente, 
el establecimiento del llamado Banco de Ju a n  de la C ueva, pero todo 
esto se derrum bó en pocos años por la acción combinada de la depresión 
económica europea, la crisis de la minería peruana y, por último, la 
Inquisición que en 1635 apresó a unos cien ’’señores del comercio”.5  ^
Cerca de treinta y cinco serían ajusticiados y el resto presos o des­
terrados.53 La recomposición de la clase alta colonial debió esperar hasta 
el siglo siguiente.
Entonces, la aristocracia mercantil limeña no era de antigua data, 
recién form ada al compás del siglo y de los incrementos en las activi­
dades mercantiles. A los miembros reclutados a través de la migración 
vasco -  navarra, habría que añadir aquellas familias que, como los Vega 
del Rhen o los M arqueses de Valle Umbroso, se trasladaron de 
H uam anga o Cuzco a Lima. T anto  en 1770 como en 1810, 21 por 
ciento de los que realizaban testamentos eran originarios de provincias 
(ver T abla IV).
En cualquiera de los casos, casi siempre se produjo una asociación 
estrecha entre los comerciantes y la administración colonial. Hemos 
mencionado el sustento que encontraron en el monopolio comercial y el 
recurso al mecanismo impositivo del reparto. Pero quizá ambos sistemas
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exigieron que los comerciantes además integrasen la alta burocracia. Es 
así como es frecuente encontrarlos de oidores: Q uerejazu , O rtiz de 
Foronda, Bravo de Rivero; Felipe Sancho Dávila fue alguacil; como 
alcaldes de Lim a figuraron Sebastián de Aliaga, José M aría Sancho 
Dávila, Miguel de Oyague, José Colm enares; Augustin Q uijano  fue 
gobernador del Cercado. Casi todos los mencionados tenían algún cargo 
dentro del ejército: Coronel de dragones como O yague, o de caballería 
como José González y Fernando Carillo de Albornoz. Desde luego que 
entre los cargos más preciados estuvieron, junto a los puestos públicos, 
los de prior y cónsules del T ribunal del Consulado, detentados, entre 
otros, por Antonio Elizalde, el Conde Villar de Fuentes, Francisco de 
Izcue, Joaquín  Azcona, Isidro de A barca, Joaquín  Ferrer.
TABLA IV: Principales Personajes de la Clase Alta Lim eña
L ugar de Actividad C argos
naci -  em presarial públicos M
N om bres m iento T ítu lo /O rd en 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 A B C  D
A badía, Pedro N a X X X
A barca, Isid ro  de Li C onde X X X X X
A guirre , J a v ie r  M aría C arlos I II X X X
A riaga, S ebastián de Li C onde X X X X X X X
A lvarez del V illar, A ntonio Li X X
A rias de S aavedra, Francisco Li C onde X X X X
A rnaiz , D om ingo Bu X X X
A rrese, Jo a q u ín X
A rrie ta  y A scaraja , J u a n Vi X X X
Asín, Jo a q u ín N a X X X X
A scona, Jo a q u ín C onde/C alatrava X
B aquíjano  y C arrillo , José Li C onde/C arlos I II X X X X
Boza, Pedro Li M arqués X X X X X
C arrillo  de A lbornoz, F ernando Li C onde/M ontaza X X X X
C astañeda , J u a n  M iguel Vi C onde X X X X X X X
C olm enares, Jo sé  Félix C onde X X
Elizalde, A ntonio Na Santiago X X X X X
Elizalde, Jo sé  M atías N a X X X
E ncalada, J u a n  Félix Li C onde/Santiago X X X X
Espinach , M iguel de X X
Espinoza, J u a n  Francisco X X
E scurra , D om ingo de N a X X X
F errer, Jo a q u ín Bi C arlos I II X X
G ara te , J u a n  Bautista E X
G onzález G utiérrez , Jo sep h Li C onde/S antiago X X X X
G onzález y Fuente, Jo sep h Li C onde/S antiago X X X X X
Iscua, Ja v ie r  de X X
L am o y Z úñiga, Jo a q u ín Bu C onde X X X
L arre ta , M atías N a X X X X
269
N om bres
L ugar de 
naci -
m iento  T ítu lo /O rd en
Actividad C argos
em presarial públicos M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  A B C D
L arriva , V icente Li X X
Lavalle, Jo sé  A ntonio T r C onde X X X X
López, M iguel Li X X
M e n d ib u ru , M iguel de Vi X X X
M oreira , F rancisco Li X X X X X
O rtiz  de Foronda, José Li C onde/S antiago X X X X
O rra n tia , D om ingo de Li X X
O yague, M iguel Li C onde/S an tiago X X X X X
P uen te  y C astro , Esteban de la C arlos I II X
Q u e re ja z u , Jo sé  de Li C ond e/C alatrav a X X X X
Q u e re ja z u  y M ollinedo, A ntonio Santiago X
Q u ija n o , A gustín Li C ond e/C alatrav a X X X X
R am írez  de A rellano, D om ingo V ig C ala trav a X X X X X X
R am írez  de L aredo, G asp ar Stgo. C onde/San tiago X X X
R iva A güero, Jo sé Li C arlos I II X X
Sancho D ávila, Felipe Li M arqués/M onteza X X X X X
Sancho D ávila, Jo sé  M aría Li C arlos I II X X
T o rre  T agle, M atías C alatrava X X X
T ra m a rria , Pedro  de Li X
V ásquez de A cuña , Jo sé Ay C onde X X
V illar, Jo sé  A ntonio  del V i X
N ota: (1) C om ercio (casa com ercial, bodega, tienda); (2) a rm ad o r (p roprie tá rio  de naves);
(3) m an u fac tu ra ; (4) servicios (p an ad ería , pu lpería  e tc .); (5) créditos; (6) m inas;
(7) haciendas (bajo  este ru b ro  quedan inclu idas chacras y pequeñas propriedades);
(8) obrajes.
(A) C abildo; (B) A udiencia; (C ) E jército; (D ) O tros; (M ) S uscriptor del 
Mercurio Peruano (1 7 9 0 -  1795).
Ay = A yacucho; Bi = Bilbao, Bu = Burgos; E  = E spaña; Li ■= L im a; N a  «  N avarra;
Stgo. = Santiago/C hile; V i *  V izcaya; V ig ■ V iguera
Fuentes: A G N (P), Protocolos N otaria les (índice T e rán ); T rib u n a l del C onsulado (H .3 , L .N . 907,
L .N . 975, L .N . 1031. A rchivo H istórico  R iva  -  Agüero; J e a n  -  P ie rre  C lém en t, Indices 
del Mercurio Peruano 1790-1795  (L im a, 1979); G uillerm o L o h m an n , Los ministros de 
la Audiencia de Lima  (Sevilla, 1974); M an u el M e n d ib u ru , Diccionario Histórico Bio­
gráfico del Perú (L im a, 1932); Luis V arela  y O rbegoso, Apuntes para la historia de la 
sociedad colonial (L im a, 1924).
La culminación en la carrera de un comerciante fue casi invariable­
mente el ingreso a alguna orden nobiliaria. En Lim a, durante la segunda 
mitad del siglo X V III, se produce una verdadera inflación de títulos. 
Ascienden casi verticalmente, de ocho durante el quinquenio 1761 -  65 a 
cincuenta y tres entre 1 7 8 6 -9 0 , y en el lustro siguiente, noventa y uno.
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En adelante se producirá un descenso igualmente brusco, hasta los nueve 
que se otorgan entre 1821 -  25 (ver Gráfico II). Desde luego que las 
órdenes no estaban reñidas con el comercio, mientras no fuese ejercido 
directam ente. Por el contrario, aunque en apariencia era sólo una 
recompensa por los servicios al Rey y la Corona, lo cierto es que una 
sólida fortuna era un respaldo indispensable. El historiador Pablo M acera 
llega a sostener que si un noble no se vinculaba al comercio o a la 
burocracia, estaría condenado a la m iseria.5^ En definitiva, el incremento 
de nobles obedece a un total de 161 que ingresan en la nueva orden de 
Carlos III, para lo cual un requisito más im portante que la hidalguía y 
la constancia de no haber desempeñado oficios ’’bajos,” era poder abonar
la sum a exigida. Esa orden se creó como un medio de solventar nuevos
i - 55ingresos a la m onarquía.
U n destino individual, el de Domingo R am írez de Arellano, nos 
puede ayudar a precisar otros rasgos de esta aristocracia mercantil. 
H abia nacido en V iguera, Logroño, el 8 de mayo de 1742, y pasó a 
A mérica cuando en 1764 falleció su tío, el comerciante Andrés Ram írez 
de Arellano, quien, al no tener descendientes, lo designó como su here­
dero universal.56 Domingo tuvo como principal rubro de sus actividades 
el comercio de exportación -  importación. Fue propietario de la fragata 
’’N uestra Señora de las M ercedes.” En los protocolos notariales aparece 
comprando azúcar a hacendados de Cañete. La internaba en Chile, de 
donde a su vez em barcaba trigo. Pero no se detenía en Valparaíso, sino 
que continuaba hasta Chiloé, para de allí im portar cueros. Sobre el eje 
Callao -  V alparaíso sus negocios se expandieron a escala continental. En 
su archivo se puede encontrar una intensa correspondencia con un 
empleado suyo, Bernardo Roca, establecido en G uayaquil, al igual que 
con otros comerciantes, tanto en C erro de Pasco como en Potosí. Poseyó 
una recua de muías propia y un obraje en la sierra. Al comercio sumó, 
finalm ente, el oficio de prestamista.
El matrimonio con C atalina Baquíjano y Carillo le permitió en trar en 
posesión de la hacienda Pando, cerca de Lim a. Esta era h ija  del Conde 
de V ista Florida y heredó el título. Ju a n  Bautista de Baquíjano, su 
padre, vino al Perú durante el prim er tercio del siglo X V III. Poseyó 
barcos, casas y haciendas. A su vez, Domingo Ram írez de Arellano 
pertenecía a la orden de C alatrava. Fue tam bién C apitán de Alabarderos 
y Prior en el T ribunal del Consulado. De su matrimonio tuvo una hija, 
doña Josefa Ram írez, que se casaría con G aspar de O sm a, miembro del 
Consejo de su M ajestad y oidor, un aristócrata que, durante las guerras 
de la Independencia, em igraría al Callao, ocupado por los realistas.
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G R A FIC O  II: Ordenes Nobiliarias, Lima 1 7 0 0 - 1825
1701 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1800 10 20
□  Santiago ggg Carlos n I
Ill'll C alatrava 6= 3  M alta 
[~~G A lcántara 
ÍH9 M ontesa
Fuente: El gráfico se basa en cifras proporcionadas por Guillermo Lohmann
Villena, Los americanos en las órdenes nobiliarias (1529-1900)  
(M adrid, 1947) I, pp.LX X V  -  LX X V I.
La aristocracia limeña desarrolló rasgos endogámicos. ”E ra una 
sociedad dentro de la sociedad,” sostenía el historiador Jorge Guillermo 
Leguía. Pariente cercano de los Ram írez de Arellano fue José M aría 
Sancho Dávila, casado con la M arquesa de C orpa. El matrimonio similar 
del M arqués de Valle Umbroso con doña G rim anesa de la Puente unió 
un linaje cusqueño con uno de Lim a. Alianzas matrimoniales como éstas 
garantizaban la estabilidad de los sectores dominantes. Eran imprescin­
dibles dada la imbricación entre familias y empresas mercantiles. Un 
caso extremo pero ilustrativo fue el de Ju an  Miguel de Castañeda, quien 
sólo tuvo cuatro hijas mujeres y escasamente agraciadas; temeroso de 
cualqier arribista, optó por ’’im portar” a cuatro aristócratas peninsulares 
para casarlos con ellas, uno de los cuales fue Joaquín de Asín, un
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navarro, con el que com partiría la conducción de una fábrica de 
pólvora.
Jun to  a la endogamia, otro rasgo que traza el perfil de la aristocracia 
colonial es el lujo, en alguna medida denunciado por el economista 
Lequanda: las amplias casonas de Lim a adornadas con lienzos, muebles 
y platería.57 Algunas, como la de Osam bela eran provistas de un 
adecuado m irador para desde allí observar la llegada de los barcos al 
Callao; mientras otras, como la de Castañeda, exhibían con orgullo en la 
fachada la proa de un navio. Las habitaciones eran altas y anchas, en 
la tradición de la casa solariega levantina, colocadas alrededor de un 
patio central rectangular. Siguieron en la parte posterior, un segundo 
patio y, en dirección opuesta al viento, los cuartos de los esclavos, para 
que el aire se llevase supuestos malos olores. Las dos secciones de la 
casona quedaban separadas y comunicadas a la vez por un angosto 
callejón. La biblioteca y las calesas completaban el mobiliario. Su 
extensión ideal era de 1.200 varas cuadradas.58
Pero, más allá de la amplitud interior, otros rasgos distintivos de estas 
casonas dieciochescas fueron las paredes exteriores altas, los balcones y 
las ventanas enrejadas. A mediados del siglo X V III se desarrolla una 
actividad artesanal de amplia demanda: la barrotería de hierro o bronce 
con piezas fundidas. M am paras y ventanas de rejas se pueden observar 
todavía, por ejemplo, en la llam ada C asa la Riva. Protegían y ador­
naban; a veces se les recargaba con adornos rococó. Fueron tan  fre­
cuentes en las fachadas limeñas que, comparando con La H abana de 
Alejo C arpentier (la ciudad de las columnas), podríamos llam ar a Lima 
la ciudad de las rejas. Ellas separaban con nitidez a la aristocracia, cuya 
vida fam iliar transcurría con más frecuencia en las salas y comedores 
interiores, de la plebe, que invadía las plazas y calles de la ciudad, como 
veremos más adelante.
Algunos aristócratas consideraban -  como el Conde de C asa Jijón  
en carta dirigida a Miguel de Jijón , residente en Lim a -  al lujo como 
un imperativo de su condición. ’’Aunque no sea por propia comodidad y 
gusto, estamos ... precisados a conservar la decencia necesaria para  que 
no se burlen los émulos.”59 Pero no era un sacrificio tan grande si 
atendemos a la multitud de distracciones que enm arcaban la vida de la 
aristocracia. El Conde de la Vega del Rhen, aparte de veladas fam iliares 
(banquetes como el que pintara Tadeo Escalante en un ’’árbol de la 
vida,” sobre los muros de Acomayo), el juego de naipes, las corridas de 
toros, era gran aficionado a la cacería y, al igual que otros, frecuentaba 
los pantanos de Surco (cerca de la hacienda Villa), donde podía ejerci­
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tarse en la caza de venados o patos salvajes.®® Otros ’’signos exteriores 
de riqueza” eran los perros, los caballos, las alhajas, las escopetas y un 
costoso vestuario. De especial significación fueron las calesas. En ellas se 
exhibían los aristócratas todos los domingos recorriendo la alam eda que 
había edificado el Virrey Am at. Pero, evidentemente, más im portante 
que cualquiera de los mencionados era la posesión de otros hombres: el 
núm ero de esclavos.®1
De la combinación de estos rasgos tradicionales con los elementos 
innovadores mencionados páginas atrás (talleres ”al partir,” redes de 
endeudamiento) derivó la edificación de un peculiar mercado de trabajo. 
Se requería de jornaleros y asalariados para poner en funcionamiento los 
circuitos mercantiles. Fuerza de trabajo  esclava para las haciendas y 
tam bién como símbolo de estatus en las ciudades. Artesanos que susten­
tasen los pedidos de rejas o platería. La relación podría seguir. Pero esta 
dem anda era tan fluctuante e inestable como el devenir mismo del 
capital comercial limeño. Para saciarse requería de una heterogeneidad 
muy am plia de oficios. A esta situación se am oldaba más el jornalero 
eventual que el asalariado perm anente. La desocupación tem poral y el 
subempleo son factores constitutivos al esplendor mercantil. Fueron 
simplemente el reverso. Sería erróneo considerar estos rasgos del mercado 
laboral como anómalos o marginales. Eran parte imprescindible de la 
estructura colonial.
Pero el sustento del esplendor mercantil era sum am ente frágil, como 
pudieron experimentarlo a  medida que el siglo X V III se aproxim aba a 
su fin. Los comerciantes habían sido celosos defensores del monopolio. 
Para ellos, el contrabando era un ’’horrendo crim en,” y exigían que 
quienes lo perpetrasen fuesen ahorcados sin m isericordia.52 No pudi­
eron sentir ninguna sim patía por la apertura de nueve puertos de España 
y América, decretada en 1765. Amenazaron con entregar las llaves de 
sus tiendas y cajones, anunciaron una inminente ruina general. Similares 
protestas se repitieron cuando, en 1777, se crea el V irreinato del Río de 
la Plata. El Atlántico se impone sobre la M ar del Sur y, aunque la 
población de Lim a sigue incrementándose, en fechas similares la de 
Buenos Aires se multiplicará por cinco.
A parece, de esta m anera, un polo rival en el continente, y tanto los 
hacendados como los comerciantes de Santiago quedan al acecho de 
cuanto pueda favorecerlos en el conflicto. La hegemonía de los merca­
deres limeños se deteriora. Al año siguiente, Carlos III decreta el libre 
comercio. Para el T ribunal del Consulado fue una especie de ’’institu- 
cionalización” del tráfico ilícito.®3 A brir Arica como puerto libre equi­
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valía, glosando nuevamente los pareceres de la corporación limeña, a la 
amputación de todo el Alto P erú .6“*
TABLA V: Efectos Personales Registrados en Testamentos, 1770
Tipo Hombres Mujeres Total
Ropa 38 44 82
Muebles 39 43 82
Vajilla 22 27 49
Alhajas 17 32 49
Libros 9 1 10
Calesas 10 9 19
Lienzos 15 22 37
Armas 12 - 12
Declaran: 110
No declaran: 120
Fuente: AGN(P), Protocolos Notariales, Testamentos.
Lim a pierde, de esta m anera y en pocos años, el respaldo colonial 
que siempre le había conferido la corona española. Q uizá ésto hubiera 
aproxim ado a los comerciantes hacia posiciones reformistas, e incluso 
separatistas, si no m ediaban otras circunstancias. Paralelam ente, en las 
áreas del interior, donde reposaba -  como decíamos -  el otro pilar del 
fugaz esplendor mercantil, los motines urbanos y rurales desembocan en 
una "gran rebelión,” que convulsiona, con T úpac Am aru II, a todo el 
Cuzco y después, con T úpac C atari, se propala hasta La Paz. El 
T ribunal del Consulado se compromete, entonces, a m antener 1.000 
hom bres arm ados y, además, otros 1.000 uniformados para com batir a 
los insurgentes, a lo que se sum arán algunos donativos particulares, como 
el de Q uere jazu , ascendiente a 2.000 pesos.65 Com prendieron que 
España seguía siendo la mejor garantía de su poder y que, a pesar de 
la abolición del reparto o la apertura del "libre comercio,” el destino de 
la aristocracia limeña estaba indisolublemente ligado a la Corona:
Las Américas son una  parte integrante y muy principal de la m onarquía 
española. U nidas íntim am ente a ella y conspirando siempre a  su mayor 
lustre, prosperidad, es muy difícil que ningún poder extraño consiga trans­
form arla en ningún evento.®®
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Sabemos que el vaticinio no se cumplió. Pero los comerciantes se 
aferraron casi con desesperación a este proyecto, no obstante que los 
cambios desencadenados por las reformas borbónicas se sintieron rápi­
dam ente en sus libros de contabilidad y en el peso de sus arcas. Después 
de un brusco ascenso en las recaudaciones de la C aja  Real de Lim a en 
la década de 1770, antes que term ine ese período se inicia un descenso 
que, dibujando una febril inestabilidad, proseguirá hasta term inar el 
siglo. U na trayectoria similar será seguida por los ingresos en la recién 
creada aduana de Lim a (ver Gráfico III).
G R A FIC O  III: Ingresos de la Caja Real y  la Aduana de Lim a,
1 7 6 0 - 1799
LIMA ,1760-1799Pesos
 C a ja  Real
 A d u an a
A ños 60 70 80 90 99
Fuente: Javier Tord y Carlos Lazo, ’’Economía y sociedad en el Perú
colonial (dominio económico),” Historia del Perú, t.IV  (Lima 
1980), p p .549 y 550.
En 1787, un m ercader limeño describe los intercambios como muy 
abatidos, señalando como causa el ”libre comercio:”
Los muchos registros que han conducido bastante ropa, e infin ita mercería, 
pues no hay calle en que no se vean dos o tres tiendas de este género, fuera 
de que los Almacenes se hallan abarrotados sin poder vender ni al fiado por­
que no se encuentra persona segura de vida y m uerte con quien hacer
dependencia.67
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Se benefician navios y comerciantes extranjeros inundando el escaso
mercado, mientras para los mercaderes locales las cobranzas se hacen
difíciles. A um entan los juicios por deudas. La morosidad interfiere los 
negocios. T erm inan fallando incluso los más cumplidos. Ju an  
Domínguez, vecino de Lim a y comerciante, que se enorgullecía de haber 
pagado puntualm ente las habilitaciones que le hacían los almaceneros, 
en 1797 tiene que admitir ”la injuria de los tiempos: la común y general 
decadencia en que se halla el comercio, me ha venido a tocar en des­
gracia de experim entar la adversidad;” se hallaba bordeando ”la ruina 
total.”68 Acabó partiendo para  Trujillo, a la espera de m ejor suerte. Ese
mismo año los ingleses am enazaban la costa. Se teme que el Callao
termine bloqueado. La fragata ”E1 C arm en” opta por no salir, enterada 
que otra fragata se encontró con una goleta inglesa. Los demás navieros 
deciden exigir que se form e un convoy arm ado. El azúcar se queda en 
los almacenes del puerto y corre el riesgo de deteriorarse.69 El precio del 
trigo asciende, perturbando la vida en la ciudad. A unque estos proble­
mas duran apenas pocos meses, 1797 sería la antesala en el callejón sin 
salida a donde se dirigía casi inexorablemente el comercio limeño.
Desde dos años antes, Ignacio de Lequanda había constatado los 
inicios de la crisis mercantil. Las acuñaciones monetarias y las cifras de 
la C aja  Real confirman su versión. El fenómeno afecta incluso a las 
adquisiciones de títulos nobiliarios. ’’Este comercio está en notable deca­
dencia, así por la división del V irreinato, escasez de dinero y compra­
dores, como tam bién por los muchos efectos que hay en esta Plaza por 
cuyo motivo no saben qué hacer las gentes...”70
Así empezó el epílogo de un dram a que, visto desde su inicio, pudo 
tener otro desenlace: bruscamente se interrum pió el proceso que llevaba 
a la edificación de una clase dominante colonial. La aristocracia limeña, 
liderada por los comerciantes del T ribunal del Consulado, no sólo tenía 
un mismo sustento material, sino que además parecía cohesionarse con 
proyectos políticos propios, la opción a favor de una integración mayor 
con España, la procedencia común de sus miembros, los lazos de 
parentesco y los hábitos cotidianos. Pero, ante todo, la aristocracia se 
definía en ese empeño por dom inar a las economías vecinas de Q uito  y 
Santiago y, paralelam ente, construir una vasta red mercantil que signi­
ficara la imposición de Lim a sobre los espacios andinos. Las dificultades 
para  crear este mercado interno colonial -  tem a que sobrepasa los 
límites de nuestra investigación -  perm itirían entender las débiles raíces 
que, en definitiva, unieron a la aristocracia con el país. A la postre, 
quedó suspendida entre el gran comercio de exportación y los vastos 
espacios interiores. En alguna medida, su trayectoria resume esa ambi­
valencia de un país provisto de "millares de puertos y caletas que le
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proporcionan comunicación cómoda con todo el resto del m undo,” 
mientras de espalda al m ar se podía contem plar ”un terreno inmenso, 
dividido por grandes e inaccesibles cordilleras, multitud de caudalosos 
rios, tarabitas o pasos dificultosísimos...”^
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11. U RB A N  M A R K E T  A ND  A G R A R IA N  H IN T E R L A N D : 
LIM A  IN  T H E  L A TE C O L O N IA L  PE R IO D
M arcel H aitin
Since the publication more than thirty years ago of Guillermo 
Céspedes del Castillo’s seminal ’’Lim a y Buenos Aires: Repercusiones 
económicas y políticas de la creación del virreinato del P lata ,” our 
understanding of this period of Peruvian history has been colored by a 
persistent image of widespread stagnation and economic decline.* In 
recent years, however, this traditional interpretation has begun to be 
replaced by a less pessimistic and at the same time more nuanced model 
of Peruvian economic perform ance. John  R . Fisher’s 1977 monograph 
on the growth (rather than decline) of postpartition Peruvian silver pro­
duction has categorically revised long -  held views about the condition of 
this key sector of the colonial economy.“* T here are also indications of 
economic vitality in other sectors of the Peruvian economy. An earlier 
study by Fisher of the impact of Bourbon administrative changes in the 
viceroyalty suggests that overseas trade was experiencing modest econo­
mic expansion in the 1790’s.3 The lo n g -aw a ited  publication of statistics 
of colonial revenue entering the Lim a treasury by John  J .  TePaske and 
H erbert S. Klein bears out the British historian’s thesis, for they show 
that tax collections from commerce (alcabalas) and foreign trade (almo­
jarifazgos) rose steadily and at times dramatically during the fifty -  year 
period 1 7 3 6 - 1785.4 Alcabala revenues rose even higher in the 1790’s, to 
about four million pesos in the quinquennium  1 7 9 0 - 1794.'’
In  addition to confirming the flourishing state of the mining sector of 
Lower Peru, the treasury accounts of Lim a also suggest regional econo­
mic expansion, for the net rem ittance from provincial treasuries to the 
Lim a m atrix increased substantially between the 1760’s and the 1780’s. 
They also provide a sense of demographic transition, as revealed in the 
growth of tribute revenue in the last fifty years of the eighteenth cen­
tury.
T he new perspective on the global state of the Peruvian economy 
afforded by the recent historiography should certainly not obscure the 
fact that our knowledge of substantive problems is still rather patchy. 
T he agricultural sector is a case in point. T he movement over time of 
the two -  ninths of one -  half of the tithe collected as Crown income
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shows, for instance, a healthy increase between the 1740’s and 1760’s, 
but this impetus appears to have been spent by the following decade.® 
O n the other hand, tithe figures for the Lim a archbishopric suggest a 
more positive trend in agricultural production. While the average figure 
for the period 17 7 4 - 1779 was 126,546 pesos, the years 17 9 0 - 1794 saw 
an 18 percent increase to 148,866 pesos. T he value of the tithe in 1803 
was 182,349 pesos, a figure apparently maintained throughout the 
decade. In 18 1 0 -1 8 1 4  tithe revenue averaged 184,826 pesos.^ At about 
the same time that eighteenth -  century commentators pointed to the 
dismal condition of the sugar haciendas of Trujillo, one Crown official 
noted with satisfaction that tithe revenue in that province had increased 
from  72,685 pesos in 1759/60 to 131,509 pesos in 1787/88, a surge he 
ascibed to the discovery of silver ore in Hualgayoc in the early 1770’s.®
These contradictory strands of evidence underscore w hat seems to be 
the crucial aspect of the colonial economy: its spatial fragm entation and 
regional diversity. T he fundam ental integrative force here is obviously 
represented by the dynamic inter -  relationship between regions and 
markets. In  this regard, the key role played by the mining sector of the 
Peruvian economy (as the tithe data for Trujillo  reveal) has been recog­
nized by most colonial historians.9 O n the other hand, the part played by 
urban markets as stimulators of trade, agriculture, and industry still 
needs to be delineated in sharper detail.^9 In this paper, therefore, we 
attem pt to refine our understanding of late colonial P eru’s agrarian 
sector from a regional perspective: the capital of the viceroyalty and its 
hinterland. Because of L im a’s functional importance as interm ediary 
between the outside and domestic economies, we are concerned to 
develop two tightly interwoven avenues of historical evidence: first, the 
impact external factors had in transform ing the size and structure of 
u rban dem and, second, the response of the rural economy to the urban 
market through the analysis of price trends for selected agricultural 
commodities.
Let us begin with modifications in the city’s traditional commercial 
structure. Prior to the changes in Crown policy that took place during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, Lim a had been the beneficiary of 
the mercantilistic economic ideas followed by Spain since the early colo­
nial period. As the southern terminus of the fleet system that connected 
the peninsular and colonial economies, the city held a relatively tight 
monopoly of European trade and export of bullion. L im a’s most im por­
tant merchants, organized in a Consulado since 1613, controlled the 
viceroyalty’s internal markets by purchasing most of the European
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merchandize imported into Peru and through dominance of marketing 
and pricing mechanisms. T he transition from a strictly regimented to a 
progressively looser transatlantic trade structure, begun in the 1740’s as a 
consequence of the Spanish -  British w ar of 17 3 9 - 1748 when single 
ships were allowed to ply the alternative route around Cape H orn and 
anchor at Callao irrespective of tim e and condition of the Peruvian 
m arket, inaugurated a period of progressive erosion of the ability of 
Lim eño  importers to control an increasing flow of goods into Peru. In 
institutional term s, this process was carried to completion by 1778 with 
the elimination of the Cádiz -  Lim a trade monopoly and the further 
simplification of transatlantic shipping through the abolition and reduc­
tion of a num ber of regulatory constraints.11
Events resulting from  Spain’s almost continuous involvement in 
European conflicts also contributed to destroy w hat little was left of 
L im a’s old monopolistic structure. In the afterm ath of the Spanish- 
British w ar of 1 7 7 9 - 1783, for example, peninsular m erchants shipped 
the large inventories they had accumulated during the years when 
communications between Spain and the American colonies were in ter­
rupted. As a consequence of the excess of supply over demand, prices of 
imports began to fall drastically, commercial capital in Lim a became tied 
to merchandize that was rapidly depreciating, and a rush of business 
failures ensued. By 1795, much of the Peruvian debt owed to metro­
politan interests still remained unpaid .1^
. These episodes of European w arfare continued to underm ine Spain’s 
ability to trade with its colonies and made it impossible for the large 
Lim eño  m erchant to exert an effective degree of control over the supply 
of foreign goods entering the Peruvian market. New hostilities between 
Spain and England (1 7 9 6 - 1802) forced the Spanish Crown to open 
colonial tade to neutrals (1797).13 Seven years earlier, the Nootka Sound 
dispute between the two powers was solved when the Bourbons grudg­
ingly conceded England permission to navigate, trade, and fish in the 
Spanish Pacific, an agreem ent that resulted in an increase of smuggling 
episodes along the coast of southern P e ru .14 Vessels from other countries 
also began to penetrate the South Pacific market. In 1800, for example, 
a ship from  H am burg  was allowed to sell its cargo in L im a.13 Between 
1788 and 1809, some 257 United States sails plied the coasts of Chile 
and P e ru .1®
It was Britain, however, that presented the greatest threat to Lim eño  
commercial interests. By 1806, a brisk trade under a licensing system 
was underw ay from  Britain to the Pacific coast of South A merica and
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the Río de la P la ta .12 T he rhythm  of exports to Spanish America 
increased substantially when Britain began to suffer the effects of 
N apoleon’s continental blockade. By 1808, in the afterm ath of the fall of 
the Spanish Crown to the French, Britain and Spain became allies in 
the war against the common enemy; this alliance further encouraged 
British penetration in the Spanish American market. In 1807 -  1808, for 
instance, eleven ships sailed from England to Chile and Peru, their hauls 
laden with merchandize valued at 933,000 pounds Sterling.18 In response 
to a viceregal inquiry, the Lim a Consulado estimated that in the 
tw o -y e a r  period 1 8 0 9 - 1810 nine million pesos worth of manufactures 
had been smuggled into Peru while for the period 1800 -  1810 contra­
band trade entering the viceroyalty by the Panam a -  Paita route had 
exceeded twenty million pesos. O n the other hand, legal imports through 
Montevideo, Panam a, and Spain, for the same eleven -  year period, 
were estimated at 29.5 million pesos.1® W hatever their merits, these 
figures indicate the declining importance of legal trade and the com­
parative advantage of extralegal economic avenues.
T he steep erosion of the Lim a -  Cádiz commercial route severely 
affected the large Lim eño  wholesaler who over the course of the early 
colonial period had been the principal beneficiary of L im a’s monopoly of 
trade. T he underm ining of his control over commercial events had as its 
main consequence the appearance of competing interests, some power­
ful, some modest, within the city’s mercantile community. A foreboding 
of developments that would show their full impact in the closing decades 
of the eighteenth century occurred during the period of registered ships 
when, as a result of the expansion of trade, the Lim eño  im porter, fe a r­
ful about the very real possibility that he would be unable to dispose of 
his stock in a glutted market, elected to restrict the am ount of goods he 
purchased. This forced the Spanish m erchant just docked at Callao to set 
up shop and sell his cargo directly to the public. As a result, Lim eño  
businessmen had thereafter to share their domestic market with a new 
and substantial group of peninsular m erchants.2®
The liberalization of trade after 1778 and the recurrent dislocations of 
inter -  oceanic communications through the turn  of eighteenth century 
continued the process. T he two wealthiest men in late colonial Lima 
were the merchants Pedro Abadía and José Arizmendi. Abadía had a 
personal fortune of four million pesos; Arizmendi was worth over two 
million pesos.21 These men were closely connected to the Royal Philip­
pine Com pany, a stock corporation which since 1796 imported goods into 
Peru directly from M anila .22 Abadía and Arizmendi possessed the abi­
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lity and entrepreneurial flexibility to engage in unconventional com m er­
cial ventures involving other sectors of the Peruvian economy and foreign 
markets that had been beyond the reach of the city’s traditional m er­
cantile groups. Abadía, for example, managed to consign cargoes of 
cascarilla bark for sale in Russia; through his connections with Asia, he 
was able to introduce into Peru better strains of sugarcane which he 
imported from Ind ia .23 In 1819, when Lim a was being strangled by the 
insurgents’ sea blockade, it was the firm  of Arizmendi and Abadía that 
struck a deal with the Viceroy whereby they donated 200,000 pesos to 
the exchequer, 50,000 as an outright grant and the rem ainder against 
custom duties. In  return, the viceroy granted the two merchants the right 
to use one or two ships of any flag to im port merchandize from 
C hina .24 T he two businessmen also invested directly in P eru ’s mining 
sector, form ing a company in 1812 to finance the construction in London 
of steam engines to be installed at C erro de Pasco.23
Small merchants were also able to take advantage of the new econo­
mic opportunities. D uring the 1786 market glut, for instance, the Lim a 
Consulado noted that while large commercial houses had withdrawn from 
business or gone into bankruptcy commerce was being conducted by 
"hands of very limited m eans.”23 Five years later, the ’’M ercurio Perua­
no” reported that since the liberalization of trade one third more retail
shops (tiendas de varear géneros) had opened their doors to Lim eño
9 7consumers. Again, in 1810, at a time when the viceroyaity was flooded 
with English manufactures, L im a’s main square was teeming with stalls 
in which foreign merchandize was sold.23 Tadeo Haenke, the Czech 
naturalist who visited Lim a in the late 1790’s, noted that, in addition to 
the wholesalers (almaceneros) and commission merchants (encomenderos) , 
the viceregal capital featured independent small m erchants who pur­
chased merchandize in small quantities, hauled it to the interior for sale, 
and returned to Lim a to start the process anew. These modest entre­
preneurs apparently also traded in silver piñas, purchasing small quan­
tities at a discount, on a cash basis, at the pit head, and selling them  to 
the Lim a mint. Since this trade did not involve offering advances to the 
miner, it was free from risk and usually gave the small m erchants good 
financial retu rns.2^
By the late colonial period, therefore, the old Lim eño  monopolist, so 
deeply committed to the Cádiz commercial lifeline, saw his position 
weakened by the emergence in the city of new and more dynamic 
economic groups. This redistribution of commercial wealth, although 
ungaugeable, appears to be the most significant social consequence to
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evolve out of the Bourbon reform period. W riting in the "M ercurio 
Peruano” in 1790, José Rossi y R ubi, the V ice -P res id en t of the Socie­
dad de Am antes del País, indicted the old monopolists who longed for 
times long past and exaggerated the city’s poverty because of the absence 
of ’’those gigantic capitals” existing at the beginning, and even in the 
middle of the eighteenth century. Observing that earnings were less 
substantial because they were distributed among a larger num ber of 
individuals, Rossi y Rubi pointed to the increased prosperity of the arti­
san, the sm a ll-sca le  m erchant, the laborer, and the trader.30 This 
assessment was shared by many prom inent creoles.31 In his visit to Lima 
twelve years later, Alexander von Hum boldt also noticed that commer­
cial wealth was evenly distributed particularly, as he was to find out 
later, when compared to M exico 's.3“1
Rossi y R ub i’s favorable prognosis of the changes brought about by 
the implementation of the Bourbon reforms appears to be essentially 
correct but requires further amplification. T he available evidence 
suggests, for instance, that the city experienced a period of urban growth 
in the last third of the eighteenth century followed by stagnation or 
perhaps decline of the building industry in the early nineteenth 
century. O n the other hand, examination of parish registers of 
baptisms and burials for the years following 1790 indicates that Lima 
-  with a total population of roughly 53,000 in 1790 -  experienced a 
mild demographic increase, fueled mainly by immigration, which peaked 
during the first decade of the nineteenth century. T he outbreak of revo­
lutionary activity within and without the viceroyalty in the late 1800’s 
caused a substantial num ber of refugees to seek sanctuary in the vice­
regal capital. As a result, by 1811 Lim a had swelled to an estimated
80,000 inhabitants. T he population declined immediately thereafter, but 
sharp demographic fluctuations associated with the movement of civilians 
and armies in and out of the city continued to characterize the rem inder 
of the period.3^
Connected to the changes in the structure of commercial life were the 
expansion and transform ation of urban patterns of consumption, as seen 
in the more cosmopolitan air urban life had taken since the 1770’s, with 
new cafés, inns, barber shops, and commercial establishments opened to 
the public. Several factors account for the general well -  being of the 
city’s middle groups. The economy of Lim a rested upon two basic pil­
lars: commerce and government. If the new economic climate that 
evolved as a consequence of imperial policy brought about a redistribu­
tion of commercial wealth, it also contributed to mitigate, in a city
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accustomed to operate within a wider viceregal space, the economic shock 
of market losses and territorial dislocation. An increase in the elasticity 
of Peruvian demand after the loss of twenty -  three provinces to the new 
Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata was reported by a senior customs 
official in 1794.30 W hile this increase in internal consumption was 
undoubtedly related to the decline in the cost of imports, it was also the 
expansion of silver mining, to which we have alluded, that contributed to 
stimulate local demand for industrial and consumer goods. This demand 
continued to be met by L im a’s mercantile com m unity.3  ^ T he overall 
increase in the size of government promoted by a Crown interested in a 
more efficient colonial administrative apparatus also contributed to 
modify the structure of urban dem and.38 Not only were many mid -  and 
low -  echelon posts made available to Lim eños in the civil bureaucracy 
but also in a substantially expanded military establishm ent.39 Finally, the 
1790’s were years of relative prosperity for the capital’s artisans,
brought about by the increase in the num ber of consumers and an
apparently plentiful supply of currency.4,0
Let us turn now to the last part of our topic, namely, the response of 
the agrarian hinterland to the urban market. T he viceregal capital was 
an impressive urban conglomeration that perform ed, as P eru ’s neural 
center, a variety of complex economic, administrative, and social activi­
ties associated with the various groups which made up its active popula­
tion. In  the late eighteenth century, urban consumption surpassed eight 
million pesos per annum  and 60 percent of this amount was spent in 
domestically -  produced foodstuffs.4  ^ In functional term s, therefore, as 
coastal P eru ’s principal market, Lim a depended upon trade linkages that 
extended well beyond its adjacent hinterland. T he pull of urban demand 
radiated to a significant num ber of regional markets along the Peruvian
coast and into the sierra. In the late 1780’s, for example, the provinces
sent Lim a domestic m anufactures and agricultural products am ounting to 
about 1.8 million pesos per year, a figure representing close to 40 per­
cent of the total value of viceregal output.4  ^ H ispanoam erican imports 
supplied the rem aining needs. In exchange, Lim a provided the interior 
with European goods, mainly textiles, but also paper, iron tools and 
nails, metals, some furniture items, and pharm aceutical products. It also 
supplied the provinces with American commodities such as indigo, cacao, 
tobacco, and wax, and with African slaves imported through Buenos 
Aires via C hile.43
How did the agrarian sector respond to u rban  demand? W e may 
approach this problem through the examination of the behavior of
287
wholesale prices for selected commodities reaching the Lim a m arket.44 
Starting with the movement of prices for some comestibles, between 
1799 an 1819 the average porcentage growth rate for potatoes (calculated 
on the basis of the linear trend in the logarithms of the index numbers) 
was 0.51 percent per annum . Prices for pumpkins exhibit stronger gains. 
Between 1798 and 1818, the index for this staple rose at a rate of 2.75 
percent per year. Q uinoa followed closely, at an annual rate of 2.68 
percent (1 7 9 8 - 1814). Rice, on the other hand, did not exhibit a 
noticeable trend, the annual average rate being 0.12 percent 
(1795 -  1818).45
Although lacunae in the data prevent calculation of rate, it is clear 
that, with few exceptions, the direction of prices for garden crops and 
grains also follows a growth pattern .46 Black beans, lima beans, and 
chickpeas show price increases over this period. As for grains, three 
quotations for maize for the period before Independence suggest that the 
cost of the cereal was also rising. In 1798, white maize flour sold for 
twenty -  two reales each fanega. T he following years the price rose to 
twenty -  four reales. In 1807, it had climbed 82 percent over the 1798 
figure, to forty reales per fanega. In  the decade following the early 
1820’ s (at which time consumers paid seventy reales for one fanega of 
maize flour) the price of this staple never dropped below the tw enty- 
eight reales mark. These scattered data suggest that the long -  term  trend 
for maize prices was also one of growth.
As for animal products, the abundance of hens kept the b ird’s 
unitary value fixed at about six reales (1 7 9 0 - 1819). T he overall trend 
for unsalted pork grease (unto sin sal) between 1799 and 1819, was one 
of mild growth (0.6 percent per annum ). Prices for this commodity, 
however, were generally depressed. For eleven years out of twenty for 
which we have information, index num bers (1799= 100) were below 100. 
W ith the exception of 1812, when the index reached 121, relatively 
strong prices in the early 1800’s gave way to a declining trend whose 
bottom was reached in 1816, when the index hit a low of 58 points. This 
trend was reversed in the following years when insurgent activity helped 
push prices upw ard.4  ^ As for mutton, the data are not completely reli­
able because our source, Santa M aría hospital, purchased the commodity 
under an annual supply contract. Nevertheless, the series shows a steady 
rise. From 1792 to 1798 the hospital paid 13.5 reales per carcass. The 
price rose to fifteen reales in 1801 and remained at that level until 1806, 
when the institution began paying sixteen reales. Disruption of internal 
trade during 1811 -  1812 caused supplies from the sierra to Lim a almost
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to cease; as a result, the hospital could only obtain pieces of mutton at 
retail prices. In 1813, it paid fifty -  six reales for half a carcass. By 
1815, however, the reestablishment of communications brought prices 
back to sixteen reales, at which level they remained to the end of the 
decade.
While it is clearly impossible to identify with much precision the 
reasons behind the changes in the price of a commodity in particular, the 
more so since we lack detailed knowledge of regional conditions, the 
essential feature of the price of staples we have just analyzed is one of 
moderate vigor. An unweighted arithmetic average of relatives of prices 
for hens, potatoes, pumpkins, rice, and unsalted pork grease for the 
period 1 7 9 9 - 1819 shows an average percentage growth rate of 0.66 
percent per year. In  addition, as has been noted previously, tithe figures 
for the Lim a archbishopric, although undeflated, also suggest an increase 
in agricultural production. T he principal operative factor that accounts 
for the long -  term  rise in the cost of foodstuffs must be found in that 
substantial and dynamic market that was late colonial Lim a. T he modest 
but sustained rise in prices and the relatively low value of the index 
num bers at critical conjunctures, suggest that the price rise was not 
directly related to agrarian crises of anden régime type. As we have 
seen, the urban market acted as a potent engine whose strength exceeded 
the geographic demarcations of the Lim a valley. But the effects of urban 
demand can be appreciated most clearly at the local level, for contrary 
to what has been supposed, L im a’s rural landscape in the eighteenth 
century was one where small and medium -  size estates, ra ther than 
latifundia, predominated. O f 190 production units in the city’s hinterland 
(that is, the eight districts surrounding the urban core plus the 
Carabayllo and Pachacam ac valleys, twenty and thirty kilometers from 
the city, respectively) for which data on size are available, at least 47 
percent did not exceed 145 hectares each and at least 16 percent had an 
area of 73 hectares or less. Each district contained only one or two large 
haciendas. It was in districts like Surco and Carabayllo that good access 
to w ater and closeness to the urban market happily combined in a sector 
of relatively prosperous and heavily cultivated small -  scale 
landholdings.48
It is within the more restricted area of cash -  crop agriculture that an 
agrarian crisis may be identified with certainty. T he movement of prices 
for sugar and aguardiente, the principal cash crops, behaves in a 
markedly different pattern than that for foodstuffs. Between 1790 and 
1819, the index of sugar prices declines at an average rate of 0.62 p e r­
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cent per year. A fter mild gains in the 1790’s that peaked in 1800 when 
the index reached 106 (1792/95 = 100), sugar prices fell to an index of 
88 in 1803. Prices recovered somewhat after the latter year, but it was 
not until the 1820’s that sugar prices returned to (and surpassed) the 
level they had reached twenty years earlier. W ith minor variations, the 
series of aguardiente prices follows the same pattern as that for sugar, 
with the notable difference that index num bers for aguardiente are con­
sistently lower than those for sugar.4® If we combine sugar and aguar­
diente into a single index of cash crops, the resulting average percentage 
growth rate for the period 17 9 9 - 1819 is negative: -  0.96 percent per 
annum .
T he differential behavior in the price movement of foodstuffs and 
cash crops must be understood in terms of the relative weight of internal 
and external factors affecting the viceroyalty. Sugar and aguardiente 
were not only consumed in Lim a but were also exported to H ispano- 
am erican markets. These commercial products were therefore highly 
sensitive to market forces vaster than the city’s. T here is substantial 
evidence to indicate that the Peruvian internal market for sugar became 
saturated early in the eighteenth century; moreover, by the late colonial 
period the size of the viceroyalty’s H ispanoam erican market also began 
to suffer a series of contractions, particularly by competition from  Bra­
zilian producers in the Río de la Plata market. T he outbreak of revolu­
tion in 1810 practically sealed the Chilean market to Peruvian sugar 
(while motivating Peruvian landowners to step up domestic production of 
wheat). In general term s, sugar producers responded to declining demand 
by increasing rather than reducing output. This effort to offset the 
weakening trend of sugar prices had the obvious effect of further 
depressing prices and aggravating the crisis. T he same type of problems 
befell the wine and arguardiente industry which was greatly affected by 
the establishment of royal monopolies for aguardiente in G uayaquil and 
Panam a (1777) and the imposition of a surtax in addition to the normal 
alcabala. M oreover, traditional markets in the Altiplano were beginning 
to produce their own spirits while the old Potosí market had shifted its 
wine purchases to M endoza. U nder these circumstances, it is obvious 
that the u rban economy could not provide a sufficiently ample umbrella 
to protect sugar and spirit producers from  the structural vulnerabilities 
inherent in an integrated colonial m arket.'’®
W hile our price evidence reveals that the agrarian sector reacted 
positively to the urban demand for comestibles, it would be clearly 
dangerous to propose generalizations at the viceregal level. As has been
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noted, spatial fragm entation and regional diversity are factors of im por­
tance in the colonial economy. And direct linkages between urban 
markets and supplying regions not always produced beneficial effects, 
either in local o r regional contexts. These ties could produce a profound 
disarticulation of traditional commercial circuits. T he decline of sugar 
production in the region of T rujillo in the second half of the eighteenth 
century was, in large part, a direct consequence of the relative geogra­
phic advantage enjoyed by producers closer to the viceregal capital, the 
principal consumer m arket.^1 Notwithstanding these disturbing elements, 
the importance of urban markets as growth poles for economic develop­
ment cannot be minimized. But only detailed study of economic pheno­
m ena in a variety of regional contexts will establish w hether the validity 
of the old notion of agrarian crisis in eighteenth -  century Peru must be 
rejected o r thought out afresh.
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PR IC E  SERIES:
All prices in reales; figures in italics denote years for which only one 
price quotation was available; no data found for missing years.
TABLE I: Aguardiente (botija), (1792/95 =* 100) and
Unsalted Pork Grease (arroba), (1798/99 = 100)
Aguardiente (botija) Unsalted Pork Grease (arroba)
Average Index Average Index
Year Price (1792/95 -  100) Price (1798/99 -  100)
1794 160.00 100.00 - -
1795 - - - _
1796 - - - -
1797 - - - -
1798 - - - -
1799 172.00 107.50 75.00 100.00
1800 168.00 105.00 - -
1801 144.00 90.00 56.00 74.67
1802 143.34 89.59 56.00 74.64
1803 116.62 72.89 79.19 105.59
1804 161.87 101.17 87.50 116.67
1805 183.35 114.59 79.00 105.33
1806 178.98 111.86 68.00 90.67
1807 139.44 87.15 75.48 100.64
1808 142.97 89.36 73.10 97.47
1809 135.12 84.45 64.70 86.27
1810 135.31 84.57 62.50 83.33
1811 144.15 90.09 66.25 88.33
1812 128.12 80.08 90.50 120.67
1813 142.00 88.75 61.75 82.33
1814 138.92 86.82 58.25 77.67
1815 140.67 87.92 59.11 78.81
1816 150.34 93.96 43.75 58.33
1817 142.00 88.75 95.75 127.67
1818 134.00 83.75 90.67 120.89
1819 202.67 126.67 102.88 137.17
1820 194.00 121.25 - -
1821 209.00 130.62 - -
1822 209.00 130.62 - -
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TABLE II: Potatoes (carga), (1798/99 = 100), Pumpkins (serón),
(1792/95 = 100) and Quinoa (costal), (1798/99 = 100)
Potatoes (carga) Pumpkins (serón) Q uinoa (Costal)
Y ear Average Index Average Index Average Index
Price (1798/99 = 100) Price (1792/95 = 100) Price (1798/99 = 100)
1794 - - 16.00 100.00 - -
1795 - - - - _ _
1796 - - _ _ _ _
1797 - - - _ _ _
1798 - - 10.12 63.25 50.50 100.00
1799 24.21 100.00 17.50 109.38 - -
1800 29.74 122.84 18.88 118.00 - -
1801 35.26 145.64 21.75 135.94 56.00 110.89
1802 28.31 116.94 23.00 143.75 47.97 94.99
1803 28.93 119.50 - - 50.17 99.35
1804 37.58 155.23 21.38 133.62 57.08 113.03
1805 33.81 139.65 19.00 118.75 71.00 140.59
1806 32.04 132.34 20.00 125.00 88.00 174.26
1807 30.74 126.97 20.00 125.00 78.00 154.46
1808 39.75 164.19 20.00 125.00 92.25 182.67
1809 41.00 169.35 . 23.75 148.44 96.50 191.09
1810 31.75 131.14 27.00 168.75 88.00 174.26
1811 34.12 140.93 29.00 181.25 89.44 177.11
1812 31.52 130.19 35.34 220.88 76.00 150.50
1813 30.43 125.69 32.00 200.00 55.75 110.40
1814 33.68 139.12 29.33 183.31 52.50 103.96
1815 30.34 125.32 26.25 164.06 58.66 115.96
1816 30.82 127.30 20.21 126.31 83.33 165.01
1817 36.74 151.76 23.56 147.25 83.33 165.01
1818 35.69 147.42 20.67 129.19 86.67 171.62
1819 28.16 116.32 25.33 158.31 - -
1820 36.87 152.29 28.25 176.56 - -
1821 58.50 241.64 34.62 216.38 168.00 154.46
1822 38.64 159.60 27.72 173.25 - -
1823 33.15 136.93 21.38 133.62 - -
1824 60.77 251.01 - - - -
1825 - - - - 78.00 154.46
1826 - - 13.75 85.94 - -
1827 - - - - _ _
1828 - - - _ _ _
1829 - - - _ - _
1830 30.83 127.34 - - - _
1831 22.20 91.70 - - _ _
1832 26.06 107.64 - - 58.67 116.18
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TABLE III: Rice (botija), (1792/95 = 100) and
Sugar (arroba), (1792/95 = 100)
Rice (botija) Sugar (arroba)
Year Average Index Average Index
Price (1792/95- 100) Price (1792/95= 100)
1790 - _ 21.28 96.90
1791 - _ 22.99 104.69
1792 _ _ _ _
1793 _ _ _ _
1794 - _ 23.25 105.87
1795 18.06 100.00 20.67 94.13
1796 - _ _
1797 - _ _
1798 21.00 116.28 _ _
1799 19.67 108.91 28.84 131.33
1800 17.97 99.50 31.13 141.74
1801 27.52 152.38 28.00 127.50
1802 25.21 139.59 22.16 100.91
1803 25.31 140.14 19.30 87.89
1804 22.30 123.48 23.56 107.29
1805 21.33 118.11 26.61 121.17
1806 22.13 122.54 27.38 124.68
1807 20.94 115.95 24.76 112.75
1808 19.28 106.76 24.34 110.84
1809 18.93 104.82 24.29 110.61
1810 20.74 114.84 23.32 106.19
1811 25.70 142.30 22.97 104.60
1812 20.71 114.67 23.86 108.95
1813 20.12 111.41 22.18 101.00
1814 18.68 103.43 17.15 78.10
1815 15.36 85.05 25.65 116.80
1816 24.66 136.54 22.94 104.46
1817 25.70 142.30 _ _
1818 22.96 127.13 17.62 80.24
1819 27.39 151.66 17.41 79.28
1820 25.86 143.19 31.96 145.54
1821 40.62 224.92 45.27 206.15
1822 23.82 131.89 47.39 215.80
1823 30.83 170.71 34.72 158.11
1824 26.80 148.39 42.78 194.81
1825 22.32 123.59 37.50 170.77
1826 17.67 97.84 - _
1827 19.00 105.20 28.50 129.78
1828 14.50 80.29 22.38 101.91
1829 _ _ _
1830 17.74 98.23 _ -
1831 17.40 96.35 17.50 78.69
1832 12.54 69.44 18.06 82.24
1833 13.28 73.53 -
1834 _ _ _ _
1835 _ _ _ _
1836 - _ _ _
1837 _ _ _ _
1838 _ _ _
1839 - _ - _
1840 12.00 66.45 15.71 71.54




































































































COMMERCE IN LATE COLONIAL PERU AND MEXICO:
A COMMENT AND SOME COMPARATIVE SUGGESTIONS*
Nils Jacobsen
It is characteristic for the commercial systems of the ancien regime 
colonial empires that even purely economic variables, such as the volume 
of trade, commodity prices, o r the direction and composition of com­
modity flows, appear strongly influenced by the political regulatory 
fram e constructed by metropolitan governments and their colonial 
administrations. It is thus not surprising that in the historiography on the 
trade to and within the Spanish Indies so much emphasis has been 
placed on the regulatory policies of institutions as the Consejo de Indias, 
the Casa de Contratación and the Consulados in Cádiz, Mexico and 
Lim a. Particulary for the late colonial period a good deal of attention has 
been focused on that body of royal laws, ordinances and decrees which 
apparently brought such sweeping changes not only on the trade, but 
also to the fiscal and administrative structure of Spanish America and 
which is commonly referred to as the Bourbon reforms. Only during the 
last fifteen years has there grown a substantial body of studies on 
economic and social aspects of Spanish American commerce during the 
late colonial period. Only since the late 1970’s do we posess thorough 
quantitative studies on the trade between Spain and Spanish America 
during the last century of the colonial regime. Only since the publication 
of Brading’s innovative study on miners and m erchants in Bourbon New 
Spain have we begun to get a glimpse of the mercantile and credit 
practices among the commercial elite of that viceroyalty, as well as its 
social recruitm ent mechanisms, problems which have typically remained 
unexplored for the case of Peru until the just completed work of Flores 
Galindo and H a itin .1 Even for the better studied M exican viceroyalty 
many issues concerning the late colonial commercial structure rem ain 
obscure: W hat was the pattern of transport, its cost and the degree to 
which it allowed the rise of an integrated market covering the core of the 
viceroyalty? T o which degree was trade competitive or, conversely, con­
tinued to rely on clientelistic monopolization of commodity and credit 
markets? How did mercantile interest rates develop? Did their evolution 
influence investment decisions?
299
W hile shifting the focus away from institutional histories, much of 
the recent economic and social historiography on late colonial commerce 
does not escape the spell of Bourbon policy making: Spectacular increases 
of trade volumes are explained as consequences of comercio libre, the 
rise of new groups of traders and the relative decline of others are de­
scribed as the result of lifted trade monopolies or the establishment of 
comercio neutral. In short, the power of the Spanish crown to effect 
changes in the economic and social structure looms large in most of these 
studies.
T he three papers to be discussed here, as different as they are in 
methodological approach, in scope and contents , share this trait: They 
use particular Bourbon reform  measures or other political events for 
periodizing changes in commercial patterns and the composition of the 
m erchant communities. Barbier approaches his topic from  the perspective 
of modern political history, tracing an evolving commercial policy­
making process on the basis of the conflicting interests bearing on it. 
Flores Galindo looks at the operation of L im a’s mercantile aristocracy 
primarily from  the point of view of the social historian, while H aitin 
approaches the same city’s commerce with its overall economic structure 
foremost in his analysis.
It is clear that these papers, demonstrating the broad range of issues 
now being researched in the area of Spanish A m erica’s late colonial 
commercial structure -  from  policy -  making to price history -  , hardly 
in and of themselves facilitate a comparison of the two viceroyalties’ 
trade pattern. W ith the overall purpose of this volume in mind, I shall 
thus begin with a critique of the three individual papers and then 
attem pt to outline some m ajor points for a comparison of New Spain’s 
and P eru ’s late commercial structures.
In his paper on the policy struggle over H ab an a’s right to re -  export 
European goods to V era C ruz, a struggle which spanned most of the 
reign of Charles IV , Barbier lucidly presents another facet of his general 
model for Spain’s colonial policy evolution during the twenty years 
between C harles’ III death and the dram atic events of 1808. By 1807 the 
royal finance and colonial administrations in M adrid were ready to 
pursue a policy, which singlemindedly tried to maximize fiscal revenues, 
even if this upset the longstanding fram e of colonial commercial policy 
and thus might be prejudicai to entrenched and hitherto powerful mer­
cantile interests. For the specific issue studied by Barbier here, this 
m eant allowing La H ab an a’s m erchants the re -  export of European 
commodities to V era C ruz, so that receipts from  this potentially rich
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trade would obviate the need for hefty amounts of Mexican crown silver 
flowing to C uba as situado instead of aiding M adrid’s treasury in the 
fight against mounting deficits. But such a policy shift, according to the 
author, also spelled the death of the coalition of interests, constitutive for 
the Bourbon reform era, between the crown and M adrid interests on the 
one hand and the Cádiz Consulado and coastal Spain’s mercantile 
interests on the other.
M uch of this conflict over La H ab an a’s role in the Spanish em pire’s 
colonial structure during the reign of Charles IV  has been studied 
previously in the literature.^ T he value of B arbier’s contribution here lies 
in his emphasis on the strong link between commercial and monetary 
issues, in identifying particular interests with both sides in the policy 
debate and in deftly placing these developments, concerning a single 
issue, within the broader fram e of M adrid ’s colonial policy between 1788 
and 1808.
I would like to suggest two lines of critique to B arbier’s argum ents, 
one concerning the significance of species shortages in late eighteenth 
century C uba and the other dealing with the alignment of interests which 
had an impact on M adrid’s po licy -m ak ing  process.
C uba’s species shortage had two causes: 1. the different intrinsic 
value of the currency which its merchants and bureaucracy received from 
New Spain from  that of its m ajor trading partners, Spain and the 
United States and 2. the rapid development of the island’s sugar 
industry between 1792 and 1808. A fter the clipped coinage which had 
stimulated the island’s exports, had been called in by the mid -  1780’s, 
the strong M exican pesos began to circulate since the early 1790’s. These 
coins immediatly flowed out again, because both U .S. and Spanish 
merchants could make speculative profits on exchanging them  for gold or 
Spanish pesetas. This was a condition which could not even be halted by 
a positive balance of trade with foreign areas and indeed continued to 
characterize C uba’s currency situation until the mid -  nineteenth 
century.3 It is true that the negative balance of trade with ’’foreign 
colonies,” particulary the United States, also caused coinage to flow out 
from  the island. But this negative balance of trade, as Barbier has 
pointed out, was a necessary side effect of the extremly rapid expansion 
of C u b a’s sugar industry after St. D om ingue’s collapse as m ajor 
producer. This expansion was enthusiastically pushed by La H ab an a ’s 
m erchant community, and while planters became ever more endebted for 
lack of own funds for the acquisition of slaves and agricultural imple­
ments required to increase their sugar production, the H abaneros, both
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merchants and prestamistas, were the main beneficiaries in this ’’take off” 
period for C u b a’s plantation economy. They were willing to supply 
credit to the planters against payment in sugar as long as the market 
promised high returns and expanded. In this way the rapid growth of 
sugar production was underwritten by massive investments of m erchant 
capital in C uba from diverse sources, as the peninsula, New Spain and 
even the United States.4 This infusion of capital probably did as much 
as the crown situado to compensate for the island’s negative balance of 
trade. Since the high rates of imports into the island was in good 
m easure a direct gauge of m erchant investors’ confidence in the further 
growth of the Cuban sugar economy, it is obvious that the H abaneros 
could live with the negative balance of trade and the consequent shorta­
ges of species.
T heir political pressure to liberalize species and trade flows between 
the island and V era C ruz should thus not be seen prim arily as an 
attem pt to find replacement for the declining situado specie entering 
C uba. R ather it aimed at strengthening La H ab an a’s (and thus the 
m erchants’own) commercial and financial centrality, to transform  the 
port into ”el almacén general, el emporio de éstas Am éricas,” as the 
sindico of the city’s newly created Consulado, Arango y Parreño, 
declared.5 O f course the H abaneros hoped to take in more Mexican 
currency with gaining the privilege of selling European goods in New 
Spain. But this increased am ount of currency was m eant to sustain the 
expansion of both exports and imports from and to C uba, a function of 
pum p priming, one might say, for the further growth of the island’s 
sugar industry. This process would continue to produce negative balances 
of trade, and the H abaneros, through these very trade deficits, would 
further fortify their control over the island’s economy.
W ith regard to the interests which had a bearing on M adrid’s deci­
sion making over trade between C uba and New Spain, it would appear 
that Jaques Barbier may have downplayed the combined voice of New 
Spain’s Consulados -  united on this issue inspite of their otherwise 
fierce rivalry -  and the colony’s viceregal administration, something 
carefully documented by Ortiz de la T ab la .6 Between 1797 and 1799, 
when the question of European re -e x p o r ts  from  H abana to V era Cruz 
was first debated, interests of the Mexico and V era C ruz Consulados 
coincided completely with those of Cádiz. M adrid’s policy must have 
been aimed as rauch at not alienating New Spain’s m erchant guilds, a 
key power group in this centerpiece and most valuable revenue source of 
Spain’s American empire, as it was at maintaining a balance between
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crown (fiscal) and coastal commercial interest in the peninsula itself. 
While the growing pressure of fiscal issues clearly had a strong impact 
on the 1807 policy change , one may wonder, whether the desire to keep 
New Spain as closely integrated into the em pire as possible, did not play 
an equally im portant role. A fter all, in 1807 the alternative for M adrid’s 
policy makers was not whether Mexico was to be provisioned with 
European goods only from peninsular ports or also, by way of re­
exports, from  La H abana. R ather, in the face of the metropolis’ inca­
pacity to keep up regular trade with America, the only realistic options 
consisted in making La H abana the entrepot for neutral ships arriving 
with European goods for the M exican market, or seeing the viceroyalty 
supplied completely by direct links between foreign ports and V era Cruz. 
U nder prevailing circumstances granting La H abana a privileged status 
in transatlantic commerce did not only legalize a de facto trade pattern 
established at least since 1805, but also offered the only, albeit feeble, 
possibility to limit direct access to New Spain’s market by foreign m er­
chants. O ne may also wonder to which degree changes in the pattern of 
commerce during the w ar years had strengthened the position of those 
merchants in V era C ruz and the interior of New Spain (especially in the 
intendancy of O axaca), who openly favored re -e x p o r ts  from  La 
H abana (Ortiz de la T abla only views these as minor ’’defections” from 
the opposing view of New Spain’s Consulados).
O ne final comment on periodization: For Barbier the royal decree of 
1807 signalled the abandonm ent of the commercial policies of the Bour­
bon reform  era, thus pushing the political turnabout, at least in this 
issue, nearly to the very end of Spain’s ancien regime. It is ironic that 
on the question of trade between La H abana and V era C ruz Barbier 
should identify the position, which helped to m aintain the interests of the 
Consulados of Cádiz, Mexico and V era C ruz on the basis of commercial 
regulations from  the seventeenth century, contained in the Recopilación 
de Leyes de Indias of 1687, with the Bourbon reform  policy, while he 
attaches the abandonm ent of that policy to a m easure liberalizing trade. 
If nothing else, this suggests that the peculiar mixture of Spanish 
aggrandizement and enlightened reform  characteristic of C harles’ III 
commercial policy some fifteen years later through the rapid turn  of 
events had been converted into a last line of defense for the most 
powerful m erchant groups in the peninsula and New Spain. T he fiscal 
crisis and the disruption of transatlantic commerce which resulted from 
the Napoleonic wars, was producing a strange coalition between m er­
cantilist bureaucrats in M adrid, who were reducing their political projects
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to the immediate welfare of the Spanish state in its hour of need, and 
’’dissident” merchants at various points in the em pire, who profitted from 
a further liberalization of trade. W hat then is to be gained from  the 
application of a common label ’’Bourbon reform s” to commercial policies 
evolved over more than forty years?
T he problems raised by Alberto Flores G alindo’s paper on the 
economic operations and the social dem eanor of L im a’s m erchant aris­
tocracy during the eighteenth century are of different nature. T he value 
of his contribution, part of a larger study, rests on providing us for the 
first time with information about the social, economic and political 
mechanisms by which the highest stratum  of L im a’s merchants attained 
and attempted to solidify wealth and power. W e now learn that in many 
aspects they operated much in the same way as those of other Spanish 
A merican cities in the Bourbon era: T he continuity of a fam ily’s com­
mercial operations was often assured by having a nephew from  the 
peninsula take over the business in Lima; exclusivity and social distan­
cing were pursued by endogamous m arriage patterns. But Flores Galindo 
tries to cover much vaster ground in his paper and touches upon as 
diverse issues as the articulation of various modes of production, the 
relation between ’’mercantile splendour” and the structure of the labor 
market, the ties between the merchants and the colonial bureaucracy, 
and commercial conjunctures. W hile very suggestive, the treatm ent of 
some of these issues raises more questions than it answers. W hat does it 
m ean, for example, to insist on calling L im a’s Consulado merchants 
both an aristocracy and the dominant colonial class? It is impossible to 
discuss all of these questions here. I shall limit myself to make a few 
remarks primarily on the author’s periodization scheme and his inter­
pretation of the effects of the commercial crisis of the m id -  1780’s, as 
well as some methodological problems.
Tim ing and nature of both the rise and the decay of what Flores 
Galindo views as the ephemeral wealth and power of L im a’s merchant 
aristocracy in the third quarter of the eighteenth century seem proble­
matic. His view that between the mid -  1630’s and the early decades of 
the Bourbon era a long break occurred in L im a’s mercantile penetration 
of the Andean hinterland, roughly coinciding with the phase of the 
seventeenth century crisis debated for many of the Atlantic economies, 
seems untenable. T he decline of silver production, which reached its 
nadir probably during the early decades of the eighteenth century, never 
lead to an abandonm ent of the credit and commodity circuits stretching 
from  Lim a to Potosí, Q uito  and places in between. Even the production
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of precious metals did not decline uniformly throughout the viceroyalty 
since the 1630’s and some mining regions, notably Puno, reached their 
apex precisely during the last third of the seventeenth century, pre­
sumably the nadir of the crisis.7 O ther activities, which presumed fairly 
large credit and commercial circuits, were either in their ’’take off” phase 
during the seventeenth century, as the repartos by corregidores, or 
reached their peak of production, as the Q uito  obrajes.8 T he Lima 
m erchants provided credit for such enterprises and were involved in the 
commercialization of the goods produced or sold in the Sierra. This is 
not to say that the crisis of the seventeenth century had no effect on 
L im a’s m erchant community and its control over the Andean hinterland. 
R ather the period between 1635 and the early decades of the eighteenth 
century witnessed a thorough restructuring process affecting both over­
seas trade and ties with the Andean hinterland: It was marked by a 
changing relative weight of transatlantic and domestic trade, by a dif­
ferent composition of European imports (cheaper grades of textiles 
beginning to asume greater significance since the later seventeenth
century), declining unit prices for European goods (m eaning that the 
im port capacity of the viceroyalty did not decline proportionate to the 
decline of precious metals shipments). Also during this period, what 
Sempat Assadourian has called the ’’Peruvian space”, i.e. that vast region 
which had been integrated into one, albeit precariously weak commercial 
network during the late sixteenth century through the rise of the silver 
mining complexes, for the first time began to shrink. This process 
continued in the later eighteenth century, as Flores Galindo observes, 
with the escisión of the Viceroyalty of La Plata and L im a’s consequent 
loss of control over Alto P eru ’s mines.
If this view of the period of crisis has any merit, then Flores Galin­
do’s idea about the ’’project” of L im a’s merchants during the eighteenth 
century requires serious revision: It was not that the creation of a m er­
cantile space in the Andean hinterland was ’’just beginning” during the 
Bourbon era. R ather L im a’s merchants readjusted their methods of
penetration, the spatial patterning of their trade in the Sierra, and the 
type of goods they supplied.
But what about the effects of comercio libre for the city’s mercantile 
aristocracy? Did it really bring about a rapid decay of their "ephemeral 
splendour” after 1783? Flores Galindo here coincides fully with the con­
ventional view, as it was first suggested by the bitterly complaining
petitions and inform es of L im a’s Consulado during the 1780’s and
magisterially expounded by Céspedes del Castillo’s study on the relation
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between Lim a and Buenos Aires. To be sure, the glut of the market, 
produced by the first rush of liberalized trade after the peace of Paris, 
caused a grave short -  term  crisis and lead to the recomposition of 
L im a’s m erchant community.
But the author does not convincingly show that L im a’s merchants did 
not benefit from  the strong growth of imports at least until 1797, as well 
as the rise of P eru ’s silver production, which continued until the early 
years of the nineteenth century. Fisher has shown that it was the Lima 
merchants who, working through aviadores and repartos de bienes by 
subdelegados (although forbidden) reaped high profits in the expansion 
of silver production.®
Flores Galindo is certainly right, when he suggests that Lim a was 
loosing market shares in the trade of Chile, Alto Peru and even the 
southern Intendencies of Lower Peru itself. But this was occurring at a 
tim e when volume and value of European imports were rising fast. We 
thus need much better documentation to tell wether L im a’s trade in those 
regions was declining in absolute terms before 1810. At the same time it 
now appears likely that the sale of European goods in the remaining 
areas of the viceroyalty and particularly in Lim a itself, i.e. regions where 
L im a’s merchants still maintained an undisputed hegemony, was 
expanding at least until the mid 1790’s and thus compensated for any 
losses sustained in the South.
As Sergio Villalobos has shown more than twenty years ago, com­
plaints about ruinous gluts on the market, due to the effects of comercio 
libre, neutral ships since 1797, an increased presence of foreign m er­
chants and ram pant contraband, were not only uttered by L im a’s m er­
chant aristocracy, but just as often -  and with the same voice of des­
peration -  by the newly established m erchant guilds of Santiago and 
Buenos Aires, the beneficiaries of the Bourbon commercial reform s.10 
Since such complaints were raised simultaneously with a large expansion 
of trade, they cannot be used as evidence for a pervasive and lasting 
commercial decadence. R ather they demonstrate greatly changed condi­
tions of trade, under which merchants used to monopolies and privileges, 
saw their profit margins slashed as agile and at times highly capitalized 
competitors entered the market. As Flores Galindo has pointed out, 
under these circumstances quite a few of the monopolistic merchants 
succumbed in this brisk new business climate. But others survived and 
did well, either by adapting or by carving out a share for themselves in 
one of the niches in which good monopolistic profits were still to be had, 
as for example trade and credit operations with the burgeoning silver
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mines through aviadores. At the same time new fortunes were made by 
the very m erchants who entered the market only after the liberalization 
of the trade between the late 1770’s and the 1790’s. Such m erchants or 
companies, both peninsular and creole, at first operated independently of 
L im a’s Consulado and were viewed as dangerous rivals. But by the 
second decade of the nineteenth century, they often had become res­
pected mem bers of the m erchant guild. T he largest fortunes existing in 
Lim a during that time, such as those of Pedro Abadia and José de 
Arizmedi, had been made since the 1780’s, i.e. the presumed beginning 
of decay.11 L im a’s mercantile aristocracy of the late eighteenth century 
thus would seem to have been much less of a closed, quasi corporate 
social stratum  than Flores Galindo assumes. It may very well be that the 
drastic changes in the viceroyalty’s commercial structure since the early 
1780’s forced this stratum  to allow fast rising new merchants to join its 
ranks precisely at the moment when it had begun to close itself off as an 
exclusive aristocratic group.
Flores Galindo primarily uses two types of evidence to support his 
claim concerning the decay of L im a’s trade since the 1780’s: 1. a com­
parison of various data on merchants and their capital in wills from  two 
sample years, 1770 and 1810, and 2. a  variety of trade, tax and pro­
duction statistics contained in the literature on this period.
T he first source, the wills drawn up before Lim a notaries in 1770 
and 1810, raises the question, how much confidence we may place in 
this small sample. W ith a m erchant community num bering in the hun­
dreds, what does it tell us that ten or six m erchants respectively possess 
between 2500 and some 60,000 pesos in cash in the two sample years, 
lying more than a generation apart? W hat share of a m erchant’s total 
assets was held as liquid cash in his strong box at any given moment, 
and how much was invested in merchandise or circulating as credits? 
Also the range of credits which Flores Galindo found in the wills, up to 
2,200 pesos in 1770, seems low. W e know of quite a few loans by 
L im a’s m erchants to miners, for example, am ounting to more than 
10,000 pesos. For the purpose of analysing the fate of the Lim a m er­
cantile aristocracy, a more promising -  and not necesarrily more 
laborious -  research strategy might have consisted in tracing all notarial 
contracts pertaining to a few m erchant families over a period of forty or 
fifty years.
T he variety of statistics on trade, taxation and production which 
Flores Galindo cites from the literature, faces a double drawback as 
evidence for his argum ents. In the first place, several of these statistics
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allow rather different conclusions than those the author draws from 
them . It is true, for example, that the revenue collected by the vice- 
royalty’s caja matriz in Lim a declined somewhat after a peak in the 
1780’s. Nevertheless the mean receipts for every f iv e -y e a r  period 
between 1790 and 1820 continued to surpass the collection of any similar 
period before 1780, in most cases by as much as 50 to 100 percent.12 
Similarly it is true that the production of silver and gold coins in the 
Lim a mint reached its apex in 1794 and from then on stagnated. But the 
m ean annual mint production was slightly higher between 1796 and 1815 
than it had been in the preceding twenty -  year period.1"*
Secondly, the statistics on mintage, tax collection, silver production 
and new titles of nobility all show peaks at different points of time 
between the mid -  1780’s and 1804. For example the conferral of new 
titles of nobility peaked in the quinquennium  1790 -  94, and stayed at a 
comparatively high level during the following ten years. But Flores 
Galindo views the political administrative changes of the late 1770’s as 
m ajor causes for the decline of L im a’s monopolistic merchants. Thus 
one is left wondering when precisely this decay of L im a’s mercantile 
aristocracy set in.
M y comments on Alberto Flores G alindo’s paper owe much to the 
revisionistic notions about L im a’s late colonial economy developed by 
M arcel H aitin in his contribution to this volume and, in greater detail, in 
his recent dissertation. R ather than focus on one preem inent social strata, 
H aitin presents an interpretation of L im a’s overall economy between the 
1780’s and the outbreak of the W ars of Independence. Ju s t as Alberto 
Flores Galindo, he stresses the interm ediary position of the city between 
overseas trade and the Andean hinterland, but places more emphasis on 
L im a’s centrality as a market in its own right and the great significance 
of the bureaucracy (both civil and ecclesiastic) for its economy. T o my 
knowledge H aitin is the first author who manages to come to a balanced 
realistic assessment of L im a’s economy in the quarter century before the 
W ars of Independence, an assessment which comes to grips with the 
confusing evidence both for crisis or decline and continued buoyancy. H e 
does so by insisting on differentiated conjunctures for P eru ’s regional 
and sectoral economies, as well as on changes in the social distribution of 
benefits from L im a’s trade and industry. H aitin mostly agrees with 
Flores Galindo concerning the crisis of the city’s monopolistic merchants. 
At the same time he stresses two elements which provided new pros­
perity to certain groups of traders and artisans: the continued strenght of 
the viceroyalty’s mining production and the city’s population growth,
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M y comments on M arcel H aitin ’s paper concern his explanation of 
price increases in connection with L im a’s population growth and his view 
about the distribution of mercantile capital since the 1780’s. Any one 
who has ever worked on Peruvian economic history knows the frustration 
which arises from  the absolute dearth of price data for any period prior 
to the late nineteenth century. H aitin ’s series on prices for agricultural 
commodities, carefully constructed from  hospital accounts, thus constitute 
a welcome tool. His findings on the gradual decline of sugar prices 
coincide fully both with qualitative studies on the crisis of late colonial 
P eru ’s sugar industry as well as with recently published price series for 
P o to s í.^  At the same time the author’s finding that prices for garden 
crops and cereals rose moderately between the 1790’s and 1818/19 raises 
some interpretative questions. His price series only cover a relatively 
short period, during which exogenous factors often may have distorted 
longfrange price trends. T hus we may wonder whether the lo n g - ra n g e  
growth of L im a’s population, underway since the 1746 earthquake, really 
constituted the main cause of these price rises. Prices for grains and 
tubers were also rising in Potosí between 1790 and 1810. T his rise, 
however, reversed a trend towards lower prices that began in the 
mid -  1750’s, inspite of population growth. T andeter and W achtel view 
climatic conditions as principal factor responsible for the renewed price 
increase after 1790.15 Also for H aitin ’s data on Lim a for key food crops 
such as potatoes and quinua the impact of climatic cycles on prices is 
discernible, inspite of the au thor’s claim to the contrary. For population 
growth to be the culprit behind rising food prices, it would need to be 
shown that the num ber of people in the market rose faster than agricul­
tural production. This was indeed what happened in Mexico since the 
1770’s. T he relatively slower growth of agricultural production than of 
population owed much to the fact that in the densely settled central parts 
of that viceroyalty most land apt for crop production had been put 
under the plough by the 1780’s .16 W hat little we know so fa r about the 
complex interrelationship between population, climate, production and 
social structure in the countryside of late colonial Peru does not suggest a 
similar development in the Andes: H ere the demographic recovery had 
set in too recently for the rural population to be pushing against upper 
limits of crop production under prevailing social and technological con­
ditions. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that the growth 
of agricultural production could not have kept apace with population 
growth -  as T andeter and W achtel suggest it did during the third
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quarter of the eighteenth century -  , if exogenous factors had not 
interfered.
Marcel H aitin makes much of the changed size distribution of L im a’s 
mercantile wealth since the 1780’s. Unquestionably the overall num ber of 
wholesalers, commission agents and shopowners was on the rise and most 
new practicioners only controlled very modest operations indeed. Neither 
do I wish to quarrel with the au thor’s assertion that during the market 
glut of the m id -  1780’s ’’hands of very limited means” tem porarily 
assumed a much greater weight in L im a’s commerce than previously.
I rem ain skeptical however, wether this constitutes enough evidence to 
diagnose a lasting dispersal of the city’s mercantile wealth for the 
rem aining thirty -  five years of the colonial era. Contem porary accounts 
purporting to witness such a dispersal are suspect, because a greater 
distribution of wealth among ’’industrious” small traders and artisans 
coincided with how an enlightened author would have wanted to perceive 
progress. In other words, reports about the growing well -  being of ever 
larger num bers of small traders may be just as much an expression of 
the general confidence of its author about the city’s economic develop­
ment as any accurate account on the distribution of its mercantile wealth. 
H um boldt’s often cited comparison between Lim a and Mexico may also 
very well have been skewed. Some four years after comercio libre was 
finally introduced in New Spain in 1789, Viceroy Conde de Revillagi- 
gedo described the changed commercial climate there nearly in the same 
way as we have heard it for Lima:
El que ésta nueva  especie de com erciantes va cada d ía  en  a u m en to  es u n a  
verdad tan  n o ta ria  que no  se a trev e rán  a negarla  los m ism os que aseg u ran  el 
com ercio decaído. Ellos dicen  que es excesivo el nú m ero  de efectos que v iene, 
y que se h a n  re tirado  de com erciar los sujetos de gruesos capitales. C o n q u e  es 
preciso que p a ra  d a r giro y salida a  las existencias se em pleen m uchos ind i­
viduos de corto c a u d a l.17
H um boldt may also have confused the larger absolute values of m er­
cantile wealth in Mexico with a greater degree of concentration.
A fter the regulatory reforms between the 1770’s and 1790’s the 
shopkeeper as well as the small trader attempting to sell European goods 
on his own account either in Lim a itself or in the Andean hinterland, 
was just as dependent on credit from the large import m erchant as 
Flores Galindo has described it for the earlier decades. No trader could 
survive one or two commercial slumps independently, if he did not 
possess enough capital to carry him  through a num ber of years during
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which his merchandise was not selling and his commodity loans were not 
being repaid. It would seem that the need for credit and hence fairly 
substantial commercial capitals was increasing in a business environment 
calculating with lower profit margins. In brief, the increased num ber of 
small traders since the 1780’s was merely an expression of the growing 
volume of trade. To determine changes in the rate of concentration of 
mercantile capital we would require evidence from  wills of a very sub­
stantial sample of m erchants and shopkeepers of different means and, 
probably a more precise measure, an analysis of almojarifazgo  accounts 
as to the num ber of im porting and exporting m erchants and their shares 
of the whole commodity flow over the last half -  century of the colonial 
era.
I would like to conclude by proposing some broad points of com par- 
ison between the structure and evolution of commerce in late colonial 
New Spain and Peru.
1. T he expansion of the Atlantic economies and the subsequent 
liberalization of Spanish commercial regulations had a more favorable 
effect on the trade of New Spain than on that of Peru during most of 
the eighteenth century. While in this period Peru suffered the escisión of 
vast territories from its commercial space, that of New Spain remained 
largely intact. T he volume of transatlantic and intercolonial trade to New 
Spain grew much more rapidly during the first six decades of the 
century than trade with Peru. As John  Fisher has recently shown, it 
appears that both viceroyalties participated equally in the expansion of 
trade during the 1780’s and 1790’s .18. In other words, the different 
volumes of maritim e trade to New Spain and Peru, as one might observe 
them  from  around 1800, had their origin in divergent trends early in the 
century and not towards its end. M exico’s commerce further benefitted 
from  growing European dem and for a num ber of its agricultural com­
modities, such as sugar, indigo and cochineal. Peru, due to its unfavor­
able location, hardly benefitted at all from this new demand. -  D uring 
the last dozen years before the outbreak of the W ars of Independence 
the m erchants of Mexico City and V era C ruz were probably affected 
more seriously by comercio neutral than were their colleagues in Lima. 
By 1806/07 a great part of European goods destined for New Spain 
reached the viceroyalty by way of the C uban entrepot. A similar threat 
posed by Valparaiso to the merchants of Lim a only became effective 
with the complete opening of trade to foreign vessels and merchants 
since the early 1820’s.
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2. While Peru suffered an external splitting of its commercial space, 
the trade liberalizations of the 1780’s and 1790’s lead to a decentrali­
sation of trade networks and commercial wealth within New Spain. This 
came to the fore most clearly with the foundation of the new Consulados 
of V era Cruz and G uadalajara in 1795; but the merchant communities 
in many other provincial centers, such as O axaca, Q uerétaro , San 
Miguel el G rande and León also showed increased vigour. T heir 
onesided dependence on the m erchants of Mexico City decreased. This 
decentralization lead to a stronger integration of the M exican market. No 
such development can be observed in the truncated viceroyalty of Peru. 
H ere the trade liberalization primarily lead to a changed social com­
position of L im a’s own m erchant community. But the m erchant com­
munities in most of the provincial centers, such as Cuzco, Arequipa, 
H uam anga and Trujillo, rem ained relatively weak, and their dependence 
on Lim a for the supply with European goods and credit diminished 
little.
3. While it was typical for merchants in both viceroyalties to divers­
ify their investments, the composition of their ’’portfolio” and, hence, 
capital flows between various sectors of the economy, differred notably 
during the late eighteenth century. In both viceroyalties merchants 
invested heavily into haciendas. But investment of mercantile capital in 
mines tended to be only short -  range and of limited scale in Peru, while 
in New Spain some of the huge fortunes in late colonial mining were 
made by members of M exico’s Consulado. For L im a’s merchants 
probably their investment in ships played a greater role than for those in 
Mexico City or V era Cruz. We are lacking data to compare mercantile 
investments in industry and urban real estate.
4. Given New Spain’s considerably larger population and her greater 
urban agglomerations, the northern viceroyalty’s market for most 
commodities obviously was considerably larger than that of Peru during 
the late colonial period. T o the degree that commercial structures were 
still shaped by privileges and monopolies, this favored a larger scale of 
commercial operations and hence a greater accumulation of mercantile 
capital in New Spain compared with Peru. T he closer links with mining 
enterprises just mentioned above may also help to explain the greater 
frequency of merchants with very great fortunes in Mexico. It should be 
noted that this need not be a sign of a greater concentration of men- 
cantile capital in New Spain, since most likely the base o f small and 
middling merchants was also correspondingly broader here. But the 
greater accumulation of capital may have had some repercussions for the
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economy at large, as in Mexico it must have been easier to gather large 
sums of money for new investment projects, say a new drainage shaft 
for a mine, than it was in Peru.
5. T he most difficult and at the same time most im portant issue 
concerns the market mechanisms, or the economic organization of trade 
in both viceroyalties. While at the highest level, the import of European 
goods, there is, for both viceroyalties, much evidence for increasing 
competition among merchants since the 1780’s, it appears that the arti­
culation with the sphere of production continued to rely heavily on 
coercion, monopolization and on privileges. For the case of Mexico there 
even exists good evidence to suggest that those extending credit towards 
small Indian and mestizo producers -  not only traders, but also miners, 
hacendados and crown officials -  strengthened their position during the 
last third of the eighteenth century, as currency became scarce inspite of 
growing mining output. At the same time circulation of commodities 
and credit between merchants, crown officials and other ’’respectable” 
businessmen became more agile through the widespread use of bills of 
exchange. In Mexico, then, a cleavage may have developed during the 
late colonial period between trade mechanisms used among the middle 
and upper strata of society on the one hand and those mechanisms 
applied by traders and officials to the lowest strata of rural and urban 
society.
In Peru, on the other hand, the abolition of repartos produced a 
decline of coercive trade practices towards the Indian rural population. 
At the same time, the basic conditions of domestic trade -  dispersal and 
isolation of population nuclei, low level of production and income, 
continued importance of forced labor regimes -  favored monopolistic 
trade practices even more than in Mexico. It is thus not surprising that 
the growing credit operations by L im a’s merchants and intermediate 
traders with the new mining centers should have immediately relied on 
monopolistic and speculative practices. Although it is for the time being 
impossible to say w hether the trade liberalizations since the 1780’s 
brought about an overall decline of coercion in P eru ’s domestic trade 
patterns, it seems fairly clear that in the Andes no comparable cleavage 
of commercial practices between various social strata of the society 
developed.
The Bourbon reform s’ effect on commercial patterns was ambivalent 
and contradictory in both viceroyalties. O n the one hand there was 
growing competition, and free trade brought down the prices for 
European goods. At the same time the raised levels of taxation and the
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growing scarcity of coinage as a consequence of increased silver remit­
tance to the peninsula, made large sectors of the population ever more 
dependent on the small groups within late colonial society who were in a 
position to extend credit. In  this way the Bourbon reforms managed at 
once to threaten and strengthen the mercantile interests in New Spain 
and Peru.
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V I. T H E  PU BLIC S E C T O R
12. G EN E R A L  T E N D E N C IE S  A ND  SE C U L A R  T R E N D S  IN  T H E
E C O N O M IE S O F M E X IC O  A ND  P E R U , 1 7 5 0 - 1810: T H E
V IE W  FR O M  T H E  CAJ A S  O F  M E X IC O  A N D  LIM A
Jo h n  J .  TePaske*
D uring the past three decades the debate over a crisis in seven­
teenth -  century H ispanic America has heated up considerably, but the 
debate has also fueled m any new questions about eighteenth -  century 
economic conditions. For the seventeenth century the conventional view 
still has strong adherents in those who argue that the period was one of 
recession, depression, crisis, or stagnation, an epoch characterized by 
demographic decline or stasis, low productivity and a drift toward a 
subsistence economy in the agricultural sector, sharply reduced silver 
production, and a catastrophic drop in external and internal trade. O n 
the other side a  growing band of revisionists has argued that the seven­
teenth century was not an epoch of crisis or depression at all, but a 
period of readjustm ent and reorientation within the colonial economy and 
colonial society, a time in which Spain’s overseas kingdoms underwent 
considerable internal economic development in agriculture and industry, 
increased its silver production (in Mexico at least), and with the dram atic 
rise in smuggling, more than offset the radical decline in the legal trade 
by purchase of illicit goods from  Europe and the Far E ast.1
This debate over the seventeenth century has now opened many new 
questions concerning the eighteenth century. If there was a severe 
seventeenth -  century depression, was there a period of recovery and 
sustained economic growth in the eighteenth century? Did this epoch 
m ark a unilineal, trium phal march to prosperity across the century, or 
did it occur by fits and spurts with identifiable cyclical changes? If there 
was no serious crisis in the seventeenth century, was there more conti­
nuity in economic development patterns over time than generally sup­
posed? Attention has been focused on these questions by a wide variety 
of scholars analyzing different topics and regions. Some assume, argue, 
or document an eighteenth -  century boom; others argue for some growth 
in cyclical patterns; still other show that high prices and inflation, war,
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drought, fam ine, epidemic disease, mercury shortages, repressive or 
regressive taxes, unenlightened governmental fiscal policies, and 
m an -  land pressures in rural areas which led to proletarization of the 
rural labor force in the face of a growing money economy, belie or at 
least call into question an eighteenth -  century boom, particularly during 
the last quarter of the eighteenth century.
This paper will attem pt to provide a new focus for this growing 
debate by looking at trends in Mexico and Peru from the vantage point 
of the public sector, a macrocosmic analysis based on the accounts (car­
tas cuentas) of the two principal regional treasuries (cajas) of Mexico 
and Lim a. V irtually complete for the period 1750 to 1810, these annual 
records of income and disbursements for each treasury provide at least 
one quantitative base for comparing economic conditions in the two 
regions in both the public and the private sector. Although it should be 
clearly recognized at the outset that there are dangers in relying on tax 
records to assess economic conditions, used carefully, these records con­
stitute an im portant source for establishing and measuring significant 
economic trends in both Mexico and Peru. 2
The M atrix Treasuries o f  Lim a and M exico and the Structure o f  the 
Treasury System  in N ew  Spain and Peru, 1 7 5 0 - 1810
T he treasuries of Mexico and Lim a stood atop a well -  structured 
nexus of cajas within their respective regions. By 1750 in Mexico caja 
districts existed for every m ajor port -  V eracruz, Acapulco, Tabasco, 
and Cam peche. In the Yucatán royal treasury officials for the caja of 
M érida collected some import -  export duties as well, but that treasury 
was more significant as the seat of an administrative -  market center with 
a large Indian population. T o  the northwest in Nueva Galicia the 
treasury of G uadalajara had operated since the mid -  sixteenth century to 
serve that im portant mining, administrative, and market area. M ore­
over, almost all m ajor silver producing centers in Mexico had cajas by 
1750 including D urango, G uanajuato, Pachuca, San Luis Potosí, 
Sombrerete, Zacatecas, and Zim apán. O ver the next half century this 
treasury network expanded to include the northern frontier outposts of 
Arispe, C hihuahua, and Saltillo and the mining centers at Bolaños and, 
successively, at Los Alamos, Rosario, and Cosalá in the far northwestern 
reaches of New Spain. In the 1780’s new cajas were also set up in the 
capitals of each intendancy, which added Valladolid de M ichoacán,
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O axaca, and Puebla de los Angeles to this nexus. O n the southeast coast 
the tiny military outpost of the Presidio del C arm en merited a caja as 
well, giving Mexico twenty -  three treasuries by the end of the eighteenth 
century, including the m atrix treasury of Mexico.
As a m atrix treasury Mexico was the clearing house for virtually all 
the treasuries in the viceroyalty (M erida, Cam peche, Tabasco, and the 
Presidio del C arm en were the exceptions; they used the caja of V era 
C ruz instead). These cajas, at least those producing income for the 
Crown, sent their revenues to Mexico from  mining and sales taxes, tithes, 
tribute, salary imposts, royal monopolies, pension funds, and a host of 
other assessments after administrative costs, salaries, and other expenses 
had been paid in the treasury district.3 In Mexico City the viceroy and 
his aides allocated these funds for viceregal bureaucratic salaries and 
administrative expenses, defense and war, charitable and educational 
activity, missions, and military subsidies for the C aribbean islands, 
Florida, Louisiana, and the Philippines. If  anything remained as surplus, 
it went to Spain.
A similar system developed in Peru where Lim a was the matrix 
treasury for both U pper and Lower Peru. By 1750 there were cajas in 
the regional market centers of Arequipa, Cuzco, Jau ja , La Paz, and 
Trujillo; the mining districts of Cailloma, C arabaya, C arangas, C h u - 
cuito, Huancavelica, O ruro, Potosí, and Vico y Pasco; and the ports of 
Arica, P iura y Paita, Saña (also Trujillo), and Lim a, the latter collecting 
im port -  export duties for Callao. In U pper Peru this network of 
treasuries expanded somewhat in the 1770’s when Charcas and Cocha­
bam ba became official treasury districts in 1773 and Santa C ruz de la 
Sierra became a sub -  treasury of Cochabam ba a short time later, but in 
Lower Peru the system contracted, perhaps to promote administrative 
efficiency. In 1760 eleven cajas functioned in the region: Arequipa, 
Cailloma, C arabaya, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Ja u ja , Lima, Piura, Saña, 
T rujillo, and Vico y Pasco; by the time of the wars of Independence 
there were only eight: Arica, Arequipa, Cuzco, H uam anga, Lima, Puno, 
T rujillo, and Vico y Pasco. T he others either had gone out of existence 
or had been incorporated into one of the new or existing cajas.
For over two hundred years of the colonial period Lim a was the 
m atrix treasury for all the cajas of Lower and U pper Peru. Every 
treasury in both areas sent its surplus revenues to Lim a for distribution 
by the viceroy and his subordinates, again like Mexico after all admi­
nistrative costs and salaries had been paid in the caja district. In the City 
of Kings royal bureaucrats allocated royal taxes for subsidies to military
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garrisons in Chiloé, Concepción, Valdivia, and Panam á; for the upkeep 
and im provem ent of the mercury mines at H uancavelica; and for the 
m aintenance of the Pacific fleet (Arm ada del Sur), so im portant for 
insuring safe passage of Peruvian silver to the Isthmus of Panam á and 
the carrying of European goods back to Callao. Adminstrative and mili­
tary salaries, war, charitable' and educational activity, upkeep and con­
struction of public and ecclesiastical buildings and bridges, and a host of 
other things also took large sums from  the revenues coming both from 
outside cajas and from the Lim a area. Again, as in Mexico, surplus 
funds went to Castile. D uring the early seventeenth century this 
amounted to over 50 percent of what the m atrix treasury of Lim a 
collected.
A fter 1760, however, this system changed dramatically when the 
treasuries of U pper Peru severed their ties with Lim a and began 
remitting surplus revenues to Buenos Aires for support of the growing 
military and civil establishment in the Rio de la Plata. Initially, Lim a 
shared these surplus funds, but by the 1770’s all monies form erly sent to 
the Pacific coast from C arangas, C harcas, Chucuito, C ochabam ba, 
O ruro, La Paz, and Potosí were flowing to Buenos Aires with Potosí 
serving as an intermediate transfer point for these. L im a’s revenues from 
outside cajas were thus reduced to those produced by A requipa, Arica, 
Caillom a, C arabaya, Cuzco, Huancavelica, Ja u ja , Piura, Saña, Trujillo, 
and Vico y Pasco. A fter administrative reorganization in the 1780’s, 
only the seven treasuries of Arica, Arequipa, Cuzco, H uam anga, Puno, 
Trujillo, and Pasco fell within the Lim a orbit, an im portant factor in 
assessing and interpreting the Lim a account da ta .4
General Tendencies and Secular Trends in M exico: The View  from  the 
Caja o f  M exico, 1 7 5 0 -1 8 1 0
Tables I and II have been developed from the royal accounts of 
Mexico and Lim a to show the m ajor sources of royal income by quin­
quennia for the entire eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Broadly 
these taxes can be placed in a num ber of categories: 1. taxes on mining 
production including the sale of mercury; 2. taxes on agricultural and 
commercial activity encompassing tithes (novenos), sales taxes (alcaba­
las), im port -  export taxes (almojarifazgos), and imposts on pulque ;
3. income from the sale of indulgences (bulas de santa cruzada and bulas 
cuadragesimales)-, 4. up to 1786 extraordinary income, and, for the late 
eighteenth century; 5. mint assessments, and 6. income from the tobacco
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monopoly."’ Also, in order to place the period 1 7 5 0 - 1810 into a
broader context and to measure the pace of change more precisely over 
the whole eighteenth century, Tables I and II use data for the entire 
century 1700 -  1810.
For Mexico, then, what do the nominal figures from  the cartas
cuentas reveal concerning economic developments in the eighteenth 
century, not only the figures for total revenues collected but also for the
various categories of taxes? Broadly for the first forty years of the
eighteenth century, they reveal modest growth in the commercial -  
agricultural sector and a more substantial development for the mining 
sector, particularly after the end of the W ar of the Spanish Succession 
when new supplies of mercury from Almadén becam e available. In fact, 
income from silver taxes and the sales of mercury almost doubled be­
tween the first and fourth decade of the eighteenth century. Sales tax 
and tithe collections, however, barely rose at all during the first quarter 
century, although they increased somewhat after 1725. T ribute income 
followed the same pattern as that for the alcabalas and novenos, but 
overall the increase in mining production seems prim arily responsable for 
a modest rise in royal revenues during the early part of the century.^
T he middle of the eighteenth century (1 7 4 0 - 1775) appears to have 
been an epoch of more rapid growth in all sectors of the Mexican 
economy, particularly in the commercial sector, perhaps spurred on by 
the increase in silver production. Although income from mining taxes 
and sale of mercury reflected a continued rise in silver mining, more 
dram atic surges came in trade and commercial activity where the collec­
tion of sales taxes doubled between the 1730’s and the 1770’s. This 
increase stemmed in part from  the elimination of the alcabala tax farms 
in the 1760’s and 1770’s, in part from  more efficient collection tech­
niques, in part from  a rise in population, and in part from increased 
commercial activity, but whatever the reason, the increase was substan­
tial. T ribute collections also rose sharply in the early 1740’s and sus­
tained that higher level over the next three decades. T ithe income, 
however, increased only moderately.
Most apparent as the cause for the increase in total revenues was the 
meteoric upsurge in income from  the ramo  of extraordinario, that 
catch -  all category for colonial accountants for which there was no 
established ramo  (and the bête noire of modern -  day analysts). W hat 
types of income did this ramo produce? In 1750, as an example, extra­
ordinario included income from  various monopolies such as cockfighting, 
playing cards, powder, and leather; payment of fleet costs by miners
320
who had purchased mercury; reintegration of salaries paid in advance to 
soldiers or officials who had died or otherwise forsaken their posts; 
return by the caja of Acapulco of 14,000 pesos which had not been put 
aboard the M anila galleon bound for the Philippines; import -  export 
taxes from M anila; an individual gift to Ferdinand V I; back taxes paid 
from  the sale of aguardiente and vino mescal', two large loans for 
strengthening the Spanish defensive posture in the C aribbean; and 
monies garnered from the confiscation and sale of illegal goods found on 
the M anila galleon.7 Imcome from this ramo thus contained a diverse 
h o d g e -p o d g e  of revenues which cannot be categorized. Increases in 
paym ent for rights over royal monopolies such as cockfighting and 
playing cards might well have meant an increase in those enjoying and 
being able to afford the pleasures of gambling in Mexico or in those 
able to buy leather and powder, but loans and reintegros where just that, 
loans and reintegros. Also if income from  extraordinario rose so sharply 
in the 1740’s and again in the 1750’s, it may have been due to more 
efficient collection efforts by earnest royal officials as well as to the 
increasing profitability of royal monopolies and the income to be ob­
tained from them . W hatever the reason, this account category expanded 
rapidly in Mexico during mid -  century to constitute almost a quarter of 
treasury income in the 1760’s. M ore than likely the 1740’s marked a 
watershed in the M exican economy, and the ramo of extraordinario 
clearly reflected this change in economic rhythm  as well.
If  the 1740’s were one turning point in the M exican economy, the 
1770’s were still another, a time when the pace of tax collections seemed 
to quicken once again in virtually all ramos of the royal treasury. In the 
1760’s, for example, taxes on silver amounted to about twelve million 
pesos, rose to fifteen million in the 1770’s, sixteen million in the 1780’s, 
nineteen million in the 1790’s, and over twenty million in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century. Sales tax income jum ped markedly 
also, almost doubling in the decade 1 7 7 6 - 1785 from  the previous ten 
years (1766 -  1775). D uring the same period taxes on the sale of pulque  
followed the same trend with tithe collections rising also but at a slower 
pace. Overall, total revenues into the M exican caja increased even more 
substantially than those on sales or mining at the end of the eighteenth 
century; in fact they increased exponentially. Total revenues in the 
quinquennium  1 7 7 6 - 1780 were fo r ty - th re e  million pesos; by the last 
quinquennium  of the century they amounted to eighty -  seven million 
pesos; and during the five years prior to the outbreak of the W ars of 
Independence (1 8 0 6 - 1810), they reached 112 million pesos. If  Crown
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revenues reflected the state of the Mexican economy, the viceroyalty 
seemed to be flourishing as never before. The millenium had apparently 
arrived.
But had it? Was the last quarter of the eighteenth century and first 
decade of the nineteenth something of a golden age for Mexico, a period 
manifesting economic growth and prosperity in all sectors of the econo­
my? Did the larger, ever -  expanding revenues truly reflect an increas­
ingly prosperous economy? T he answer to this questions may lie in the 
juxtaposition of the account figures against a host of other factors -  
royal tax policies, administrative reforms, prices and inflation, demo­
graphic changes, patterns of imperial expenditure, currency debasement 
schemes, and the like.
First, what was the apparent pattern of growth in trade, silver pro­
duction, industry, and agriculture, as reflected in the revenues flowing 
into the caja of Mexico? Clearly expansion of all these sectors played at 
least some role. In the quinquennium  1771 -  1775 silver taxes produced 
seven million pesos. T hirty  years later in the quinquennium  1801 -  1804 
they produced over ten million pesos or about 1.4 times what they had 
generated in the earlier period. For sales taxes income produced in the 
quinquennium  1771 -  1775 amounted to six million pesos and eleven 
million pesos for the quinquennium  1781 -  1785, or 1.8 times as much. 
T hus, economic expansion may have played some role in the expansion 
of the tax revenues, although clearly total tax revenues rose at a far 
more rapid pace than silver production taxes and later at a much more 
rapid rate than sales tax collections.
Imposition of new taxes was another factor responsible for the 
phenomenal rise in royal revenues. Beginning in the 1770’s about the 
same time as the rapid increase in treasury income, the Crown began 
assessing a host of new taxes in Mexico -  salary deductions for a 
multitude of pension funds (m ontepíos, inválidos), fondos for pious 
works, new taxes on pulque, aguardiente and vino mescal, subsidies on 
both the ecclesiastical and civil establishments, additional tribute assess­
ments for support of hospitals and legal defenders of the Indians (medio 
real de hospital, medio real de ministros), nuisance taxes such as one 
imposed for the shoeing of horses or the right to slaughter calves 
prem aturely; new requirem ents and higher payments for the royal 
gracias al sacar, a new set of indulgences (bulas cuadragesimales) to 
allow one to eat m eat on certain days of Lent when it was normally 
prohibited; increased salary taxes; and a host of other new imposts. 
These new taxes and an increase in old levies on such things as aguar-
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diente and pulque  thus were as responsible as economic expansion for 
the meteoric rise in royal revenues in the late eighteenth century.
Still another vital reason for the expansion or seeming expansion in 
treasury incomes was the imposition of forced loans on various assigned 
or special ramos (ramos ágenos and ramos particulares) of the royal 
treasury, ramos normally reserved for or allocated to specific purposes in 
either Mexico or Spain. T he ramo of temporalidades, for example, was 
normally assigned to religious ends in Mexico, yet income from  it was 
oftentimes shifted to the real hacienda for military and civil expenses. 
Tobacco income was supposedly reserved for the Crown for shipment to 
Spain, but it too was oftentimes diverted by treasury officials for the 
immediate needs of the viceroyalty. As examples, in 1789 the royal 
treasury of Mexico owed over five million pesos to various creditors, the 
largest of these being the ramo of temporalidades for over one million 
pesos borrowed from  it.8 In 1798 these debts had grown to well over 
twenty -  three million pesos with the largest sum of eight million pesos 
owed to the tribunal of the bulas de santa cruzada for advances made to 
the royal treasury officials from  that ram o.9 (Not surprisingly, in 1805, 
bulas, novenos, polvora, and confiscaciones all were shifted from  ramos 
particulares to the ramos de real hacienda in the caja of Mexico.)
This process of borrowing from  the various ramos of the treasury 
continued into the epoch of the W ars of Independence and was imple­
mented by royal policies which forced individuals and institutions to 
provide additional monies for the royal coffers through forced loans. 
Pious foundations, bishoprics, religious orders, the mining guild and 
Consulado, and wealthy individuals all poured specie into the royal 
treasury for use in shoring up imperial defenses or for remissions to 
Spain. In fact, by the end of the first stage of the W ars of Independence 
in 1816, the royal treasury owed over eighty million pesos to individuals, 
institutions, and various ramos of the treasury. M ore than ten million of 
these loans had come from  the trade and mining guilds, over six million 
from the estanco of tobacco, ten million from religious and charitable 
institutions and foundations, twenty -  four million from unpaid military 
subsidies (situados), and five million from  various ramos particulares and 
ramos ágenos of the royal treasury. In  fact this enormous debt led one 
bureaucrat in M adrid to suggest that it be placed into three categories: 1. 
T hirty  -  two million pesos to be paid back as soon as possible; 2. Seven 
million to be paid sometime in the future if possible, and 3. forty -  one 
million to be written off, including the twenty -  four owing for unpaid 
situados.^9 All this can only fortify the view that tax policies and loans
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forced on institutions, individuals, and ramos of the real hacienda con­
tributed greatly to the increases in royal revenues late in the eighteenth 
century and early in the nineteenth and most likely were more im portant 
than economic growth in New Spain for the rise in treasury income.
Price increase may also be crucial for the rapid rise in revenues at the 
end of the colonial period. Fortunately, price series and price indices for 
various regions and products abound for eighteenth -  century Mexico to 
enable a more accurate assessment of the real meaning of the account 
fig u res .^  Generally, for the first three quarters of the eighteenth 
century, although there were cyclical price changes caused by drought, 
fam ine, or epidemic disease, prices were relatively stable, making the 
nominal values of the royal account data more reliable in assessing 
economic trends for the earlier epoch. Beginning in 1775, however, 
about the same time as the dram atic upsurge in royal income, prices 
began to rise drastically and sharply affect the purchasing power of the 
peso throughout Mexico. Com parison of nominal and real values of net 
revenues into the caja of Mexico during this epoch demonstrates how 
rapidly the value of the peso declined in this period. In the late 1780’s 
(1 7 8 6 - 1790), for example, nominal net revenues were fifty -  six million 
pesos; adjusted for prices, they amounted to only thirty -  two million 
pesos. Prices came down somewhat during the next quinquennium , but 
in the f iv e -y e a r  period 1 7 9 6 - 1800 the eighty -  seven million pesos 
collected by royal officials had a purchasing power of only sixty -  seven 
million. For the decade prior to the outbreak of the W ars of Indepen­
dence, the situation got even worse when the real value of royal revenues 
diminished to half their nominal value. T he other ramifications 
stemming from  rising prices such as the increasing cost of silver prcr- 
duction, agriculture, and m anufacturing; reduced profits; and royal 
revenues based more on an increase in prices than on increased produc­
tion must also be taken into account when considering the state of the 
economy.
Still another question concerning Mexican economic development 
concerns the increase in tax revenues as a function of demographic 
growth. Did the rise in royal revenues outstrip the population growth rate 
in Mexico during the eighteenth century? U nfortunately demographic 
data are neither as precise nor as rich as those for prices or tax collec­
tions, although some convenient benchmarks do exist. Rough estimates 
for the M exican population indicate a total of 3.6 million in 1742, 5.2 
million in 1793, and 6.1 million in 1810. Another estimate for the 
center -  west of Mexico in G uanajuato and M ichoacán shows that the
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population quintupled between 1700 and 1810, virtually the same pattern 
as in the G uadalajara region.1^  Using these estimates, one finds that 
population grew 1.44 times between 1742 and 1793 and by 1.17 times 
between 1793 and 1810; for the whole period 1742 to 1810 population 
grew 1.69 times. T ax collections more than kept pace with this growth to 
1793 but slowed after that. Nominal tax figures show that royal revenues 
increased 2.95 times between 1742 and 1793 and 1.6 times during the 
years 1793 to 1810; for the period 1742 to 1810 they increased 4.75 
times, in every case faster than the population growth rate. If  one uses 
real rather than nominal values, however, the pattern is somewhat 
different. From 1742 to 1793 the real value of royal revenues increased 
2.54 times, but between 1793 and 1810 no increase occured because of 
the rise of prices, despite the fact that nominal values of Crown income 
were sixty -  nine million pesos in the early 1790’s and 112 million in the 
quinquennium  ending in 1810. For the entire century, royal revenues 
increased in value tenfold nominally and sevenfold in real terms. If 
population quintupled, this m eant that in either case royal revenues 
increased at a faster rate than the population of Mexico, although again 
the loans and allocations made to the royal treasury may well account for 
this rise .13
T o all this might be added a crude, highly speculative effort to 
establish per capita income figures for eighteenth -  century Mexico based 
on the population counts of 1742, 1793, and 1806 and gross national 
product estimates based on silver production. (The method for this has 
been discussed in detail elsewere.)14 These crude estimates confirm 
the patterns already established. In 1742, for example, annual per capita 
income in Mexico not adjusted for prices amounted to 28 pesos, 26 pesos 
after price adjustm ents. In 1793 this sum had risen to 43 pesos annually 
and 41 pesos in real terms. Thirteen years later, however, stagnation or 
downturn had set in with annual per capita income still at 43 pesos 
nominally and at 37 pesos adjusted to the inflationary spiral. Again the 
crude estimates bear out a mid -  century spurt and end -  of -  century 
downturn.
W hat then can be stated definitively about the M exican economy in 
the eighteenth century? Clearly it was a century of growth in all sectors, 
slow development at first and more substantial growth from  1740 to 
1775. Then, despite the seeming increases in royal revenues, the pace of 
expansion lessened hindered by high prices and inflation, w ar and 
interruption of trade, obscurantist fiscal policies, and other factors. In 
fact the large sums produced by the royal treasury in the last quarter of
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the eighteenth century serve more to mask the reality of what was 
actually occurring in the Mexican economy than to clarify some of its 
growing problems.
Still, with all the caveats and warning signals which have emerged 
concerning the prosperity and vitality of the M exican economy, there is 
strong evidence of growth and increasing wealth. W hat is perhaps most 
impressive about the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Mexico 
-  in addition to the rising prices and inflation, forced loans, repressive 
fiscal policies, and a host of new taxes, all of which seemed to hold back 
economic development -  is the great wealth which had been accumu­
lated by specific institutions, individuals, and various ramos of the royal 
treasury over the century. T hat the mining and m erchant guilds could 
provide over ten million pesos in loans to the caja of Mexico and large 
sums in outright donations, that the estanco of tobacco could contribute 
more than five million, that the tribunal of the bulas de santa cruzada 
could accumulate eight million pesos in reserves, that religious institutions 
and pious foundations could provide more than thirteen million pesos to 
the treasury of Mexico testifies to the economic vitality of these institu­
tions and to their growing wealth over the eighteenth century. They had 
become rich from  the production of more and more silver, from in­
creased trade, from  greater sales of snuff, cigars, and cigarette tobacco, 
from  more purchase of indulgences by those seeking atonement, 
redemption, or spiritual favors for themselves or others, and from larger 
and larger contributions from tithe payers, givers, penitents, and ren­
te r s .^  And the monies which created these institutions had to come 
from  Mexicans at many levels of society, M exicans who had the specie 
to buy tobacco or indulgences or merchandise or offices or to contribute 
to their favorite church or charity. If  the Mexican economy fell on bad 
times at the end of the eighteenth century, the evidence is strong that it 
had flourished earlier. T hat wealth was unequally distributed, that rural 
society in Mexico had been proletarianized in the face of m a n - la n d  
pressures and a growing money economy, that poverty and banditry had 
increased, and that high prices ate away at profits and wages and pre­
vented further development may well be true, but the economy showed 
all the signs of having prospered nevertheless, particularly during the 
middle of the century.
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General Tendencies and Secular Trends in Peru: T he View  from  the 
Caja o f  Lim a, 1750 -  1810
If Mexico seemed to grow and prosper in the eighteenth century, 
what then was the pattern in Peru, so similar in many ways to its 
counterpart to the north? Both Peru and Mexico were vital imperial 
centers, focal points for the viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain 
respectively. Both regions had large Indian populations with rich deposits 
of silver. As such, both might have been expected to m aintain the same 
economic rhythms, but this was not the case.
In 1700 Peru was deep in the throes of depression. M ining produc­
tion had declined, and shipments of silver from  the mines of U pper Peru 
to Lim a had dropped precipitously. T rade had slackened, the A rm ada 
del Sur was sailing for Panam á only sporadically, and the fair at P u e r- 
tobelo had become virtually insignificant.16 T he mercury mines at 
Huancavelica had fallen into a state of disrepair, and mercury production 
had dropped. T he depression seems to have begun in the 1660’s and 
taken hold gradually. Initially in the 1660’s, 1670’s, and 1680’s, royal 
treasury officials in Lim a compensated for revenue losses from  declining 
silver production and trade by selling land titles, titles of nobility, offices, 
and annuities (censos), but when these expedients were exhausted, 
income began dropping sharply in the 1690’s, reflecting the decline of 
the economy, particularly silver mining, which had made Peru the Crown 
jewel of the Spanish em pire in the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries.1^
From one perspective Peru seems to have remained depressed for the 
first three quarters of the eighteenth century with little evidence of any 
sustained recovery or growth during this period. Although income from 
mining production increased substantially, it did not fuel a steady 
advance in the commercial o r agricultural sectors of the economy. After 
a sharp decline from  1700 to 1725, for example, sales tax revenues rose 
a bit because of an increase in the ships calling at Callao with European 
goods, but then income dropped off during wartime when these vessels 
failed to reach the Lim a area. In  the 1760’s sales tax collections suddenly 
doubled over the previous decade because of increased trade, but fell 
back again in the quinquennium  1771 -  1775 to a sum only a bit larger 
than that garnered by royal officials seventy -  five years earlier during 
the first five years of the century. T ithe income also spurted in the early 
1760’s but dropped again in the latter part of the decade and early 
1770’s. In fact, aside from  mining, tribute was the only ramo of the
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Lim a treasury to show any sustained growth; but in this case doubling of 
the Indian population in the Lima district between 1750 and 1800 seems 
mostly responsible.18 Extraordinary income actually declined over the 
century, but this was caused prim arily by the addition of new ramos to 
the accounts or the reinstitution of old entries which had fallen into 
disuse. T hus, looked at from  most vantage points except mining and 
tribute, the Lim a account figures show that Peru had little tendency to 
emerge from the economic doldrums in the first sixty or seventy years of 
the eighteenth century. In fact, despite the brief resurgence in the early 
1760’s, total income into the Lim a caja for 1 7 6 6 - 1775 was no greater 
in nominal and probably real terms than for the first decade of the 
century.
Although these indicators may well reflect the realities of economic 
life in Peru -  stasis with some cyclical change -  viewed another way, 
the accounts suggest both a new economic reorientation and perhaps 
some economic revival, particularly in Lower Peru. Like the treasury of 
Mexico the caja of Lim a relied in large m easure upon remissions from 
other treasuries in the viceroyalty for its revenues. From 1580 to 1700, 
for example, 60 percent of total revenues into the caja of Lim a came 
from  the interior and coastal cajas of Peru and U pper Peru (aproxi- 
mately 232 million pesos out of a total of 385 million collected), most of 
this from the rich mining treasuries of Potosí and O ru ro .1® At the 
opening of the eighteenth century, however, as these mines grew less and 
less productive or were exhausted, income into the Lima treasury 
dropped, particularly because of reduction in the monies being remitted 
from  cajas outside the City of Kings. Between 1700 and 1760, for 
example, only 23 percent of the income of the caja of Lim a came from 
outside treasuries; in the halcyon days of the seventeenth century the 
proportion was over 50 percent of total revenues. In terms of total sums 
being remitted, the slash in income was even more astounding. For the 
first fifty years of the seventeenth century, Lim a treasury officials took 
in aproximately 125 million pesos from its dependent treasuries; for the 
first fifty years of the eighteenth century the same caja garnered only 
seventeenth million pesos from  the same source, about one -  seventh that 
of the previous epoch.
In the 1760’s the situation for the caja of Lim a appeared to become 
even more critical when the cajas of U pper Peru began severing ties 
with the m atrix treasury. In  1766 the cajas of La Paz, Potosí, and O ruro 
sent their last significant surplus tax revenues to the City of Kings. 
Chucuito made its last remission in 1769 and C arangas in 1776, effecti­
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vely cutting off the last m ajor sources of income to the Lima treasury 
from U pper Peru. Yet, through ail this readjustm ent and reorientation, 
royal officials in Lim a managed to sustain royal income at the same 
levels for the first three quarters of the century and to counteract and 
compensate for this great loss of income from  U pper Peru. This could 
only have been done by garnering additional revenues in Lim a itself or 
from  the various cajas of Lower Peru.
Actually, the loss of revenues from  U pper Peru in the 1760’s and 
1770’s was not as serious for Lower Peru as might be supposed. Viewed 
from a long -  range perspective, the real losses and subsequent adjust­
ment by the Lim a caja had already occurred. For example, from 
1641 -  1650 the treasury in the City of Kings received 53 percent of its 
income (over 23 million) from  other cajas, mostly from  Potosí and 
U pper Peru. O ne hundred years later (1741 -  1750) these same treasuries 
produced only 13 percent and about two million pesos for the Lim a caja, 
clear evidence of how drastically income from  outside treasuries had 
declined. Interestingly, too, during the 1770’s, the very epoch of foun­
dation of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, more monies were 
flowing into the Lim a treasury from other cajas than at any other time 
in the eighteenth century.^1
Revival of the mining economy in Lower Peru seems largely
responsible for the ability of Lim a treasury officials to survive the loss of
U pper Peru and m aintain consistent levels of income into the Lim a caja. 
For the first decade of the eighteenth century silver production in Lower 
Peru was about 2.3 million pesos; by the 1760’s it had risen to 16.2
million, a sevenfold increase, with the most significant jum p occurring in
the mid -  1730’s, when Philip V lowered the tax rate on Peruvian silver 
from a fifth to a tenth. In fact, the reform  was so successful that legal 
production in Lower Peru more than doubled from  3.3 million pesos in 
the first quinquennium  of the 1730’s to 7.6 million in the second quin­
quennium . W ith only a few modest setbacks, probably caused by the 
lack of mercury, mining production continued to rise until it reached a 
peak of 40.6 million pesos in the last decade of the eighteenth century. 
Although the am ount of silver produced dropped to 38.7 million in the 
first ten years of the nineteenth century, that decade still was a milestone 
because the mines of Lower Peru outstripped production in those of 
U pper Peru (30.2 million pesos) for the first time.
T he growth of the mining economy in Lower Peru occurred in dif­
ferent regions at different times. At the C erro de Pasco mining produc­
tion grew steadily throughout the century from  approximately 300,000
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pesos in the first quinquennium  of the century to a peak o f 11.2 million 
pesos in the last quinquennium  making it the second most im portant 
mining area in Peru in 1800, second only to Potosí. Both Huancavelica 
and Cailloma flourished at the opening of the eighteenth century when 
production rose steadily to 1750 before dropping off. From 1730 Ja u ja  
consistently produced small amounts and silver tax income for the Crown. 
Arequipa became more significant as a generator of silver taxes after 
1780 when the miners at Cailloma began registering their silver here 
after the caja of Cailloma was closed. Most im portant, though, in the 
last quarter of the century, was the sudden silver boom in the Trujillo 
area. T o 1773 no silver at all was produced in the region, but the dis­
covery of ore at Hualgayoc rocketed Trujillo into a prime position as a 
silver producer, and for a brief time in the late 1770’s and early 1780’s 
the Hualgayoc mines challenged those of the C erro de Pasco. T o the end 
of the century mining production grew steadily in Trujillo, although not 
quite as rapidly as in the C erro de Pasco reg io n .^
M ining production may well have been responsible for fueling the 
seeming resurgence in the Peruvian economy in the late 1770’s. In 
successive quinquenniums from 1776 to 1790 total income into the Lima 
caja jum ped from  twelve million pesos (1776 -  1780) to sixteen million 
pesos (1781 -  1785) to 18.7 million pesos (1 7 8 6 - 1790). Growth 
seemingly occurred in all sectors. In 1 7 7 6 - 1780 income from sales taxes 
almost tripled compared with that of the previous five years; revenues 
from  almojarifazgos quadrupled during the same period. T he rapid 
increase in mining production also led to a rise in mining revenues, while 
greater supplies of mercury em anating from both Almadén and 
Huancavelica gave impetus to silver production. At the same time 
remissions from the cajas of Lower Peru to Lim a jum ped by one million 
pesos from  three million (1771 -  1775) to four million (1 7 7 6 - 1780), 
indicating an economic upsurge in regions outside Lim a as well. Im perial 
reforms were partially responsible for the increased revenues -  the 
decree of comercio libre in 1778, new imposts on aguardiente, repair of 
the mines of Huancavelica, formation of the cuerpo de minería, adjust­
ments in sales tax rates -  but revival of the economy was also a cause. 
Even serious local uprisings such as the one in A requipa in 1780 
protesting new sales tax rates and the new impost on aguardiente and the 
rebellions which swept through the Andean highlands in the early 1780’s, 
surprisingly, did not significantly slow the pace of economic growth. A 
new economic rhythm  seemed firmly established in Peru in the late 
1770’s.
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But, alas, the economic revival did not last and apparently could not 
be sustained. A fter 1800 mining production slowed a bit and mercury 
sales began dropping, income from  sales taxes and trade imposts de­
clined, and tribute income turned d o w n w ard /3 In fact, for the Lima 
caja the quinquennium  1786 -  1790 was the zenith for the eighteenth 
century, producing 18.7 million pesos, leveling off by 1800 to about 
fourteen million pesos per quinquennium  until independence in 1821. 
Peru was probably victimized by its geographic position. Ju s t as it 
seemed to emerge from  its economic doldrums and began to prosper a 
bit, European wars interrupted the flow of goods from Spain. Unlike 
Mexico, which was flooded with legal and illegal British, Am erican, and 
French goods, Peru was not as easily accessible for these traders, and 
foreign merchants saw no reason to chance the dangerous voyage
through the Straits of M agellan and around Cape H orn to make their
profits in Peru when they were more easily available in the C aribbean, 
G ulf of Mexico, or Buenos Aires.
W hen income into the caja of Mexico needed to be increased during 
the pre -  independence decades, infusions of money from  m int assess­
ments, the tobacco monopoly, the ram o of temporalidades, forced loans 
on the mining and m erchant guilds, and other expedients helped to 
produce new monies for imperial uses and to keep funds flowing into the 
royal caja. T he same was true in Peru but on a fa r smaller scale; indi­
viduals, institutions, and the ramos ágenos and ramos particulares of the 
Lim a treasury simply were not as wealthy as their counterparts in 
Mexico. None had benefitted as much as in Mexico from  a sustained
period of economic growth in which they could accumulate wealth and
build up their profits and reserves. Only the estanco of tobacco pros­
pered in Lim a to become the one real source of large contributions to the 
Lim a caja in the second decade of the nineteenth century. N either the 
Consulado nor the new T ribunal de M inería in Peru, set up in 1787, 
had the resources to meet the exigencies of w ar and imperial defense. 
T he revival of trade and mining simply had no sustained growth in 
Peru.
Lack of sustained development was also reflected in the inability of 
royal officials to lay new taxes on Peruvians as they had in Mexico at 
the end of the eighteenth century. T he Peruvian economy simply had not 
prospered enough to make many new taxes possible. In the late 1770’s a 
new impost on aguardiente appeared along with a num ber of new 
pension fund taxes (montepíos) and assessments on Peruvian Indians for 
Indian hospitals and legal defenders (m edio real de hospital and medio
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real de ministros). Peruvian bishoprics had to pay assessments levied by 
the Crown for the Real O rden de Carlos III, but there were limits on 
the num ber and amount of such levies. In fact in 1793 the Lim a account 
lists only forty -  one entries on the income side of the ledger; that same 
year the account for the caja of Mexico shows ninety -  five, again 
evidence that the royal treasury had not benefitted from  a long period of 
economic development in Peru. It simply had not occurred.
In conclusion, then, this paper has assumed a broad, macro -  cosmic 
perspective using the data from the accounts of the matrix treasuries of 
Mexico and Lim a. From both a comparative and synchronic point of 
view for each region, this fiscal data has provided some intriguing indices 
and benchmarks for the course of Mexican and Peruvian economic 
developments in the eighteenth century. As might be expected, however, 
the paper poses as many questions as it answers, but by turning the 
hourglass over once again, perhaps we can come closer and closer to the 
truth.
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1. The current debate over the seventeenth -  century crisis in the Spanish Indies 
has been summarized in John J .  TePaske and Herbert S. Klein, ’’The 
Seventeenth -  Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality ,” PP, 90(1981), 
1 1 6 -  135. Also see the criticisms of TePaske’s and K lein’s views by Professors 
Jona than  Israel and H enry Kam en and a rejoinder by TePaske and Klein in 
PP, 97(1982), 1 4 4 - 161.
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large measure on subsidies from the opulent treasuries such as Durango, 
G uadalajara, San Luis Potosí, and Mexico.
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Mexico, see the introduction by TePaske and Klein in the appropriate volumes 
listed in footnote 2.
5. Actually since tobacco revenues and income from seized Jesuit estates were 
allocated for special uses, the am ounts taken in often did not appear in the 
accounts. Only when a contribution from the estanco or the temporalidades was 
made to the ramos of the real hacienda was it usually entered in the accounts.
6. Table I may be a bit m isleading in regard to the sums collected as silver taxes 
in the caja of Mexico. Up to 1726 royal accountants reported only net sums 
collected in the viceroyalty, considerably less than  was actually produced. After 
1795 the accounts list only what was produced in the district of the treasury of 
Mexico. For a more detailed breakdown on silver production in Mexico in the 
eighteenth century caja by caja, see John  J .  TePaske, ”Economic Cycles in 
New Spain in the Eighteenth Century: The View from the Public Sector,” 
Bibliotheca Americana, 1:3(1983), 169 -2 0 3 .
7. C arta  cuenta de la real caja de México, año de 1750, AGI, Contaduría Section 
(hereafter Contaduría), Leg. 836.
8. Estado general de los valores y distribución que han tenido los Ramos 
Com unes y Particulares de la Real Hacienda en las Tesorerías de Nueva 
España en el año de 1798, A G I, Audiencia de México, Leg. 2026.
9. Estado general de los valores y distribución que han tenido los Ramos Comu­
nes y Particulares de la Real Hacienda en las Tesorerías de Nueva España en 
el año de 1789, AGI, Audiencia de México, Leg. 2026.
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11. I am  deeply grateful to Professor John  Coatsworth for providing the price 
indices which make these estimates possible. These price indices and the 
adjustm ents made for them may be found in the article cited in note 6.
12. Population estimates are taken from Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, La población 
negra de M éxico  (México, 1972); Claude M orin, ’’Sentido y alcance del siglo 
X V III en América Latina: El caso del centro -  oeste m exicano,” in Enrique 
Florescano, ed. Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de M éxico y  América  
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13. Debasement is still another factor to be taken into account when assessing the 
significance of the treasury accounts. Unlike Spain where debasement and 
devaluation were very common under the Hapsburgs and early Bourbons, in 
Mexico and the Indies generally there was little tam pering with either the value 
or silver content of the peso. In fact the peso de ocho of 272 maravedís, used 
as the unit of account for this paper, was never devalued. It was debased, 
however, but not until the eighteenth century. To 1728 the peso de ocho con­
tained 25.561 grams of fine silver. In 1728 Philip V reduced the content to 
24.809 grams. From 1772 to 1786 it fell still further to 24.433 grams and from 
1786 to 1825, the end of the colonial period, its content was further reduced 
to 24.245 grams. Thus, over the eighteenth century the silver content of the 
peso de ocho declined by a bit over one gram. Significantly, perhaps, two 
debasements occurred at the same time as the Crown began asserting its new 
fiscal policies and imposing a myriad of new taxes in Mexico.
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collection figures. O n this score it should be noted that comparison of tribute 
figures for Lima and Mexico can be misleading, because the Mexican treasury 
reported total net tribute income for most of Mexico, while Lima listed tribute 
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total revenues into the Lima treasury and the sums remitted to Castile, 
1 582- 1800.
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21. The place of U pper Peru in the fiscal structure of the viceroyalty of Peru is 
explained in John J .  TePaske, ’’The Fiscal Structure of U pper Peru and the 
Financing of Em pire,” in K. Spalding, ed., Essays in the Political, Economic, 
and Social History o f  Colonial Latin America (Newark, D el., 1982), 
p p .6 9 -9 4 . The various appendices, p p .8 6 -9 4 , provide a breakdown on the 
remission patterns for each of the cajas in U pper Pern.
22. See the unpublished paper by John  J . TePaske, ’’Silver M ining and the 
Imperial Reform in U pper and Lower Peru, 1 700- 1810,” presented at the 
44th International Congress of Americanists in M anchester, England, 
September 11, 1982.
23. Actually, as in Mexico the government subsidized the sale of mercury to 
encourage an  increase in m ining production in the 1770’s, 1780’s, and early 
1790’s to 1795. During this period it cost 111 pesos to produce one quintal of 
mercury at Huancavelica; the government sold this mercury to miners at 
seventy -  five pesos per quintal; Luis Navarro García, Hispanoamérica en el 
siglo X V I I I  (Sevilla, 1975), p.226.
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EX PLA N A TIO N S O F TABLES
Explanation o f  Table I
Table I was taken from  the cartas cuentas for the caja of Mexico found in Leg.s 
8 1 6 -8 4 0  of the C ontaduría Section and Leg.s 2029, 2 0 4 4-2072  of the Audien­
cia of Mexico Section of the Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla, Spain. Two 
accounts for 1808 and 1812 were found in Books 81 and 68 respectively of the 
Ramo de Real Hacienda of the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City. To 
1786 the net total of income into the caja of Mexico was determined by taking the 
original accounts, total and subtracting all monies carried over from the previous 
year (existencia, alcances de cuentas), deposits (depósitos) which could be removed 
at any time, loans (préstamos of m any different types), and entries like cambio de 
platas, temporary infusions of coins into the treasury which were rem inted and 
given back to their owners.
After 1786 a great m any problems arise, and the net totals are only w e ll-  
informed estimates of the annual am ounts taken in. For these accounts the method 
described above has been followed where applicable (existencia was no longer used 
as an account entry), but in order to account for the inclusion of ca rry -o v e rs  from 
the ramos particulares and ramos ágenos which began to appear in 1796 and 1797, 
I have subtracted the real hacienda en comun  on the data side of the ledger since 
this ramo usually accounted for all c a rry -o v e r  sums as debits on the data side. 
Also the estimates for 1789, 1793, 1794, 1797 and 1798 were checked with Estados 
Generales of the Real H acienda found in Leg. 2026 of the Audiencia of Mexico 
Section of the Archivo General de Indias and were found to coincide very closely 
with the sums listed in these estados, although probably the estimates are a bit low.
Explanation o f  Table I I
Table II was taken from the cartas cuentas for the caja of Lima found in Leg.s 
1 7 6 0 - 1772 of the C ontaduría Section of the Archivo General de Indias in Sevilla. 
O ther accounts were found in the Archivo General de la Nación in Lim a, Sección 
Histórica, in the Cuentas Mayores, Lima: Libros 1011, 1045A ,1046, 1063B, 1066, 
1074, 1082, 1090, 1092, 1098, 1112, 1117, 1120, 1127A, 1155, 1167, 1170, 1187, 
1207, 1211, 1217A, 1222, 1230A, and 1238; also Leg.s 1 5 -2 0  and 25 of that same 
archive.
The net totals to 1786 were arrived at in the same way as the net totals for the 
caja of Mexico, described above for Table I. A fter 1785 total am ounts were deter­
mined by going through each libro mayor of the accounts ramo by ramo, noting 
down the income for each ramo and the expenditures made from it, including the 
sums collected from previous years, which were lumped into one category, cobrado 
de valores años anteriores. Two accounts in the series from 1 786- 1820 for Lima 
(1788 and 1812) are aberrations; they are accounts called estados, representing the 
total am ounts taken in and expended in the whole area of the Viceroyalty of Peru. 
They are useful, however, for comparative purposes, since they list sums collected 
for import -  export taxes, sales taxes, aguardiente imposts, and other categories 





















































































TA B LE II: Revenues Collected in the R oyal Treasury o f  L im a, 1701 -1 8 2 0  
B y Q u inquenn ium  with Percentage o f  Total in Each Category  
(Pesos o f  272 M aravedís)
Years N et Total
T axes on 








Im p o rt-
Export
Taxes %
1701 -  1705 7,577,507 35,951 .5 N L 1,132,364 15 150,287 2 364,696 5
1 7 0 6 - 1710 8,889,747 69,511 .8 N L 576,661 6 125,700 1 212,355 2
1 7 1 1 -1 7 1 5 3,548,587 126,357 4 N L 541,668 15 61,271 2 183,937 5
1 7 1 6 -1 7 2 0 5,770,966 263,215 5 N L 805,881 14 75,416 1 406,989 7
1721 -  1725 6,339,210 213,333 3 N L 491,747 8 88,894 1 80,859 1
1 7 2 6 -  1730 7,688,139 103,432 1 N L 1,157,289 15 97,356 1 269,101 4
1731 -  1735 6,490,776 132,164 2 N L 867,602 13 99,991 2 335,638 5
1 7 3 6 -  1740 5,608,660 313,955 6 N L 872,852 16 79,353 1 252,007 4
1741 -  1745 5,000,706 170,225 3 N L 729,543 15 69,677 1 217,976 4
1 7 4 6 -  1750 8,283,468 591,840 7 22,7723 .3 944.862 11 86,902 1 292,623 4
1751 -  1755 7,921,365 420,535 5 220,862 3 1,192,747 15 165,329 2 222,472 3
1 7 5 6 -  1760 8,204,104 413,031 5 415,193 5 926,428 11 379,254 5 279,428 3
1 7 6 1 - 1765 13,473,813 569,474 4 531,393 4 2,160,426 16 602,470 4 458,493 3
1 7 6 6 - 1770 7,591,935 929,681 12 273,149 4 2,180,593 29 125,920 2 584,210 8
1771 -  1775 8,300,975 1,120,452 13 682,248 8 1,392,539 17 170,540 2 315,043 4
1 7 7 6 - 1780 12,187,974 1,132,351 9 1,198,562 10 3,708,782 30 156,620 1 1,267,064 10
1781 -  1785 16,066,348 1,051,239 7 1,579,484 10 2,680,590 17 141,297 .9 1,055,272 7
1 7 8 6 - 1790 18,652,405 807,007 4 2,578,630 14 N L 100,908 .5 N L
1791 -  1795 15,682,182 535,634 3 811,127 5 N L 17,693 .1 N L
1 7 9 6 - 1800 14,178,236 443,189 3 564,385 4 N L 34,250 .2 N L
1801 -  1805 14,421,070 340,434 2 919,126 6 N L N L N L
1 8 0 6 - 1810 14,518,781 339,630 2 587,810 4 N L 29,307 .2 N L
1811 -  1815 15,452,970 796,577 5 747,210 5 N L 195,888 .9 N L
1 8 1 6 -1 8 2 0 17,593,050 438,864 2 98,702 .6 N L 84,774 .5 N L
N otes: N L  -  N ot listed o r not applicable
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Y ears Im positions 
on Censos %
Form er Jesu it 
P roperties
%
O th er 
T  reasuries 
T otal %
O th e r T r e a ­
suries less 
M a jo r  R am os % O th e r %
1701 -  1705 N L N L 2,088,282 28 10
1 7 0 6 -  1710 N L N L 3,186,384 36 17
1711 -  1715 N L N L 625,510 18 23
1 7 1 6 -1 7 2 0 N L N L 1,017,217 18 12
1721 -  1725 N L N L 2,294,234 36 21
1 7 2 6 -  1730 N L N L 2,837,929 37 12
1731 -  1735 N L N L 2,190,744 34 10
1 7 3 6 -  1740 N L N L 1,021,054 18 16
1741 -  1745 N L N L 694,778 14 20
1 7 4 6 -  1750 N L N L 1,222,729 15 17
1751 -  1755 N L N L 990,629 13 17
1 7 5 6 -  1760 N L N L 985,900 12 19
1761 -  1765 N L N L 2,001,621* 25 1 ,4 2 1 ,9 1 4 "  11 18
1 7 6 6 -  1770 N L N L 2,064,590* 27 3 7 6 ,9 7 4 "  5 5
1771 -  1775 N L N L 3,010,392* 36 7 1 9 ,5 3 1 "  9 14
1 7 7 6 -  1780 N L 19,000 ' .2 4,078,837* 33 7 3 5 ,2 8 3 "  6 6
1781 -  1785 1,879,256 12 N L 4,081,474* 25 1 ,1 1 1 ,1 7 8 "  7 7
1 7 8 6 -  1790 165,397 .9 17.1172 .1 7 ,6 4 7 ,5 5 3 * " 41 25
1791 -  1795 840,859 5 N L 8,502,217 54 20
1 7 9 6 -  1800 615,043 4 487 ,2582 3 8,000,840 56 21
1801 -  1805 98,5002 .7 626,573 4 7,724,318 54 24
1 8 0 6 -  1810 N L 415,251 3 7,064,163 49 21
1 8 1 1 -1 8 1 5 23,4503 .2 318,562 2 3,407,512 22 38
1 8 1 6 -1 8 2 0 174.3863 1 266,674 2 5,853,678 33 23
N otes: N L  -  N o t listed o r  not applicable
N um erical subscrip ts ind icate the n u m b er o f years the en try  was listed d u rin g  the q u in q u en n iu m .
• Inc ludes the total en te ring  the treasu ry  o f L im a fro m  outside ca jas.
** T h e  total en te ring  the treasu ry  o f L im a excluding the ram os o f  a lcabalas, alm ojarifazgos, 
avería, azogue, ex tra o rd in ario , novenos, tribu tos , bu las de sa n ta  cruzada , casa de m oneda , 
tabaco , aguard ien te , an d  1.5%  diezm os y quin tos de p lata o ro , 1 7 6 5 -  1785.
• • •  B eginning in the 1786 o ther treasuries includes not only the incom e fro m  cajas outside L im a 
b u t also the ram os o f alcabalas, alm ojarifazgos, an d  aguard ien te in  the hands o f the aduana.
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13. LAS REFORMAS FISCALES BORBONICAS Y SU IMPACTO 
EN LA SOCIEDAD COLONIAL DEL BAJO Y EL ALTO PERU
Scarlett O ’Phelan Godoy
El presente trabajo* tiene como objetivo analizar el impacto  
inmediato que tuvieron sobre los diferentes sectores sociales de la 
población colonial, las reform as fiscales Borbónicas. Estas medidas 
económicas cargaban el propósito de d renar un mayor excedente 
económico de las colonias a la metrópoli, a través del endurecimiento 
de los cobros fiscales y los controles aduaneros.1 Fueron aplicadas en la 
región del sur -  andino del virreinato peruano (que comprendía el Bajo 
y el Alto Peru) entre 17 7 5 - 1783, propiciando una coyuntura de 
violencia, que eventualmente culminó con la ’’gran rebelión” de 1780.^
Mi intención no es referirm e a  como las reform as se plantearon en 
la teoría o se legislaron desde el papel. Pretendo más bien incidir en 
los conflictos que se suscitaron al tra ta r de ponerlas en práctica, y 
encontrarse que chocaban con una realidad socio -  económica que, 
habiendo relativamente alcanzado un punto de equilibrio, venía 
operando en la colonia ’’desde tiempo inm em orial.” La cuál, además, 
demostró estar en capacidad de generar sus propios mecanismos de 
defensa y resistencia al cambio y la reforma.
Q uizás el prim er anticuerpo provocado por las reformas Borbóni­
cas, fue el hecho que se encomendara su establecimiento a funcionarios 
venidos ”de afuera” (desde Europa, España o inclusive Lima), quienes 
fueron enviados a las provincias peruanas, con ésta específica misión. 
Con ésta política se m arginaba claramente a los notables vecinos 
provincianos, quienes se sentían con un tácito derecho a ser las perso­
nas más indicadas para hacerse cargo de dicha implcmcntación.
Ya los recientes trabajos de Burkholder y C handler sobre la pugna 
entre criollos y peninsulares a nivel de la Audiencia de Lim a, han 
señ alado que desde que José de Gálvez fue nombrado M inistro de 
Indias (1776), la Corona adoptó una política orientada a reducir la 
clara influencia que en los años anteriores habían estado ganando los 
criollos, dentro del gobierno colonial. No resulta pues casual que en 
1779, un año antes del estallido de ”la gran rebelión,” de dieziseis 
oidores de la Audiencia de Lim a, nueve fueron españoles y sólo siete 
criollos.3
Esta corriente de discriminación frente a los criollos, también se 
reflejó en las provincias. Si bien las quejas sobre las trabas que se
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ponían a los criollos para ocupar cargos de corregidores estuvieron 
presentes a lo largo de todo el siglo X V III, luego de la inflexible 
política de Gálvez, los criollos envueltos en la develada conspiración 
cuzqueña de 1780 declararon con resentimiento ’’que ni aún alcaldes 
ordinarios querían ya hacer a los criollos.”1*
Sin em bargo, la perspectiva de la Corona frente al problema era 
justam ente lá opuesta. El interés por enviar funcionarios foráneos para 
cubrir los puestos claves de la administración fiscal, respondía a la 
necesidad de garantizarse que éstos individuos no hubieran tenido
oportunidad de arraigarse en las colonias, y consecuentemente, no se 
hubieran creado compromisos con pobladores locales, que afectaran su 
imparcialidad en el momento de aplicar las nuevas medidas económi­
cas.5 Dentro de ésta linea, Don Bernardo Gallo, el odiado aduanero de 
La Paz, de acuerdo a los registros, era genovés. M ientras que, Don 
Bautista Pando, el recién nom brado aduanero de Arequipa, era 
señalado como español.6
H abría  entonces que precisar, que si bien la Corona no estuvo del 
todo errada al confiar la implementación de las reform as Borbónicas a 
funcionarios europeos y españoles que velaran por increm entar las 
ganancias fiscales (como efectivamente lo hicieron), tuvo el desacierto 
de no preveer el profundo malestar que ésta actitud provocaría en los 
residentes criollos y españoles de las provincias. Estos últimos, para
sentirse integrados y aceptados por las elites provinciales, contraían 
muchas veces matrimonio con criollas de la región, sacudiéndose así de 
su origen peninsular, y acercando sus expectativas a las del sector 
criollo.7
No es pura coincidencia entonces, que en el caso concreto de la
conspiración del Cuzco de 1780, fue precisamente un hacendado criollo
nacido en el Cuzco, Lorenzo Farfán de los Godos, quien a pesar de 
ser cobrador de alcabalas, encabezó una cam paña contra el estableci­
miento de la A duana del Cuzco, por sospechar que vendrían ’’nuevos 
aduaneros” a desplazarlo de su cargo.8 Igualmente, Eugenio Cárdenas 
de la Riva, el guarda del camino de Puquín, quien era natural de La 
Paz, se permeabilizó a la conspiración, debido a los insistentes rumores 
que circulaban de que ”lo quitarían de cam inero.”6 A esto habría que 
sum ar el hecho de que efectivamente existió un sentimiento bastante 
generalizado en el Bajo y el Alto Perú, de que el visitador Areche 
estaba estableciendo gravámenes por su libre albedrío, sin la debida 
aprobación del Rey.*6 Asi lo confirman por lo menos, las declaracio­
nes de numerosos reos procesados por su participación en la gran 
rebelión de 1780-81.**
Dentro de la re -  estructuración del fisco, las dos medidas econó—
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micas que más airadas protestas engendraron, fueron ciertam ente la 
creación de las aduanas, y la subida de la alcabala del 4 al 6 por 
ciento. Ambas afectaban directamente la producción y circulación de 
bienes entre el Bajo y el Alto Perú. El norm alm ente activo comercio 
entre el sur andino ya había sido recortado al transferirse en 1776 el 
Alto Perú al recién constituido V irreinato del Río de la Plata, tam bién 
denominado Buenos A ires.12 Las trabas orientadas a desestabilizar éste 
tradicional flujo comercial se agudizaron cuando un año después, en 
1777, se prohibió la circulación de metales del Alto al Bajo P e rú .111 
Consideramos que la creación de aduanas no respondió a un intento de 
im pulsar o reforzar los mercados del surandino, sino más bien de 
obstaculizar el desarrollo de los mismos, provocando eventualmente un 
colapso comercial entre el Alto y el Bajo Perú.
Es interesante observar que la crisis pareció precipitarse, cuando se 
inició el establecimiento de aduanas, en puntos estratégicos del Bajo 
Perú. M ientras las aduanas bloquearon sólo el Alto Perú, al crearse en 
1775 la A duana de Cochabam ba y en 1777 la de La Paz, las protestas 
no llegaron a paralizar el comercio regional.1,1 Fué cuando se insta­
laron aduanas en Arequipa y Cuzco, bloqueándose con ello por ambos 
extremos el circuito comercial Cuzco -  Potosí, que las protestas escala­
ron en intensidad, culminando eventualmente con la gran rebelión de 
1780, cuyo radio de acción justam ente envolvió el circuito mencionado. 
El incremento de la alcabala y la creación de aduanas a lo largo de la 
ruta comercial que articulaba el Bajo y el Alto Perú fueron por lo 
tanto, dentro del paquete de medidas económicas promovidas por los 
Borbones, ”la plum a que dobló al camello.”1'1
Por ejem plo, en el caso concreto de la alcabala, con la decretada 
alza al 6 por ciento, las ganancias líquidas obtenidas por efecto de las 
ventas, se reducían. Esto debido a que de acuerdo con L  nueva tasa, 
habia que separar un mayor monto de dinero para cubrir el incre­
mento en la contribución. Por otro lado, es evidente que la finalidad 
intrínseca a la implantación de aduanas, era corregir el modo en que 
venían operando ’’tradicional” y ’’librem ente” las transacciones comer­
ciales dentro de la región. Y es que las aduanas tenían como objeto, 
por una parte ejercer un estricto control sobre la entrada y salida de 
mercaderías, y por otra, asegurar que la alcabala que se cotizaba 
estuviera ajustada al 6 por ciento y guardara una proporción equiva­
lente al total del producto introducido para la ven ta .1*5
Es cierto que de prim era impresión, las medidas pueden haber 
parecido estar orientadas simplemente a garantizar un sistema más 
eficiente en el cobro de impuestos, antes que dirigidas a prom over un 
cambio radical en la taxación. Sin em bargo, a través de las quejas de 
quienes resultaron ’’afectados” por su implementación, el trasfondo que
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emerge es más complejo. Prim eram ente, la subida de la alcabala del 4 
al 6 por ciento decretada en 1776 resultaba indudablemente más 
dijerible que una subida radical del 2 al 6 por ciento, que en vez de 
significar un aum ento de 50 por ciento sobre el impuesto inicial, 
representaba más bien un 200 por ciento. Lo curioso y quizás contra­
producente fué, que en algunos casos y algunas provincias, esta última 
exorbitante subida fué la que efectivamente se aplicó, no precisamente 
porque no se hubiera estipulado ya en 1772 que la alcabala debía 
cobrarse al 4 por ciento, sino porqué esta alza previa, nunca entró en 
vigencia, debido a la neglicencia y táctica indecisión por parte de las 
autoridades locales.*7
En segundo lugar, la significativa curva ascendente en el rubro de 
alcabalas entre 1779 y 1780, es incuestionable para  las C ajas Reales 
del Alto y Bajo Perú (Potosí, La Paz, Cochabam ba, Cuzco y Arequi­
pa), y decididamente sus efectos como detonante de la ’’gran rebelión” 
deben ser subrayados (ver Gráfico I). Efectivamente se puede consta­
tar, que la curva relativa al total de alcabalas en el Bajo y el Alto 
Perú, alcanza su punto máximo, justam ente en 1780, coincidiendo este 
pico con el momento más álgido de las protestas sociales en el sur -  
andino, que precedieron ese mismo año el estallido de la gran rebelión.*® 
M ientras las C ajas Reales de Potosí, Cochabam ba, Cuzco y Arequipa 
registraron sus cifras más altas por recolección de alcabalas en 
1780, La Paz alcanzó su máximo absoluto en 1779, es decir un año 
antes. Esta evidencia refuerza nuestra hipótesis, de que el Alto Perú 
necesitó del Bajo Perú para movilizarse en conjunto contra las medidas 
económicas. Es interesante constatar que a pesar de la transferencia del 
Alto Perú a Buenos Aires en 1776, cuatro años después, en 1780, el 
Alto y Bajo Perú funcionaron como un todo, como una unidad aco­
plada y sincronizada con un interés común:*9 salvaguardar los merca­
dos del sur -  andino frente a la incidencia de Buenos Aires y la indis­
criminada penetración de productos europeos, con la apertura del libre
■ 20 comercio.
Sin embargo, queda aún por establecer, si esta pronunciada alza 
registrada en 1780 con relación a las alcabalas:
1) fué consecuencia de un incremento real en la producción y el
comercio colonial;
2) fué resultado de haber entrado en vigencia la nueva tasa de alca­
bala al 6 por ciento, y de efectuarse su cobro a través de las
aduanas;
3) o si respondió más bien a que el cobro de alcabalas se hizo
acumulativo, incluyéndose en la cifra final, el monto correspon­
diente a las alcabalas rezagadas de los años anteriores, en que 
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Si este último factor tuvo algún peso, ello querría decir que entre 1779 
y 1780 se cobró lo que se había venido debiendo de 1772 en adelante, 
poniéndose al día la contabilidad fiscal. De allí que el rubro de alca­
balas apareciera tan inflado. No obstante, nos inclinamos a pensar que 
en el pico que alcanzó en 1780 la recolección de alcabalas, hubo 
espacio para que se combinaran las tres variables arriba mencionadas. 
Lam entablem ente, esta hipótesis es difícil de com probar, pues las 
C ajas Reales no siempre precisan en la entrada de alcabalas, el origen 
de las mismas.
Siendo el mercado un punto de confluencia para los diferentes 
grupos de intereses, las protestas de comerciantes, arrieros, viajeros y 
trajinantes que hemos logrado registrar, nos han permitido identificar 
las fuerzas económicas que operaban dentro de las redes comerciales 
del sur -  andino y percibir las repercusiones, que sobre estos diferentes 
sectores tuvieron las Reform as Borbónicas. En este sentido, el impacto 
que tuvo el incremento en el cobro de alcabalas y el consecuente
reajuste de cuentas, no pudo ser el mismo en un grande que en un 
mediano o pequeño productor. Por su liquidez económica un gran o un 
mediano productor, estaba indudablemente en m ejor posición para 
afrontar la subida de la alcabala de lo que estaba un pequeño 
productor. M as aún si tenemos en cuenta, que un gran productor 
estaba en posición de diversificar su economía inviniendo en las dife­
rentes ram as de la producción, pudiendo en caso de ser necesario,
transferir capital de una ram a a otra, y así compensar pérdidas y
redistribuir ganancias. Sólo un paquete de medidas económicas que 
comprometieran todas las ramas de la economía colonial podría por lo 
tanto afectarlo, y paradójicam ente, esto fué lo que efectivamente 
ocurrió.
La evidencia señala que para poder esquivar el pago de alcabalas y 
subsecuentemente conseguir así una ganancia marginal en sus ventas, 
muchos campesinos indígenas habían orientado su producción agraria 
al cultivo de productos exentos del pago de alcabala, como lo eran el 
maíz, coca, ají, chuño, papa, azúcar etc. Sus protestas contra la alca­
bala no se redujeron por lo tanto a rechazar el incremento de la
misma, sino tam bién al hecho de que en el nuevo esquema de cobros
la aplicación de la alcabala se am pliaba a productos del consumo
indígena, tradicionalm ente excentos, ’’...siendo así que de estos efectos 
nunca han pagado los indios alcabala.”^1
Inclusive los chorillos, a nivel de la producción m anufacturera,
fueron afectados por las reform as. H asta ése momento sólo los obrajes 
estaban sujetos al pago de alcabalas por la venta de sus productos. No 
debe llam ar por lo tanto la atención, que para mediados del siglo
X V III varios obrajes habian sido transferidos a la categoría de
347
chorrillos y más de un criollo acomodado consideraba que era más 
lucrativo fundar y controlar chorrillos, antes que obra jes.22 Con los 
chorrillos se liberaban del pago de impuestos, permitiéndoles ello dis­
poner de mayores ingresos. Esto lleva a cuestionar el aceptado concepto 
de que los chorrillos eran manejados por individuos de una mediana 
capacidad económica, dado el carácter doméstico de la em presa.2® 
Para  m uestra de lo contrario tomemos el caso de Don M ateo O rcaín y 
R ivera, quien además de ser propietario del chorrillo y hacienda 
Paucarpata, se desem peñaba como regidor perpetuo del Cabildo del 
Cuzco.24 Era por lo tanto, un vecino ’’notable” del Cuzco.
Al proponerse dentro de las reformas fiscales, am pliar la alcabala 
que gravaba los paños y bayetas producidos en los obrajes, a los teji­
dos manufacturados en los chorrillos (que hasta ése momento habían 
perm anecido protegidos), Cuzco, con sus numerosos chorillos, era 
indiscutiblemente un área sensible para ser afectada por esta nueva 
política.25 La intención que cargaba esta medida económica a n t i-  
proteccionista, era la de ir paulatinam ente quebrando la industria textil 
colonial, para que el mercado interno fuera fácilmente copado por los 
textiles europeos introducidos a través del comercio libre. Resulta 
coherente entonces, encontrar a Ildefenso del Castillo, administrador 
del chorrillo de Paucarpata, conspirando contra las medidas. No es 
tampoco casual que hacendados -  obrajeros como el criollo Don 
Bernardo de la M adrid y los españoles Don Antonio Figueroa y Don
Francisco Cisneros (casados con criollas prom inentes), se vieron impli­
cados en la gran rebelión de 1780.26 Las medidas económicas estaban 
afectando la esfera agraria y la esfera m anufacturera, y en ambas, 
ellos tenían intereses.
Incluir, dentro del nuevo esquema de alcabalas, la coca, el maíz, el 
chuño, el ají, textiles de chorrillo etc. perjudicaba al campesino 
indígena que los producía y comerciaba. Pero también esta medida era
resentida por el propietario de minas y obrajes, que pagaba parte del
salario de sus operarios en especies, y precisamente en estos productos.27 
Indirectam ente se estaba tam bién afectando la minería, que ya 
había sufrido un prim er revés, al activarse el control sobre la contri­
bución del quinto, con la clara intención de reducir el contrabando.2® 
Se estaba comprometiendo por lo tanto, todas las ram as de la economía 
colonial.
En el caso de los hacendados de Arequipa y La Paz, les debió 
resultar conflictivo no sólo el incremento de la alcabala que pesaba 
sobre los productos agrarios, sino tam bién la imposición del nuevo  
impuesto  del 12.5 por ciento sobre el aguardiente, ya que ambas eran 
provincias productoras (Gráfico I I ) .29 De acuerdo a la evidencia, 
antes de la gran rebelión habían estado cotizando 18.5 por ciento por
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el derecho al comercio del aguardiente. Concretamente en el caso de 
A requipa se llegó a solicitar que se suspendiese el encabezonamiento, 
pues sumado al cabezón se les estaba conminando a pagar la nueva 
tasa de alcabala al 6 por ciento, y el nuevo impuesto del 12.5 por 
ciento con que se había gravado el aguardiente.**® Es explicable 
entonces que en el caso de los hacendados de Sinti (La Paz), éstos soli­
citaran tajantem ente que se les rebajara  la alcabala del 6 al 4 por 
ciento, y que además se decretara la anulación del nuevo impuesto del 
aguardiente.1*1
Es im portante sin em bargo precisar, que si bien para criollos y 
mestizos el problema de la alcabala se reducía al reajuste de su incre­
mento, para el campesino indígena representaba, de un lado, la inno­
vación de un impuesto que hasta ése momento había exceptuado los 
productos ”de la tierra” en que tradicionalm ente ellos comerciaban, y 
de otro lado, la presencia de las aduanas, donde los sometían al siste­
m a de guías y tornaguías, cuya operatividad no comprendían, eviden­
ciándose con ello los precarios niveles de monetarización en que sus 
transacciones comerciales se realizaban.
Las rigurosas disposiciones adoptadas con relación al sistema de 
guías, con el fin de que los trajinantes y viajeros acreditaron pertene­
cer a la categoria de indios tributarios, resultó una complicación para 
los campesinos envueltos en el comercio regional.1*2 M ás incompren­
sible les pareció todavía, el sistema de tornaguías al que fueron para­
lelamente sometidos. Este último consistía en pagar una fianza al pasar 
por la aduana, depósito que podía ser recuperado al exhibirse de 
regreso el recibo o tornaguía, el cuál indicaba que la venta del pro­
ducto se habia efectuado, con el respectivo pago de la alcabala.**^ Es 
decir, los pequeños comerciantes del sur -  andino se vieron forzados a 
duplicar el monto de dinero con que norm alm ente operaban, para  así 
estar en posición de cancelar la nueva tasa de alcabala al 6 por ciento, 
más una sum a equivalente, por derecho de fianza. Se demandó por lo 
tanto del campesinado indígena una liquidez monetaria, de la cual no 
tenía disponibilidad inmediata.
Las quejas de los trajinantes, viajeros y arrieros en la Aduana de 
Arequipa, apuntaron consistentemente al m alestar que les ocasionaba 
tener que depositar en la aduana sus productos, para que éstos fueran 
tasados. ’’Esta conducción y exámen les parecieron violentos, así por su 
ignorancia y miseria, como por la costumbre en que habían vivido de 
todo lo contrario.”'*'1 En la A duana de La Paz, los indios de la comu­
nidad de Coroyco protestaron porque se retenía la coca que traían para 
comerciar, con el peligro de que se descompusiera y fuera imposible 
venderla. Además, señalaron que en su calidad de indios forasteros 
pagar la fianza en La Paz les resultaba inconveniente
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...pues como ha sido costumbre pagar de contado la alcabala de todo efecto, 
traen tasadamente aquello que comprende, y afianzado o depositado el 
dinero se les irroga mucho perjuicio, y que no habían de pagar más de una 
vez la alcabala, o en la A duana, o donde iban a vender, pues así lo 
acostum braban desde sus antepasados, sin que hubiese aumento. 35
Reiterativamente en el Cuzco las protestas se desencadenaron contra 
los vistas de aduana, que cobraban la alcabala aún a los indios ’’que 
eran exceptuados de tiempo inmemorial. ”
Sin embargo, la guía tenía su razón de ser. Parece que se había 
hecho una costumbre que muchos indígenas introdujeran productos 
pertenecientes a  criollos y/o españoles, para liberarlos de este modo del 
pago de impuestos. ^  Con la creación de las aduanas y la presencia de 
’’gente de afuera” para hacerse cargo del chequeo de los productos 
internados, estos arreglos clandestinos, montados con el fin de evadir la 
alcabala, fueron descubiertos y sancionados. Inclusive, en la A duana de 
La Paz, Don Bernardo Gallo se ganó muchas enemistades, porque 
obligaba a los comerciantes indígenas y mestizos a  medir y pesar sus 
productos en presencia del vista de aduana, poniendo así en evidencia 
el hecho de que muchos acostum braban a introducir prácticam ente el 
doble de varas de tejidos de las que declaraban, y la misma práctica 
fraudulenta seguían con respecto a las arrobas de granos y coca en que 
comerciaban. Consecuentemente tanto los trajinantes como los viajeros 
que transitaban por La Paz, reclamaron que no se les debía m edir las
OQ
bayetas en los caminos o cantos de la ciudad.
No en vano, una de las demandas que más insistentemente llevaron 
adelante los involucrados en la gran rebelión fue
...que se les dejen a los naturales el paso y conducto libre para que puedan 
viajar y transitar no sólo a la ciudad de La Paz, sino tam bién a cualquier 
otros lugares, [y que] ni en éstos ni en sus caminos se les infiera estorbo o 
perjuicio el más mínimo, castigando severamente a los contraventores, y 
que en esta mism a libertad disfruten igualm ente todos los españoles en sus 
tránsitos, tratos y comercios, que hiciesen en los lugares de los naturales.39
El reclamo es elocuente, y trae a colación una ácida crítica a la inoper- 
ancia del sistema de aduanas, y las nefastas consecuencias que su fun­
cionamiento estaba originando en la actividad comercial del su r-
andino, donde existía una economía segmentada, coexistiendo mercados 
incipientes, paralelos a mercados más desarrollados.
Trabajos recientes como los de Wibel y Brown para el caso de
A requipa, se han encargado de señalar los conflictos que ocasionaron la 
rigidez del cobro de alcabalas en las aduanas, y la inflexibilidad de los
oficiales encargados de efectuar dicho c o b r o . N o  obstante, conside­
ramos que los desajustes que se generaron no se limitaron a estos
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puntos, sino más bien pueden ser entendidos en su completa dimen­
sión, si tenemos en cuenta dos factores relevantes, que no han mere­
cido la suficiente atención. Por un lado el trastorno que debió provocar 
el hecho de que productos tradicionalm ente excentos se vieran inclu­
idos en el nuevo esquema de la alcabala, y por otro lado, que los 
mecanismos fraudulentos de que se valían los grandes hacendados 
usando indígenas como intermediarios, quedaran suprimidos mediante 
el sistema de las guías.
La política fiscal Borbónica no sólo se materializó en el incremento 
de la alcabala y el establecimiento de aduanas, sino que tam bién estuvo 
encauzada a modificar sustancialmente la estructura del tributo indí­
gena, a través del cual la Real H acienda percibía considerables ingre­
sos.^ ' Para  potenciar los beneficios económicos del tributo, se adopta­
ron básicamente dos medidas: llevar a cabo un exhaustivo y riguroso 
censo de la población colonial y am pliar el tributo que hasta ése 
momento había recaído solamente sobre los indígenas, a la creciente 
población de mestizos, sambos y m ulatos.4^
La revisita general que con este proposito se mandó efectuar, 
reveló que existía un significativo núm ero de indígenas que se habían 
estado registrando en los censos previos bajo la categoría de mestizos, 
para  así evadir el tributo. Tam bién puso en evidencia, que estaba en 
pleno auge el mecanismo de ’’ocultación de tributarios,” que era la 
cobertura más utilizada por las autoridades civiles y eclesiásticas, para 
incluir sólo parcialm ente a la población indígena en edad de tributar 
(entre dieziocho y cincuenta años), dentro de las listas oficiales de 
tributarios.43 Estas irregularidades pueden explicar que en el censo 
que en 1785 realizó en el Cuzco el Intendente M ata Linares, con el fin 
de medir el impacto demográfico de la rebelión de T úpac A m aru, los 
resultados fueran tan inesperados. La revisita arrojó un incremento de 
12,821 indios tributarios, la cuál elevó a 37,729 el número de tributa­
rios, totalizando un monto de 281,346 pesos por concepto de tributos.44 
Es decir, alrededor del 30 por ciento de la población indígena en 
condiciones de tributar, había estado consistentemente evadiendo el 
tributo. La práctica tam bién demostró que no era aconsejable am pliar 
el tributo a las otras castas, por los anticuerpos y protestas que dicho 
proyecto había desatado.4'' El V irrey Don Augustin de Jaúregui tuvo 
que reconocer que muchos mestizos se plegaron a las huestes de T úpac 
A m aru, por haber creido que serían obligados a tributar, al igual que 
los indios. Efectivamente, la participación de mestizos fué significativa 
en la gran rebelión, pero su adhesión al movimiento no estuvo deter­
m inada exclusivamente por la ampliación del tributo, sino tam bién 
porque en su situación de arrieros, chacareros, trajinantes y viajantes, 
se vieron directam ente afectados por las aduanas y alcabalas.46
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Del presente trabajo  se desprende, que en el Perú colonial del siglo 
X V III, un medio eficaz para m aximizar la acumulación y generar un 
excedente económico fue la evasión de impuestos. Este mecanismo 
podía funcionar a varios niveles. Evadían impuestos los hacendados y 
chacareros que declaraban menos parcelas de tierras que las que usu­
fructuaban, para así reducir el cabezón. T am bién se liberaban de 
impuestos, aquellos criollos que optaron por fundar chorrillos y así 
ahorrarse la alcabala. Evadían impuestos aquellos productores que 
utilizaban indios para transportar sus mercancías, sabiendo que de esta 
m anera no se les cobraría la alcabala. Justam ente, por reducir el 
monto de sus impuestos, fué que numerosos hacendados hicieron caso 
omiso de la subida de la alcabala del 2 al 4 por ciento, decretada en 
1772. Las autoridades locales (que probablem ente tam bién tenían 
propiedades), se coludieron a favor de los hacendados, expresando que 
no habían dado cumplimiento a la nueva legislación, por no quedarles 
claro cuales eran los productos sujetos al 4 por ciento. Finalmente, 
para  conseguir algunas ganancias marginales que le perm itiera hacer 
frente a tributos y repartos, el campesino indígena tam bién entró en el 
juego de la evasión de impuestos, dirigiendo su producción y comercio 
hacia los productos ”de la tie rra ,” que estaban exonerados de pagar 
alcabalas, y declarando siempre una menor cantidad del producto que 
estaba introduciendo al mercado, para am inorar de esta m anera el 
pago de alcabalas. Paralelam ente hubo indígenas que arreglaron su 
inscripción como ’’mestizos,” para así evitar la cotización del tributo 
indígena.
El program a fiscal de los Borbones sacudió los cimientos de la tra­
dicional economía colonial y, sobretodo, de uno de sus principales 
recursos de acumulación: la evasión de impuestos. Las reformas
Borbónicas se dirijieron 1) a gravar todas las ram as de la economía 
colonial; 2) de una otra m anera afectaron a todos los sectores de la 
sociedad colonial, propiciando la plataform a ideal para m ontar una 
alianza, la cual se materializó con la gran rebelión de 1780.“*7 Podemos 
por lo tanto establecer una correlación entre el relajam iento del cobro 
de impuestos -  ausencia de brotes de rebelión por un lado, y el endu­
recimiento en la recaudación de impuestos -  estallido de rebeliones, por 
otro.
No hubo por lo tanto un acoplamiento entre las medidas fiscales 
propuestas por los Borbones y la realidad económica colonial del vir­
reinato peruano, donde una mayor dem anda de liquidez monetaria a 
través del incremento del sector impuestos afectaba la estabilidad 
económica colonial, montada sobre las bases de una monetarización 
incipiente. Como resultado de ello, ciertos productos seguían in ter­
cambiándose en los mercados regionales a través del trueque, y el 
sistema de salarios en los centros productivos era de carácter mixto:
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parte en plata o moneda, y parte en especies.
Si bien debemos admitir que la política fiscal de los Borbones no 
mantuvo una continuidad consecuente, ello se debió a que al ponerse 
inicialmente en práctica, se cometieron abusos que tuvieron que ser 
violentamente enmendados. Si efectivamente el program a sufrió 
recortes, negociándose incluso alguno de sus puntos, ésto respondió a la 
necesidad de- am inorar la resistencia que las medidas encontraron por 
parte de todos los sectores de la sociedad colonial.48 Sin em bargo, los 
planteamientos incluidos en el proyecto fiscal guardaban una raciona­
lidad económica: acelerar la recaudación de impuestos para aum entar 
los ingresos de la Real Hacienda. Si el plan no funcionó, no fué 
precisamente por falta de una coherencia interna del mismo, sino por 
falta de concordancia entre las medidas económicas y la realidad colo­
nial. El nivel de desarrollo de la economía de mercado en el V irreinato 
del Perú, aparentó ser más ’’m oderna” de lo que efectivamente era. El 
term óm etro que midió esta inconsistencia, fueron precisamente las 
reform as fiscales Borbónicas.
Las reform as tuvieron como consecuencia inm ediata, el abrir una 
brecha irreversible entre la sociedad colonial y la C orona.4® Las 
protestas frente a las medidas económicas salpicaron todo el territorio 
del virreinato. No obstante cabe preguntarse porqué sólo el su r- 
andino estuvo en capacidad de generar una caja de resonancia de tal 
intensidad, que desembocara en el estallido de la gran rebelión de 
1 7 8 0 -8 1 . Consideramos que es probable que las reform as fiscales 
tam bién tuvieron la peculiaridad de acentuar los regionalismos.
A nuestro entender, el sur -  andino del virreinato peruano fue la 
región donde se acumularon las contradicciones coloniales. Sólo las 
provincias del sur -  andino estuvieron sometidas a la mita m inera de 
Potosí. Además concentrándose en esta región la población indígena 
colonial, la masa de tributarios era la más alta del virreinato. Si a ésto 
le sumamos el reparto, las presiones económicas a las que era sometida 
esta región eran considerables. Al transferirse en 1776 el Alto Perú al 
V irreinato del Río de La Plata (Buenos Aires), hubo un debilitamiento 
de las tradicionales redes comerciales que unían el sur -  andino. La 
creación de aduanas a partir de 1775 en adelante en puntos estratégicos 
del circuito comercial Cuzco -  Potosí y el incremento de alcabalas, al 
que se sumó el nuevo esquem a de alcabalas, term inó por desestabilizar 
el sistema económico regional. Dado el impacto de la disrupción 
económica, una rebelión de las dimensiones descritas, sólo habría 
podido prender en el sur -  andino peruano. Si las reform as fiscales 
Borbónicas no hubieran sido aplicadas con tanta rigurosidad en esta 
región, la gran rebelión probablemente no habría llegado a estallar, o 
en todo caso, no se habría presentado con la misma intensidad.'58
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C O M M E N T A R Y
M anfred Kossok*
T he contribution by Scarlett O ’Phelan is of particular interest for 
demonstrating, on the basis of solid sources, the effects of the Bourbon 
reforms ’’from below.” In contrast to much of the literature on the 
Caroline reforms in which theoretical -  juridical questions are excessively 
dominant, O ’Phelan presents us with a material -  social study. O f course 
the au thor’s chosen geographical focus permits only in part generaliza­
tions concerning the whole of Spanish America during the so -  called 
reform  era.
T he author convincingly documents the quantitive and qualitative 
changes of fiscal policy, the key element of the whole reform  project. It 
becomes clear that the m ajor categories of the population -  creoles, 
mestizos and Indians -  were affected by the altered system of taxation, 
and by which mechanisms this occurred. As a consequence the possibi­
lities of a general opposition against the Spanish policies and its dedica­
ted representatives were enhanced. T he connection drawn by O ’Phelan 
between reform policy and revolutionary crisis (1780) must be viewed as 
conclusive.
T he results and interpretations o f the study invite further discussion 
and give rise to the following lines of thought:
1. As close as the connection between reforms -  especially the new 
fiscal policies -  and the revolutionary movements of 1780 may have 
been, the other factors which triggered and gave it its peculiar im print, 
must not be neglected. Otherwise the impression may arise that the great 
crisis commencing in 1780 was a mere tax rebellion of which, as is well 
known, there were many during the colonial period -  just as in the 
history of feudalism in general. Such a perspective would constitute an 
underestimation of the complexity and program m atic breadth of the 
movement since 1780, of its new historical quality -  precisely trans­
cending tax protests -  as an integral part of the pre -  independence 
process. T he connection between the economic and political spheres in 
reality was considerably more complex.
* Translated from G erm an by Nils Jacobsen
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2. Creoles, mestizos and Indians admittedly were all affected by the 
new fiscal policy, albeit in rather different ways, something which the 
author has not stressed sufficiently. Also on this point a differentiated 
approach is necessary, in order to comprehend the distinct behavior of 
the mentioned groups (classes, strata) during the critical years of 
1 7 8 0 - 1781 and especially thereafter.
3. Besides the growing delimitation between Bajo and Alto Peru, 
clearly perceived by the author, a delimitation whose proto -  national 
potential might well be worth a study of its own, there arises the 
question of an intra -  regional (localistic) differentiation concerning the 
application and consequences of the new fiscal policies. For the type of 
dissolution later experienced by the ’’uniform ” colonial system, the 
dialectical relationship between intra -  and inter -  regional diversification 
requires detailed analysis.
4. Only in passing does the author mention the significant conse­
quences of the new fiscal policies for the process of accumulation. 
Because of the well known close connection between primitive accu­
mulation and the genesis of capitalism, more attention should be 
dedicated to this problem, in order to come to grips with the double 
deformation of the process of accumulation in the Iberian world: on the 
one hand concerning the volume and quality of accumulation directed ”to 
the outside” (from the colony to the metropolis), for which a comparison 
to the analogous studies of Enrique Semo on New Spain would be 
worthwhile; on the other hand concerning the primarily feudal (and not 
capitalist) utilization of the products of the accumulation process in the 
metropolis, or its immediate or indirect drainage to the other European 
centers of accumulation. These are, after all, decisive defining points for 
the later socioeconomic character of the independent regimes. W hat was 
articulated, at the surface, as resistance motivated by traditionalism and 
insistence on entrenched rights, ultimately had its substance in funda­
mental economic conflicts of interests.
T he results of John  TePaske’s study on the development of revenue 
collection in the cajas of Mexico and Lima reaffirm s the well known 
picture about the general economic tendencies of development during the 
period of the Caroline reform  policies and the open crisis of the tradi­
tional colonial system. This study documents the continuing dominance of 
mining inspite of the general upswing in agriculture, something already 
affirm ed by numerous contem porary authors (e.g. H umboldt). P eru ’s 
capacity to compensate for the loss of U pper Peru that occurred with the
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foundation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, seems quite remarkable. 
It serves note on us, not to underestim ate the degree of flexibility of 
colonial economies.
W hat makes such a study problematic, is that an augmented inflow 
o f revenue does not constitute immediate proof for a comparable econo­
mic upswing. For the M exican case the author him self relativized the 
results by attem pting to juxtapose the nominal and deflated real revenue 
income. Analogous data for Peru unfortunately are not available, a fact 
which made it impossible to fully accomplish the interesting comparison. 
O ne would also have to investigate the problem to which degree the 
greater efficiency of fiscal policies lead to higher collections of the 
treasury without necessarily implying a proportionally equivalent econo­
mic development. T he paper by Scarlett O ’Phelan offers interesting clues 
for this discrepancy, which, of course, cannot be measured with pre­
cision. As a partial correction one would need to add the "illegal quota” 
(contraband trade, tax evasion and similar activities).
T he au thor’s attem pt to calculate the per -  capita tax rate for Mexico 
appears less compelling: O n the one hand, the available statistics on 
population are too imprecise. O n the other hand, the very measure of a 
tax rate for a colonial feudal economy must be questioned for the fol­
lowing two reasons: 1. the extreme polarization between a minority of 
property owners and the large m ajority of non -  proprietors; and 2. the 
great significance of a non -  integrated subsistence economy, which often 
is not even registered through tribute collection.
Beyond the detailed calculations of revenue quantities, there is the 
problem of the functional utilization of the accumulated sums (for 
productive ends or for the quasi -  feudal formation of treasure). As is 
well known, the late colonial period was characterized by an acute shor­
tage of capital in the mining sector as a consequence of an insufficient 
credit system. From the deformation of the process of accumulation 
(both towards the exterior and the interior) follows the further problem, 
that figures on quantitative growth need not necessarily constitute an 
index for qualitative changes in the structure of production (and, by 
extension, in the social structure). O ne may deduce as a working hypo­
thesis, that from this there arose rather im portant consequences for the 
nature of the future independent societies. T he quantitative economic 
growth had the potential to deepen the conflict of interests between 
colony and metropolis, since the discrepancy of economic power and 
political subordination experienced by the creole aristocracy (large land­
holders, local notables) was becoming more acute. Colonial economic
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growth did not, however, imply a corresponding gain in bourgeois 
(capitalist) substance. In this way a deficit of social hegemony -  relative 
to other revolutionary processes of the epoch -  was preprogram m ed.
T he question concerning the cyclical nature of economic development 
(cycle understood as periodicity), which TePaske raises in connection with 
various methodological approaches and interpretations found in the 
literature, can, I believe, be answered negatively. R ather it is the 
element of steady progression without qualitative leaps which is domi­
nant, combined with partial, regionally differentiated recessions. In  this 
the complicated influence of exogenous factors would require precise 
analysis.
Also the difference between the various ’’core areas,” which without 
doubt contributed the lion’s share of revenue, and the less im portant, but 
at the same time more dynamic ’’periphery,” should not escape our 
attention.
Finally, concerning the revenues of Lim a (and their partial flow to 
Spain), the question still requires detailed analysis what the consequences 
(at least temporarily) of the profound crisis of 17 8 0 -8 1  might have 
been.
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14. THE MONEY PLANT: THE ROYAL TOBACCO 
MONOPOLY OF NEW SPAIN, 1765- 1821
Susan Deans -  Smith
I.
In a recent review article John  Fisher posed the question of whether or 
not
...the Bourbon reforms tend to bewitch all who study them. Did they really 
comprise the smooth, coherent, masterly program  of imperial change and 
revival that generations of commentators, from the very imperial policy 
makers of eighteenth century Spain to the researchers of today have identi­
fied? M ight they not be more realistically depicted in terms of a halting, 
uncertain, inconsistent desire for imperial modernization and centralization, 
characterized more by delay, contradiction and obstruction than by decisive­
ness?1
It is a question well worth asking but one which still awaits a satisfactory 
response. Certainly in the following analysis of the Royal Tobacco 
Monopoly of New Spain, evidence presented can only be used to support 
the traditional view of the Bourbon reforms. The monopoly’s adminis­
tration and managem ent illustrates not just the organizational capacity of 
the Bourbon reformers but the lenghts to which they were prepared to go 
to ensure its success in producing revenues for the Spanish crown. 
Behind those revenues, however, lies a hitherto virtually untouched 
history of how the establishment of the monopoly affected New Spain 
and those individuals caught in the changes it wrought.^ Emphasis will 
be placed on two groups affected by the imposition of the monopoly: the 
tobacco growers and the cigarreros (private tobacco store owners). Before 
exam ining what happened to these groups a brief look at the back­
ground to, and fiscal structure of the Tobacco Monopoly is in order.
T he monopolization of tobacco in New Spain came relatively late 
compared to other Spanish American colonies. A formal monopoly had 
been established in C uba in 1717, in Peru by 1752 and in 1753 Chile 
and La Plata were added to the Peruvian jurisdiction. Venezuela, 
G uatem ala, Costa Rica and Nueva G ranada joined the group in 1778, 
thirteen years after it had been established in New Spain. Monopolies 
were established in the Philippines in 1782 and Puerto Rico in 1783.
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The Visitor G eneral, José de Gálvez, had always supported the idea 
of such a monopoly in New Spain and was only too well aware of its 
revenue potential. W riting to the Viceroy in 1766, he commented:
Muchos son los millones que perdió la Corona en tantos años que ha corrido 
el tabaco por toda la América Española como género de libre comercio. Mas 
de un  siglo ha que el Venerable Dn. Ju a n  de Palafox aconsejó al Conde de 
Salvatierra ... que se estancara el tabaco ... pero ha sido, tal la desidia de 
los que han gobernado estos Dominios distantes del Trono, que, ó no pen­
saron en los asuntos más im portantes, ó se finixieron dificultades que nunca 
hubo. 3
Reluctance to establish a monopoly can be partially explained by a fear 
of hostility on the part of vested interests.
Yet those fears and objections were superseded by a greater threat -  
possible defeat at the hands of the British. M ilitary reform was necessary 
and the costs of raising regular and militia units in New Spain made the 
imposition of new taxes im perative as did the general war effort of the 
peninsula. Since tobacco was deemed to be a substance unnecessary to 
sustain hum an life, the creation of the monopoly was judged to be the 
fairest and least burdensome way of generating new revenues. T he 
C row n’s decision was made public in two royal decrees of Decem ber 14, 
1764 and January  18, 1765.4 Profits received from the Tobacco
Monopoly along with those from the playing card and quicksilver 
monopolies were to be placed into the masa remisible and shipped 
directly to Spain. Production was for the domestic market only.
Designed to secure control over tobacco and tobacco products 
throughout the colony, the monopoly was placed in the hands of a 
professional, salaried bureaucracy. T he Viceroy, acting as President of 
the Ju n ta  de Tabaco, met and conferred periodically with the members 
of the General Directorate. All policy decisions were taken at this level. 
Selection of personnel was the responsability of the General Directorate, 
accounts and finance were administered by the Contaduría and Tesorería 
sections. Bureaucrats were paid fixed annual salaries while other 
employees such as the mem bers of the Resguardo  units were paid fixed 
daily wages. By 1790 there were an estimated 17,256 individuals 
employed and paid by the monopoly.
By' 1810 New Spain provided three quarters of all profits received 
from  the Spanish colonies. T he contribution made to those profits by the 
sale of tobacco was substantial and, after silver, was probably the most 
lucrative source of revenue to which the Spanish Crown had access. As
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can bee seen from  G raph I, using current pesos (nominal) total receipts 
from  the monopoly followed a secular upward trend to nine and one half 
million pesos by 1809; profits grew steadily until 1799 when the trend 
seemed to stabilize at between three and one half and four million pesos. 
It should be noted here that state m anagem ent of the tobacco industry 
was not apparently as efficient as that of private control -  one estimate 
of the values of tobacco sales in 1748 for all of New Spain was placed at
12,348,000 pesos.5 In order to express the value of these receipts, 
however, in terms of their purchasing power, the data have been defla­
ted by an index of maize prices based on Florescano’s Mexico City 
figures. T he deflated data (Table I, G raph II) show that the highest 
point and longest period of sustained increase in the value of tobacco 
receipts occurred by 1792 when total receipts reached nine million pesos 
and stabilized thereafter at around seven million pesos; profits reached 
their peak of five million pesos in 1792, thereafter fluctuating between 
three million and four million pesos. Hence, in real term s, the high point 
of fiscal returns from  tobacco occurred well before 1809 although the 
income from  the sale of the tobacco products remained substantial until 
the outbreak of the insurgency in 1810. Not surprisingly, the most 
lucrative administrations were Mexico City and its environs (Q uerétaro 
came under its jurisdiction), Valladolid and G uadalajara.
T hroughout the period, the General D irectorate was concerned to 
keep prices of tobacco products at a reasonably moderate level in order 
to avoid encouraging contraband. Nevertheless, prices were increased 
twice -  in 1777 and 1800. Until the first increase consumers could 
purchase a pack of cigarros containing between forty -  two and sixty 
cigarros, according to the quality, for one half real. Papeles de puros 
(packs of cigars) containing between six and sixteen puros, again 
depending on their class, could also be purchased for one half real. With 
an eye to reaching all types of consumers, certain types of cigarros 
could also be sold in sets of twelve for one tlaco (there were five tlacos to 
one half real).^ L eaf tobacco was sold at six reales per pound in the 
General Administration of Mexico but at seven and one half reales in 
C hihuahua. A fter 1777, however, this price of leaf was standardized 
throughout the colony at eight reales per pound. T he price of cigarros 
and puros was then increased by reducing the quantity contained in each 
packet. T he num ber of cigarros ranged between thirty -  six and 
forty -  eight per pack and between five and forteen per pack of puros. 
A fter 1800, leaf sold at ten reales per pound, puros remained the same, 








































































for one half real.8 It should be noted that although the cost of tobacco 
products to the consumer increased, the cost of leaf tobacco purchased by 
the crown did not. T he ability o f the G eneral Directorate to maintain 
the same purchase price of tobacco from the growers for almost forty 
years is crucial to an understanding of the fiscal success of the monopo­
ly. This is one of the issues with which we shall deal in the next 
section.
TABLE I: Total Receipts, Costs o f  Production and N et Profits o f  the
Royal Tobacco M onopoly, 1765 -  1809 (Current and 
Constant Pesos)
YEAR T O TA L R EC EIPTS T O TA L  COSTS N ET PR O FITS
Nominal Deflated Nom inal Deflated Nominal Deflated
1787 5,957,720 2,984,531 3,036,655 1,521,218 2,921,065 1,463,313
1788 6,243,183 3,463,298 3,336,942 1,851,111 2,906,241 1,612,187
1789 6,293,182 3,910,922 2,682,971 1,667,343 3,610,211 2,243,579
1790 6,235,315 4,404,715 2,837,349 2,004,344 3,397,966 2,400,372
1791 6,485,627 5,939,763 3,058,789 2,801,345 3,426,838 3,138,417
1792 6,705,635 9,260,648 2,991,004 4,130,650 3,714,632 5,129,999
1793 6,684,864 6,811,559 3,258,772 3,320,534 3,426,092 3,491,025
1794 6,526,352 5,288,711 3,417,540 2,758,973 3,108,812 2,509,738
1795 6,975,463 4,662,743 3,039,864 2,031,995 3,935,599 2,630,748
1796 7,336,540 7,527,747 3,400,312 3,488,931 3,986,228 4,090,117
1797 7,660,350 6,271,265 3,847,000 3,149,406 3,813,350 3,121,858
1798 8,251,574 5,220,202 3,711,778 2,348,186 4,539,796 2,872,016
1799 7,521,621 5,297,289 4,125,232 2,905,298 3,396,390 2,391,992
1800 7,433,159 5,145,479 4,020,559 2,783,164 3,412,600 2,362,315
1801 7,825,914 5,978,087 3,832,079 2,927,262 3,993,834 3,050,824
1802 7,686,835 4,006,064 3,594,205 1,873,152 4,092,630 2,132,911
1803 7,747,529 5,558,817 4,196,914 3,010,915 3,550,615 2,547,252
1804 7,910,719 7,493,339 4,125,747 3,908,068 3,784,972 3,585,272
1805 8,599,624 6,531,691 4,352,379 3,305,772 4,274,345 3,246,502
1806 9,116,393 6,141,466 5,255,066 3,540,195 3,861,327 2,601,272
1807 9,417,205 6,832,478 6,287,483 4,561,767 3,129,781 2,270,755
1808 9,061,468 5,214,333 4,613,982 2,655,071 4,447,486 2,575,014
1809 9,558,698 5,126,682 5,978,748 3,206,623 3,579,950 1,920,059
Source: Fonseca y U rrutía, Libro de la .Real Hacienda Vol. VII; Relaciones
Generales for years 1 790- 1809, extracted from various volumes of the 
Ramo de Tabaco, Archivo General de la Nación, México;
E. Florescano, Precios del m aíz y  crisis agrícolas en México 1 7 0 8-1810  




Apart from  the creation of the extensive administrative machinery 
which provided the base of the monopoly operations, three m ajor steps 
were taken to ensure complete control over tobacco: the restriction of 
tobacco cultivation, elimination of the cigarrerías and the erection of the 
state tobacco factories and estanquillos (monopoly tobacco stores). Not all 
were achieved at the same time and, as we shall see, the Spanish 
Crown was not in complete control of income from  sales of tobacco until 
1775.
In 1765, m erchants and dealers throughout New Spain were required 
to declare all their tobacco stocks and sell them  to specially appointed 
officials representing the new monopoly. Cultivation of tobacco was 
henceforth declared illegal with the exception of that grown in what is 
today the state of V eracruz. M ore specifically, the area chosen encom­
passed the villas of O rizaba, C órdoba, Huatusco and Zongolica. Prior to 
the monopoly, tobacco was grown as a cash crop mainly in G uadala­
ja ra , Puebla and O axaca. Very little is known as to actual numbers 
involved and the real impact of the monopoly prohibition for these 
growers. Evidently whatever protests were made by these growers fell on 
deaf ears. T he advice was to convert to other crops. A less acceptable 
alternative as fa r as the Spanish Crown was concerned was, of course, 
contraband. Given the efforts put into eliminating clandestine cultivation 
of tobacco, some growers found contraband a viable option.
T he areas in Veracruz were chosen partly for the quality of the 
tobacco produced there and partly for the relative ease with which illegal 
cultivation could be controlled by reason of the geographical features of 
the region. By 1803 the Intendancy of V eracruz covered 4,141 square 
leagues and had a population of 156,000, a ratio of approximately 
th ir ty -e ig h t inhabitants per square league.9 Such a low population 
created an enormous obstacle to the development of urban centers, 
commerce and local artesan crafts in view of the lack of sustained 
dem and from  local markets. V eracruz remained throughout the colonial 
period a region dependent upon its agricultural products, most notably 
vanilla, sugar, cotton, maize and tobacco. Sugar and tobacco were the 
m ajor crops of the growing zone prior to the implem entation of the 
monopoly. In order to take a closer look at the tobacco growers, 
emphasis will be placed on O rizaba as it is impossible to deal with all 
four areas in this paper.
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Towards the end of the seventeenth century tobacco had slowly begun 
to displace sugar as the dominant cash crop of O rizaba. By the early 
1700’s O rizaba had gained fam e as one of the most im portant tobacco-  
producing regions of the colony. A wide -  leaf plant was cultivated (of 
the species Nicotiana Tabacum) which produced a good, aromatic 
tobacco. T hus, since a shift had occurred away from  sugar to tobacco 
almost fifty years before the monopoly, the Spanish Crown simply 
accelerated a trend that already was under way.
W hile tobacco growers in G uadalajara wondered how to make their 
future living, the growers in O rizaba contemplated their new situation. 
Instructions were given that diputados (representatives) were to be elected 
from  the común de cosecheros. These had to travel to Mexico City 
where, theoretically, they negotiated with the General Directorate for 
satisfactory prices at which they would sell their tobacco to the monopo­
ly. T he relationship between the monopoly and the growers was carried 
out via a contract system. Such contracts stipulated prices, conditions of 
delivery, packaging, deductions to be made for waste and shrinkage and 
the duration of each contract. T he General Directorate decided how 
much tobacco had to be produced in order to satisfy the needs of the 
domestic market. Licenses were issued to each planter who had agreed to 
the new contract stating how many matas (plants) he had been allocated. 
T he eventual am ount was a compromise between how many tercios of 
tobacco the General Directorate required, how many growers wished to 
contract and the production capacity of each .1® Growers were then 
bound by these conditions. Excess cultivation of tobacco by growers 
above their license allocation was treated as contraband activity. A fter 
delivery at the monopoly warehouse in O rizaba, each p lanter’s tercios of 
tobacco were weighed, evaluated and, after deductions such as the alca­
bala (6 percent) and diezm o  (8 percent), he received a cash payment. 
For its part, the monopoly represented a guaranteed buyer and, of far 
more significance, it advanced to the planters interest -  free credit to help 
cover costs of production.11 It seems that this was done in order to 
ensure that the required production levels were met by the growers. Left 
to their own resources, apparently, the majority would have been unable 
to increase the quantity of tobacco cultivated. W riting to the Viceroy in 
1764, the m an who was to become the first D irector General of the 
monopoly, Jacin to  Espinosa commented:
...los labradores cosecheros y rancheros que se ocupan y emplean en la siem­
bra y cultivo de tabacos en Orizaba y Córdoba ... son pobres y que piden a 
los Hacenderos y m archantes algún dinero para el havio de sus gastos de
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siembra ... por lo que se hace preciso e indispensable se les proponga y 
asegure que por cuenta de la Real Hacienda se les subm inistran y anticipara 
el mismo havio que antes ... en dinero efectivo y no en otras especies —
Another adviser to the General D irectorate, Don Antonio Carlin, ob­
served that prior to the monopoly few growers cultivated more than
30.000 or 40,000 matas. Considering that by the beginning of the 1770’s
100.000 matas was to be the average num ber planted by many growers 
with some receiving licenses to plant 5,000,000, then clearly an intensi­
fication of cultivation was under way.
Any illusions that the deputies elected by the growers could influence 
the contracts drawn up were soon destroyed. By 1772 they were refusing 
to agree to further contracts until the prices offered by the monopoly 
were increased. Indeed, in 1777 the deputies and the común de cose­
cheros were abolished. T he growers found themselves unable to bargain. 
In 1765 prices for tobacco were set at three and one fourth reales a 
pound of first grade tobacco, two and one half reales a pound of second 
grade, one real a pound of third grade and punta  was to be purchased at 
twenty -  four reales an arroba .13 Gálvez, the Visitor G eneral, furious 
that the prices had been set so high, at least by his standards, declared 
that they must be reduced. T hus, the second contract drawn up in 1767 
stipulated that the prices for first, second, third grade tobaccos and punta  
were to be set at three reales, two reales, one real and twenty -  four 
reales respectively. Between 1765 and 1810 fifteen m ajor contracts were 
drawn up and agreed upon despite continuous and severe conflict 
between the growers and the monopoly. Prices were always the central 
point of contention. O n two occasions planters complained that it was 
simply not worth their while to continue growing tobacco at the prices 
offered and that there was no point in signing a contract. O n both 
occasions the monopoly, with royal approval, took the same action. The 
General Directorate ordered the Factor of O rizaba to buy up or rent as 
many tobacco ranchos as possible so that the Crown could cultivate its 
own tobacco, thus bypassing the recalcitrant planters. Shortages of 
tobacco were to be met by imports from  C uba and Louisiana. Both 
options proved extreemly costly to the crown, but they served their pu r­
pose. T he growers eventually submitted and accepted the prices offered 
by the monopoly. By 1810 they were still being paid the same prices 
stipulated in the 1767 contract (with the exception of punta  which had 
been lowered to twenty -  two reales per arroba). M oreover, following the 
abolition of the común de cosecheros and dissolution of general contracts
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(a tem porary measure) those growers who contracted individually did so 
at lower prices still -  two and three -  fourths reales, one and three -  
fourths reales, one real for first, second and third grades, and 
twenty -  two reales per arroba of punta . 14 T hus most growers eventu­
ally faced a fall in real income during the inflationary years of the late 
eighteenth century as costs of labour and basic necessities increased, a 
situation which was acknowledged by the Director General.*"’ Yet for 
whatever reasons, economic, political or a combination of both, the 
growers continued to supply the monopoly with tobacco during the 
chaotic period between 1810 and 1821, often without receiving full 
payment for the value of their tobacco.1®
Given the paucity of information concerning the tobacco trade and 
planters prior to 1765, any comparison between pre -  and p o st-  
monopoly situations is rendered extremely difficult. The best that can be 
done at the moment is to take a brief look at the planter group of 
O rizaba.
O ne advantage of the contract system and licensing of growers was 
that those growers known as los cosecheros verdaderos were given 
preference when the tobacco quota was allocated between the planters. 
Partly to prevent an influx of potential tobacco growers tempted by the 
thought of in te re s t-f re e  credit, those individuals known to have made 
their living from growing tobacco prior to the monopoly, especially those 
with their own ranchos and equipm ent were permitted to request their 
preferred quantity of matas first. T he monopoly, of course, did have a 
vested interest in this. Subsistence farm ers with few tools and even less 
skill at growing tobacco were not in a position to produce high quality 
tobacco which satisfied the consumer. At the same time, a limit on the 
num ber of growers who could contract meant that growers were more 
likely to receive the quantity of matas requested. Only when their allo­
cations had been made and if a quantity remained to be distributed 
would new growers be allowed to contract. T hus, a distinction can be 
made between a core group of planters, los cosecheros verdaderos, and 
the rest of the growers who were far less stable in their composition. 
W hile the form er group generally grew tobacco every year, the latter 
were a mixture of what appears to be a floating rural m igrant group, 
and local subsistence farm ers who grew tobacco when it was convenient
to do so. T hus determination of how many growers were involved is not 
1 7a simple exercise.
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If the num bers are measured by the quantity of licenses issued, then 
we get the following range of figures:








However, if the aviados of certain planters are added then the numbers 
increase. For the year 1789, for example, by adding the total num ber of 
aviados the num ber becomes 575. Conversely, the numbers are reduced 
if the am ount of harvests delivered to the monopoly warehouse is taken 
as a measurem ent:




T he discrepancies can be accounted for, in part, by poorer growers 
selling their tobacco to wealthier growers after cutting the leaf since they 
could not afford to dry and cure their tobacco. A different set of figures 
is presented altogether if the num bers of planters receiving credit is taken 
as a m easurem ent as to how many individuals were involved.18
Y ear and N um ber of Growers Receiving Credit
1792 83 1799 56 1806 126
1793 70 1800 58 1807 148
1794 76 1801 56 1808 176
1795 65 1802 104 1809 176
1796 61 1804 82 1810 114
1798 60 1805 69 1811 110
T hus, for the moment, it seems as though the core group
numerical range of between 50 and 150. ^
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The credit advanced by the monopoly was not given to everyone. 
Planters had to be able to provide a suitable fiador and/or security 
against any credit borrowed. Restrictions were imposed on the use of 
monopoly credit to prevent it being invested in other interests. An overall 
am ount was decided depending upon the quantity of plants a grower had 
to cultivate. T he amounts and names were entered into registros de 
créditos. Amounts allocated were generally divided into two parts, the 
first to cover costs of growing the tobacco, the second to cover its bene­
ficio (curing, drying and packing). M oney for the latter operation was 
not delivered until monopoly officials, namely the Factor and the 
Inspector G eneral, were satisfied that the first credit quota had been 
used for its correct purpose.
Much of the credit advanced went to pay labour costs. O ne crucial 
feature to rem em ber about tobacco is that it was (and is) a labour 
intensive crop. T here was always a high demand for tabaqueros, 
especially skilled ones. Effectively, these workers could determine the 
quality of a p lan ter’s crop. Knowing when to cut the leaves, and how to 
cut them correctly was a skilled operation. Cutting too high, too low and 
too soon could mean the difference between a crop with a high propor­
tion of a high grade leaf, as opposed to one with predom inantly low 
grade leaf. Cuadrillas of Indians were brought in from the surrounding 
pueblos to perform  a variety of tasks. W orkers were needed for the 
preparation of seed beds, transplanting, weeding, topping, suckering, 
cutting, stringing and hanging the leaves, sorting and packing. Those 
planters who employed operarios on their tobacco ranchos paid them 
between two and three -  fourths reales and three reales per day (with or 
without food depending on the task).^® By 1800 growers were
complaining that costs of labour had risen to between three reales and 
four reales per day.^* Competition for skilled workers undoubtedly 
exercised an influence on rural wages, but so did competition between 
tobacco growers and sugar hacendados. It was not simply a question of a 
shortage of skilled tobacco workers but of workers in general.
Com m enting on the problems faced by tobacco growers, Antonio de 
Sobrevilla observed that the gente operaría constituted the greatest cost, 
not just for the jornales but for the money which remained owing to the 
growers from workers who ran away or died. Costs were increased
further by having to pay people to search for and bring back recalcitrant
• 22  operarios.
Any idea that the tobacco growers were akin to a homogeneous group 
of yeoman farm ers is firmly dismissed by looking at the following two
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examples: In 1779 the total value of tobacco cosechas in O rizaba
amounted to 240,085 pesos. O f that am ount 5 1/2 percent of the total
num ber of growers paid, received 40 percent of the value of the crop
with three growers receiving 61,942 pesos, 22,366 pesos and 11,303
pesos respectively.^ In  1792 the spectrum of payments included
M anuel José Hernández who received ten pesos from a crop worth 360
pesos after 'credit and other deductions had been made; Don Felipe
Torres received 331 pesos from a crop worth 3,531 pesos, while Da.
Bernarda Rendón received 21,416 pesos from her crop valued at 36,000 
24pesos.
T he differentiation of the planter group implied by these two 
examples is borne out if we take a closer look at the growers. Based on 
planter cultivation profiles the pattern of differentiation which emerged 
between the growers can be roughly described as follows:“^
1. an ’’elite” core of wealthy growers, the m erchant -  planters;
2 . a middle group, ranging from  prosperous to poor rancheros;
3. a marginal but e v e r-p re se n t group of subsistence farm ers, 
the pegujaleros.
The first group tended to be wealthy Spanish merchants for whom 
tobacco was one of several economic interests. O ften holding political 
posts they were more likely to live in the villa of O rizaba rather than on 
tobacco ranchos which they owned or rented. They employed mayordo­
mos to look after their tobacco crops and were aviadores for the bulk of 
the Indian growers and poor creole or mestizo planters. For 1789/90, for 
example, one of the most outstanding tobacco planters of O rizaba, Don 
Antonio Montes Argüelles had thirty -  eight creole and mestizo aviados 
distributed throughout the jurisdiction of O rizaba. H e was also aviador 
to 358 Indians of the Sierra de Tequila and forty -  eight Indians from 
Tom atlan. O n average, however, the num ber of aviados was much 
lower, varying from one to fifty. These planters generally cultivated 
between 600,000 and 5,000,000 matas. Argüelles is typical of this group. 
A peninsular Spaniard, he was a regidor of O rizaba. His house in the 
villa was valued at 20,000 pesos. H e owned two boticas and a general 
store valued at 30,000 pesos. His bulls for the abasto de cam e  of 
C órdoba and O rizaba were valued at 75,600 pesos and his tobacco 
ranchos (including stock) were worth 18,000 pesos. At the time of his 
death his total estate was valued at 283,600 pesos, 138,788 pesos after 
payment of debts.“7 So also, by 1810 Don Francisco Florentino Avila
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owned six houses, a tienda de comercio, two tobacco ranchos (valued at
6,000 pesos). His goods and properties were worth 56,800 pesos. Don
Domingo Piñeiro, Spanish, also by 1810 owned four houses, three
9fttobacco ranchos, and 150 mules, collectively worth 51,268 pesos. 
C learly these individuals were not solely dependent upon income received 
from  the sale of their tobacco crop. They could withstand bad years 
when the value of a harvest was low.
T he second group constitutes the majority of the core group of 
growers. These medium to small -  scale planters were generally creole or 
mestizo rancheros (the m ajority were probably arrendatarios).^  They 
were likely to live on their ranchos, have a few aviados, and cultivate 
between 100,000 and 500,000 plants. They generally owned livestock 
ranging from sheep to bulls. Values placed on ranchos which were 
owned by various planters ranged between 300 pesos and 3,000 pesos. 
T he main difference between this group and the previous one was that 
they were much more vulnerable to fluctuations in the tobacco harvest, 
this crop being their m ajor source of income. It should be noted here 
that one of the problems facing a  grower was that, if he borrowed a 
certain amount of credit based on an estimated value of his crop he ran 
the risk of finding that he could just about pay off the credit and other 
deductions. No adjustm ents were made for bad harvests, prices could not 
be increased. The m argin between profit and loss could be very thin 
indeed.
T he third group, the pegujaleros, according to the C om m ander of 
the resguardo, can be divided into two categories: Those individuals who 
owned their ranchelos and who knew no other profession than that of 
growing tobacco, and those of no fixed domicile who requested licenses 
at the time of the allocation of matas, generally cheated their aviadores 
and were a m ajor source of contraband for dealing in tobacco leaf.^® 
Generally mestizo or Indian (occasionally mulatto), they tended to culti­
vate between 6,000 and 60,000 plants.
T he pegujaleros were a source of contention between monopoly 
officials and the tobacco growers. In  the light of restricted quantities of 
tobacco to be harvested each year, the more growers there were the less 
num ber of plants were available for allocation. T he wealthier growers 
argued that the pegujaleros were too poor to produce high quality 
tobacco. T he Crown responded that if such people were not perm itted to 
cultivate tobacco they would have no means of earning an income. The 
Factor of O rizaba, M endiola, a candid individual, observed drily that 
’’above all else they (the pegujaleros) are the reserve body upon which
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the R enta counts against the threats of the tobacco growers.”31
Certainly by the first decade of the nineteenth century this pattern of 
differentiation within the core group seems to have established itself. 
Based on the growers receiving credit, you find a distribution pattern 
which suggests the existence of a strong middle group of small to
medium -  scale planters but, at the same time, what appears to be an 
expansion and consolidation of the elite group. Such differences did not 
go unnoticed by the tobacco growers who were well aware of the 
existence of a ’’privileged” group of planters. Reacting strongly to an 
assessment made by the Factor of O rizaba that the monopoly was 
responsible for the economic growth and prosperity of the villa, a
spokesman for the informally reconstituted común de cosecheros re­
sponded:3^
Se describen muchas y hermosas fábricas nuevas, otro tanto más opulento y 
decoroso en los vecinos, un  comercio brillante con un  rápido y lucroso giro, y 
todo por afecto de los beneficios que ha comunicado al establecimiento de 
esta R enta ... no es más que una violenta estracción del dinero ... reducida 
toda la utilidad verdadera a una corta parte á veinticinco o treinta comerci­
antes... 33
Given the existing information, any assessment of the beneficial 
effects bestowed upon the regional economy by the establishment of the 
monopoly must be a speculative exercise at this stage. A part from 
tobacco, sugar was the only other cash crop of significance. This
suffered from  two disadvantages, however, in that there was not a large 
market for it and, of more importance to the local farm ers, it demanded 
heavy capital investment. M igration and contraband were other possi­
bilities or, indeed, to work for the sugar hacendados or wealthy tobacco 
growers. A guaranteed buyer did not necessarily mean constant flows of 
capital into the economy -  such dependence upon a single crop could 
plunge the region into crisis as it was to do in 1782 and 1801. N ever­
theless, there were positive features which were direct results of the 
monopoly’s presence: the interest -  free credit which enabled wealthier 
planters the freedom to invest their own capital in other activities such as 
commerce and property; improvements of the highways from  Veracruz 
to Mexico City. This was designed to achieve two things: to improve the 
route from  O rizaba and C órdoba to Mexico City in order to speed up 
the transportation of tobacco from the growing regions to reduce wastage 
en route. In a wider context, the highway was conceived as part of a 
plan to encourage the import -  export trade centered in V eracruz but also
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to strenghten the development of the sugar and tobacco growing regions 
of Córdoba and O rizaba.34 This, in addition to the substantial comings 
and goings of the muleteers responsible for transporting the tobacco was 
designed to encourage the commerical development of the area.
III.
If  history has permitted the tobacco growers to give their views on 
the Tobacco Monopoly, it has not been so kind to their urban counter­
parts, the cigarreros. T he few protests that have survived reveal little of 
their struggle to withstand the decision of the General D irectorate and 
José de Gálvez to take over the private tobacco stores. T he ultimate 
testimony to their fate is their elimination and it is to this process and 
their replacement by the royal factories and estanquillos to which we now 
turn.
T he decision to control the m anufacture and sale of tobacco products 
was not without conflict. In 1764 when the initial discussions were in 
progress concerning this policy, Espinosa, one of the Director Generals 
pointed out to the Viceroy that between 5,000 and 6,000 individuals were 
occupied in the m anufacture and sale of tobacco and that they could not 
be left without em ploym ent.35 H e complained that the attem pt to 
create a tobacco factory in Puebla had been the cause of several riots in 
which leaflets had been distributed with statements such as ’’death to 
Spain, long live the English” followed by threats promising to burn down 
the monopoly offices. V elarde, the Fiscal (Treasury Attorney) received 
petitions which made obvious a ’’general repugnance” to the abolition of 
private m anufacture of tobacco products, i.e. puros and cigarros. On 
July 26, 1766, 30,000 people occupied the city of G uanajuato, threat­
ened to bum  the monopoly offices and demanded a return to control 
over the sale of leaf tobacco only. In  Decem ber of the same year, 
popular riots broke out in Puebla and O axaca, albeit on a smaller scale, 
but with the same objective -  withdrawal of the decision to take over 
the cigarrerías,36 José Gálvez, dismissive of any suggestions that there 
was a link between the riots and the decision to control the m anufacture 
and sale of tobacco products, began to outline how such control was to 
be achieved. T he transfer must be carried out, but in a way that would 
keep the potential social and economic dislocation to a m inim um . This 
was to be done by ensuring that the ex -  cigarrerías were absorbed by 
either the new monopoly stores or the royal factories. Initially emphasis 
was placed on the need for a gradual transition from private to state
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control over the m anufacture and sale of tobacco and tobacco products. 
All existing cigarrerías were declared non -  transferable through sales (at 
least to other private citizens), monopoly officials were to prepare regis­
ters of all the existing tobacco shops in Mexico City and tobacco fac­
tories were to be set up in the m ajor urban centers of New Spain -  
Mexico City, Q uerétaro , Puebla, G uadalajara. Factories were also 
eventually established in O rizaba, O axaca and Durango. T hus, for a 
period an uneasy co -  existence was maintained between private and 
state -  owned tobacco shops. It did not last for long. W ith the encour­
aging signs of a 50 percent ’’profit” figure from  Mexico City factory in 
1769 the General Directorate was motivated to speed up the process of 
elimination of the private shops.37 T o perm it the final transfer from 
private to public control, several surveys were carried out to determine 
location, age, family size, scale of operation and general economic con­
dition of the cigarreros of Mexico City. Based upon the results of these 
surveys those owners with the largest families, owners of advanced age 
or widows would be given first refusal on the offer of a license to 
operate an estanquillo. W hen all licenses had been allocated those 
cigarreros rem aining and their employees would be offered work in the 
Mexico City factory.
The takeover took about ten years to complete. In 1765, there were 
an estimated 543 cigarrerías in Mexico C ity .33 By 1772 they were 
down to 286. By 1775 all tobacco shops were in the hands of the 
monopoly. O ne hundred and ten estanquillos were in operation. Riva 
Agüero, one of the Director Generals, estimated that in order to achieve 
control, it had been necessary to relocate approximately 400 owners and 
1,700 tobacco workers.39 Clearly, the Mexico City factory bore the 
burden of absorbing the majority of displaced cigarreros. Indeed, 
although the figures available for the num ber of individuals involved in 
the tobacco trade and industry are, at best, dubious, if the m aximum 
estimate of 5,000 to 6,000 is taken, then the employment of 7,500 in the 
Mexico City factory indicates that extra jobs were created. This positive 
feature was counteracted, however, by the need to reduce the num ber of 
workers periodically after the 1790’s when acute shortages of paper 
resulted in lower production of cigarrettes.
T hus far, it has not proved possible to trace the pace of the takeover 
for the rest of New Spain. In  1772, well into the transition phase, the 
distribution of cigarrerías throughout the colony was as follows:*10
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General Administration of Mexico 
Factoría de Durango 
Factoría de Valladolid 
Factoría de Puebla 






As to the cigarreros themselves not that much is known. T hus far, 
only one of the surveys carried out by the monopoly has been located. 
Taken in 1773 it revealed that of the existing 146 cigarreros, approxi­
mately half were women, seventeen of whom were widows or daughters 
of the previous owners. T he total labour force employed in the shops 
amounted to 691, 30 percent of which was female. T he largest shop 
employed thirty -  one workers (all female) although the average shop 
employed between four and eight workers. Seven owners were classified 
as not needing their tobacco stores because they had other economic 
interests. Eight offered to sell their shops to the monopoly. O f the six 
who put prices on their stores, one wanted eleven pesos, three requested 
twenty pesos each, one, twenty -  five pesos and the final one suggested 
120 pesos. No indication of wages paid to the employees is given, or 
indeed, if the larger concerns operated with a system of wage labour at 
all. No direct statem ent of ethnic background is given. No assessment of 
daily takings is m ade.41 In the same year, 1773, the views of the 
comunidad de cigarreros were made known through the Procurador del 
núm ero de la Real Audiencia. They offer us a rare glimpse into the 
cigarreros’ self -  perceptions of their situation. They lamented that their 
families were being ruined by the operation of the Mexico City factory. 
T hey requested that the K ing order the elimination of the cigarrerías to 
be stopped and that the m anufacture of cigarros should rem ain free. 
T hey also emphasized the detrimental effect on women since so many 
derived their livelihood from  the m anufacture and sale of cigarros, not 
merely in Mexico City, but throughout the colony. They were thus being 
deprived of an honest livelihood and exposed to great dangers (i.e. 
prostitution).42 T he response to their pleas has already been described.
T he reaction of the General Directorate to accusations that the 
monopoly had caused nothing but misery and unemployment was that, 
on the contrary, the policy devised to effect the takeover was such that 
nobody would be left without some employment of some sort. T o what 
extent that was achieved is impossible to say. For those who were 
employed as estanquilleros, they were to receive a commission on sales 
for their salaries. However, there was a m inim um  and a m axim um  rate
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set to ensure that they received something. No estanquillero was to 
receive less than six reales per day nor more than twenty -  two reales. 
Commission on sales varied between 4 percent and 9 percent.4  ^ H ours 
of operation were between six a.m . and ten p .m . and only family 
members were permitted to work in the estanquillos. This was to be 
uniform throughout the colony. By 1780 the distribution of estanquillos 
throughout the cascos of the administrative divisions was as follows:44
Mexico City 64 G uadalajara 18 Córdoba 18
Valladolid 9 O rizaba 17 Veracruz 13
Puebla 26 O axaca 9 M érida 2
Durango 2 Rosario 1
T hus the option of opening up a tobacco store was removed from the 
list of possibilities available to New Spain’s artisans. Even the possibility 
of gaining a license became less feasible as limits were placed on the 
num ber of estanquillos which could operate. M oreover, the policy 
adopted after the takeover was completed was that if an estanquillo 
became vacant, retired monopoly bureaucrats or their widows or children 
were given preference am ong those seeking access to a license.
T he gradual takeover of the cigarrerías was accompanied by the 
parallel process of the creation of the royal factories. Between 1769 and 
1777 four factories became operational: Mexico City, Puebla, O axaca 
and O rizaba -  Q uerétaro  and G uadalajara were added two years later. 
It seems that there were no private ’’factories” as such. It was José de 
Gálvez who strenuously advocated their establishment in New Spain 
using the tobacco factory of Seville as a model. José de Gálvez’s views 
on the merits of the factories were quite clear. T he m anufacture of 
puros and cigarros was to be standardized and a steady supply of these 
made available throughout the colony. T he consum er was to be protected 
from  the fraudulent practices, allegedly carried out by the cigarreros. 
Chiles, ashes, and other ’’noxious substances” were often mixed in with 
the tobacco to give it ’’body.” Monopoly products were to be of the 
highest standard. Colonial society in general, Mexico City in particular, 
was to reap the benefits from  the ’’social” effects of the factories. For 
Gálvez, the Mexico City factory was
. ..ta n  beneficioso al Público como el mejor hospicio por el gran núm ero de 
pobres que se m antienen del jornal que ganan y por los muchos delitos que 
se evitan con el recojimiento voluntario de una m ultitud de ociosos y de 
m ujeres pobres que en aquel asilo socorren su necesidad y se livertan de
infinitos riesgos.
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Each factory was similar in structure and administration, the m ajor 
difference being the scale of operation. T he Mexico City factory 
produced the bulk of labrados (m anufactured products i.e. puros and 
cigarros) for distribution throughout New Spain, although each factory 
was responsible for supplying its immediate areas. Coahuila, M onterrey, 
Santander, M azapil and the factorías of Valladolid, G uadalajara, 
D urango and Rosario were supplied by the Mexico City factory. 
Q uerétaro  also supplied G uadalajara and Valladolid. G uadalajara, 
Puebla and O axaca were supplied by their own factories while O rizaba 
supplied V eracruz, C órdoba and parts of Puebla.“1® Table II shows the 
distribution of workers between the six factories for the quinquennium  
1 7 9 0 -9 5 . They emphasize two im portant characteristics of the factory 
structure: high employment of female workers and large num bers of 
pieceworkers.
TABLE II: Q uantities and Total Value o f  Tobacco Products Sold in 
N ew  Spain, 1 7 9 2 -1 8 0 6
Y ear
Lbs. of 
R aw  L eaf
Packets 
















1773 1,387,091 3,486,635 28,548,635 19,456 3,089,270
1774 1,373,801 2,757,805 30,609,396 19,662 3,206,605
1775 1,073,565 3,325,117 40,936,966 20,246 3,681,861
1776 1,089,798 3,544,773 42,794,331 22,218 3,845,743
1792 348,564 9,585,744 89,930,721 17,549 6,705,635
1793 324,281 9,939,056 89,437,612 16,112 6,684,863
1796 347,590 10,426,393 99,108,282 17,663 7,336,539
1797 319,439 10,353,013 104,423,327 17,601 7,617,688
1798 247,975 1,208 12,338,321 113,752,168 21,827 8,251,574
1799 520,408 1,226 21,355,046 87,548,816 18,430 7,521,621
1800 635,024 3,415 15,163,510 89,989,580 20,682 7,433,459
1801 560,996 773 15,168,921 97,976,248 15,745 7,794,744
1802 611,646 1,640 14,648,040 95,104,840 24,285 7,686,824
1803 526,879 988 15,023,004 97,428,579 13,992 7,747,528
1804 539,568 826 15,141,370 99,822,406 14,465 7,910,719
1805 448,273 1,230 16,551,456 111,381,283 15,605 8,599,623
1806 345,457 1,621 16,712,433 121,377,189 14,672 9,116,392
Source: Com piled from  the R elaciones G enerales, the yearly accounts o f  the R oyal T obacco 
M onopoly for the  years 1773 -  1776 and 1792 -  1806.
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The labour force of the Mexico City factory can be divided into 
three m ajor groups.47 T he administrative and supervisory personnel 
included the factory m anager, accountants, carpenters, foremen and 
forewomen, guards and clerks. They received annual salaries or fixed 
daily rates with a range from fifty -  three to 2,000 pesos per annum. 
T he second group was comprised of workers with specific tasks such as 
preparation of the raw leaf, shredding it, packing up the labrados and 
stamping boxes. T heir wages were within a range of n in e ty -o n e  pesos 
to 249 pesos per annum . T he third group, the pieceworkers, constituted 
the bulk of the work force. They carried out the actual m anufacture of 
puros and cigarros, and included cutters, twisters and fillers. The 
majority received between three and eight reales a day with average 
annual incomes of between 100 and 271 pesos.48 Overall, women 
received marginally less than their male counterparts. Although maestros 
de mesa and maestras de mesa both received one peso per day, a 
maestro  was in charge of 119 workers while a maestra had 160 women 
to supervise. No Indians were found in the ranks of the administrative or 
supervisory personnel. For the year 1800, of the 7,074 factory workers, 
525 were Indian tributaries (7.4 percent of total workers).49
Although some workers gained increases in wages (mainly between 
1771 and 1779) the majority did not (see Table III). Like the growers 
and, indeed, most other colonial workers, they were highly susceptible to 
the inflationary pinch of the late eighteenth century. V ery early on, 
however, in the history of the Mexico City factory the tobacco workers 
organized a mutual -  aid society known as the Concordia. By deducting 
one half real each week from  m em bers’ wages a common fund was 
created which provided aid in times of emergency, illness for example. 
In 1771 the factory m anager, Isidro Romafia, estimated that the
Concordia had 5,600 members with total funds on hand of 70,394
50pesos.
It has been estimated that by 1790 the tobacco workers constituted 
11.6 percent of the economically active population of Mexico C ity .51 
Indeed, by 1795 the Mexico City factory employed 59 percent of all 
tobacco workers employed in the six royal factories. T he m ajor d iffe r­
ence between the tobacco workers and other workers (particularly those 
employed in the obrajes) was the nature of their labour. Thus far, no 
evidence of extra -  economic coercion has been found with regard to
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TABLE III: Wages and Salaries o f  the M exico C ity Factory Personnel
(Selected)
PO SITIO N  1771




a. Yearly Salaries and Fixed Daily Wage (Pesos) 
Administrador 1,400 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
Contador 800 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
M aestro Mayor 500 -  550 400 -  600 600 500 600
M aestra Mayor 350 -  400 350 -  450 350 -4 5 0 350 -  450
b. Piecework (Reales)
Maestros de Mesa - 8 8 8 -
Envolvedores* - 4 -  4.5 4.5 -  5.25 4.5 -  6.5 -
Encajonadores* - 4 4 -
Operarios - - 2 - 4 -
Source: M cW atters , Table 7, p .245
Note: Envolvedores were employed to prepare the packs for the cigarros and
wrap them according to their classification.
Encajonadores were packers who put the packs of cigarros into large 
wooden boxes, ready for distribution to other parts of the colony.
work in the tobacco factories. Piecework rates were neither exceptionally 
high nor low in comparison with other occupations.52 Throughout the 
final decades of the eighteenth century the state tobacco factories became 
a focal point of criticism for several reasons. For lack of space only two 
can be discussed briefly. T he first attack was based upon the alleged 
decline in ’’profits” of the factories, particularly that of Mexico City. O ne 
estimate showed that the Mexico City factory’s ’’profits” had fallen from 
50 percent in 1769 to 28 percent in 1794.55 This is not a marginal 
profit calculation and apparently was designed to show that it was more 
profitable to sell the leaf tobacco only and return m anufacture of cigars 
and cigarettes to the private sector. T able IV  shows the volume and 
value of sales of tobacco products in New Spain for 1773 -  1806. Both
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packets of cigars and cigarettes show stable production levels. Reduced 
production is generally related to shortages of paper.
TABLE IV: Distribution o f  Fixed D aily W age and Pieceworkers in the 
M exico C ity Factory, 1795
Factory












N um ber 
of Workers
México 373 64 6 3,646 2,991 94 7,074
(.) ucrr t aro 76 15 7 716 590 93 1,397
G uadalajara 18 18 2 - 1,514 98 1,550
Puebla 57 15 7 460 495 93 1,027
Oaxaca 21 7 5 - 582 95 610
Orizaba 11 3 4 149 192 96 355
12,013
Source: Estado de los empleados de las fábricas de la Real R enta del Tabaco de
este Reyno, México, 20 Ju ly  1795, Francisco M aniau y O rtega, AGN 
México, Tabaco, V. 495.
T he second criticism concerned the dangers inherent in the high 
concentration of workers in the Mexico City factory. T he workers had 
already rioted twice, in 1780 and in 1794, prim arily due to increases in 
their work quotas without a concomitant increase in wages. T he ’’solu­
tion” was to divide the Mexico City factory into three separate units, one 
of which was the especially constructed and first state -  owned tobacco 
factory which was opened in 1807.
The m anagm ent and operation of the factories, their profitability and 
production costs all require careful consideration but cannot be dealt with 
here. A general question underlying any analysis of the tobacco factories 
is, to what extent they can be characterized as state -  induced industriali-
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zation. State control and managem ent resulted in a change in the division 
of labour upon which the m anufacture of tobacco products was based. 
T here  were no technical innovations, however, and manual labour pre­
dominated. T here was clearly an emphasis upon a quantitative expansion 
of production but not toward a qualitative change in the mode of pro­
duction. As such it is difficult to disagree with M oreno Toscano’s 
observation that
el cambio o modificación principal que introdujo la fábrica de cigarros fue la 
concentración de un núm ero grande de operarios en el establecimiento de la 
fábrica. Esta concentración en lugar de originarse en la necesidad de mejorar 
el proceso productivo, tuvo por causa una medida política de carácter 
monopólico impuesta por la Corona con fines fiscales.51
For colonial society in general the Royal Tobacco Monopoly provoked 
a variety of responses. T he Consulado de México, ever vigilant in its 
mission to prove the ’’harm ful” effects of the monopoly, argued that it 
worked against the development of New Spain.
Las fábricas de todos los cigarros y puros que se gastan en el Reyno, se han 
fixado en Orizaba, Oaxaca, Puebla, México, Q uerétaro y G uadalajara, 
dejando de todas las demas poblaciones sin esta ocupación y quitándoles una 
m ultitud de familias á servir á aquellos seis lugares privilegiados. En ellos se 
viven con la sugeción y reconocimiento de Parroquias que en donde nacie­
ron ... pero ... una vida la mas licensiosa y criminosa en spiritual y 
tem poral.55
Amidst the Consulado’s painful lam ent of how the implementation of 
the factory system had broken up families and exposed decent people to 
the sexual immoralities of working in a factory, were complaints con­
cerning the economic effects of the monopoly. Strong productive male 
labour was being wasted in the factories when it could be used in agri­
culture or in the mines. Moreover, it was labour used to produce profits 
which were then shipped out of the country. O ne of the monopoly’s most 
vociferous critics was the Padre Antonio de San José M uro, a 
’’Bethlemite” friar who seems to have devoted himself to a one man 
campaign against the monopoly.56 Although he pointed to the evils of 
monopoly in general, one of his m ajor concerns was the ill effects the 
factories had upon their workers. Conducive to blasphemy, licentious 
behaviour and subversion, the Mexico City factory was nothing short of 
’’una casa de perdición.”57 In response to such attacks the Director 
General asserted that far from breeding delinquent citizens, not only was
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the Mexico City factory a manufactory for puros and cigarros but ”ha 
sido destinado taller para hombres de b ien ...”58 Overall, consumers 
benefitted from the monopoly because they purchased better quality 
products. From the labour required by the factories emerged a group of 
producers and consumers simultaneously benefitting both New Spain and 
the metropolis. At least that is how the General Directorate perceived 
the effects of the monopoly. Mexico City could not fail to gain from  the 
operation of the factory, since
continuaría tam bién el m aior fomento que recive esta Capital en sus 
comercios transcendiendo á otros, con la circulación del crecido caudal de 
mas de 750,000 pesos que se distribuye anualm ente en la Gente operaría que 
se ocupa en la labor de puros y cigarros. ^
IV .
M uch of what constitutes the history of the Royal Tobacco Monopoly 
rem ains untouched. However, a  general picture has emerged of what the 
production of four million pesos implied. M any of the hallmarks of 
eighteenth century mercantilism are to be found in the Spanish state’s 
managem ent of the tobacco monopoly in New Spain: an emphasis upon 
large centralized m anufactures and capital contributions in the form  of 
the interest -  free credit allocated to encourage the cultivation of tobacco. 
Such m anagem ent signified much more than an exercise in the raising of 
revenues. T he reorganizations and restrictions which typified the abso­
lutist Bourbon reforms were applied with a vigour which was felt 
throughout the colony. Farm ers in New Spain were effectively prohibited 
from  growing tobacco apart from  the "privileged” who lived and worked 
in the province of V eracruz. W ithin a region largely dependent upon 
tobacco for its survival there emerged an elite m erchant -  planter group 
who manipulated the conditions created by the monopoly to their own 
advantage. T he less able were subject to insolvency and destitution in the 
face of poor harvests and unsym pathetic bureaucrats. If  the cultivation 
of the crop was confined to the rural southeast, manufactures were 
firmly established in the m ajor urban centres of New Spain, especially 
Mexico City. Production of cigars and cigarettes was removed from  the 
hands of private artisans and placed into those of the workers employed 
in state -  managed factories -  a sweeping change and one which is too 
easily ignored or underestim ated. N urtured by the Bourbon state, the 
tobacco monopoly was to survive its demise only to experience its own in 
the new M exican republic.
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15. ETAPA FINAL DEL MONOPOLIO EN EL VIRREINATO 
DEL PERU: EL TABACO DE CHACHAPOYAS
Christine Hünefeldt*
Hace casi tres décadas, Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo publicó un 
documentado trabajo  sobre la R enta de TabacoB en el V irreinato del 
Perú. En este articulo, el autor describe el proceso de formación del 
monopolio y las principales reformas instauradas desde el momento de su 
fundación en 1752. Tem poralm ente su análisis term ina hacia 1792, año 
en que se iniciaría el declive tanto de los valores totales de tabaco pro­
ducido como de los beneficios líquidos obtenidos por la metrópoli.
Las prim eras propuestas para la creación de un monopolio tabacalero 
se rem ontan al siglo X V II. H ubo una fase en la que se arrendó la renta 
del tabaco a particulares a cambio de un apone previamente fijado 
entre el arrendatario y la Corona española.1 Estas tentativas, sin 
em bargo, no duraron por largo tiempo. A pesar de que hubo regiones 
coloniales en las que existió el monopolio estatal del tabaco ya en las 
primeras décadas del siglo dieziocho recién el reglamento de 1740 y las 
ordenanzas de 1759 sirvieron como base para la creación de la R enta de 
Tabacos en territorio colonial.^ Sucesivamente estos cuerpos legales 
fueron ampliados, complementados y ajustados a las condiciones parti­
culares de cada región.3
H asta entonces, la producción del tabaco estuvo en manos de peque­
ños agricultores independientes (llamados cosecheros o vegueros), que 
vendían sus cosechas a comerciantes. Estos a su vez se encargaban de 
distribuir el tabaco a las haciendas, los pueblos, las ciudades y las 
m inas.* Parece haber sido práctica usual, el que los comerciantes 
compradores del tabaco pocas veces pagaban en dinero. Se pagaba en 
especies y en algunos lugares el tabaco hizo las veces del dinero.5 Esta 
práctica comercial no fue patrim onio de la producción tabacalera. Al 
igual a lo que sucedía con otros productos, el tabaco podía recorrer 
vastas regiones del espacio colonial hasta insertarse en form a de dinero 
en el mercado internacional. En el trayecto desde el centro productor 
hasta él puerto de salida, el tabaco podía ser cambiado por diferentes 
artículos -  ropas de la tierra, minerales, lana, coca, etc. -  consecuti­
vamente, hilvanando entre sí a diversas regiones y diferentes circuitos 
comerciales.®
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Los fines expresos que condujeron a la creación del monopolio fueron 
sustancialmente la elevación de los ingresos fiscales y la delimitación y el 
control del comercio (y el contrabando) intercolonial, La meta era co­
ordinar en manos del monopolio la producción, la distribución y la venta 
de tal m anera que se lograra un autoabastecimicnto a nivel de virreinato. 
D ada la existencia de grupos de interés ligados a la producción tabaca­
lera antes de la creación del monopolio, el ajuste a las metas del mono­
polio tuvo que ser gradual. En el caso de los cosecheros, la R enta de 
Tabacos aprovechó tierras y mano de obra existentes en regiones que 
-  en parte hacia siglos -  producían tabaco. A fin de efectivizar el 
control sobre las cantidades de tabaco producido, se form aron matrículas 
de cosecheros, en las que figuraban el núm ero de matas asignadas a 
cada cosechero. En el caso ideal el reparto de las matas se hacía de 
acuerdo a los logros obtenidos por cada cosechero individualmente y de 
acuerdo a los requerimientos de consumo del virreinato, calculados con 
anterioridad. La R enta de Tabacos a través de sus almacenes de acopio 
de tabacos -  las factorías, ubicadas en un lugar céntrico en relación al 
área de producción tabacalera -  asum ía las funciones que previamente 
habían sido patrimonio de comerciantes privados.7 De acuerdo a los 
defensores del monopolio, al arrogarse la factoría la exclusividad de la 
tasación y la compra de los tabacos a los cosecheros, se eximía a estos de 
las extorsiones a las que habían sido expuestos por parte de inescrupu­
losos comerciantes.8 Ahora el valor de las cosechas les sería abonado en 
dinero.
En un prim er momento, los comerciantes por su parte quedaron 
marginados de sus actividades mercantiles. Ocasionalmente eran contra­
tados por las factorías, ya sea para  transportar el tabaco desde las 
chacras tabacaleras a los almacenes de las factorías, o de aqui hacia las 
administraciones del tabaco. Como se verá, las factorías nunca llegaron a 
prescindir totalmente de los servicios de estos comerciantes, a pesar de 
que las Ordenanzas de 1759 propugnaban la cancelación de toda activi­
dad particular -  transporte incluido -  a favor del monopolio estatal. 
Sólo la preparación de cigarros, puros y limpiones quedaba (en el 
V irreinato del Perú hasta 1780) en manos privadas, aunque la R enta de 
Tabacos tam bién aqui controlaba peso, calidad y cantidad.9 En una 
suerte de última etapa en este proceso gradual de implementación del 
monopolio se instalaron las fábricas reales dedicadas a la elaboración del 
tabaco. En las tercenas y los estanquillos, los lugares de venta al menu­
do, concluía la circulación del tabaco de acuerdo a los planes de la R enta 
(ver D ibujo I).
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D IB U JO  I: Los circuitos del tabaco de Chachapoyas durante el 
monopolio
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Decisivamente, entonces, el éxito del monopolio dependería de la 
capacidad del estado colonial de organizar la producción, la distribución y 
el consumo del tabaco de acuerdo a sus planes y de la supeditación de 
los intereses de cosecheros, transportistas y de sus propios empleados a 
los cometidos de la R enta de Tabacos. La perseverancia de la lucha 
entre los intereses de uno y otro grupo -  que tratarem os de ubicar -  
parecerían revelar una intrínseca debilidad del monopolio en el V irrei­
nato del Perú, sin que ello signifique que los ingresos logrados por la 
Renta sean despreciables, aun después de 1792.1® Para docum entar lo 
enunciado nos moveremos en dos compartimientos de análisis contiguos a 
las propuestas de G. Céspedes del Castillo. Por una parte interesa saber 
cuáles fueron los efectos y las reacciones a las reform as suscitadas por la 
introducción y el perfeccionamiento del monopolio tabacalero a nivel 
local, y por otra parte conocer las razones de un supuesto declive a partir 
de 1792.11
La Renta del tabaco: algunos indicadores cuantitativos
De acuerdo a los datos estadísticos proporcionados por G. Céspedes del 
Castillo puede ubicarse un período de auge de la producción tabacalera 
entre 1763 y 1788. En este lapso de tiempo el valor total de lo producido 
por la R enta fluctúa en torno a los 800.000 pesos anuales, con escuetos 
repuntes entre 1773 y 1776 y alrededor de 1786, y una baja  hasta los 
337.025 pesos en 1780, año en que se inicia el levantamiento de T úpac 
A m aru. En términos de ganancia líquida, es decir, deducidos los gastos 
por sueldos, local, compra de tabacos a los cosecheros y un porcentaje de 
aproxim adam ente el 10 por ciento entregado como comisión de venta a 
los tercenistas y estanquilleros, los beneficios logrados entre 1763 y 1788 
van gradualm ente en aum ento -  desde 19.991 pesos hasta alcanzar 
445.662 pesos anuales. Los gastos ocasionados a la Renta como conse­
cuencia de la sucesiva ampliación de sus cuerpos administrativos, irán 
disminuyendo conforme queda afianzada la infraestructura adm inistra­
tiva. La organización de la R enta toma gran impulso con las Instruc­
ciones de 1776, al introducirse el sistema de las Intendencias. Prim ero el 
Visitador Areche, luego Escobedo perfeccionarán la administración 
colonial; el V isitador La Riva será enviado desde Nueva España para 
organizar, en base al éxito y las experiencias logradas allí, la R enta de 
Tabacos en el V irreinato del Perú. '  ^ El salto más brusco por gastos de 
orden administrativo se da entre 1776 y 1779. M ientras que entre 1780 
y 1783 los gastos ascienden a 677.229 pesos, entre 1776 y 1779 llegaron
391
a 1.581.133 pesos. Serán La Riva y Escobedo quienes darán al mono­
polio su máximo desarrollo.13
Al final de sus gestiones quedaron establecidas la administración 
central en Lim a, cinco administraciones subalternas en T arm a, lea, 
Ja u ja , C hancay y H uánuco, y otras administraciones generales en 
A requipa, Huancavelica, Cuzco y Trujillo. Los dos grandes centros 
productores de tabacos en el V irreinato a partir de 1780 fueron Saña y 
Chachapoyas. En el primero se producían los tabacos de Saña, que luego 
de pasar por los almacenes de la administración central en Lim a, estaban 
destinados al consumo de la C apitanía General de Chile, mientras que 
el tabaco Bracamoro producido en Chachapoyas abastecería el mercado 
peruano .14 A partir de 1809 la factoría guayaquilcña fue incorporada 
al V irreinato del Perú. En lo sustancial, sin em bargo, hacia 1785 
”la gran transformación de la R enta se había ya terminado de operar.”15
Las preferencias por uno u otro tabaco estuvieron establecidas antes 
de la creación del monopolio, y la R enta tuvo que considerarlas al 
hacerse cargo de la distribución. A parentem ente el tabaco fum ado estuvo 
muy difundido entre la población negra; poco a poco logra ascender la 
escala social.16 En Chile se prefería el tabaco de Saña, en el Perú el 
de Bracamoros, en el Cuzco específicamente el de M oyobam ba. Los más 
ricos fum aban el tabaco cubano que tam bién se consumía preferencial­
m ente en España, mientras que el indígena preparaba el camasayre.17 
Según W ibert la costumbre de inhalar el tabaco estuvo bien difundida 
tam bién entre los quechua y aym ara hab lan tes.16 Los cigarros y puros 
fabricados en Centroam érica eran preferidos a aquellos producidos en las 
fábricas de Sevilla. En parte, estas preferencias inhibieron la realización 
de la meta de autoabastecimiento. Por lo menos hasta 1777 fue necesario 
complementar la producción del V irreinato del Perú (incluyendo Chile) 
con tabacos producidos en Nueva España. Se trataba sobre todo del rapé 
o tabaco en polvo, que no fue producido localm ente.19 H asta mucho 
más tarde, a poco de la independencia, se seguían importando diferentes 
calidades de tabaco desde La H avana y G uatem ala; antes de 1809 
tam bién de Guayaquil. Asi fueron las viejas y nuevas preferencias del 
consumidor las que fijaron o afianzaron las rutas del comercio tabacalero 
tanto intercolonial, como al interior de los V irreinatos, incluso en detri­
m ento de lo producido en la metrópoli.
Existen afirmaciones de que lo producido por la Renta de Tabacos 
fue después de la minería el rubro más im portante de los ingresos para 
la C orona española.20 En Chile la R enta de Tabacos aportaba casi el 
50 por ciento de los ingresos anuales totales entre 1788 y 1809. En
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Venezuela entre 1780 y 1810 la R enta fue ’’una de las más robustas 
fuentes de ingreso de la hacienda colonial.”2*
En N ueva España la R enta produjo entre 1776 y 1809 un promedio 
del 18 por ciento de los ingresos totales.22 En oposición a la situación 
en Nueva España, Chile y tam bién Venezuela, lugares en los que se 
registra un crecimiento constante de las ganancias producidas por la 
R enta de Tabacos, lo obtenido en el V irreinato del Perú estuvo sujeto a 
im portantes fluctuaciones. Las ganancias más altas logradas -  según G. 
Céspedes del Castillo -  se registran en 1788, con 445.662 pesos, es 
decir aproxim adam ente el 10 por ciento de los ingresos totales de la Real 
Hacienda. Sin em bargo, se registra un nuevo repunte de la producción y 
los beneficios logrados hacia 1810, con una ganancia de 284.967 pesos 
que van en aum ento hasta 1815 en que llegan a 548.590 pesos (ver 
T abla  I), aproxim adam ente el 14 por ciento de los ingresos totales de la 
Real H acienda.25 U n año antes, en 1814 las ganancias bajaron a 
16.548 pesos, pero el valor total de consumos alcanzó casi los niveles de 
1788.24 Ello significa que si bien entre 1814 y 1815 las ganancias 
bajaron estrepitosamente, esta baja  no significa que se hayan producido 
y consumido sustancialmente menos tabacos, y que por tanto (si agre­
gamos las existencias de 1813) tenemos una línea de ascenso de la pro­
ducción y el consumo entre 1810 y 1815. Si esta tendencia se confirma, 
estaríamos en el V irreinato del Perú ante una suerte de auge tardío del 
monopolio, que en términos relativos solo era un \  por ciento inferior a 
las cifras anotadas para Nueva España. Los ingresos por tributos indí­
genas form aban el 18 por ciento del ingreso de la Real H acienda en el 
V irreinato del Perú (en Nueva España en 1808 este procentaje ascendía 
a sólo 6 por ciento).25 Ello significaría que hacia fines del período 
colonial, la R enta del Tabaco, junto a la minería y los tributos indí­
genas, fue una de las fuentes de ingresos más importantes para el estado 
colonial.
Cabe, entonces, preguntarse tam bién acerca de las razones que pro­
vocaron las sensibles fluctuaciones de las ganancias líquidas obtenidas por 
la R enta de Tabaco y resolver una aparente contradicción entre la 
debilidad del monopolio en el V irreinato del Perú y la tendencia a la alza 
de los valores de consumo registrados por la Renta hacia fines del perí­
odo colonial. Para ello, buscaremos algunos indicadores en los sucesos 
ocurridos en Chachapoyas, que como se ha señalado, producía en casi su 
totalidad el tabaco consumido en el V irreinato (Chile excluido).
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TABLA I: Consumos, Sueldos y  Gastos, y  Ganancias Líquidas de la 
Renta del Tabaco, 1 7 8 6 -1815  (en pesos)
A ño C onsum os Sueldos y G astos G an an c ias  L íquidas
1786 (1) 843.932 483.466 360.466
1788 790.489 (2) 344.821 (1) 445.662 (2)
(790.483) (1)
1789 (2) 756.030 318.407
1790 (2) 842.874 397.022
1791 (2) 268.382
1792 600.764 (2) 297.376 (1) 230.177 (2)
(612.589) (1) (315.213) 0 )
1793 (2) 551.265 236.014
1794 (2) 504.350 250.041
1795 (2) 505.350 ( + ) 250.041 ( + )
1810 (3) 284.967
1814 (3 ,4) 731.892 715.343 16.548
1815 (4) 855.842 307.251 548.590
F uen tes: 1) C éspedes del C astillo , ” L a re n ta  del tab aco ,"  p p .1 6 0 -  161.
2) O peraciones que acred itan  el estado actual de la real re n ta  del 
tabaco  del P e rú , y decadencia a  que  h an  venido sus productos por 
la  variación  de su s istem a, L im a, Ju lio  10 de 1796, B N P, 
C  3739.
3) J o h n  F isher, Government and Society, pp . 1 1 0 -  111.
4) Estado de los cotejos de los consum os, valor en tero , gastos y líquidos
que rindió  la  re n ta  del tabaco del reino del P e rú  en  el añ o  de 
1814 con el de 1815, e tc ., L im a, Sep tiem bre  22 de 1819, B N P, 
D 9283.
N ota: + )  Estos m ontos son proyecciones realizadas en  el docum ento  2.
La producción en Chachapoyas
Chachapoyas está ubicada en las márgenes orientales del Alto M ara - 
ñón, a unos 250 kilómetros de C ajam arca y a aproxim adam ente 550 
kilómetros de Trujillo. En 1780 vivían 22.329 personas en Chachapoyas, 
cuya extrema pobreza llamó la atención del Visitador La Riva, quien en 
ese mismo año llegó a Chachapoyas para inspeccionar el funcionamiento 
de la Factoría.26 Chachapoyas fue la prim era factoría creada en el 
V irreinato, en 1753. En una circunferencia de aproxim adam ente 200 
kilómetros hubo varios partidos dedicados a la producción tabacalera: 
M oyobam ba, G uayabam ba, Sipasbam ba, Sesuya y Chillaos, rodeados a 
su vez de pueblos y comunidades bajo la tutela de subdelegados.
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D urante su visita, el V isitador constató que el pago efectuado a los 
cosecheros era sum amente bajo. Los reconoccdorcs, empleados de la 
factoría que tenían a su cargo la evaluación de la calidad y la cantidad 
del tabaco producido por los cosecheros matriculados, desechaban gran 
parte del tabaco cosechado. El restante era dividido por calidades ( ’pri­
m era ,1 ’segunda,’ ’tercera’). Traducido a pesos, la ganancia que 
quedaba a los cosecheros se reducía a montos irrisorios. La Riva asegura 
que el cosechero que plantaba mil matas de tabaco producía 320 mazos, 
por los que recibía aproxim adam ente cinco pesos. Por otra parte, el 
cultivo de mil matas de tabaco implicaba traba ja r por lo menos siete 
meses al año ’’duram ente al sol, aire y aguas ... con el arado y azada 
personalmente desde el mas distinguido hasta el mas bajo, por su 
indigencia.”27 Aun los cosecheros m ejor provistos -  aquellos que 
estaban matriculados con una mayor cantidad de matas -  no tenían 
acceso a mano de obra auxiliar ’’por carecer de Indios y Negros que les
OO
sirvan.
Las indicaciones en cuanto a la diferenciación existente entre el ’’mas 
distinguido” y el ’’mas bajo” son escuetas. Em pero, es de suponer, que 
las diferencias sociales entre los cosecheros eran mínimas en vista de que 
según el Visitador, todos estaban obligados a cultivar ’’personalmente” sus 
chacras y de que no podían cultivar sino mil matas en siete meses de 
trabajo  anual. Consecuentemente la productividad chachapoyana dejaba 
mucho que desear en ojos del Visitador. La Riva sostenía que para 
satisfacer las necesidades del V irreinato sería necesario elevar la pro­
ducción a 12.000 zurrones anuales.29 En 1780 Chachapoyas sólo se 
cosechaban 2.000. Los logros de la factoría entre 1753 y 1780 no mere­
cieron el aplauso de La Riva.
Con nuevas energías, el V isitador dictaminó un conjunto de medidas 
para elevar la producción, y m ejorar la situación general de la región 
tabacalera. Las calidades de tabaco se redujeron a una sola clase. Ello 
perm itiría uniform izar los precios de compra y venta del tabaco y haría 
-  junto a una elevación del precio pagado a los cosecheros a tres 
quartillos de real el mazo -  que ’’adm itan gustosamente los cosecheros 
esta ¡novación; para que no extravien como hasta ahora, la mitad de sus 
partidas según su conjetura, obligados de sus necesidades y del Tavaco 
Ínfimo que se les desechava, y ya se les recivirá tam bién en el grado de 
consumible.”^® En oposición a lo que sucedía en otros lugares, en los 
que la tarea de cosechero fue una tarea buscada, en Chachapoyas era 
necesario ’’inclinarlos a extender mucho las siembras, y hacer la contrata 
de cuyas obligaciones como jente ruda recela la mayor parte temiendo
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agravios y violencias.”31 A partir de entonces, se preveía un pago de 
setenta y cinco pesos (a partir de 1803: ochenta pesos) por mil mazos de 
tabaco. Es decir, el pago a los cosecheros se qu in tup licó .^  En 1808 
hubo regiones en las que el cosechero recibía un real por mazo, es decir, 
125 pesos por mil mazos.33 Sin em bargo, la elevación de la nómina 
por compra de tabacos concedida a las factorías no significaba auto­
m áticam ente, que este aumento llegara a ser entregado a los cosecheros, 
y tampoco garantizaba que los cosecheros se libraran de ’’agravios y 
violencias.”
Los factores estaban obligados a visitar por lo menos una vez por año 
cada uno de los lugares donde trabajaban  los cosecheros. En cada parti­
do, a su vez, perm anentem ente residía un guarda veedor, empleado de la 
factoría, que cada ocho días debía inspeccionar las chacras tabacaleras. 
La ronda volante, compuesta por un pequeño cuerpo militar de cuatro a 
seis personas, y tam bién sujeto a la factoría, se encargaba de controlar 
perm anentem ente ríos y caminos en busca de los ’’tabacos extraviados.” 
N inguna de las personas empleadas por la factoría podía poseer o culti­
var tabaco. Esas eran al menos las estipulaciones.
La Riva en su visita inculpaba al factor y a los guardas veedores de 
no cumplir a cabalidad sus funciones. No sólo que poseían chacras de 
tabaco, sino que además perjudicaban la calidad del tabaco producido al 
sem brar otras plantas entre las matas del tabaco. Ellos, señalaba, 
’’siembran Abilla y Sapallo, por lograr mas proventos para su m anuten­
ción: no descervan, aporcan, despuntan ni descogollan quando devian.” Y 
peor aun, de aqui resultaba ’’que los mas de los cosecheros siguen su 
mismo exemplo, respecto a que saben que no ha de reprehenderlos ni 
dar parte a la Factoría de los delitos que con mas execravilidad están 
comprehendidos." Se trataba evidentemente de productos para el consu­
mo propio, que no podían ser sembrados en otros terrenos por que no 
había quien podría hacerse cargo de su cuidado. Por otra parte, es pro­
bable que las dificultades del transporte hayan impedido o dificultado un 
regular suministro de viveres.34 Al parecer la cercanía entre coseche­
ros y guarda veedores no sólo permitió que los cosecheros, siguiendo el 
ejem plo de los guarda veedores no cuidaran debidamente las matas de 
tabaco, sino además, que los guarda veedores utilizaran esta cercanía 
para adelantar sus propios intereses comerciales.
Al margen de lo provisto por las ordenanzas, los cosecheros no reci­
bieron el valor de sus cosechas en efectivo. T anto  reconocedores como 
guarda veedores, señala La Riva, ’’cometían el atentado de entregar en 
ropas de la tierra, la mayor parte de aquellas cantidades que están
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dispuestas se den a los cosecheros ... [ya que] con la plata hacen mas 
aquellos Pobres, que con la ropa que se les hacia recivir como de por 
fuerza, en unos precios exorvitantes.” Esta práctica de los repartos fo r­
zados tan usual en todo el V irreinato, primero en manos de los corregi­
dores, luego de los subdelegados, en Chachapoyas adquiere una pecu­
liaridad que es necesario recalcar. En el caso de subdelegados o corregi­
dores, éstos com praban los bienes a repartirse en los almacenes de los 
grandes comerciantes limeños, ya sea con dinero que estos adelantaban o 
con dinero propio. En el caso de las factorías y los guarda veedores, el 
capital usado en la transacción provenía de la Renta y pertenecía en 
principio al cosechero. Con la apropiación de este dinero, era el estado 
colonial quien subvencionaba transacciones comerciales al m argen de sus 
cometidos oficiales y de sus intenciones, y '-orno se verá enseguida, in­
cluso en contra de sus propios intereses. El capital adquirido de esta 
m anera proporcionaba una liquidez que no costaba nada. Existen prue­
bas de que la práctica detectada por La Riva fue m antenida en pie a lo 
largo de todo el período de nuestro análisis, y de que los cosecheros no 
fueron las únicas víctimas.
Tabaco y  comercio
Cosechado y ’reconocido’ el tabaco, tenía que ser depositado en los 
almacenes de la factoría, en donde sería luego enzurronado, es decir 
forrado en cuero y marcado para  evitar que pudiera ser intercam biado o 
mezclado con tabacos de contrabando ( ’cim arrones’). De acuerdo a las 
distancias por recorrer entre las chacras y la factoría, el transporte era 
efectuado por los propios cosecheros, o si las distancias eran mayores, 
por arrieros contratados por la factoría. Para trasladar el tabaco de 
Chachapoyas a los almacenes de C ajam arca se volvía a contratar los 
servicios de arrieros. Extraídos los zurrones requeridos para el abaste­
cimiento de C ajam arca y sus zonas aledañas, el tabaco era encaminado 
por Trujillo  hasta el almacén central de Lim a. En las diferentes etapas 
del camino entre Chachapoyas y Lim a (cerca de 1.200 kilómetros) los 
respectivos arrieros cargaban con toda la responsabilidad del transporte, 
expuestos a asaltos y caminos intransitables. De acuerdo a lo constatado 
por La Riva, los arrieros recibían dem asiada carga y poca rem uneración, 
por lo que había ’’atendido a los pobres Arrieros con la minoración del 
peso de las cargas y algún mayor flete reparando la ruina en que estaban 
sepultados.”55
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TABLA  II: Mazos de tabacos producidos en Chachapoyas, 1 7 7 0 - 1815















sólo m azos B racam oro consum idos 
en  el A rzobispado de Lim a
sólo m azos B racam oro consum idos 
en  el casco de la  c iudad de L im a 
consum o to tal de m azos B racam oro 
en  el V irre ina to
m azos existentes en los a lm acenes 
de la  R en ta  a fines de 1814 
consum o to tal de m azos B racam oro 
en  el V irre ina to
m azos existentes en  los alm acenes 
de la  R en ta  a fines de 1815 
m azos de tabaco  com prados po r la 
R en ta  en  C hachapoyas en  1815
Fuentes:
1) R eal R en ta  de T abacos, L im a, 3 de m arzo  de 1790, B N P, C  3400.
2) E stado que m an ifie s ta  los tabacos de ram a , lab rado , polvo existentes en  la 
te rzena  y estanquillos de esta capital de L im a y adm in istraciones fo ráneas 
agregadas a  la  G eneral de su A rzobispado fin  de D iciem bre de 1779, etc ., 
L im a, ju n io  de 1781, B N P , C 907.
3) C u en ta  fin a l de consum os y valores de la  ren ta  del tabaco de la facto ría  y 
A dm in istrac ión  G eneral de C hachapoyas, re la tiva  al a ñ o  1802, L im a, ab ril 4 
de 1804, B N P, D  9616.
4) D atos resum idos de varios docum entos: B N P, D  198, D  10249, D  10853, 
D  10854, D  10352.
5) Estado de cotejos, L im a, setiem bre 22 de 1819, B N P, D  9283.
6) D e acuerdo a  los datos contenidos en  B N P , D  9282, la  R en ta  com pró tabaco 
B racam oro en  C hachapoyas por u n  valo r de 52 .240 pesos y 6 3/4 reales. Lo 
ofic ia lm ente  pagado  al cosechero po r m azo de tabaco  ascend ía  a  u n  rea l, de 
aq u i resu lta  el núm ero  de m azos indicado.
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Sin em bargo, con los fletes destinados al arriero podía ocurrir lo 
mismo que con las asignaciones para los cosecheros. Estos, ’’aburridos de 
ver que no cobraban físicamente sus fletes en dinero como está mandado 
desde sus principios ... dejaban muchas vezes regadas las cargas por los 
caminos a la inclemencia del sol y de la agua.”36 En 1802, año en 
que estamos ante una cosecha m ediana de tabacos en Chachapoyas (ver 
T abla  II), los gastos por transporte desde los almacenes hasta Lima 
ascendieron a 16.711, lo que equivalía al 28 por ciento de los 
costos por mazo de tabaco (frente al 44 por ciento equivalente al costo 
por compra de tabaco a los cosecheros; ver T abla III). La consecuencia 
más inm ediata de los repartos a los arrieros fue el abandono de las c a r­
gas, por lo que la producción destinada a los almacenes de Lim a podía 
encontrarse desperdigada por los caminos. Adicionalmente las actitudes 
descritas explican las dificultades que encontraron las factorías y admi­
nistraciones en conseguir muías para el transporte y para lograr un 
aprovisionamiento puntual en las diferentes dependencias subalternas, lo 
que a su vez provocaría las quejas del consumidor.
El alejamiento del arriero como consecuencia de las prácticas descri­
tas y el hecho de que los propios arrieros fueran víctimas de repartos 
plantea una interrogante crucial: cómo llegaban las ropas de la tierra a 
las factorías, a  manos de los cosecheros?
U na respuesta plausible a esta interrogante es la existencia de un 
doble circuito comerical nucleado en torno a los centros productores de 
tabaco. Por una parte, aquel animado por el transporte del tabaco, 
pagado por la R enta y parte de la organización del monopolio. Por otra 
parte, un activo comercio que abarcaba toda la ruta tabacalera entre 
Chachapoyas y Lim a que perm itiría no sólo comerciar con tabaco de 
contrabando, sino tam bién con otros productos de la m ontaña. Con las 
ganancias logradas por la venta de estos productos y al repartirse los 
sueldos de arrieros y cosecheros, era posible adquirir bienes en Lima 
para reiniciar el ciclo de transacciones que partía de las chacras tabaca­
leras. Las ganancias eran fácilmente multiplicables. Al comerciante par­
ticular resultaba más ventajoso inscribirse en este circuito comercial que 
en el servicio al monopolio con el transporte de los tabacos. Al parecer, 
ni el aumento de los fletes pudo delimitar estos giros. Es probable que 
las rutas seguidas correspondieran a aquellas existentes antes de la crea­
ción del monopolio, pero parece viable pensar que la creación del 
monopolio activó sustancialmente las rutas comerciales.
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TABLA  III: Gastos ocasionados a la Renta del Tabaco hasta que el 
tabaco de Chachapoyas estuviera depositado en los A lm a­
cenes de Lim a
por com pra sueldos: factoría , otros costo po r m azo
añ o de tabaco v eeduría , rondas fletes aprx. aprox. (1)
1 .........  ...
1770 (2) 20.929 9 granos
1771 (2) 21.445 10 granos
1772 (2) 15.954 10 granos
1786 (2) 57.669 2.2  reales
1787 (2) 67.565 2.2  reales
1788 (2) 92 .224 2.2  reales
1802 (3) 26.075 12.750 16.711 4.000 2.1 reales
1815 (4) 52.240 18.216 18.936 200 1.7 reales
1802 44% 21% 28% 7%
1815 58% 20% 21% 1%
aprox.
1750 39% _ 47% 14% (5)
F u en tes  y N otas:
1) E l precio de v en ta  al público por m azo ascend ía  hasta  1795 a 8 reales, luego a  9 
reales, es decir, el benefic io  ob tenido  por la R en ta  del T abaco  po r los m azos de 
B racam oro p rocedentes de C hachapoyas, flu c tu a b a  a  p a rtir de 1786 ap rox im a­
d a m e n te  a lrededor del 3 0 0 % , descontados todos los gastos. H a b ía , sin  em bargo , 
adm in istraciones que  apenas  cu b rían  sus gastos: P uno , C onchucos, T ru jillo  
hacia  1815. V er ’’Estado de los co te jos,” L im a, 22 de Setiem bre de 1819, B N P, 
D  9283.
En la adm inistracón de Chile el precio del tabaco por mazo vendido al público 
permaneció igual desde 1753 hasta el fin del estanco, a 4 reales por mazo. Ver 
Stapff, ”La renta del tabaco,” p.7.
2) L am en tab lem en te  estos datos no  se e n cu e n tran  desagregados. Las cifras h a n  sido 
lige ram en te  redondeadas. V e r ’’R eal R en ta  de T a b a c o s ,” L im a, 3 de m arzo  de 
1790, B N P  C 3400, fs. 5 ss.
3) ’’C u en ta  fina l de  co nsum os,” L im a, 20 de abril de 1804, B N P, D  9616.
4) ’’E stado de los co te jos,” L im a, 22 de setiem bre de 1819, B N P, D 9283.
5) Los po rcen tajes pa ra  1750 h a n  sido calculados en  base a los indicadores anotados 
p o r C éspedes del C astillo , ”L a  re n ta  del ta b a co ,” p .139  p a ra  los tabacos de 
S a ñ a . L a p recaria  d isponb ilidad  de fuen tes  con series tem porales m ás cerradas 
sólo perm ite  u n a  consta tación  ten ta tiva  po r aho ra : al p arecer hu b o  e n  el largo 
p lazo  u n  aum en to  de los gastos po r com pra de tabacos, u n a  d ism inución  por 
aquellos de los fletes en  la  com posición del costo de lu u n id ad  de tabaco.
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Tampoco escapó a los ojos de los visitadores que llegaron después de 
La Riva, que los propios factores y demás empleados de la factoría eran 
cómplices de este tráfico. En los primeros años del siglo X IX  el sub­
delegado de Chachapoyas, D. M atías M achuca y Larrea, comunicaba al 
V irrey Avilés, que los guarda veedores, lejos de cumplir sus deberes, lo 
que más les im portaba era ’’que el que haya quien anticipadam ente le 
recivan los trapos de sus comercios para cobrárselos puntualm ente a el 
tiempo de la Tasación de los Tavacos,” es decir, constataba la misma 
situación que La Riva veinte años antes.37 En 1816 se descubre una 
malversación de fondos en la factoría, y el factor es sometido a un juicio 
de residencia. Uno de los declarantes en este juicio aseguraba que el 
factor, D. Andrés Llanos y M endoza ’’siempre tenia avilitación antici­
pada a los Cosecheros de Sipasbamba que m anejaba y que saliendo a las 
tasaciones andaba igualmente con cargas de comercio por delante, avili- 
tando de nuevo con los efectos de su contenido, al mismo tiempo que por 
los anticipados que tom aba el dinero que resultaba a fabor de los cose­
cheros.”38 Es decir, este comercio ligado estrechamente a la producción 
tabacalera, existía desde los inicios del monopolio hasta su abolición 
(brevemente en 1812 y definitivamente en 1820).
Además de este circuito comercial paralelo al transporte de tabacos y 
con la complicidad de los empleados de la factoría, distinguible por el 
tiempo de productos llevados y traídos, tam bién hubo un doble circuito 
en términos geográficos. Uno que incluía las rutas desde las chacras 
productoras hasta los almacenes de la factoría, y otro que partía de 
Chachapoyas hasta C ajam arca (Trujillo -  Lim a). Como se ha señalado, 
hasta aproximadam ente 1780 el prim er circuito desde las chacras hasta la 
factoría estaba a cargo de los cosecheros, y en parte a cargo de arrieros. 
H acia fines de siglo y comienzos del siglo X IX  surgen nuevos proble­
mas. La creación del V irreinato de La Plata, la disminuición en la pro­
visión de muías del Tucum án, y según el subdelegado de Chachapoyas, 
la abolición de los corregimientos en 1784- y las sequías en Piura, lugar 
del que se lograba obtener una parte de las muías requeridas, aparejó 
una fatal escasez de m uías.3® Ello condujo no sólo a que, ya tasados 
los tabacos, estos perm anecieran meses y hasta años en las improvisadas 
casuchas de los cosecheros sin un adecuado almacenamiento, sino que 
además, a fin de asegurar un abastecimiento mínimo, el traslado del 
tabaco a la factoría se hacía ”en muchas ocaciones ... á hombros de 
Indios.40 Los cientos de pregones en pueblos y ciudades para transferir 
la conducción del tabaco al m ejor postor no encontraron el más mínimo 
eco. Nadie estaba dispuesto a asum ir esta tarea, que como se ha indi­
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cado, no sólo era mal pagada, sino que además exponía a no recibir 
dinero alguno.'1'1 Fue entonces que se pensó en los pueblos indígenas en 
las circunferencias de las chacras y la factoría. Los indios tenían que 
pagar tributos y necesitaban ingresos monetários para cumplir con sus 
pagos. Q uedaría  a cargo de los subdelegados organizar esta suerte de 
m ita -  arriera. H acia 1804 se comenzó a elaborar registros de las muías 
existentes en los pueblos. Ese mismo año, el subdelegado aseguraba:
L a Provincia de O lleros c ituada  en tre  la  ciudad de C hachapoyas, y las 
siem bras de M oyobam ba y H u a y ab am b a , no  dexa de esta r provista a lo 
m enos de doscientas M uías , que sin  em baraso , y d istribu idas a discreción, 
b a s tan  p a ra  poner en  la  Factoría sus Cosechas sin pérd ida de tiem po. El 
valle de L uya , tiene  tam b ién  el núm ero  de A rrieros necesarios, p a ra  sacar a 
los m ism os A lm acenes las cargas de Jam a ic a , y dem ás lugares dei Partido  de 
C ipasbam ba . E n  las D octrinas de Ja le a , Santo  T om ás y las B alzas, hay 
tam b ién  las sufic ientes, p a ra  poner con p ron titud  a las M árgenes del rio 
M arañ o n  q u an tas  cargas se acopien  en  C hachapoyas; y á  este servicio están  
siem pre p rontos los Indios de las expresadas tres D octrinas, y lo ab rasa rían  
gustosos po r la  com beniencia  que les resu lta  de ten é r u n  renglón  seguro en 
que tra v a já r pa ra  satisfacér sus T ribu tos  y su b b en ir las dem ás necesidades 
que les ro d e an .^
U n juicio iniciado por los indios de la comunidad del pueblo de Jau lia  en 
la doctrina de Olleros pocos meses más tarde, contra su cura que 
pretendía trasladarlos a otro lugar a fin de asegurar el ’’pasto espiritual,” 
indica que al menos por algún tiempo, se siguió las recomendaciones del 
subdelegado. Para perm anecer en Jau lia , los comuneros adujeron que 
servían con ’’fletes, víveres y Peones” al Rey, siendo "tributarios y que 
continuamente servimos a nuestro natural Señor el REY nuestro amo en 
el acarreto de sus Reales intereses del privilegiado ramo de Tavacos, asi 
de M oyobam ba como del Valle de G uayabam ba á entregar en los 
almacenes de esta ciudad [Chachapoyas].”43 Al margen de los servicios 
de transporte, la comunidad aportaba víveres a los pobladores de 
Chachapoyas. Prohibido -  aunque como se ha visto, sin mucho éxito -  
el sembrío de verduras entre las matas, el abastecimiento de ganado 
(Jaulia fue una comunidad ganadera) y víveres corría a cargo de las 
comunidades circundantes. Ello a su vez debe haber disminuido consi­
derablemente el interés de sus pobladores a aportar sus muías para el 
transporte de tabacos, valiéndoles la acusación de perezosos, ociosos, 
inactivos y adormecidos.44
El transporte desde la factoría a los almacenes de C ajam arca fue 
concedido como ’’negosiasión esclusiva de los Arrieros” a un pueblo que
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en 1804 era ’’una nueba población:” Celendín, ubicado en la provincia de 
C ajam arca. Dos diputados nombrados por la factoría de Chachapoyas 
tenían la obligación de asegurar el abastecimiento de muías y arrieros 
para efectuar el traslado de los tabacos.*5 Este circuito prometía 
mejores ingresos y su organización no estuvo sujeta a las dificultades del 
circuito m enor entre chacras y factoría. Utilizando las muías existentes 
en los pueblos que rodeaban las chacras y la mano de obra indígena, y 
luego a los arrieros de Celendín, el subdelegado de Chachapoyas en 1804 
sugería dividir el acarreto de los tabacos entre los celendinos y los 
pueblos indígenas. Postulaba que les fuera permitido a los m itayos-  
arrieros conducir los tabacos hasta las orillas del río M arañón, donde 
luego serían recogidos por los arrieros de Celendín. Toda la transacción 
de entrega sería controlada por un encargo de la factoría en un nuevo 
puesto/almacén a ser construido en Las Balsas. Proponía, además, que 
los tabacos de Sipasbamba y Sesuya (que eran los más inmediatos a la 
factoría), fueran almacenados en las casas de comunidad  y que el 
cuidado -  a cambio de un pago de cincuenta pesos anuales -  quedara 
a cargo de los respectivos alcaldes de M endau y Las Balsas.
Tanto  en términos de organización como de ahorro a la R enta, las 
propuestas del subdelegado eran viables y beneficiosas. No pudieron 
encontrar, sin em bargo, el aplauso general. U na de las razones fue la 
resistencia de los indígenas; no sólo porque estuvieron expuestos a no 
recibir el pago por sus servicios, sino tam bién porque era más rentable 
dedicarse a otras actividades comerciales. Igualmente, al separar el cir­
cuito de transporte del control inmediato de la factoría permitiendo a los 
pueblos y sus arrieros el traslado hasta el M arañón y hasta Las Balsas se 
interrum pía la negociación de los empleados de la factoría y  de los 
comerciantes privados dedicados a otros rubros. Ya los cosecheros no 
tendrían que llegar hasta la factoría a entregar los tabacos, tampoco los 
arrieros llegarían a recogerlos. Al no pasar el tabaco prim ero por la 
factoría tam bién se coartaba las posibilidades de contrabando, en medida 
que lo entregado previamente por cosecheros y arrieros no necesaria­
mente tenía que coincidir con las cantidades luego despachados por la 
’via oficial’ (ello se detallará enseguida). Inevitable era, asimismo, el 
choque de intereses entre subdelegados y empleados de la factoría, ya 
que al menos una parte de las asignaciones por fletes se destinarían a 
cubrir los tributos; sería dinero que no podría ser retenido por los 
empleados de la factoría, dinero que era extraído del circuito comercial 
privado.
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El significativo fracaso de las propuestas del subdelegado de 
Chachapoyas queda documentado por las afirmaciones del Visitador 
Andrés de Eguren en una carta dirigida al Director General de la Renta 
de Tabacos en 1814:
E n  v irtud  de los conocim ientos prácticos que  he adqu irido  de la  situación  local 
de esta provincia , genios y proporciones de sus A vitantes ... es ind ispensab le  
preciso y necesario  c rear en la  cap ital de O lleros del tránsito  com ún y ordi­
nario  p a ra  M oyobam ba, u n a  D ipu tación  com puesta  de u n  solo Ind iv iduo, 
dotado con c incuen ta  pesos p a ra  que este ha  1?] de rem ober la  A rriería  de los 
Pueblos de J a u lia ,  D iozan , Y am bafalca , Q u in fa lc a , C h u q u in , C uelcho, 
C au n a l, T a u p a , G oncha, R u ta , T u m b illa  y C h irqu illa , que están  casi conti­
guas la  u n a  de la  o tra ; pues hé visto por esperiencia , que no  ten iendo  aque­
llos N a tu ra les, u n  A gente  que les inspire  sen tim ien tos de honor, ellos por si 
solo no  apetecen  sino es el ocio, e inacción , con que congen ian  sin que vasten  
reconvenciones, n i providencias judicia les, que los saquen  de este adorm eci­
m iento  y pereza  com ún y n a tu ra l a todos los indios ... U n a  que o tra  vez se 
le com isiona al T e n ie n te  de la  R o n d a  p a ra  que solo active la salida  a  M oyo- 
b am b a  de los nom inados Pueblos, y au n q u e  en  ocasiones se consigue el 
in ten to  de que salgan , a  su regreso se m eten  con las cargas en  sus hogares, y 
se están  alli m eses enteros sin  que se ten g a  noticia de su paradero.
M ientras tanto, el problem a del transporte quedaba irresuelto. Y, mien­
tras más escaseaban la voluntad de los arrieros y las muías, más arre­
ciaba la competencia con los comerciantes privados; ”lo único que se há 
conseguido és despertar las continuas y odiosas disputas que alli se ofre­
cen con los comerciantes de cascarillas, cacao, lonas y otros efectos.”4  ^
U n silencioso comercio que hacia décadas funcionaba en contra de los 
intereses del monopolio se había convertido en una disputa bulliciosa de 
grupos interesados, dispuestos a defender sus prerrogativas. Para los 
indios de Chachapoyas el tributo al parecer no representó el supuesto 
aliciente que el subdelegado asumía en 1804; tampoco se registran quejas 
por el imcumplimiento del pago de los tributos.*® Lo probable es que 
el suministro de víveres, asi como la entrega de lonas y cueros para el 
enzurronado del tabaco hayan bastado para cubrir los tributos.49
Como consecuencia de los múltiples problemas tanto a nivel de la 
producción como del transporte, el monopolio fue incapaz de cubrir con 
la producción chachapoyana la dem anda del consumidor. La Riva en 
1780 había calculado que hubiera sido menester producir aproximada­
mente 12.000 zurrones anuales para cubrir esta demanda. Si bien La 
R iva era conocido por su ’’ambición desm edida,” de todas m aneras se 
produjo bastante menos de lo necesario.50 En los años de mayor pro­
ducción en Chachapoyas, sólo se obtuvieron 4.222 zurrones en 1788 y
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5.224 en 1815. Para cerrar la brecha entre lo obtenido y lo necesario 
estaba el contrabando.
El contrabando
Aunque difícil de cuantificar, es posible que la diferencia entre las 
frustradas perspectivas propagandizadas por La Riva y la producción real 
de Chachapoyas, sea un indicador general del volumen de estas trans­
acciones ilegales. Todo tabaco que no era cultivado por un cosechero 
m atriculado en los registros de la factoría era considerado de contraban­
do. El contrabando encontró un piso propicio tanto en la corrupción de 
los empleados de la factoría como en la incapacidad del estado colonial 
de im plem entar y proponer un efectivo control; ciertam ente, en una área 
geográfica que por su simple constitución era difícil de controlar. El 
Ucayali, el M arañón y el H uallaga fueron las rutas fluviales predilectas, 
y los agricultores (y tam bién los cosecheros) en los márgenes de estos ríos 
debieron sentirse particularm ente tentados a usarlas. El tabaco cim arrón 
llegó no sólo a C ajam arca y P iura al norte de Chachapoyas, sino sobre 
todo, por H uánuco hacia el sur (ver D ibujo I). Estaban comprendidos en 
el contrabando tam bién arrieros y hacendados, a través de quienes el 
tabaco cim arrón llegaba a los tam bos, a manos de jornaleros y yanaco­
nas. La R iva aseguraba haber impuesto severas multas y castigos ”a 
todos aquellos Hacendados ... en atención a que muchas ó las mas vezes, 
estos son los auxiliadores, y en alguna m anera Receptadores de los 
malignantes contrabandistas. ”51
Especialmente en 1785 y 1793 se realizaron enormes campañas para 
com batir el contrabando. En 1785 el V isitador Bernardo M arconie hizo 
arrasar y quem ar treinta y tres sembrados de tabaco, a la par que otros 
dueños de sembras prefieran arancar sus plantas ante la inminente 
llegada del Visitador y huir, ’’temerosos del castigo.”52 Grupos form a­
dos por peones completarían la tarea de lim piar los márgenes de los ríos; 
a quienes detectaban sembríos clandestinos se les abonaba gratificacio­
nes. Por la acción iniciada en 1793 sabemos que las plantaciones ilícitas 
se extendían hasta H uanta, ’’frontera á la M ontaña de los Chunchos 
infieles,” y T ayacaja en el actual departam ento de Huancavelica, lugar 
en el que el tabaco era sem brado en los mismos lugares que la coca.55 
U n vecino de H uanta aseguraba que había observado
asi Peones com o H acendados v enefic iar los unos cogiendo porción de o jas de
las m a d u ra s, u n a s  sobre o tras, y tenerlas  de vaxo de sus cam as h asta  que
405
m ortiguadas  m an o jean  en M azitos cubriendo  con Q u ilm a , y puestos e n  hum o 
lo u san , y los otros por de p ron to  las secan en  el fogon pa ra  lo m ism o, 
gastando  los prim eros p a ra  aux ilia r sus vicios y los segundos consum iendo 
p a ra  a d e lan ta r el trab a jo  de los H orna leros , siendo esto el consum o de todos 
aquellos que p rac tican , siendo el nom bre  com ún de sa ire .54
Era, entonces, un contrabando que funcionaba paralelam ente al mono­
polio, puesto que de haberlo querido hubieran podido com prar la totali­
dad del tabaco consumido. Asi, como se negociaba el tabaco cim arrón, 
en las alforjas de los contrabandistas tam bién venían otros productos de 
la montaña, provocando quejas por la evasión del pago de alcabalas.55 
A pesar de los esfuerzos realizados por parte del estado colonial, los 
resultados fueron endebles. Las penas leoninas impuestas no surtieron el 
efecto deseado.55 Casi resignadamente en 1814 se afirm aba que 
’’generalmente hablando, no se puede em barazar la extracción furtiva de 
los Contrabandos ... y son ... quantiosos ... los contrabandos que se 
hacen por el R io H uallaga a Guánuco sin poderlo rem ediar.”57
Contando el contrabando con la complicidad de los empleados de la 
factoría, las posibilidades de un efectivo control se reducían a zero. El 
’contrabando oficial’ (el de los empleados de la factoría), a decir de La 
Riva, se llevaba a cabo con los tabacos entregados en la factoría. ’’Como 
quiera que ellos se inspeccionan a si mismos”, señalaba, oficialmente los 
empleados de la factoría declaraban enzurronar una determ inada canti­
dad de zurrones, que correspondían a los pagos legal -  o nominalmente 
efectuados a los cosecheros. Sin embargo, la cantidad de tabaco entre­
gada podía reducirse a la mitad, ”en no voleando los mazos con la pre­
cisa apretura que se requiere.” Al no ajustar bien los mazos con la 
debida cantidad de tabaco, no sólo era posible estafar a la R enta en un 
100 por ciento, sino que además de aqui ’’dim ana la pérdida de su 
fortaleza y el riesgo de su pudrición.”58 Asi, los estancos y tercenas 
expendían un tabaco cuya calidad dejaba mucho que desear y que fue 
fuente renovada de quejas de los consumidores, mientras que probable­
mente por la misma razón el tabaco de contrabando lograba am pliar su 
mercado de consumo."®
En los dos grandes levantamientos en la segunda década del siglo 
X IX , el contrabando y el tabaco aparecen como una cuestión más que 
echa leña al fuego, traduciendo el descontento por la política tabacalera 
del estado colonial. En 1812 estalla un violento levantamiento en 
H uánuco. Pocos días antes se habia esparcido la voz de que desde Lim a 
se habían enviado
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rigorosas y exclusivas providencias para que todas aquellas personas que 
sembrasen, beneficiasen o tuviesen tabacos en maso u oja, fuesen sequestra­
dos sus bienes, presas sus personas, y tenido o reconocidos como traidores 
contrabandistas ... sin perdonar aun los miserables pueblos.60
José Crespo y Castillo, el líder mestizo del levantamiento fue acusado de 
alm acenar tabaco en su casa. El levantamiento estuvo dirigido contra la 
familia Llanos compuesta de treinta y un personas que controlaban el 
comercio, las haciendas y los puestos políticos más im portantes de la 
región.61
La constitución liberal dada por las Cortes de Cádiz preveía la 
libertad de manufacturas, es decir, tam bién la apertura para que todos 
pudieran sem brar tabacos. No sorprendería en este contexto la oposición 
de los españoles en H uánuco a la implementación de la constitución, 
también por el control factible de ser ejercido gracias al monopolio y al 
monopolio del poder. Si bien el tabaco no fue la decisiva bandera de 
lucha en este levantamiento, en base a las vastas redes sociales ligadas 
por la producción tabacalera, valdría la pena preguntarse hasta que 
punto el tabaco, el monopolio y el contrabando enardecieron los ánimos 
en el contexto de estas luchas. Es una tarea por hacer.
En el Cuzco, en los años 1813/14 el tabaco se convirtió en uno de los 
argumentos de reivindicaciones difundida en estos años.62 Los cus- 
queños aprovecharon el marco constitucional para dejar brotar sus 
recelos no sólo frente a la predominancia limeña, sino tam bién frente a 
la dependencia de los tabacos de Chachapoyas (al Cuzco llegaban 
sobre todo los tabacos de M oyobam ba), su desigual calidad y su 
decontinuado abastecimiento. Q uerían  cultivar su propio tabaco y 
tenían -  en Paucartam bo -  la zona climática ideal para realizarlo. El 
ayuntam iento constitucional revistió su proclama regionalista en un 
manto de sugerentes reformas:
...Fom entando ... la industria y la agricultura de esta provincia, funda­
mento sólido y duradero de la opulencia de la Nación; remediará tal vez los 
contrastes reprobados de los cosecheros de Chachapoyas y las grandes pudre­
dumbres que padesen al paso que recompense la fidelidad de los que se 
establescan Cosecheros Cusqueños; haorará [sie!] el exeso de ciento por 
ciento que a los primeros se ha aum entado al mismo tiempo que im pedirá la 
diminuición del Erario causado por los fletes de los tabacos de Bracamoro, 
H abano, Saña y Guayaquil.®3
Además, como se agregaba en la misma exposición del ayuntam iento, se 
evitaría el contrabando debido al desabastecimiento ocasionado por el
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tra jín  entre Chachapoyas y Cuzco, y ”la mala versación que franquea a 
los infieles.” Para  subrayar los argumentos vertidos se señala que estaban 
’’disgustados generalmente los Consumidores con el tabaco de B racam o- 
ro ,” y que con ello los consumidores estarían obligados o a "reducir su 
consumo ó a buscar el de Apolobamba resultando de qualesquiera de 
estos extremos decadencia notable en el ram o.”^  Era, pues, un 
ayuntam iento constitucional que no buscaba la libertad de cultivos, sino 
la cobertura del monopolio con cosecheros inscritos, pero -  en el 
Cuzco.
La oposición a Lim a (y probablemente tam bién al propio miedo) 
resaltan más nítidam ente cuando en 1813 existe la intención de subir el 
precio del tabaco de nueve reales la libra a dieciseis reales el mazo. Ese 
mismo año la administración general del Cuzco advertía a la Dirección 
General de Tabacos en Lim a, que
el variar el precio corriente, no parece conveniente en las circunstancias 
actuales de consternación en que se halla el Público con la derrota de la 
división de nuestro Exército en Salta ... temo, no sin fundam ento que al 
disgusto con que el Público ha de resibir esta novedad, siga alguna inquietud 
por parte de los malcontentos, que todo lo trastorne y cause un  perjuicio 
irremediable a la Renta.
Se tem ía que con el aum ento del precio ’’algunos particulares emprendan 
esta negociación con los Tabacos de Miciones u otros, y seria sumamente 
difícil evitar estos contrabandos por la escases de manos auxiliares.”65 
A los pocos días de haberse redactado este informe, estalla el levanta­
miento de los herm anos Angulo y M ateo G. Pum acahua. Recién en 
marzo de 1814 se decretaba en Lima no alterar el precio del tabaco y 
asegurar el suministro con tabacos de G uatem ala y G uayaquil.66
De m anera bastante distinta, tanto en el Cuzco como en Huánuco, 
los problemas discutidos en torno a la producción y la comercialización 
del tabaco, encontraron un piso de resonancia política. Si bien en 
ninguno de los dos levantamientos el tabaco fue la razón decisiva para 
explicar el estallido, el tabaco y todo el campo anexo que arrastraba, fue 
una razón más que revelaba no sólo el descontento ante imposiciones 
coloniales, sino tam bién los intereses en conflicto tanto a  nivel regional, 
como al interior de los grupos sociales dentro y fuera de la esfera del 
m onopolio.6  ^ Con reservas quisiera sugerir, que en Huánuco estamos 
ante una élite regional que gracias a la existencia del monopolio del 
tabaco ensancha sus bases de acción comercial, sobre todo a través del 
contrabando y los repartos, utilizando los mecanismos descritos. En el
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Cuzco encontramos una élite que buscaba cierta independencia de pro­
ducción tabacalera en función del desarrollo regional, aunque claramente 
subrayando los intereses de la R enta de Tabacos y la perm anencia del 
sistema monopólico. Estaríamos ante un proceso global de afianzamiento 
de los intereses locales gracias al monopolio.
Finalmente es necesario referirse brevem ente a las fábricas reales, en 
las que se ataban y liaban cigarros y puros, con las que se buscaba 
aum entar las entradas de la R enta, asi como concretar la última fase de 
la monopolización del tabaco. El ’sueño urbano’ duró once años.
Las fábricas
En España las fábricas reales fueron un éxito, se multiplicaban en las 
ciudades más importantes y en una época tan tem prana como 1790 se 
instalaron m aquinarias, sobre todo para producir el rapé y el tabaco en
t ro
polvo. La preparación de puros, cigarillos y cigarros por largo 
tiempo seguiría siendo una tarea netam ente manual.
En territorio colonial en un prim er momento se mantuvo la libertad 
de m anufacturas del tabaco (de acuerdo a las Ordenanzas de 1759), pero 
los tabaqueros privados estarían sujetos a control y a producir sólo en 
pequeñas cantidades.69 Recién en 1780 se instalaron dos fábricas en el 
V irreinato del Perú, una en Trujillo, otra en Lima. C uando estas 
fábricas iniciaron sus operaciones, la de Lim a contaba con cincuenta 
operarios. En su momento de máximo auge (probablem ente entre 1781 y 
1786) llegó a tener 663, con una nómina de personal que ascendía a 
155.905 pesos anuales. De acuerdo a G. Céspedes del Castillo ”en 1781 
ambas fábricas abastecían ya al Perú y a Chile con su producción anual 
de 8.635.652 ataditos de cigarros liados en papel, 4.315.040 ataditos de 
puros y 249.745 limpiones que producían a la Renta beneficios líquidos 
superiores a los 360.000 pesos al año.” Los ataditos de veinticuatro 
cigarros o aquellos de ocho a doce puros en 1781 se vendían a medio 
rea l.70
Ya en 1791 se decretó el cierre de las fábricas. Las razones explici­
tadas en el Superior Decreto del 26 de diciembre de 1791 indican las 
desventajas creadas a la R enta por no haberse llegado a consumir todo el 
tabaco labrado en las fábricas.7* La fabricación quedaba nuevamente 
abierta a la iniciativa privada. En el mismo decreto se fijaba la venta 
por libras (en vez de mazos) y se fijaba un peso de dieziseis onzas. 
Intentos posteriores de reintroducir las fábricas propuestas por el V irrey 
Abascal fracasaron ante las condiciones políticas.7“*
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El cierre de las fábricas fue un tem a controvertido. Si bien el decreto 
de diciembre de 1791 afirm aba que las fábricas eran perjuiciosas a la 
R enta, hubo quienes con datos a la mano podían mostrar que con el 
cierre los consumos bajaron, es decir, que los montos percebidos 
cayeron. En los últimos tres años de existencia de las fábricas 
(1 7 8 8 - 1790) el consumo ascendió a 2.389.393 mazos, produciendo una 
ganancia líquida para el mismo período de 1.161.091 pesos. En el trienio 
posterior a la cancelación de las fábricas (entre 1792 y 1794) el consumo 
ascendió a sólo 1.656.329 mazos y se obtuvo una ganancia líquida de 
716.232 pesos. La Dirección General de Tabacos explicaba la dismi­
nución de los ingresos y del consumo en los términos siguientes:
...A  proporción que fué faltando la provicion general de Puros, y Cigarros en 
las Administraciones, y Estancos del V irreynato, fueron progresivamente 
minorando los Consumos ... La principal razón en que esto estriva ... es, la 
de que adoptado el sistema de la venta en ram a, el Tavaco por su natural 
constitución del mazo, no puede dividirse en quartillos y octabos de Real, que 
es la M oneda, ó quota con que regularm ente se abastecen los consumidores 
Pobres, cuyo núm ero es crecido; sucediendo lo contrario con el Labrado, pues 
de cada Mazo de Tavaco resultan un  mil, y mas cigarritos, que admiten una 
divición y subdivición muy lata, proporcionada á esa especie de consumo: De 
que se sigue por una  ilusión forzosa la minoración de ventas en los Pueblos, 
Haziendas, y Tambos de lo interior del Virreynato (atendida la dificultad de 
poderse provéer bajo de aquel método) cuyos consumos reunidos, son de no 
poca consideración en la extensión vasta de esta R en ta .73
Esta básica contradicción entre las afirmaciones vertidas en el decreto y 
el análisis efectuado por la Dirección General es difícil de resolver. 
Parece, sin embargo, que los cigarreros privados jugaron un rol impor­
tante en la decisión de cerrar las fábricas. La relativamente baja  canti­
dad de operarios que laboraban en la fábricas indicaría que sólo una 
pequeña parte de los fabricantes particulares de cigarros y puros pudie­
ron ser absorbidos hacia las fábricas reales. Ello provocaría descontento. 
Com o lo indicaba Hipólito U nánue,
en el hecho de reservarse a la Real renta la fábrica de cigarros, quedaba sin 
recurso para subsistir el gran núm ero de familias que se alim entaba labrán­
dolos ... V iniendo hechos de Europa desde el zapato a la gorra, queda muy 
corto espacio a  los peruleros para el ejercicio de las artes mecánicas. El tabaco 
alim entaba entonces a  un número crecido de familias, no sólo en Lim a, sino 
en todo el reino. El indigente padre de fam ilia ocurría a la tercena, y a costa 
de un  corto precio, conseguía un buen mazo. Lo reducía a cigarros ayudados 
de sus hijos, y en su venta y corta ganancia encontraban el medio seguro de 
subsistir.74
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La fuerza de presión de los cigarreros en Lim a y en ’’todo el reino” 
tam bién queda m anifestada en reacciones posteriores, cuando para 
compensar la baja  del consumo por la abolición de las fábricas se 
aum entó el precio de la libra de tabaco de ocho a nueve reales. Al 
cotejar las ventas efectuadas antes y después del aum ento del precio, la 
mism a Dirección G eneral constataba que el resultado era ’’venderse aora 
mas caro, y ganarse m enos.”75 Al respecto se indicaba:
Este es un  contraste que tiene sus causas, y principios conocidos, que acaso se 
ocultarían a los Autores del proyecto, por falta de los devidos conocimientos 
en este vasto mecanismo. Varios son los que pudieran señalarse, pero entre 
ellos, el mas poderoso és, el que respecta a la Docis de Tavaco que los ciga­
rreros abastecedores im bierten en sus M anufacturas la qual, haviéndola estos 
minorados en proporción á el aum ento que se hizo en el precio del Tavaco, el 
resultado há sido, consumirse menos cantidades, que aquellas que se con­
sum ían quando el Tavaco se vendía á ocho Reales; y como aora se vende 
menos, aunque el Tavaco balga mas, nunca parece el aum ento que se havia 
calculado. De esto hay una  prueba bien reciente en la repulsa que sobre este 
mismo Capitulo acaban de hacer los cigarreros: Pues, haviéndoseles querido 
obligár a que imbiertesen en sus M anufacturas, aquella Docis de Tavaco que 
la R enta im bertia en sus Fábricas extinguidas (llebándose en esto la m ira de 
lográr mayor consumo, y de consiguiente, el aum ento de utilidades que se 
solicitaba) los cigarreros lo han resistido vigorosamente fundados en la altera­
ción del precio del Tavaco, que les deja muy pocos ensanches comprándole á 
nueve Reales, para proveer al Público en Labrado aun con quatro onzas de 
rebaja en cada mano, respecto de la quota de las Fábricas.76
A fin de m antener su nivel de ingresos, los cigarreros compensaron el 
alza del precio del tabaco proporcionado por las administraciones reba­
jando el peso el la fabricación de puros y cigarros. Así se m antenía el 
núm ero de unidades vendidas al por menor, pero disminuía el tabaco 
comprado a las administraciones, es decir, el volumen del consumo total 
del tabaco. Los cigarreros no pudieron ser obligados a proporcionar 
cigarros y puros con el mismo peso establecido para  las fábricas extin­
guidas. Sin admitirlo expresamente, el estado colonial tuvo que aceptar la 
respuesta de los cigarreros y la baja  de sus ingresos procedentes de la 
venta de tabaco.
Aunque a una escala bastante menos im portante, entonces, tam bién 
en los centros urbanos, en los que existieron fabricantes particulares de 
cigarros y puros, el estado colonial tuvo que ceder ante las presiones del 
grupo interesado. Tanto los sucesos descritos en Chachapoyas, como la 
resistencia de los cigarreros documentan la debilidad del monopolio, su 
dependencia frente a las fuerzas que crea con su presencia y los vaivenes
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de su política tabacalera.
Fin del final
De acuerdo a lo expuesto, hubo una serie de intereses bien funda­
mentados y asentados de características muy específicas y en buena 
m edida regional y ocupacionalmente contradictórias que impidieron que 
la eficacia de un buen pensado sistema de reformas encontrara la viabi­
lidad deseada. Esto parece haber sido la razón esencial de fluctuantes 
niveles de productividad y de consumo.
En el ámbito rural los cosecheros se vieron expuestos a típicas 
extorsiones coloniales, sin que los administradores del aparato tabacalero 
estuvieran en condiciones o quisieran im plem entar a cabalidad los 
dispositivos reales. Los cosecheros y en parte tam bién los arrieros fueron 
víctimas de repartos, las comunidades indígenas fueron incluidas a las 
labores del monopolio por las vías de la mita y el tributo. El estado 
colonial no logró crear las bases de una economía monetarizada en su 
esfera de acción. Los capitales proporcionados por la R enta de Tabacos 
agrandaron los márgenes del capital comercial privado, y los propios 
empleados de las fábricas sucumbieron ante la tentación de un enrique­
cimiento más rápido via el comercio y aprovechando su presencia ’ofi­
cial’ en la zona productora. La corrupción y el contrabatido anim aron 
rutas y productos comerciales que estaban al margen del tabaco, pero 
que pudieron existir gracias a la existencia del monopolio y su infra­
estructura. El afianzam iento de estos intereses demostraría la debilidad 
del estado colonial para perfeccionar el monopolio, pero por otra parte 
tam bién tenía una base de acción segura e incluso la capacidad de 
aum entar al interior de ciertos márgenes sus niveles de ingreso, gracias a 
la creación de fuertes intereses locales privados.
En el ámbito urbano, donde existieron las fábricas y se concentraba 
la m ayor parte de los cigarreros, el estado colonial tampoco pudo, a 
pesar de su cercanía geográfica, im poner sus expectativas en la produc­
ción de los cigarros y puros. Si en el ámbito rural fueron las élites (como 
se ha tratado de dem ostrar, con pretensiones muy concretas y no coin­
cidentes), quienes actuaron en contra de la consolidación de un eficiente 
monopolio tabacalero, en el gremio de cosecheros y en el grupo de los 
cigarreros el estado colonial encontró una resistencia que no pudo que­
brar.
La existencia del monopolio garantizaba un flujo perm anente de 
dinero via sueldos, pagos a los cosecheros y arrieros del cual se derivaban
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otras fuentes de ingresos. El monopolio al asentar con contratas a los 
cosecheros los fijó geográficamente permitiendo que los repartos forzados 
se realizaron con cierta regularidad; lo mismo sucedía con los arrierqs. 
C ontaban los agentes de este supra -  circuito de comercio con las insta­
laciones del estanco y hasta con los agentes (los guarda veedores) para 
obligar a  arrieros y cosecheros a adm itir los repartos. Por otra parte, las 
comunidades circundantes tenian un mercado para sus productos, esen­
cialmente víveres, entregados tanto a la población urbana en C hacha­
poyas como a los cosecheros. Sus tributos los pagaban en form a de lonas 
y cueros al subdelegado respectivo.
A pesar, entonces, del cortapisas, puesto a las gestiones del estado 
colonial para im plem entar su política monopolista, la región en sí vivía 
de la existencia del monopolio. Las anotaciones del viajero inglés Lister 
en 1826, hechas a raíz de conversaciones con el entonces Intendente de 
Chachapoyas parece confirm ar estas afirmaciones:
Comimos nuevam ente con el Intendente, quien entonces nos mostró el censo 
y los tributos de los habitantes de la provincia. Las cifras acusaban 5.083 
mujeres y 5.093 hombres. El tributo pagado por los blancos [!] (personas que 
tienen parte de sangre europea) era 4.426 pesos anuales; y por los indios, 
8.708 pesos. Este impuesto era, según entendí, de naturaleza personal y 
variaba de acuerdo con el lugar en que se vivía.
El Intendente nos informó que la población de la provincia de Chacha­
poyas habia ... llegado a los veinte mil. La disminución se debía al cambio 
experimentado por el tabaco. Antes de la revolución el comercio de tabaco era 
monopolio del gobierno y como el tabaco se produce hacia la región oriental 
de Chachapoyas, algunas personas, entre las que estaba el actual Intendente, 
fueron nombradas para hacer las compras y llevarlas hacia la costa. Estas 
personas recibían considerables salarios y el trabajo pagado en pesos, al 
cambio, por el gobierno, en grandes sumas o por lo menos comparativamente 
grandes, había entrado entonces en circulación. C uando cesó el monopolio, se 
produjo una  paralización temporal, y varias familias afectadas abandonaron 
el distrito. El Intendente era tam bién de opinión que la dem anda sim ultánea 
de reclutas habia producido un dañino efecto. Dijo que desde el comienzo de 
la revolución, 1.800 hombres se habían  ido de la provincia como s o l d a d o s . 77
Igualm ente im portante que el suministro de sueldos y asignaciones 
gracias a la existencia del monopolio y el reclutaje de hom bres para el 
ejército, fue el hecho de que ante la inseguridad política creada por las 
convulsiones a partir de 1812, los indios que hasta entonces habían 
coadyuvado a activar el comercio (sobre todo de zarzaparrilla, y cera de 
abejas) desde el interior de la m ontaña hasta Pasco, dejaron de hacerlo
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por tem or ante la presencia de los soldados españoles enviados a 
Pebas.78 En parte, con esta actitud, se interrum pía el circuito com er­
cial paralelo a la producción tabacalera. Posteriormente hacia 1819 y 
1820 ”el vicioso sistema de rentas” y los impuestos al añil y las cascarillas 
”a la buelta de poco tiempo” causaron ”la ruina del comercio y la agri­
cultura.”79
Sobre estas bases debilitadas sustancialmente, el contrabando maríti­
mo con tabacos de V irginia desembarcado en las costas pudo sin pro­
blemas cubrir el consumo en territorio todavía colonial.80
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C O M E N T A R IO
Horst Pietsch maim
El estudio del fisco colonial, de su organización, impacto económico y 
social y de sus rendimientos es un campo bastante descuidado por la 
historia colonial hispanoam ericana. D urante muchos años solo apare­
cieron estudios de tipo institucional y alguno que otro cuantitativo sobre 
algunas de las rentas reales en determ inadas regiones y épocas. Recién 
en los últimos años se ha dado un gran paso en adelante con la publi­
cación de las series de la contaduría fiscal en las distintas unidades 
administrativas coloniales que proporcionaron H erbert S. Klein y John  
J .  T ePaske.1 A pesar de este gran progreso queda mucho por hacer, 
tanto bajo una perspectiva general como en el campo de rentas indivi­
duales.
Vale esto tam bién para el monopolio estatal del tabaco que por su 
parte ha sido estudiado desde los años cincuenta en algunos análisis 
regionales y de tem ática parcial. Al igual que otras rentas como los 
diezmos de oro y plata, alcabalas, diezmos eclesiásticos, el estanco del 
tabaco no sólo fue una de las entradas de m ayor im portancia para  la 
corona, sino tam bién tuvo repercusiones económicas e incluso sociales de 
gran transcendencia. Efectivamente el cultivo del tabaco, su elaboración, 
venta y consumo afectaron a muchas regiones del imperio colonial 
hispanoamericano y ocuparon al parecer a una porción considerable de la 
población. M onografías históricas sobre la historia del tabaco en las 
principales regiones productoras y consumidoras constituirían por lo tanto 
un im portante sector en la reconstrucción histórica de la economía y 
sociedad hispanoam ericana. Sin em bargo, hasta la fecha todos los estu­
dios parciales sobre el tabaco se limitan a la época en la cual este pro­
ducto estuvo estancado como monopolio estatal y omiten el rastreo de la 
historia del tabaco en sus fases pre -  y postmonopólicas -  sin que los 
dos estudios que vamos a com entar constituyan una excepción. Esto se 
explica por el hecho de que la existencia del monopolio proporciona un 
cuerpo considerable de fuentes producidas por las administraciones esta­
tales y por lo tanto de fácil localización en los archivos, mientras que el 
estudio del tabaco en el período en que no estuvo estancado resulta 
mucho mas difícil por lo disperso de las fuentes para estas épocas. Con 
todo hay que destacar que la concentración de los estudios existentes a la
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época del monopolio no sólo constituye una lam entable limitación de la 
tem ática, sino que incluso impide una verdadera evaluación del mono­
polio mismo. H ay que adm itir que mientras carezcamos de conocimientos 
sobre la economía del tabaco en las épocas en que 110 estuvo estancado 
este producto, careceremos tam bién de puntos de comparación que nos 
ilustren el impacto del monopolio en la economía del tabaco.
Los trabajos de Susan Deans -  Smith y Christine H ünefeldt tampoco 
escapan a esta problemática. H abría sido por falta de espacio y el 
carácter algo tentativo de estos ensayos que ambas autoras desgraciada­
mente no nos presentan una introducción sistemática al estado de la 
cuestión en la literatura, tanto más grave en el caso de Susan D eans- 
Smith, ya que ella mism a cita dos estudios anteriores que tra tan  de 
temas que ella misma abarca en su articulo (véase su nota 2). Con todo 
hay una diferencia interesante en la aproximación al tem a por parte de 
las autoras. M ientras Deans -  Smith al citar al principio el párrafo  de 
John  Fisher sobre el caracter de las reform as borbónicas conecta su tem a 
con la discusión sobre si las reform as borbónicas respondieron a un plan 
prem editado y homogéneo de modernización o no, Hünefeldt sitúa su 
tem a, a lo menos de form a implícita, en el contexto de la discusión sobre 
la capacidad extractora del estado español frente a sus colonias. Estos 
dos enfoques distintos responden a dos líneas de interpretación muy 
difundidas últim am ente y que se entrecruzan y parcialm ente se enfrentan 
en la evaluación histórica de las reform as del siglo X V III.
Todavía no queda claro si las reform as del siglo X V III respondieron 
más bien a un plan colonialista que pretendía aum entar los beneficios en 
favor de España o si prevaleció la idea de modernización colonial como 
insinúa John  Fisher, o si, como tercera posibilidad, ambos intentos se 
mezclaron prem editadam ente para lograr una m ayor extracción econó­
mica mediante una modernización. En este contexto hay que apuntar a 
un gran vacío en la historiografía sobre el siglo X V I11 hispanoam erica­
no. Este vacío consiste en el hecho de que todavía carecemos de un 
estudio detallado de la política m etropolitana frente a sus colonias. La 
enorm e mayoría de los estudios sobre las reform as borbónicas, partiendo 
de un breve repaso de las corrientes reformistas, pasa directam ente a 
estudiar las consecuencias de las reform as en América. Sin em bargo no 
disponemos de estudios profundos de las distintas corrientes políticas en 
la Corte y su postura frente a América, quizás con la excepción del 
cambio de postura que se efectuó en el seno del Consejo de Indias en la 
segunda mitad de la centuria. No obstante, tanto en el campo del a rb i- 
trismo contem poráneo como en la postura de las principales figuras
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políticas de la época se reflejan actitudes diferentes y a  veces casi 
diam etralm ente opuestas que se pueden captar cuando los principales 
estadistas dan su dictamen sobre problemas políticos en América. Pién­
sese sólo en personajes con posturas tan distintas como A randa, M úzquiz 
y Piedras Albas en los dictámenes sobre la introducción de las inten­
dencias en América. Así que la falta de claridad en torno a este proble­
ma que lam enta John  Fisher en la cita que trac a colación Susan 
D e a n s -S m ith , se debe en gran parte a la falta de una investigación 
profunda de los policy -  makers en España.
M e parece francam ente dudoso que el pretendido reformismo de 
Carlos III responde a un plan homogéneo de reform as. M ás bien pare­
cen entrecruzarse en aquella época dos corrientes reformistas: la prim era 
arranca ya con la época de Felipe V  y está caracterizada por una mar­
cada postura mercantilista que tiene como meta principal el aum ento de 
los provechos de España tanto en el aspecto económico en general como 
en m ateria fiscal. La segunda corriente, que em pieza a surgir durante el 
reinado de Carlos III y que está caracterizada por ideas protoliberales, a 
lo menos en asuntos económicos y en política indigenista, pretendiendo 
mediante una modernización colonial estrechar los vínculos entre América 
y España. Personajes como Campillo, Ensenada, Esquilache, Gálvez y 
M úzquiz representarían en España la prim era corriente. M ientras que 
A randa, en cierta medida Floridabianca y Godoy y, en el caso concreto 
de la Nueva España, el Fiscal Posadas, los intendentes Flon, Riaño y 
Bonavía y en parte tam bién el V irrey Revilla Gigcdo II responden a la 
segunda corriente. Frente a estos grupos se mantiene una tercera postura 
que por el mismo tem or de poner en peligro el imperio español prefiere 
aferrarse al status quo y se opone a las reform as, como por ejemplo 
A rriaga, Piedras Albas (presidente del Consejo de Indias), el Virrey 
Bucareli, y más tarde los M inistros Valdés y Porlier. Si este esquem a 
podría comprobarse mediante una investigación más a fondo de lo que se 
ha hecho hasta ahora, habría que conectar el establecimiento del 
monopolio del tabaco con la corriente mercantilista de los reform adores, 
tanto más teniendo en cuenta que se habia ordenado la rem esa íntegra de 
los beneficios de la renta de tabaco a la Península. El simple hecho que 
el establecimiento del monopolio del tabaco en H ispanoam érica se 
desarrolla entre 1717 y 1778 dem uestra, a mi modo de ver, que 
Deans -  Smith se equivoca al relacionar el fenómeno con las reform as de 
Carlos III, puesto que en esta época las otras potencias europeas ya 
habían empezado una política antimonopolista, como se ve por ejem plo 
en la supresión paulatina de las compañías negreras privilegiadas.
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Pasando finalm ente a la crítica de los dos trabajos que anteceden, 
hay que resaltar que Susan Deans -  Smith recién elaboró una tesis 
doctoral sobre el monopolio en N ueva España en base a un estudio 
sistemático de las fuentes. Asi el lector puede sospechar que las limita­
ciones que la autora ha impuesto a su trabajo  deben de relacionarse de 
alguna form a con el plan de la tesis. Si ella quería ceñirse al estudio del 
grupo de productores de tabaco y de los cigarreros, hubiera sido conve­
niente que efectivam ente se hubiera limitado a estos aspectos omitiendo 
las partes cuantitativas que presenta en los primeros dos gráficos y 
tablas. Estas series cuantitativas, si bien constituyen un aporte nuevo, no 
contribuyen a m ejorar la información del lector, si carecen de una dis­
cusión detenida. Así, por ejem plo, resulta problemático proceder a la 
deflación de los ingresos, costos y ganancias con un índice de precios de 
maíz, elaborado en base a la alhóndiga de México. Esto sobre todo 
porque no se sabe hasta donde las curvas de Florescano son representa­
tivas para  Nueva España, en segundo lugar porque ni la serie de precios 
de Florescano ni la serie de Deans -  Smith tom an en cuenta la deva­
luación m onetaria de 1773 y en tercer lugar porque el maíz es un pro­
ducto de consumo sobre todo de los indios y de las clases pobres de la 
sociedad y es dudoso que este grupo de la sociedad se constituyera en el 
principal consumidor del tabaco. Finalmente, como las ganancias líquidas 
del monopolio se transfirieron a España, no tiene mucho sentido una 
operación deflacionadora utilizando precios novohispanos. Para el renglón 
de las ganancias hubiera sido m ejor utilizar para  la deflación un índice 
de precios españoles.
A parte de esto ni las cifras ni las curvas ilustran mucho al lector sin 
que se discutan detalladam ente los altos y bajos de las series. U no des­
conoce los detalles de la estructura de los costos, en que porcentaje los 
costos responden al pago de las cosechas, al costo de la elaboración y del 
expendio; ¿porque la curva de costos va tan estrecham ente paralela a la 
de los ingresos totales? T am bién el ’’T able II” deja al lector con duda 
que quiere decir ’’domestically produced.” ¿Se refiere al hecho de que 
estos productos son novohispanos en contraposición con los ’’H avanna 
cigars” o son más bien productos de fabricación casera provenientes del 
tabaco bruto que se expendió (vease renglón 2 de la estadística)? El texto 
no aclara estas dudas y si bien parece insistir en que la fabricación de 
cigarros se efectuó sólo en las fábricas reales, esto no corresponde al 
hecho de la venta de una gran porción de tabaco en hoja. Además 
hubiera sido interesante que la autora hubiera utilizado sus datos cuan­
titativos para un intento sem ejante al de Alvaro ja r a  en su ’’Plata y
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pulque," publicado hace años en los "Working Papers” de Cam bridge. 
Al igual que el pulque, el tabaco, tam bién una especie de narcótico como 
aquél, por lo visto se consume en cantidades crecientes a lo largo de la 
segunda mitad del siglo y hubiera sido interesante paralelizar consumo de 
narcóticos y coyuntura. Pero tal vez la tesis de Susan Deans -  Smith está 
respondiendo ya a estos interrogantes.
En cuanto al trabajo  de Christine H ünefeldt hay que destacar ante 
todo que tampoco resulta claro el porqué de la limitación del estudio a la 
provincia de Chachapoyas, habiendo otras regiones peruanas producto­
ras de tabaco, y si bien estas otras regiones, corno Saña, sirvieron para 
abastecer a Chile, como afirm a la autora, su intento de correlacionar la 
producción y el transporte del tabaco con los intereses económicos 
regionales dentro del Perú no justifica la omisión el estudio de las otras 
regiones. Si la autora hubiese tenido la oportunidad de revisar los fondos 
del Archivo General de Indias en Sevilla, hubiera encontrado material 
permitiéndole la reconstrucción cuantitativa, que con las fuentes al acceso 
de ella tenia que quedarse muy parcial y con grandes vacíos, que ponen 
en duda las cifras en los cuadros presentados. T am bién le hubiera 
ayudado a la autora una bibliografía más completa, utilizando varias 
colecciones documentales que traen m aterial sobre el tabaco, tanto como 
obras sobre la historia económica del Perú — solo quiero hacer referen­
cia al algunos trabajos de Pablo M acera. Estas limitaciones originan que 
el lector queda con muchas interrogantes tanto sobre el doble circuito 
comercial que la autora construye alrededor del tabaco de Chachapoyas 
como sobre los intereses de las élites (y sobre determ inar quienes eran 
estas élites, de las cuales habla). De esta form a tam bién quedan dudosas 
algunas de las conclusiones generales de la autora. T anto  los cosecheros, 
como los arrieros, hacendados, comerciantes y las varias veces aludidas 
élites quedan en una luz muy tibia como igualmente queda todo el 
mecanismo económico que se describe. C uando H ünefeldt se dedica a 
relatar las posturas de H uánuco y Cuzco, mencionando de paso las 
regiones que abastecen estos centros de consumo de tabaco, ella indirec­
tam ente anula el sustento de su planteam iento inicial en términos de 
concentrarse exclusivamente en el estudio de C hachapoyas y es que 
resulta que Chachapoyas sólo fue una provincia productora entre varias 
otras que intervinieron en el comercio de tabaco en el Perú. Así el lector 
se pregunta qué papel podrían haber jugado en el comercio tabacalero 
la s  otras regiones que tangencialm ente se mencionan. De esta form a 
queda pendiente el problem a central que plantea, o sea como se puede 
explicar el escaso éxito del monopolio tabacalero peruano. En sum a hay
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que decir que el intento de la autora de enfocar el monopolio del tabaco 
dentro del conjunto económico es metodológicamente el camino acertado, 
pero por la escasez de materiales utilizados y por la limitación regional 
inicialmente impuesta y luego inconcientemente abandonada este intento 
parece quedarse en medio camino.
Los dos trabajos son difíciles de com parar por su enfoque diferente y 
por sus limitaciones temáticas. Con todo transluce una diferencia 
fundam ental y es que el monopolio en Nueva España al parecer tuvo un 
éxito desde el punto de vista de la corona, mientras que en el Perú sólo 
logró un éxito parcial y precario. La razón principal para esta diferencia 
podría ser el hecho que en N ueva España se logró el establecimiento del 
monopolio de fabricación de cigarros y puros mientras que en el Perú la 
elaboración del tabaco quedó, con excepción de un breve lapso de tiem­
po, en manos de los privados. C laro que esto no se puede afirm ar con 
seguridad porque no sabemos que aportó la elaboración del tabaco a las 
ganancias líquidas, ya que ni las series parciales de H ünefeldt, ni las 
series completas de Deans -  Smith perm iten una desagregación de 
ingresos que estipule el aporte del tabaco en hoja por un lado y de los 
cigarros y puros por el otro. Pero aunque esta afirm ación sea cierta, 
quedaría por aclarar satisfactoriamente las causas de esta diferencia entre 
el Perú y Nueva España. T al vez esto tiene que ver con la mayor 
ingerencia en el comercio tabacalero del sector indígena y de las capas 
bajas de la población rural en el Perú, grupos, que al fin y al cabo, eran 
m uy inclinados a rebelión, como sugiere Christine Hünefeldt, mientras 
que en Nueva España el comercio y la elaboración del tabaco estuvieron 
más bien en manos de las poblaciones urbanas antes del estancamiento. 
Sea esto como sea, lo que la problem ática incide en señalar es la nece­
sidad de avanzar en el conocimiento de la economía tabacalera en el 
período previo a su estancamiento por parte de la corona, como ya 
indicamos con anterioridad.
O tro detalle común entre ambos estudios se detecta en el hecho que 
tanto los cosecheros en Nueva España como los del Perú necesitaban 
crédito para financiar la producción. En Nueva España este anticipo o 
avío se realizó en form a de pagos en efectivo, en el Perú en cambio 
parece que los funcionarios del monopolio em plearon el dinero destinado 
a este fin para  hacer sus propios negocios, facilitando a los cosecheros 
ropa y otros géneros. Es por este motivo que Hünefeldt incluye en el 
caso peruano este adelanto no bajo el rubro de avío, como lo hace 
Deans -  Smith para M éxico, sino bajo la denominación de "reparto de 
géneros.” Com o los cosecheros peruanos, por lo que trasluce del trabajo
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de Christine H ünefeldt, no eran indios, esto significaría que en el Perú 
los repartos no eran destinados sólo a la población indígena, sino que 
tam bién otros grupos de la población tuvieron que acceder a este tipo de 
comercio. C abría  la pregunta si en el caso peruano los cosecheros acce­
dieron voluntariam ente a este sistema de adelanto de pago -  quizás para 
em plear estos géneros como pago de sus operarios -  , o si los cose­
cheros peruanos no pudieron defenderse frente a la presión de las auto­
ridades. O tra  vez resulta necesario saber más sobre quienes fueron estos 
cosecheros en el Perú, como ya se señaló, para opinar m ejor sobre este 
aspecto. En todo caso parece que sobre el problema de los repartos o 
repartimientos de géneros aún no está dicho la última palabra, a pesar 
de la serie de trabajos que en la última década y media se publicaron 
sobre el tem a. H ay que tener en cuenta que o avío y reparto tienen
mucho más en común de lo que muchos autores admiten -  no consti­
tuyendo solamente un comercio forzado y abusivo -  , o el mecanismo 
tiene un significado muy distinto en Nueva España y en el Perú. Para 
esto no hay que olvidar que en N ueva España por lo menos gran parte 
de los repartos hechos a los indios fueron tam bién en dinero en efectivo 
-  al igual que el adelanto hecho a los cosecheros de tabaco, de los 
cuales, según Deans -  Smith, algunos pertenecieron a una élite local -  , 
como en el caso de los productores indios de grana cochenilla en Oaxaca. 
C abría  la pregunta, que ya he planteado en varios trabajos anteriores, 
si no sería m ejor explicar los repartos y repartimientos en términos 
económicos -  por ejem plo integración, tal vez forzada, de grupos
marginados en una economía de mercado supraregional -  en vez de
insistir únicam ente en el aspecto de abuso y explotación.
Finalmente me parece conveniente insistir un poco más en el pro­
blem a planteado por Susan Deans -  Smith sobre si el establecimiento de 
las fábricas de tabaco significó una especie de industrialización inducida 
por el estado. Es cierto que el trabajo  en las fábricaB novohispanas siguió 
siendo un trabajo  m anual. Con todo recuerdo haber visto en el Archivo 
G eneral de Indias uno que otro expediente que propuso el empleo de 
m aquinaria en la elaboración del tabaco, proyectos que parecen haberse 
frustrados. M e parece que el establecimiento de las fábricas significó un 
método nuevo en la organización del trabajo  que tal vez podría califi­
carse de proto -  industrial y que habría que com parar con el surgimiento 
de los obrajes textiles que en épocas anteriores habían surgido en com­
petencia con la producción casera de textiles tal como estaba muy 
difundida entre la población indígena. En este contexto es de notar que 
los obrajes, en Nueva España a lo menos, estuvieron concentrados más
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bien en regiones en donde desde el siglo X V II ya no había fabricación 
indígena casera de textiles -  como en Puebla y  el Bajío -  m ientras que 
en O axaca y Y ucatán había, a lo largo del siglo X V III, pocos obrajes y 
sí una fabricación casera de textiles muy im portante. En todo caso 
habría  que estudiar el surgimiento de nuevas técnicas y métodos de 
producción en conjunto bajo el aspecto de la llam ada proto -  industria­
lización, enfoque tan fértil en la historia económica europea. Bajo esta 
perspectiva fenómenos como la difusión de obrajes, las fábricas de 
tabaco, incluso los repartos de géneros (una especie de Verlagssystem ) y 
ciertas form as de la organización de la producción agraria en función de 
la proximidad al mercado (por ejem plo la aplicación de los principios de 
von T hünen) podrían, previo estudio sistemático, claro está, interpretarse 
como form as de racionalización de la producción en el contexto de la 
proto -  industrialización europea.^ Estudios de esta linea constituirían 
quizás aportes que perm itirían sacar conclusiones mas concretas sobre los 
orígenes históricos del llamado subdesarrollo latinoam ericano en el 
campo de la economía. Aún sin ir tan lejos tales estudios podrían aclarar 
la problem ática central en torno a los dos trabajos comentados y en 
torno al tem a general de este volumen. Es decir, responder a la pregunta 
sobre si el monopolio del tabaco tenía m ayor éxito en N ueva España 
que en el Perú o porque la economía novohispana estuvo más avanzada 
que la peruana o porque la autoridad regia estuvo más firm em ente 
establecida en Nueva España que en el Perú.
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